Over the past few years, focus on the Islamic State has rightfully expanded beyond its original territorial holdings in Iraq and Syria. Many of the activities that animated the organization’s core have been carbon copied to varying degrees by its global provincial network, with IS’s General Directorate of Provinces encouraging territorial control and governance, foreign fighter mobilization, and external operations planning.1 Today, the Islamic State controls territory and has governance projects at different levels in four African countries—Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Mozambique—as well as small foreign fighter mobilizations in these countries and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.2 More immediate from a Western security perspective is the growth in external operations from the Islamic State’s Khurasan Province (ISKP).3 These issues will continue to remain at the forefront of security discussions related to the future of the Islamic State. However, the original Islamic State base in Iraq and Syria remains relevant due to its historical importance and the uncertain status quo in the region since Islamic State lost full territorial control in Syria in 2019, especially when considering the future of U.S. military presence in the region.
On September 6, 2024, the United States and Iraq reached an agreement on plans to withdraw the U.S.-led “Global Coalition Against Daesh” forces from Iraq and Syria.4 Under this plan, there would be an initial withdrawal of troops from Iraq proper by September 2025, with the remainder leaving Iraqi Kurdistan by the end of 2026. This would also mean, in effect, a withdrawal from Syria.5 This will have monumental ramifications for the fight against the Islamic State in its original area of operations.
To better assess the current and future status of the Islamic State in these two countries, this paper leverages various data streams to provide a holistic picture of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria today. Each country features different dynamics, of course. Yet, by exploring Islamic State attack dynamics from various sources (including addressing the issue of underreporting claims in Syria) and publicly disclosed arrest details (local arrests as well as international arrests related to external operations), and continued shadow governance in eastern Syria, this report highlights how the Islamic State has attempted to recover over the past five years and seeks to take advantage of future change in regional dynamics.
Today, the Islamic State in Iraq is the weakest it has ever been, but the Islamic State in Syria has shown signs of building itself back up. Therefore, by understanding the current state of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, we can gain a greater understanding of the organization’s historic power base, its global expansion, and why it is not a relic of the past.
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