Articles of the Week – 2/29-3/6

Saturday February 29:

The End of AQAP as a Global Threat – Gregory D. Johnsen, Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies: https://bit.ly/32XTEqQ

Sunday March 1:

Religious violence, gender and post-secular counterterrorism – Katherine E Brown, International Affairs: https://bit.ly/2TPPxum

Monday March 2:

Genocide, rape, and careless disregard: media ethics and the problematic reporting on Yazidi survivors of ISIS captivity – Sherizaan Minwalla, Johanna E. Foster, and Sarah McGrail, Feminist Media Studies: https://bit.ly/2VRrjkA

Tuesday March 3:

Financing Da’esh with Sexual Slavery: A Case Study in Not Gendering Conflict Analysis and Intervention – Susan Hutchinson, Journal of Global Security Studies: https://bit.ly/33kkSZ1

Wednesday March 4:

Ideological Transmission in Extremist Contexts: Towards a Framework of How Ideas Are Shared – Kim Knott and Benjamin J. Lee, Politics, Religion & Ideology: https://bit.ly/2PSNDqu

Memeing and Speaking Vernacular Security on Social Media: YouTube and Twitter Resistance to an ISIS Islamist Terror Threat to Marseille, France – Joseph Downing, Journal of Global Security Studies: https://bit.ly/38S2wQ9

Thursday March 5: 

Telegram’s Cryptocurrency Could Have a Terrorism Problem – Andrew Mines, Just Security: https://bit.ly/3avEDzh

The Legal Response of Western Democracies to Online Terrorism and Extremism and Its Impact on the Right to Privacy and Freedom of Expression -Nery Ramati, Vox-Pol: https://bit.ly/2TF1jGu

Friday March 6:

Why Jihadists Loved America in the 1980s – Thomas Hegghammer, The Atlantic: https://bit.ly/3cuViES

Explaining Support for Political Violence: Grievance and Perceived Opportunity – Karin Dyrstad and Solveig Hillesund, Journal of Conflict Resolution: https://bit.ly/3cYRo7k

Articles of the Week – 10/26-11/1

Saturday October 26:

In Syria, the Women and Children of ISIS Have Been Forgotten – Devorah Margolin, Joana Cook, and Charlie Winter, Foreign Policy: https://bit.ly/2C4b8p6

Sunday October 27:

“Terrorism as Veiled Suicide: A Comparative Analysis” – Anna Geifman, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/2JFyKEI

Monday October 28:

Blood and scripture: how the Islamic State frames religion in violent video propaganda – Matthew M. Sweeney and Meghan Kubit, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: https://bit.ly/2C0oAdy

Islamist Terrorism, Diaspora Links and Casualty Rates – James A. Piazza and Gary LaFree, Perspectives on Terrorism: bit.ly/2oo4hn8

“The Khilafah’s Soldiers in Bengal”: Analysing the Islamic State Jihadists and Their Violence Justification Narratives in Bangladesh – Saimum Parvez, Perspectives on Terrorism: bit.ly/34dar8L

Islamic State Propaganda and Attacks: How are they Connected – Nate Rosenblatt, Charlie Winter and Rajan Basra, Perspectives on Terrorism: bit.ly/36cRWDl

Towards Open and Reproducible Terrorism Studies: Current Trends and Next Steps – Sandy Schumann, Isabelle van der Vegt, Paul Gill and Bart Schuurman, Perspectives on Terrorism: bit.ly/2q2jeLW

Taking Terrorist Accounts of their Motivations Seriously: An Exploration of the Hermeneutics of Suspicion – Lorne L. Dawson, Perspectives on Terrorism: bit.ly/2BPzx1x

An Evaluation of the Islamic State’s Influence over the Abu Sayyaf – Veera Singam Kalicharan, Perspectives on Terrorism: bit.ly/2WoIUii

Countering Violent Extremism Globally: A New Global CVE Dataset – Caitlin Ambrozik, Perspectives on Terrorism: bit.ly/2PqDhi8

Profiles of Islamist Militants in Bangladesh – Shafi Md Mostofa and Dr. Natalie Doyle, Perspectives on Terrorism: bit.ly/2p8rgTL

Adversity, Criminality, and Mental Health Problems in Jihadis in Dutch Police Files – Anton Weenink, Perspectives on Terrorism: bit.ly/2MScx8d

“Their Fate is Tied to Ours”: Assessing AQAP Governance and Implications for Security in Yemen – Joana Cook, ICSR: https://bit.ly/34mTMA0

How an Islamist party managed to legitimate its authoritarianization in the eyes of the secularist opposition: the case of Turkey Ihsan Yilmaz, Mehmet Efe Caman, and Galib Bashirov, Democratization: https://bit.ly/2JFLueu

When Jihadist Factions Split: A Data-Driven Network Analysis – Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Samuel Hodgson, Daniele Bellutta, Chiara Pulice, and V.S. Subrahmanian, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/34kULAr

Debunking the Smuggler-Terrorist Nexus: Human Smuggling and the Islamic State in the Middle East – Luigi Achilli and Alessandro Tinti, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/34mlsVq

Tuesday October 29:

Baghdadi Is Dead But His Legend Lives On – Aaron Y. Zelin, Foreign Policy: https://bit.ly/2JHr0C1

Wednesday October 30:

ISIS genocide against the Yazidis and mass violence in the Middle East – Vicken Cheterian, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies: https://bit.ly/2JAOzfV

Minor Misery: What an Islamic State Registry Says About the Challenges of Minors in the Conflict Zone – Daniel Milton and Don Rassler, Combating Terrorism Center: https://bit.ly/2PyR2LH

Thursday October 31:

Once more, with feeling: using sentiment analysis to improve models of relationships between non-state actors – Kevin T. Greene and Caleb Lucas, International Interactions: https://bit.ly/36pLAR9

The genesis of insurgency in northern Mozambique – David M Matsinhe and Estacio Valoi, Institute for Security Studies: https://bit.ly/2qDNcpT

Once more, with feeling: using sentiment analysis to improve models of relationships between non-state actors Kevin T. Greene and Caleb Lucas, International Interactions: https://bit.ly/2ZMBfvP

Friday November 1:

What Explains Taxation by Resource-Rich Rebels? Evidence from the Islamic State in Syria – Mara Revkin, The Journal of Politics: bit.ly/36m21xU

Jihadism from a Subcultural Perspective – Jeppe Fuglsang Larsen and Sune Qvotrup Jensen, Critical Criminology: https://bit.ly/2NuKVqo

Keeping Armed Actors Out: The Protective Effect of Shuras in Afghanistan – Jori Breslawski, Journal of Global Security Studies: https://bit.ly/2K2EhVQ

Articles of the Week – 6/8-7/19

Monday June 10:

The Non-Jihadi Foreign Fighters: Western Right-Wing and Left-Wing Extremists in Syria – Ariel Koch, Terrorism and Political Violence: https://bit.ly/2JSgSG1

“Partisan Politics Was Making People Angry”: The Rise and Fall of Political Salafism in Kenya – Sebastian Elischer, The Journal of the Middle East and Africa: https://bit.ly/2O62bEA

Exploiting Borders in the Sahel: The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara – Pauline Le Roux, Africa Center for Strategic Studies: https://bit.ly/304Mui3

Tuesday June 11:

When Extremists Become Violent: Examining the Association Between Social Control, Social Learning, and Engagement in Violent Extremism – Michael H. Becker, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/2JRjZxU

Who is More Violent in Extremist Groups? A Comparison of Leaders and Followers – Katarzyna Jasko and Gary LaFree: https://bit.ly/2Lb1vsE

Wednesday June 12:

Updated review and developments in jihadist radicalisation in Switzerland – updated version of an exploratory study on prevention and interventionn – Miryam Eser Davolio, Mallory Schneuwly Purdie, Fabien Merz, Johannes Saal, and Ayesha Rether, Zurich Universities of Applied Sciences and Arts: https://bit.ly/2GlcYob

Thursday June 13:

Playing dirty to survive: the vulnerability of civilian targets within U.S. military aid recipient states – Amira Jadoon, Small Wars & Insurgencies: https://bit.ly/2Gm4mxl

Territoriality of radical Islam: comparative analysis of jihadist groups’ approach to territory – Bohumil Doboš, Martin Riegl, and Stig Jarle Hansen, Small Wars & Insurgencies: https://bit.ly/2LyrcX2

Organized insurgency, lethality, and target selection: Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah – Nori Katagiri, Small Wars & Insurgencies: https://bit.ly/2Z8aW28

Friday June 14:

Women in Islamic State Propaganda – Europol: https://bit.ly/2FcMwMH

Monday June 17:

How Do Terrorist Organizations Make Money? Terrorist Funding and Innovation in the Case of al-Shabaab – Ido Levy and Abdi Yusuf, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/2O7H9Wg

Tuesday June 18:

Primary Data and Individual Worldviews: Walking through Research on Terrorist Media Choices – Donald Holbrook, Resolve Network: https://bit.ly/2JHNfsb

Religious Institutionalism: A Domestic Explanation for External Support of Rebel Groups – Brandon Ives, International Interactions: https://bit.ly/2SsgUbu

Motivations for Jihad and Cognitive Dissonance – A Qualitative Analysis of Former Swedish Jihadists – Marco Nilsson, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/31HUuao

Wednesday June 19:

Introducing Extended Data on Terrorist Groups (EDTG), 1970 to 2016 – Dongfang Hou, Khusrav Gaibulloev, and Todd Sandler, Journal of Conflict Resolution: https://bit.ly/2O7I0pW

Thursday June 20:

Made-to-measure Qur’anic quotations: the incomplete verses of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb – Sergio Altuna Galán, Real Instituto Elcano: https://bit.ly/2JRd1sQ

Regulating terrorist content on social media: automation and the rule of law Stuart Macdonald, Sara Giro Correia, and Amy-Louise Watkin, International Journal of Law in Context: https://bit.ly/2JYIwB0

Friday June 21:

Opposition to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi: ‘The Hollow Organization’ – Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi: https://bit.ly/2XVdKTy

Tuesday June 25:

What’s on the Terrorists’ Bookshelves? – Donald Holbrook, Europol: https://bit.ly/2GlKhY9

Black Ops: Islamic State and Innovation in Irregular Warfare Craig Whiteside, Ian Rice, and Daniele Raineri, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/2StCZGM

Call of Duty Jihad: How the Video Game Motif has Migrated Downstream from Islamic State Propaganda Videos – Cori E. Dauber, Mark D. Robinson, Jovan J. Baslious, and Austin G. Blair, Perspectives on Terrorism: https://bit.ly/2YYSGbm

The Utility of Disabled Fighters in the Islamic State – Chelsea Daymon, Perspectives on Terrorism: https://bit.ly/32F2yZV

Behind the Veil: Women in Jihad after the Caliphate – Lydia Khalil, Lowy Institute: https://bit.ly/31VJ7vD

Wednesday June 26:

Interview with Syrian war veteran Khalid Shishani – Joanna Paraszczuk, From Chechnya to Syria: https://bit.ly/2xUK1L9

The Jurisprudence Trace Behind the DAESH Trench: Theoretical Basis of Islamic Fundamentalism Focusing on Kurdistan Province of Iran – Farhad Bayani, Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies: https://bit.ly/2M34C8o

Communication (un)savviness and the failure of terrorism: a case of Pakistani terrorist organizations – Muhammad Feyyaz, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: https://bit.ly/2xWCBa9

Thursday June 27:

Women and Al-Shabaab’s Insurgency – International Crisis Group: https://bit.ly/2xYVyJf

Rethinking the repression-dissent nexus: assessing Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood’s response to repression since the coup of 2013 – Khalil al-Anani, Democratization: https://bit.ly/2GyKwzl

ISIS’s Second Comeback: Assessing the Next ISIS Insurgency – Jennifer Cafarella, Brandon Wallace, and Jason Zhou, Institute for the Study of War: https://bit.ly/2J2a1KL

The Philippines: Militancy and the New Bangsamoro – International Crisis Group: https://bit.ly/30K6cA0

From religious performances to martial themes – Discourses of Shi’a musical eulogies, war and politics in Iran – Soudeh Ghaffari, Journal of Language and Politics: bit.ly/2PFOfAn

Friday June 28:

Researching Violent Extremism: The State of Play – J.M. Berger, Resolve Network: https://bit.ly/32PpNRg

A Study of Outlinks Contained in Tweets Mentioning ‘Rumiyah’ – Stuart Macdonald, Daniel Grinnell, Anina Kinzel, and Nuria Lorenzo-Dus, RUSI: https://bit.ly/2YvticU

Sunday June 30:

How Content Removal Might Help Terrorists – Joe Whittaker, Lawfare: https://bit.ly/2LxcUFM

Structure of HTS’ Popular Resistance Companies – Caleb Weiss, The Line of Steel: https://bit.ly/2Y5GDYv

Wednesday July 3:

Surviving Boko Haram: why children under five matter – Uyo Yenwong-Fai, Institute for Security Studies: https://bit.ly/2LwwkLb

Tunisia Keeps Calm and Carries On After Latest Terrorist Attack – Aaron Y. Zelin, Washington Institute for Near East Policy: https://bit.ly/2xXzRJB

Thursday July 4:

Shedding Light on Terrorist and Extremist Content Removal – Isabelle van der Vegt, Paul Gill, Stuart Macdonald, and Bennett Kleinberg, RUSI: https://bit.ly/2Zcw8ni

Friday July 5:

Terrorist assassinations and societal unrest in Africa: a research brief – Laura N. Bell, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: https://bit.ly/2Y6XWIp

Considering the military-media nexus from the perspective of competing groups: the case of ISIS and AQAP – Carol Winkler, Kareem El-Damanhoury, Aaron Dicker, Yennhi Luu, Wojciech Kaczkowski, and Nagham El-Karhili, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict: https://bit.ly/2Z2qlAX

Saturday July 6:

Measuring Tactical Innovation in Terrorist Attacks Article – Michael K. Logan, Gina Scott Ligon, and Douglas C. Derrick, The Journal of Creative Behavior: https://bit.ly/2JF4oCB

Monday July 8:

Another Form of American Exceptionalism? A Comparative Analysis of Terrorism Sting Operations in the US and Abroad – Jesse J. Norris, Terrorism and Political Violence: https://bit.ly/30MA0Ma

The Algerian State, Islamist Insurgents, and Civilians Caught in Double Jeopardy by the Violence of the Civil War of the 1990s – C. R. Pennell, Terrorism and Political Violence: https://bit.ly/2LvLZdB

Poverty and Divine Rewards: The Electoral Advantage of Islamist Political Parties – Sharan Grewal, Amaney A. Jamal, Tarek Masoud, and Elizabeth R. Nugent, American Journal of Political Science: https://bit.ly/2JIV4xM

Tuesday July 9:

Nigeria’s Shi’a Islamic Movement and Evolving Islamist Threat Landscape: Old, New and Future Generators of Radicalization – Simon Gray & Ibikunle Adeakin, African Security: https://bit.ly/30NNjMK

A Man, A Plan, So What? The Influence of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, Reconsidered – Phillip William Etches, Small Wars Journal: https://bit.ly/2YfuzI6

A Turn to Violence: The Escalation of Nonviolent Movements – Kirssa Cline Ryckman, Journal of Conflict Resolution: https://bit.ly/2XP2TKK

Rhetorics of Radicalism – Daniel Karell and Michael Freedman, American Sociological Review: https://bit.ly/2GjXcK2

Wednesday July 10:

Economics of terrorism in Lake Chad Basin – Malik Samuel, Institute for Security Studies: https://bit.ly/2XRHSiF

Islamic State’s quest for legitimacy: An analysis of IS media frames in Dabiq magazine – Kasun Ubayasiri, Media, War & Conflict: https://bit.ly/2JPVRf0

The Evolution of Online Violent Extremism in Indonesia and the Philippines – Nava Nuraniyah, RUSI: https://bit.ly/2M36IoM

Thursday July 11:

The Salafi-Jihadist Reaction to Hindu Nationalism – Hari Prasad, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology: https://bit.ly/2XQpFSC

Countering Violent Extremism Online: The Experiences of Informal Counter Messaging Actors – Benjamin Lee, Policy & Internet: https://bit.ly/2pibdSL

Friday July 12:

Drones, Surveillance, and Violence: Theory and Evidence from a US Drone Program – Asfandyar Mir and Dylan Moore, International Studies Quarterly: https://bit.ly/2Y8zzPs

Saturday July 13:

Of terrorism and revenue: Why foreign aid exacerbates terrorism in personalist regimes – Andrew Boutton, Conflict Management and Peace Science: https://bit.ly/2Y6zNBU

Tuesday July 16:

Suicide squad: Boko Haram’s use of the female suicide bomber – Vesna Markovic, Women & Criminal Justice: https://bit.ly/2YdWYhF

Blacklists, Market Enforcement, and the Global Regime to Combat Terrorist Financing – Julia C. Morse, International Organization: https://bit.ly/2XRJ4Tb

Wednesday July 17:

Assessing the Impact of the Global War on Terrorism on Terrorism Threats in Muslim Countries – Peter S. Henne, Terrorism and Political

Check out my new edited volume for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy: "How al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings, and the Islamic State"


Over the past eight years, al-Qaeda’s fortunes have ebbed and flowed. Drones, uprisings, and a challenge from the Islamic State have forced the core al-Qaeda organization—historically based in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region—and its various branches to adapt and migrate outward.
In this new Policy Focus, Washington Institute fellow Aaron Y. Zelin compiles case studies demonstrating how each part of al-Qaeda’s network has evolved and survived the various challenges it has faced roughly since the Obama administration took office. Written by eminent scholars, practitioners, and government officials from the United States and abroad, the chapters are informed by a recent workshop in which the participants gave candid, off-the-record assessments of numerous key issues, including al-Qaeda’s current strategic outlook, a close examination of its branch in Syria, its branches outside of Syria (AQAP, AQIM, al-Shabab, and AQIS), and its current financial situation.
Contributors include: myself, Bruce Hoffman, Charles Lister, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Samuel Heller, Katherine Zimmerman, Andrew Lebovich, Christopher Anzalone, Don Rassler, Hans-Jakob Schindler, Katherine Bauer, and Matthew Levitt.
Click here to read the full publication (124 pages).

New video message from al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s Hārith bin Ghāzī al-Naẓārī [Muḥammad al-Mirshadī]: “Da’wah Series: With the Qur’ān #11: The Right Course Has Become Clear From The Wrong"

For previous parts in this video series see: #10#9#8#7#6#5#4#3#2, and #1. The title of this release is in reference to parts of Qur’anic verse 2:256. Here it is in full: “There shall be no compulsion in [acceptance of] the religion. The right course has become clear from the wrong. So whoever disbelieves in Taghut and believes in God has grasped the most trustworthy handhold with no break in it. And God is Hearing and Knowing.”



___________

To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]

Check out my new ‘Policy Watch’ with Jacob Olidort for the Washington Institute: "The Islamic State's Views on Homosexuality"


The tragic events at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando shed light on a lesser-known facet of the Islamic State (IS): the group’s virulently hostile views toward homosexuality, in particular its targeting of gay men. Thus far, no evidence has surfaced suggesting that IS directed the perpetrator, Omar Mateen, to conduct the operation, and jihadis usually have multiple motivations for taking action, including in this case possible mental health issues. Yet IS has published a vast corpus of justifications for killing homosexuals, and it has publicly targeted numerous allegedly gay men in Iraq and Syria in the past year-and-a-half alone.
To be sure, gay men were being targeted by the Iraqi and Syrian regimes prior to the announcement of the so-called IS “Caliphate,” and the region’s legal and religious climate is often inhospitable to that community. Moreover, other jihadi groups have executed homosexuals, including the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and its branches Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). What stands out with IS, though, is the level of textual justification it has produced for such executions and the theatrical manner in which it conducts them, potentially inciting greater anti-LGBT violence.
Click here to read the rest.

Jihadology Podcast: Nashids: History and Cultural Meaning

Behnam Said comes on the show to talk about nasheeds. Some of the topics covered include:

  • The role of music in Islam and how it relates to nasheeds
  • A modern history of the use of nasheeds
  • Differences between Sufi, mainstream Islamist, and jihadi nasheeds
  • Different themes used in these nasheeds
  • Why there has been such an explosion in new nasheeds and media outlets from IS and AQAP recently


Links:

Thanks to Haakon Jahr, TankThoughts, and Raihan Kadir for supporting the show. If you’d like to support the podcast please check out the show’s Patreon page!
The podcast is produced by Karl Morand. If you have feedback you can email [email protected], or find us on Twitter: @JihadPod.
You can subscribe to the show in iTunes, Stitcher, or with our RSS feed.
Download this episode (26MB mp3)

Check out my new ‘Insight’ for ICSR: "The Decline in Islamic State Media Output"

logo2
Over the years, I identified the pace at which a jihadi group releases content as one of the general indicators of its health. When AQAP and AQIM were in control of territory, they were churning out a lot more content than after they withdrew. Similarly, as Ansar al-Sharia in Libya lost ground in the fight with Haftar’s forces, defections to The Islamic State, and leadership death(s) it became far less active in producing media content. Conversely, when these groups were rising, this would be reflected in more media.
With the rise of The Islamic State’s (IS) hold over more and more territory in Iraq and Syria and its ability to consolidate these gains in late 2014 and early 2015, there was a rise in the amount of media content it released. I noticed this because I had to spend more time each day sifting, saving, and posting IS content to Jihadology. By contrast, in the past month or so, I have noticed that it has taken me less time than I had become accustomed.
It is one thing to feel this in my “gut,” and another to try and prove it. So I measured output in the following three categories:
1. Non-military Islamic State photos from Syria;
2. Non-military Islamic State photos from Iraq;
3. Releases posted to my website Jihadology overall.
The data is on three-month rolling basis beginning in January 2015 and ending at the end of November 2015. I chose these measurements because I knew from prior research that 63% of IS’s media output came from pictures and just 20% from video messages. The focus on non-military content makes sense too: IS will conduct military and insurgent attacks whether it is in control of territory or not (possibly even more so if it is hurting). Non-military content may therefore be a better proxy for its wider capabilities and general state.
Table 1: Media releases by IS

Months IS Syria non-military photos IS Iraq non-military photos Jihadology
January-March 2,321 1,777 494
February-April 2,238 1,937 592
March-May 2,249 2,197 654
April-June 2,703 2,521 737
May-July 3,403 3,117 727
June-August 3,762 3,305 728
July-September 3,653 3,217 673
August-October 3,029 2,704 619
September-November 2,750 2,558 595

As my data shows, there was a steady rise in photos from January-March period to the June-August period, with a drop off for every three-month category since. It also demonstrates that IS was putting out more content in Syria than Iraq, suggesting the consolidation had been further advanced in Syria.
Similarly, for the posts on Jihadology, there was a rise from the January-March time span until April-June. This should come as no surprise since it takes longer to film, edit, and produce a video than taking pictures.
I believe there may be two reasons for this decline: the killing of IS media operatives, and/or the loss in territory. We know of a number of media operatives that have been killed or seriously injured in airstrikes such as Junaid Hussain, Mohammed Emwazi, Abousamra, and Denis Cuspert (as well as other individuals we likely do not know the names of whether foreign or local). In addition, IS has lost territory in northern Raqqa governorate in Syria and many locations in Iraq, most recent Bayji and Sinjar, with Ramadi potentially teetering as well.
Beyond the quantity of releases, the quality has diminished too. According to Cori E. Dauber, who is a specialist on visual communication, IS’s provincial videos, which are the ones it releases most often have declined, except the ones from Wilayat al-Raqqah where it is headquartered. Releases from al-Hayat continue to be high quality, but are less frequent. Moreover, J.M. Berger told me that he has anecdotally seen IS’s social network become less cohesive in part because of the drop in media, though he cautions there may be other factors at play, too.
Put together, there are signs that IS’s much vaunted media machine has declined over the past half year. It remains very active, of course, but there seems to have been a peak between mid-spring and mid-summer this year. This, I believe, could be indicative of other structural issues IS could be having on the ground. It also suggests that military victories rather than counter messaging has a stronger effect on the media capabilities of jihadi groups.
Click here to read the original

Jihadology Podcast: Jihadi Governance 101

Will McCants comes on the show to talk about jihadi governance. The conversation is based on a chapter in his new book The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State. Aaron and Will discussed numerous cases of jihadi groups attempts to govern, including the Islamic State of Iraq, al-Shabab, AQAP, AQIM, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Islamic State.
This episode also features a Primary Sources segment covering releases from August 14-September 19 and a #SocialMedia segment on postings from October 7-13.
Links:

Thanks to Raihan Kadir and Kaspars Gasuns for supporting the podcast. If you’d like to support the show check out our Patreon page! You can help the podcast and get rewards like access to bonus content, being thanked in the show notes, and more.
The podcast is produced by Karl Morand. If you have feedback you can email [email protected], or find us on Twitter: @JihadPod.
You can subscribe to the show in iTunes, Stitcher, or with our RSS feed.

Download this episode (40MB mp3)

GUEST POST: ISIS and the Hollywood Visual Style

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Click here to see an archive of all guest posts.

ISIS and the Hollywood Visual Style
By Cori E. Dauber and Mark Robinson
The slick production techniques ISIS uses in its propaganda are the reason people have written about their videos as “Hollywood quality” or “like Hollywood movies.” Obviously this is not, strictly speaking, true. When people write about ISIS videos being like “Hollywood action films,” they don’t mean that in a literal sense – Hollywood blockbusters, after all, cost on average several hundreds of millions of dollars to produce. But that doesn’t mean people saying that aren’t onto something. They’re seeing something in ISIS videos that is reminiscent of Hollywood films that they don’t see in the videos of other groups. Yes, ISIS videos are of far higher quality than are those of other groups – we would say they are, technically, a generation ahead of most others. But there’s something else going on here that people are cueing on. We would argue that, visually, ISIS videos mimic what could be called a “Hollywood visual style.” And this is being done so systematically and carefully that, while its entirely possible that it’s accidental, we find that very unlikely.
While there has been a great deal of work done on the way ISIS uses Social Media to distribute their materials, our focus is on the content of their output, specifically, on their visual material. We believe this focus is important for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the enormous amount of empirical research that argues that visual material, in many contexts, can actually be more powerful than textual. That is to say, the image can trump the word: it more effectively draws the viewer’s attention, it is remembered more accurately and for a longer period of time.
That’s all well and good, but what specifically does it mean to say that ISIS material is sophisticated in visual terms, or that their videos are done in a “Hollywood visual style?” While that’s a complicated question to get after, one can start by breaking it down in terms of the way ISIS makes use of some of the compositional elements of production to contribute to the persuasive power of their materials, in a way that other groups either cannot or simply do not. We’ll directly contrast some of their videos with some of Jabhat al Nusrah’s to make the point.

  1. What the viewer will notice first: the opening graphics package and the clarity of the image.

ISIS employs “industry standards” for video. That doesn’t necessarily mean standard for Hollywood, it might mean what you see in commercial video or advertisement, but its what we have become accustomed to seeing, what the eye has become accustomed to for anyone who watches a good bit of professionally shot and uploaded media. Neither of us can speak to what is standard outside of Europe and North America, but it seems worth noting that ISIS is systematically working to use visual standards that will give their videos an underlying professional look to someone whose eye is accustomed to a European or North American industry standard.
This is done through a variety of techniques: for example, through the way they deal with the colors in their videos, by adjusting the range of colors you see. They minimize the color palette that comes across on video so that, for instance, there are fewer variances, fewer “shades of red,” presented in their videos than there were in the physical world seen through the viewfinder when they were filming. The result is that the reds they do show you are more vibrant, brighter, higher contrast, and they come across looking sharper and clearer. Just look at how saturated the colors of the produce are in this frame from one of the Mujatweets Episodes:
01watermellon
This requires planning, both pre-and post-production. Many of their videos were clearly shot by a media team trained (and trained sufficiently) to execute in a “digital age” style. So you see this kind of color saturation, high contrast, and an emphasis on resolution. You also see a shallow depth of field – in other words, there is a tight focus on something or someone, but the rest of the visual field is intentionally out of focus. That’s a good example of what we mean by “Hollywood style.” It points specifically to a contemporary trend set by younger media professionals, but someone who had just randomly picked up a camera certainly wouldn’t know to do that. If you look at the most expensively produced Hollywood films of the 1970s or ‘80s, you won’t see a shallow depth of field, because it’s a fairly recent development. As an example:

When video is shot (and when someone prepares to share it via the web or phone) the video must go through a compression process. This makes the files smaller at the cost of lost resolution and visual impact. Most videos we look at are grainy in part because of this process. Another reason ISIS’ videos read as so crisp and clear relative to those of other groups is that they have been shot more carefully and compressed much more carefully.
In less professional videos, already compressed sequences are put together, then exported through a compressor. These lesser quality videos are thus compressed to a point that they appear amateurish, since they read as if the person who produced them didn’t know or, at least, didn’t care that the resolution drops significantly when videos are prepared this way. This is what creates the grainy, pixelated effect. Think about how you automatically can tell the difference between the professionally shot and prepared footage from a news network and the amateur footage that network pulled from some random guy who just happened to be there with a cellphone camera in his pocket when a newsworthy event took place.
IS videos that are crystal clear suggest that there was a crafting hand behind them, one that was trained and careful.
Earlier videos from AQ and the affiliates paid no attention to contemporary industry principles and standards. More recent videos from ISIS (and more and more from some other groups) mark a clear movement: they are being produced according to knowledge and execution of industry standard in the entire process, from pre- to post-production. It seems clear that their media teams are getting trained somewhere.
There is no question that the content of some of the most recent videos released by JN were substantially better than what had been their baseline. But as often seems to be the case with groups other than ISIS, these major advances do not then override, with the prior, weaker style disappearing. There is not a single, controlling visual style, so that even after videos of much higher quality are released, those videos will then be followed by others that look the same as earlier, weaker releases did.
In this JN video that was released recently, they didn’t really know what they were doing, so they were filming with a non-professional, handy-cam, while moving way too fast:

If we just take a still of the sign you can see why that footage appears to be of low quality. Look at the leaves around the sign, and you can see that the image is actually pixelating.
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As far as graphics are concerned, as software became available making it easier and easier to produce computer-animated graphics, not only did it become commonplace for these videos to begin with animations, they are often now relatively sophisticated even if the accompanying video is of very low quality. Still, ISIS is in a class by themselves here for several reasons: the consistency of the quality, the crisp resolution of almost all of the graphics they use, and, a key factor, the design. Many groups acquired the ability to incorporate animations, but not necessarily any ability to design ones that worked. Often they go on forever, they’re distracting, they’ve got so much going on, the eye can’t figure out where to focus, and so on.
On this measure, JN made enormous leaps forward recently:

It isn’t, by the way, only JN making these leaps. This one from AQAP is hard to miss: its eye-catching, attractive, and likely took several days of work by someone who really knew what they were doing:

But of course groups now insert graphics into the middle of videos, not just at the beginning.

And compare that to the way ISIS uses graphics in the Mujatweets series:

  1. Composition:

Most ISIS videos appear as if every frame of every shot of every scene has been carefully calculated, thought through, and laid out.
Just consider the stock piece of footage that they use over and over (and that some news networks use as a “visual metaphor” for ISIS): two rows of fighters, one in the black “ninja” outfit, the other row dressed in white, both marching in unison, shot in slow motion and from below. Keep in mind, it is a truism that what is filmed from below will appear larger, more imposing, more authoritative, and so forth. It’s stock footage for them because it came out so well.
Now consider the JN version by way of comparison. You hardly need a communication or media specialist to point out the differences – the outfits don’t match, the editing is jumpy, “professional” is hardly the word that leaps to mind here. But part of the reason it looks this