Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Jabhat al-Nuṣrah in Lebanon — “A Second Martyrdom Operation Upon the Stronghold of Ḥizb Irān in the Hermel”
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To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]
NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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Faylak Wa’ad al-Sadiq: The Repackaging of an Iraqi “Special Group” for Syria
By Phillip Smyth
Figure 1: Faylak Wa’ad al-Sadiq’s logo. The top line reads: “The Islamic Resistance in Iraq” (“Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya fi al-Iraq”). The bottom says, “The Truthful Promise Corps” (“Faylaq al-Wa’ad al-Sadiq”). The logo features the map of Iraq in the center with a blackened figure holding an RPG-7.
Officially known as Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya fi al-Iraq-Faylaq al-Wa’ad al-Sadiq or The Islamic Resistance in Iraq-The Truthful Promise Corps (FWS), this organization has made some waves in Arabic-language media following the discovery of some of its images on social media networks.[1] Led by a Secretary General, FWS’s current leader is Iraqi Shia Sheikh Abu ‘Ammar al-Tamimi (A.K.A. Shiekh ‘Ammar). The organization also claims to be based in the holy city of Najaf, Iraq. It is clear from assessing the trajectory of public statements and their social media presence that the FWS appears to be increasing its public presence in an effort to establish the belief there are further organized Shia Islamist force deployments in Syria.
The group’s name references Lebanese Hizballah’s Secretary General’s long-standing goal to kidnap Israeli soldiers. This “promise” came to fruition in July 2006, when fighters from Lebanese Hizballah attacked an Israeli military convoy and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers and killed three. The attack spurred what would turn into the more than a month long 2006 Hizballah-Israel War.[2]
It is unclear whether it was created immediately following the 2006 Hizballah-Israel War or if it was established later in 2010-2011.
Reportedly, the FWS was first established to “fight the U.S. occupation of Iraq and the collaborators [associated with it]”.[3] In January 2012, FWS claimed it had no interest in running for elections or becoming part of the Iraqi government.[4] In August 2012, the FWS’s spokesperson Sheikh ‘Amr al-Lami, claimed the group changed paths and stated it would instead focus on civil projects. One year later, the organization claimed to have sent its first fighters (from a “military wing”) to Syria in order to, “defend shrines”.[5] “Shrine defense” has been the most prevalent narrative used by Iranian-backed Shia Islamist fighting groups which have deployed to Syria.
The group also made its first video and a group musical anthem public in January 2014. Though it appears to have been uploaded in February 2012. It is possible FWS uploaded the clip many months ago, then made it “private”, only to re-release it as part of a ramping-up of their public image. In the short clip, the FWS-subgroup which claims the attack is called Kata’ib Musa al-Khadhim-Sariyya ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir (The Musa al-Khadhim Brigade-‘Ammar Ibn Yasir Unit). Musa al-Khadhim references the seventh Imam in Twelver Shia Islam.[6] The targeted vehicle in the clip appears to be a U.S. armored HMMWV. [7] The naming of subdivisions after imams is a common form utilized by Iranian-backed Iraqi special groups.[8]
Little was known about the organization during the Iraq War (2003) and it had few announcements. The group also claimed to have its own webpage (since 2011). However, when the page is visited, it does not load.[9] Instead, with public appearances and statements by its leadership, it seems that since the summer of 2013, FWS has been dusted-off and repurposed for a new mission in Syria. September 2013 saw FWS start its initial postings on social media pages it had done little with since opening them in 2011.
This may indicate that the FWS was little more than a front-type group during the Iraq War (2003) which may now field rebranded fighters from other groups for the fight in Syria. In turn, this helps create perception of broader Iraqi Shia support for the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih and of this ideological grouping’s war in Syria. Comments on the page largely praised the leadership of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. This mirrors newly created front groups such as Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba (or Harakat al-Nujaba), which fields fighters from Kata’ib Hizballah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), has a leader from AAH’s ranks, yet is cast as independent organization. Photos of fighters from Harakat al-Nujaba front militias in Syria and those from Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq have found a presence on FWS’s Facebook page and adjoining profiles.
In addition to the organization’s name and links to other Iraqi Shia “special groups”, another element further cementing its relationship with Iran and its proxy militant groups, was the group claiming adherence to the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih. Wilayat al-Faqih, or the Absolute Guardianship by a Jurisprudent is Iran’s form of radical theocratic governing system. In August of 2013, the reported leader of FWS visited Beirut and confirmed his loyalty to the political-religious ideology.[10] The lead jurisprudent, or Wali al-Faqih, who is followed by FWS is Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The organization’s imagery also details their loyalty to Khamenei.
Little is known about FWS’s combat abilities, force size, or deployments. In photos released by the group, it has been shown they have what can be considered a normal small-arms accompaniment, ranging from PKM-type machineguns to Kalashnikov pattern rifles. One important detail about deployments in Syria was that the FWS has only claimed (so far) to have specifically fought in one area, Aleppo. This further helps tie the group to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s Harakat al-Nujaba and their Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir (LAIY). LAIY was the first Iraqi Shia Islamist group to announce they were fighting in Aleppo. The announcement also coincided with the December 2013-January 2014 increase in announced Shia Islamist military activities in Rif Aleppo and the city.
Figure 2: These photos, posted in mid-December, claimed to show an FWS fighter in Aleppo, Syria.
Figure 3: The FWS flag flies on a BMP-1 armored personnel carrier. It is unknown whether this flag was placed on an Iranian, Iraqi, or Syrian BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle.
Figure 4: “ma’rkat al-haq dhud al-batl al-wa’ad sadiq qadm” or the “Battle of truth against falsehood, the truthful promise is coming”.
Figure 5: This photo claims these are Faylak Wa’ad al-Sadiq personnel. However, the photo has been posted by other Shi’a Islamist fighting groups.
Figure 6: Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and Muhammed Muhammed Sadiq Sadr look from the sky down at burned-out U.S. armored vehicles. An Iraqi flag graphic is flows from the lower-right corner.
Figure 7: Another poster featuring Iranian Surpreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and Muhammed Muhammed Sadiq Sadr.
Figure 8: FWS fighters pose in front of a tank.
Figure 9: Uniformed FWS members pose with the group’s flag while flanked by Iraqi flags. Note the FWS patches worn by these 6 members.
Figure 10: The FWS flag.
Figure 11: FWS fighters hold up the group’s flag.
Figure 12: Another piece of FWS symbolism.
UPDATE 1/4/14 9:21 PM: Here is an Arabic transcription of the below video message:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Sirāj al-Dīn Zurayqāt — “About the Raid of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut” (Ar)
___________
—
___________
To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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Deck the Halls with a Minority Alliance: Shia Militia Social Media Messages to Christians
By Phillip Smyth
Figure 1: This photo, purporting to show a Shia banner on a church (possibly in Iraq) has been circulated around as a symbol of Shia-Christian unity and coexistence. The photo has been present on a multitude of Iranian-backed Shia Islamist group Facebook pages.
Minority alliances in the Middle East are hardly a new trend. During the Syrian Civil War there has been deliberate engagement by some minority elements to build more effective political alliances and fighting groups based on minority identification. This has particularly been the case with the mainly Alawite support base for Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad and his system’s relationship with Druze and Christian elements within Syria.[1] The trend of marketing the Syrian leader as both a secularist and as one who will take care of other minority groups has been a major theme in pro-Assad open source media circles.[2]
Nevertheless, Bashar al-Assad’s power bloc is not the only group touting their minority alliance credentials in the face of a mainly Sunni Islamist rebel enemy. In fact, Shia Islamist militias backed by Iran, which are also engaged in fighting these rebels, have also actively attempted to court Christians. These groups have tried to build a minority alliance sentiment with a number of strategically placed photos on their hive-like social media accounts. While this is but one of many different trends found on Shia Islamist militia social media pages, it does play to grander narratives.
Figure 2: A photo showing a man covered in blood from what can be assumed was his own practice of zanjeer zani (Shia self-flagellation using a sword or knife). Note how a crucifix around his neck is circled. Some pro-Shia-militia-in-Syria social media pages have suggested the man is a Christian showing his devotion to historical Shia leader, Husayn. Other pages have used the photo as a symbol of Shia respect for Christians (and vice versa).
Lebanese Hizballah has actively engaged Lebanon’s Christian (primarily Maronite Catholic) community. In 2006 the group became a senior partner with Michel Aoun’s mainly-Christian Free Patriotic Movement in the March 8th Alliance.[3] Lebanese Hizballah has also attempted to court Lebanon’s Christian community in recent years. In 2012 around Christmas, pro-Hizballah writers published pieces touting the group’s outreach to Christians.[4] The group also issued a 2013 Christmas greetings to Christians and held meetings with the community.[5]
Since Shia militia groups in Syria have branded their enemies as al-Qa’ida style extremist “Takfiris”, it allows for continued marketing of Shia group activities as a hard power counter. Many Christians in Syria arrived in the country due to attacks they suffered in Iraq. Other Syrian Christians worry about their presence in the country with ascendant Sunni Islamist extremist groups in the country.
The goal of these photos appears to be less of an attempt to recruit Christian fighters for Shia militia ranks.[6] Instead, they are used to create the image of cross-sectarian unity. This form also pushes a narrative that Christians can not only find protection with Shia Islamist militias, but that these organizations will both respect them and act as viable long term allies. This messaging structure also plays off of earlier themes adopted by many regional Christian groups, namely the fear of being drowned in a “Sunni Sea”.
Figure 3: A photo supposedly showing Christians in Iraq engaging in a Shia pilgrimage. This photo also received many different captions. The main theme behind the captions promoted Christian-Shia brotherhood.
Figure 4: A photograph claiming to show an Iraqi church which had hung Shia banners to help usher in the New Year. This picture started to appear on Shia Islamist militia pages in December 2013. The photo was unclear, but implied it was taken in November during Ras as-Sanah al-Hijriyah (the Islamic New Year). Rebel activists seized upon the photograph, claiming it showed a church being desecrated with Shia flags in Syria.
Figure 5: A picture promoting ‘Syrian unity’ between Shia and Christians. This picture has appeared on a small number of Iraqi Shia-manned militia group Facebook pages.
Figure 6: In April, Shia militia pages claimed this fighter was a “Christian martyred defending the Shrine of Sayyida Sukayna bint Husayn [the Sayyida Ruqayya Mosque]”. Some Shia militia pages referred to him as the “Son of the Virgin Mary”.
Figure 7: A photo showing a Syrian fighters accoutrements. Included are small medallion-like pictures of Lebanese Hizballah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah and a crucifix. It noted in the caption that these items belonged to a Christian soldier named George Elias and that he wore them around his neck.
NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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Khamenei’s Cannon: .50 Caliber Anti-Material Rifles & Shia Fighters in Syria
By Phillip Smyth
Figure 1: Combatants from Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir. The fighter on the left likely holds an Iranian-copy of the HS.50 rifle.
Since April 2013, around the same time Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas was first gaining broader exposure and name-recognition, another sub-trend started to appear in the photos showing Shia Islamist fighters in Syria. This trend remained minor and occasional. However, starting in October, there have been increasing examples of foreign Shia Islamist fighters being pictured with long range bolt-action anti-material rifles.[1]
It is possible these weapons were the bolt-action HS.50, .50 caliber (12.7x99mm) rifles produced by Austria’s Steyr Mannlicher. According to The Telegraph, 800 of the rifles were shipped to Iran in 2007.[2] However, according to the Brown Moses Blog, it is far more probable that these rifles are actually Iranian copies which were shipped to Syria.[3] Since the winter of 2012, pro-Iranian social media has also praised the Iranian-made copy of the rifle.[4] Still, serial numbers on the weapons are often hidden, making absolute confirmation difficult.
The original Steyr Mannlicher sale of these long-range weapons caused worries among British and U.S. policymakers and military personnel due to the fear they would be supplied to Iranian-created and supplied Shi’a Islamist “special groups” in Iraq. These groups included Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hizballah. Both of these organizations are now sending forces to Syria.
Anti-material sniper rifles of this caliber have found a welcome place in Western military services. The U.S. military fields the M107 semi-automatic .50 caliber rifle as do a number of other militaries. In October, 2012 one of these weapons killed a Taliban member in Afghanistan from a distance of 2,475 meters.[5]
Presently in Syria, these types of rifles have been used by both rebels and pro-Assad forces. Nevertheless, the outfitting of highly organized foreign Shia fighter manned organizations may demonstrate a shift in tactics and training.
Groups using the rifle in Syria span the full spectrum of organizations backed by Iran. Lebanese Hizballah has been a primary poster of images with the weapon. Additionally, Iraq-based Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba’s (a front for Kata’ib Hizballah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq) Syria-based front militias, Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir and Liwa’a al-Hamad have posted photos of their militants with the rifle. Iraq’s Badr Organization’s Quwet Shahid Muhammed Baqir Sadr and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada have posted their own images of their fighters with the HS.50 type rifle. Other Shia fighters from unnamed organizations have also been pictured with the weapon.
Films featuring Shia militia groups using the HS. 50 type rifles in combat in Syria have been extremely rare. Usually only photos are posted.
The first film showing Shia Islamist militias in Syria using the rifle was posted to Facebook and YouTube pages associated with the Badr Organization’s Quwet Shahid Baqir Sadr (BOQSBS), the group’s expeditionary unit in Syria. The BOQSBS has also been a main poster of high-quality images showing their combatants wielding these types of anti-material rifles. Around a minute of footage showing BOQSBS fighters using the weapon was inserted into a much longer film made to demonstrate the group’s activities in Syria (see below at minute markers 1:59-2:23).
Due to the high level of operational security employed by these groups, potential failures or successes of the rifle in combat are often not showcased. Operations using the rifle have also not been detailed on the many social media pages run by Iranian-backed Shia militia groups inside Syria. In fact, the rifle has rarely been named or described by Shia Islamist militia pages. Nevertheless, these rifles have become a regular feature in images featuring fallen fighters.
Such a capability, even if deliberately showcased for propaganda purposes, should be taken seriously by regional and global military forces. Iranian equipped and trained snipers, utilizing smaller caliber rifles, demonstrated a lethal efficiency during the Iraq War (2003). Their utilization of smaller caliber-wielding snipers (particularly using the SVD-type rifles) demonstrates a concentration on sniping tactics.
Some Possible Reasons Why the Rifles Are Appearing More
The Rifle & Its Shia Islamist Users
Lebanese Hizballah:
Figure 2: Lebanese Hizballah’s Ali al-Hadi Nuwn shown holding the weapon on his shoulder. (Left)
Figure 3: Another posed-photo of Lebanese Hizballah’s Ali al-Hadi Nuwn. In this picture he is taking aim with the .50 caliber rifle. (Right)
Figure 4: Hizballah commander Ja’afar Husayn Hashim with the rifle. He was reported to have been killed in Syria on November 1, 2013.
Figure 5: Hizballah’s Khadr Ahmed Matar, declared killed in Syria on December 2
0, is shown standing in the snow with the rifle.
Figure 6: Qasim Ghamloush is shown holding the .50 caliber rifle. His death was announced by Hizballah on December 7, 2013.
Figure 7: Ali Husayn Salah (A.K.A. Sheikh Hadi) is seen holding the rifle over his Kalashnikov-pattern weapon. Salah was also reported to have been killed in Syria on December 7, 2013.
Liwa’a al-Hamad:
Figure 8: An October photo of a fighter from Liwa’a al-Hamad taking aim with the HS.50-type rifle.
The Badr Organization – Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir Sadr
Figure 9: Following the announcement that the Badr Organization had created its own expeditionary force for Syria, this was one of the first photos they posted online.
Figure 10: A Badr Organization-Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr is shown holding the HS. 50 type rifle.
Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir:
Figure 11: A commander from Liwa’a Ammar Ibn Yasir is seen holding the .50 caliber rifle.
Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada:
Fighters from Other Groups:
Figure 12: The Shia militia effort’s “first African martyr” (Muhammed Suleiman al-Kuwni) is shown holding the rifle.
Figure 13: A fighter from an unnamed Shia Islamist militia (likely Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir) take aim with his rifle.
Figure 14: Alla’ Ibrahim (possibly from Liwa’a Zulfiqar), an Iraqi Shi’a fighter buried on November 30, 2013 holds the rifle over his shoulder.
Figure 15: An edited shot of Alla’ Ibrahim shows him posting with the rifle.
Figure 16: A Shia fighter from an unnamed militia group is shown with the HS. 50-type rifle.
[1] The Oryx Blog has an excellent post on HS. 50-type rifles in Syria: https://spioenkop.blogspot.com/2013/04/syria-and-her-hs50s.html. The post is from April 27, 2013 and pictures of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas members with the rifle.
[2] See: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1542559/Iraqi-insurgents-using-Austrian-rifles-from-Iran.html
[3] See: https://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/04/anti-material-rifles-in-syria.html. See also: https://www.thefirearmblog.com/blog/2012/07/16/mysterious-iranian-50-cals-part-3/. This post by The Firearms Blog should also be read when assessing the rifle in question.
[4] See: https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=477563188953409&id=174927625878471.
[5] See: https://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/opinion/taliban-remain-in-fear-of-lethal-strikes-writes-chris-masters/story-e6frezz0-1226504862496
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NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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Sariyya al-Tali’a al-Khurasani: A New Combat-Tested Shia Militia in Syria
By Phillip Smyth ([email protected])
Figure 1: The STK’s logo (left) and flag (right). The logo includes Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s symbol. A verse from the Quran, Quran 29:69 meaning, “And those who strive for us [in jihad] we will surely guide them to our [Islamic] ways”. Over the rifle the phrase reads, “The Islamic Resistance”.
Figure 2: Another logo used by the STK.
In late September, Sariyya al-Tali’a al-Khurasani (STK or The Vanguards of Khurasani Unit), also referred to as the Khurasani Unit, first made itself known to the world via Facebook. The group may draw their name from Abu Muslim al-Khurasani (A.K.A. Abu Muslim), an 8th century military leader who helped depose the Sunni Umayyad dynasty’s rule over the early Islamic caliphate.[1] The STK also claims to be based out of Arbil, Iraq, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan. According to the Khurasani Unit’s own releases, it appears to exclusively operate in a military function in rural areas outside of Damascus, Syria.
Technically, the STK was first announced on September 24, 2013 on Facebook. However, it is possible the group’s first page was made “private” and another mirror page was setup in its stead. Thus, the initial announcement of the group’s existence was hidden. The mirror page which first helped formally announce STK’s creation was made on October 8, 2013. Both pages hold unique images from the group and promote the same general messages. As with other Shia militias in Syria, the group claims to defend the Sayyida Zaynab shrine and promotes general pro-Iranian pan-Shia narratives. The promotion of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and of their own Shia identity through the posting of photos showing Shia clerics in their ranks is a regular theme.
Most of the STK’s imagery was posted in October. In fact, there were days when eight new images were posted on both of their Facebook sites. STK has also released extensive footage showing its fighters in combat inside Syria. This footage has included numerous photos of its fighters, including those of wounded members, and videos of the group engaged in combat. A particular feature of STK propaganda has been images showing the fighters posing with the group’s flag. Only the Badr Organization’s Syria unit, Quwet Shahid Baqir al-Sadr, has also engaged in extensive posting of images featuring their organization’s flag with their fighters in Syria.
While Shia Islamist organizations fighting in and contributing fighters to Syria have done little to hide their connections to Iran, STK went the extra step and actually repackaged Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ logo as their own. Their blatant promotion of Iran’s Supreme Leader in many of their posts leaves no illusions to which Shia clerical leader or ideology to which the group swears loyalty.
Unlike other Shia militias (E.G. Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir, Liwa’a al-Imam al-Hasan al-Mujtaba, and Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas) fighting in Syria, the STK has not stated which (if any) Iraqi Shia organizations have contributed fighters to the group.
The number of fighters in STK’s ranks is unknown, though their leadership has been identified. STK, has been reported to be fighting around Damascus’s Sayyida Zaynab Shrine and in the rural area near Damascus called Ghouta. Videos showing engagements featuring their fighters went viral among Syrian rebel supporters and Shia militia supporters online. In part, this has been due to the fact that their videos appear less staged (e.g. Shia militiamen firing a few rounds from a sniper rifle) and are much longer than others produced.
Figure 3: Two STK fighters pose in front of a truck holding the organization’s flag.
Ali al-Yasiri: The STK’s Commander
The immediate announcement of commanders for specific Shia fighting units in Syria is usually not a common theme. Less than two weeks after the first Facebook post made by the STK, it was announced by the group that their commander was named Ali al-Yasiri. Yasiri is shown in many photographs posted by the organization on its Facebook pages. Yasiri was also shown in photographs featuring Sayyid Muhammed Jawad al-Madrasi, a Shia cleric.[2]
Figure 4: Ali Yasiri is shown with Sayyid Jawad al-Madrasi. On Facebook, the group identified the cleric as, “Ajwad Madrasi”.
Figure 5: Yasiri and another unnamed STK fighter pose at Zaynab’s tomb.
Figure 6: Yasiri and an unnamed fighter pose with an unnamed cleric at Zaynab’s tomb. All three figures have been featured in other photos released by STK.
Figure 7: Yasiri (left) and the same unnamed fighter pose together for a photo. The fighter on the right holds an SVD type sniper rifle.
STK’s Fighters & Equipment
Little information is available on the numbers of fighters STK has operating in the field. Judging from their photographs, the group has over twenty members. The arms the group uses mimic the varieties used by other Shia militias. Most of these weapons are Kalashnikov-type rifles, SVD-type sniper rifles, RPG-7s, and the PKM-type machine guns. The group has also been recorded using light mortars in clashes in rural areas outside of Damascus.
In addition to their small-arms, the militia’s uniforms appear to include types of U.S.-style digitized camouflage. Some of the group’s uniforms include M81-type woodland camouflage and Desert Camouflage Uniform-type patterns. Also, other unidentified types of camouflage patterns have been seen on the STK’s fighters.
Interestingly, many of the same faces are featured in photographs of STK fighters. In fact, one in particular, that of a Shia Islamic cleric wearing a black turban, can be spotted in many photos of STK militiamen. His inclusion may be a way the group demonstrates their Shia Islamic identity. The Badr Organization has also included clerics in their militia photos in a similar effort.
Figure 8: STK fighters pose for a photo in East Ghouta, Syria.
Figure 9: STK fighters pose with the group’s flag and light weapons.
Figure 10: STK fighters pose in their uniforms and headbands.
Figure 11: An STK machine gunner.
Figure 12: An STK fighter holds his rifle as he stands with other members of his organization.
Figure 13: STK fighters pose around an RPG-7 and the group’s banner.
Figure 14: STK militiamen pose for the camera. The fighter on the right holds an RPG-7.
Figure 15: STK fighters stand and kneel together with their weapons as they pose for photographs.
Figure 16: Older and younger fighters sitting together in Rif Dimashq.
Figure 17: STK fighters take a break during fighting. The photo appears to be taken in the same area where some videos of STK combat engagements occurred.
Figure 18: STK fighters, one appearing to be a Shia cleric, hold a mixture of small-arms.
Figure 19: STK militiamen and a fighter in a black turban (signifying clerical status and descent from the Islamic Prophet Muhammed) relax in Rif Dimashq.
Figure 20: STK fighters at prayer time.
Figure 21: STK fighters. The fighter on the left has an SVD-type sniper rifle.
Figure 22: An injured fighter is shown with his compatriots and a Shia cleric.
Figure 23: The same injured fighter flashes a “V for victory” symbol from his bed.
STK on Film
STK’s combat videos were first released in October and were quickly disseminated on Shia militia social media. When Syrian rebels came across the films in the weeks after their release, often the fighters were incorrectly branded as members of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas.
The first of the videos STK released shows the group fighting from a structure in Rif Dimashq. Save for the caption and titles on the videos posted, there was nothing which identified the fighters in the film as members of STK. In two other combat videos it show STK militiamen operating in East Ghouta section of Rif Dimashq, firing mortars, RPGs, rifles, and other weapons.
NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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The Badr Organization’s Syrian Expeditionary Force: Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr
By Phillip Smyth ([email protected])
Click here for a PDF version of this post
Figure 1: The official logo for the Badr Organization’s Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr.
On July 13, 2013, Iraq’s Iranian-backed Badr Organization announced they had forces operating in Syria. Their announcement, made on a caption on the group’s “Military Wing” official Facebook page, noted that 1,500 Badr Organization fighters had been sent to Syria. Later, on July 21st, the Badr Organization announced their first casualty, Abu Dhar al-Sa’wdi. Seven days later, it was announced another Badr Organization fighter, Abu Sajad al-Hawli, was killed in Syria and that his funeral was held in Iraq (see below).
With the official July 28th declaration of Hawli’s death came the proclamation he was a member of Quwet al-Shahid Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr (BO-QSMBS). Though, at the time, the organization was simply referred to as, Quwet al-Shahid al-Sadr. The announcement of this Badr Organization sub-grouping followed the lead of their ally, the Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia Islamist organization, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) and their Liwa’a Kafeel Zaynab. Liwa’a Kafeel Zaynab was setup specifically to fight in Syria as a type of AAH expeditionary force. In effect, the BO-QSMBS serves a similar role.
BO-QSMBS’s Facebook page was started on August 19, 2013 while their official YouTube station was established on February 28, 2013. In both cases the admin name of “Abo Alhassan” was used and regularly finds a mention on photos and YouTube clips posted by the group. The first original photos which were not simultaneously or previously posted on other official, semi-official, or mirror Badr Organization Facebook pages began to appear on August 25, 2013. However, most of BO-QSMBS’s causalities have been posted on the official Badr Organization Military Wing’s Facebook page, as opposed to the BO-QSMBS Facebook site.
BO-QSMBS is named after the late Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr, the former leader of the Da’wa Movement in Iraq. Sadr, a Najaf, Iraq-based cleric, was instrumental in assisting with the creation of the Islamist ideology which would later be put into place in post-1979 revolutionary Iran by the late-Grand Ayatollah Khomeini. Sadr’s radical politics led him to be known by the name, “Khomeini of Iraq”.[1] In 1980, Sadr and his sister were both executed by the regime of Saddam Hussein.
BO-QSMBS has yet to post details about where they are fighting in Syria. However, based on their posted photographs, it is clear they are stationed in Damascus. As with other Shia Islamist organizations fighting in Syria, it is likely they have been deployed to fight on the East Ghouta front.
BO-QSMBS’s Weapons Systems
BO-QSMBS fighters utilize similar weapons systems as other Iraqi Shia organizations contributing fighters to Syria and Lebanese Hizballah. RPG-7s, PKM machine guns, SVD-style sniper rifles, Kalashnikov-pattern assault rifles, and M16-style assault rifles are the primary small-arms types featured by BO-QSMBS. M16-pattern rifles, particularly the M4 carbine model, appear to be fitted with optics, which may mean they are used in a designated marksman role. Additionally, the M16-type rifles are featured in BO-QSMBS’s posts about combat units more often than they are with other Shia militias operating in Syria.
It is possible that the group is using the Iranian-copy of the Austrian Steyr HS.50, a .50 caliber, long-range anti-material sniper rifle.[2] This rifle has been shown in the hands of many different Iraqi Shia organizations operating in Syria and Lebanese Hizballah.
As with Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s Liwa’a Kafeel Zaynab, the Badr Organization’s fighters in Syria are shown using pickup trucks (possibly the same pickup trucks as AAH’s men. See the videos on the Hizballah Cavalcade post Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s Liwa’a Kafeel Zaynab).
Figure 2: A BO-QSMBS fighter with an HS.50 type rifle.
Figure 3: A combat unit of BO-QSMBS fighters. Note the 2 optics-mounted M4-style rifles.
Figure 4: Two Badr fighters pose in front of the Sayyida Zaynab shrine in Damascus. The fighter on the right is holding an M4-type carbine (the same pictured in the photo above).
Figure 5: A BO-QSMBS fighter with an RPG-7.
Figure 6: A BO-QSMBS fighter holds a PKM machine gun in aloft as the late Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Baqir al-Sadr looks down upon him.
Figure 7: Badr fighters pose in front of a red pickup truck.
Figure 8: Badr fighters ride into battle in a mud coated white pickup truck.
BO-QSMBS’s Messaging to the Shia
BO-QSMBS has posted photographs attempting to show that Shia Islamic clerics have joined them in their fight inside Syria. The effect of these images may be to show the broader Shia community that there is broad religious support for the group’s actions in Syria.
The interconnectedness between the Badr Organization, Shia Islamist Iran and Lebanese Hizballah is also a regular feature on their social media webpages. One BO-QSMBS photo claimed to show Lebanese Hizballah fighter, Mahdi Yaghi and a fighter from the BO-QSMBS. Photos of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and of Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander, Qassem Suleimani are regular features on BO-QSMBS’s Facebook page.
Figure 9: BO-QSMBS fighters stand in front of soda machines and a poster featuring Lebanese Hizballah leader, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah.
Figure 10: A white turban wearing Shia cleric wearing combat fatigues stands in the center of BO-QSMBS fighters.
Figure 11: A black turbaned (denoting that he is descended from the Islamic Prophet Muhammed) Shia Islamic cleric stands in combat fatigues with Badr fighters.
Figure 12: BO-QSMBS claims this photo shows one of their fighters and Lebanese Hizballah’s Mahdi Yaghi. Yaghi was announced killed in Syria in October, 2013.
Figure 13: Lebanese Hizballah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah and Iranian Surpreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei are pictured behind the Sayyida Zaynab shrine in Damascus.
Videos Released by the Group
A number of videos have been released by the BO-QSMBS. However, most of them are of poor quality and follow an established pattern seen with other Shia Islamist militias (all Iranian-backed) in Syria. Most of these videos utilize older footage previously released by other groups. In October, the footage of Abu Sajad al-Hawli was released by the Badr Organization. The video was placed on YouTube, Facebook, and official Badr websites.
NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada Emerges: Updates on the New Iraqi Shia Militia Supplying Fighters to Syria
By Phillip Smyth ([email protected])
Click here for a PDF version of this post
Figure 1: A KSS member salutes the group’s flag.
When Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) first announced their presence to the world, little was known about the organization, its leadership, or its force size. Funerals the group held for three of its fallen fighters in May not only announced the group’s existence, but also pointed to a strong link with Iran. However, following these funerals, little was heard from the group. Nevertheless, it would appear that starting in August the organization has fully redeveloped its messaging and online propaganda. This campaign has included well-organized and professional group funerals for members killed fighting in Syria, brand new and far-less amateurish imagery, and the introduction of some more unique features in KSS’s propaganda. Even the group’s uniforms have undergone a type of remake, featuring the KSS’s logo and patches showing their fighter’s commitments to “Defending Sayydiah Zaynab”.
The group has also been more open when it came to the numbers of its fighters deployed to Syria. In an Al-Sharqiya interview held with KSS’s information office, the group claimed to have sent 500 members to Syria.[1] Public announcements by the group have also established that since July, KSS has deployed a number of combat units to more rural zones around Damascus, particularly the frontlines in East Ghouta.
Additionally, via official websites belonging to the Badr Organization Military Wing, it is possible that a closer relationship exists between KSS and the Badr Organization. Since Badr did not announce its involvement in Syria until July, 2013, this may be a signal that KSS was used as a front group to send Badr fighters to Syria.
In terms of a social media presence, KSS has tried to reinvent itself. When the group’s more private group page was removed from Facebook, the organization simultaneously established a new Facebook page and more private profiles to disseminate photos and other information about the group. Since August, KSS has posted 1-4 unique new photographs of their activities in Syria. Additionally, other pro-Shia militia-in-Syria Facebook pages have re-posted their photographs.
Social media stature aside, the group’s rapid public growth, increased professionalism, combat deployments, and growing presence in Iraq—beyond its original base in Basra, demonstrates KSS as a rapidly growing Shia militia force. It is likely KSS will continue to announce its militant activities in Syria.
The Fighters
The fighters of Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada appear to be uniformed with clear identifiable insignia. The combatants carry arms which are familiar to other Shia militia groups, particularly the PKM machine gun, RPG-7s, Kalashnikov-type assault rifles, and the popular SVD-style sniper rifle. KSS fighters have also been photographed with anti-material sniper rifles.
Figure 2: A KSS fighter with a customized Kalashnikov-type rifle and an SVD style sniper rifle.
Figure 3: A KSS fighter poses with a mortar.
Figure 4: A KSS fighter poses on rubble with an SVD style sniper rifle. Note the KSS logo patch.
Figure 5: A KSS fighter holds an RPG-7.
Figure 6: KSS fighters pose with a PKM machine gun.
Figure 7: A small unit of KSS fighters holding a mixture of Kalashnikov type rifles, an SVD style sniper rifle, and a PKM machine gun
Figure 8: This KSS fighter appears to be holding a Steyr HS .50 style, .50 caliber bolt action anti-material sniper rifle. The rifle could also be an Iranian copy of the HS .50.
Figure 9: Diya Issawi’s brother (left), pictured in a white turban of commonly found with Shia clerics. He was listed by KSS
Figure 10: KSS members “Enjoy a simple modest lunch”. This photo was issued by the group to demonstrate the humility of their fighters.
The KSS’s New Martyrs
On August 20, a main Facebook page which publishes information about Shia militia operations and deaths in Syria, claimed that Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada was operating in East Ghouta. During their operations in the area, the page reported three fighters as killed-in-action, with another five missing (listed in the post as, “Fate unknown”).
On August 24, KSS released eight martyrdom announcements in the form of more professionally designed graphics. The photographs were first released on the KSS and then the Badr Organization Military Wing’s official Facebook page. The posted images presumably show the eight fighters who were killed or who were missing in East Ghouta, in Rif Dimashq. It is important to note that on August 21, East Ghouta was also the reported as the scene of the deadliest chemical weapons attack within Syria.[2] According to American Military University’s In Homeland Security Blog chief correspondent and chemical weapons expert, William Tucker, it is possible these KSS fighters were, “bracketing the kill box”.[3] Meaning, they had generally surrounded the area where the chemical weapons were used and then attacked any Syrian rebel elements which may have tried to breakout.
However, a video emerged on September 1st showing some of the KSS fighters being killed in an assault by rebel forces. A longer video of the engagement was released on September 7th. The KSS fighters were reportedly stationed in what rebels referred to as a train station in East Ghouta. This would suggest that some of the KSS fighters may have been guarding transportation links in the area.
** Warning: Graphic Imagery **
In the video, it is clear to see that KSS fighters openly wear the insignia for their organization during combat operations. Some KSS and possibly Hizballah fighters are shown with Shia Islamic paraphernalia. One card removed from the pocket of a dead fighter featured a stylized photo of the assassinated Hizballah terror-leader, Imad Mughniyeh.[4]
Figure 11: Eight of the dead KSS members are featured on this poster.
Name: Amir al-Badlawi
Death Announced: September 5, 2013
Name: Muhammed Radi al-Shumaylawi
Death Announced: August 24, 2013. Funeral held on August 27, 2013.
Name: Al-Said Hasan ‘Ali Farhoud al-Furaydawi
Death Announced: August 11, 2013
Name: Sejjad al-Shibani
Death Announced: August 23, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013, funeral reportedly held on August 27, 2013.
Name: Walid al-‘Abudi
Death Announced: August 23, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013.
Name: ‘Ali Hamza al-Deraghi al-Sadiqi
Death Announced: August 23, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013, funeral reportedly held on August 27, 2013.
Figure 12: Sadiqi is shown in a car with what may be another KSS member and a Kalashnikov style rifle.
Figure 13: An official KSS release of Sadiqi with other KSS fighters.
Name: Zulfiqar al-Raseetmawi
Death Announced: August 25, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013, funeral reportedly held on August 27, 2013.
Name: Muhammed ‘Abd al-Husayn al-Faridawi
Death Announced: August 25, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013, funeral reportedly held on August 27, 2013.
Name: Ala al-Ka’bi
Death Announced: August 23, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013, funeral reportedly held on August 27, 2013.
Name: Watheq Hashem al-‘Anzi
Death Announced: August 23, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013, funeral reportedly held on August 27, 2013.
Figure 14: An officially produced martyrdom post
Name: ‘Ali Sami al-Zubaydi
Death Announced: August 23, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013, funeral reportedly held on August 27, 2013.
Notes: Zubaydi was one of the few KSS dead who had other photos of him in Syria uploaded to a number of pro-Shia militia
