GUEST POST: ISIS and the Hollywood Visual Style

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Click here to see an archive of all guest posts.

ISIS and the Hollywood Visual Style
By Cori E. Dauber and Mark Robinson
The slick production techniques ISIS uses in its propaganda are the reason people have written about their videos as “Hollywood quality” or “like Hollywood movies.” Obviously this is not, strictly speaking, true. When people write about ISIS videos being like “Hollywood action films,” they don’t mean that in a literal sense – Hollywood blockbusters, after all, cost on average several hundreds of millions of dollars to produce. But that doesn’t mean people saying that aren’t onto something. They’re seeing something in ISIS videos that is reminiscent of Hollywood films that they don’t see in the videos of other groups. Yes, ISIS videos are of far higher quality than are those of other groups – we would say they are, technically, a generation ahead of most others. But there’s something else going on here that people are cueing on. We would argue that, visually, ISIS videos mimic what could be called a “Hollywood visual style.” And this is being done so systematically and carefully that, while its entirely possible that it’s accidental, we find that very unlikely.
While there has been a great deal of work done on the way ISIS uses Social Media to distribute their materials, our focus is on the content of their output, specifically, on their visual material. We believe this focus is important for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the enormous amount of empirical research that argues that visual material, in many contexts, can actually be more powerful than textual. That is to say, the image can trump the word: it more effectively draws the viewer’s attention, it is remembered more accurately and for a longer period of time.
That’s all well and good, but what specifically does it mean to say that ISIS material is sophisticated in visual terms, or that their videos are done in a “Hollywood visual style?” While that’s a complicated question to get after, one can start by breaking it down in terms of the way ISIS makes use of some of the compositional elements of production to contribute to the persuasive power of their materials, in a way that other groups either cannot or simply do not. We’ll directly contrast some of their videos with some of Jabhat al Nusrah’s to make the point.

  1. What the viewer will notice first: the opening graphics package and the clarity of the image.

ISIS employs “industry standards” for video. That doesn’t necessarily mean standard for Hollywood, it might mean what you see in commercial video or advertisement, but its what we have become accustomed to seeing, what the eye has become accustomed to for anyone who watches a good bit of professionally shot and uploaded media. Neither of us can speak to what is standard outside of Europe and North America, but it seems worth noting that ISIS is systematically working to use visual standards that will give their videos an underlying professional look to someone whose eye is accustomed to a European or North American industry standard.
This is done through a variety of techniques: for example, through the way they deal with the colors in their videos, by adjusting the range of colors you see. They minimize the color palette that comes across on video so that, for instance, there are fewer variances, fewer “shades of red,” presented in their videos than there were in the physical world seen through the viewfinder when they were filming. The result is that the reds they do show you are more vibrant, brighter, higher contrast, and they come across looking sharper and clearer. Just look at how saturated the colors of the produce are in this frame from one of the Mujatweets Episodes:
01watermellon
This requires planning, both pre-and post-production. Many of their videos were clearly shot by a media team trained (and trained sufficiently) to execute in a “digital age” style. So you see this kind of color saturation, high contrast, and an emphasis on resolution. You also see a shallow depth of field – in other words, there is a tight focus on something or someone, but the rest of the visual field is intentionally out of focus. That’s a good example of what we mean by “Hollywood style.” It points specifically to a contemporary trend set by younger media professionals, but someone who had just randomly picked up a camera certainly wouldn’t know to do that. If you look at the most expensively produced Hollywood films of the 1970s or ‘80s, you won’t see a shallow depth of field, because it’s a fairly recent development. As an example:

When video is shot (and when someone prepares to share it via the web or phone) the video must go through a compression process. This makes the files smaller at the cost of lost resolution and visual impact. Most videos we look at are grainy in part because of this process. Another reason ISIS’ videos read as so crisp and clear relative to those of other groups is that they have been shot more carefully and compressed much more carefully.
In less professional videos, already compressed sequences are put together, then exported through a compressor. These lesser quality videos are thus compressed to a point that they appear amateurish, since they read as if the person who produced them didn’t know or, at least, didn’t care that the resolution drops significantly when videos are prepared this way. This is what creates the grainy, pixelated effect. Think about how you automatically can tell the difference between the professionally shot and prepared footage from a news network and the amateur footage that network pulled from some random guy who just happened to be there with a cellphone camera in his pocket when a newsworthy event took place.
IS videos that are crystal clear suggest that there was a crafting hand behind them, one that was trained and careful.
Earlier videos from AQ and the affiliates paid no attention to contemporary industry principles and standards. More recent videos from ISIS (and more and more from some other groups) mark a clear movement: they are being produced according to knowledge and execution of industry standard in the entire process, from pre- to post-production. It seems clear that their media teams are getting trained somewhere.
There is no question that the content of some of the most recent videos released by JN were substantially better than what had been their baseline. But as often seems to be the case with groups other than ISIS, these major advances do not then override, with the prior, weaker style disappearing. There is not a single, controlling visual style, so that even after videos of much higher quality are released, those videos will then be followed by others that look the same as earlier, weaker releases did.
In this JN video that was released recently, they didn’t really know what they were doing, so they were filming with a non-professional, handy-cam, while moving way too fast:

If we just take a still of the sign you can see why that footage appears to be of low quality. Look at the leaves around the sign, and you can see that the image is actually pixelating.
03pixelatedsign
As far as graphics are concerned, as software became available making it easier and easier to produce computer-animated graphics, not only did it become commonplace for these videos to begin with animations, they are often now relatively sophisticated even if the accompanying video is of very low quality. Still, ISIS is in a class by themselves here for several reasons: the consistency of the quality, the crisp resolution of almost all of the graphics they use, and, a key factor, the design. Many groups acquired the ability to incorporate animations, but not necessarily any ability to design ones that worked. Often they go on forever, they’re distracting, they’ve got so much going on, the eye can’t figure out where to focus, and so on.
On this measure, JN made enormous leaps forward recently:

It isn’t, by the way, only JN making these leaps. This one from AQAP is hard to miss: its eye-catching, attractive, and likely took several days of work by someone who really knew what they were doing:

But of course groups now insert graphics into the middle of videos, not just at the beginning.

And compare that to the way ISIS uses graphics in the Mujatweets series:

  1. Composition:

Most ISIS videos appear as if every frame of every shot of every scene has been carefully calculated, thought through, and laid out.
Just consider the stock piece of footage that they use over and over (and that some news networks use as a “visual metaphor” for ISIS): two rows of fighters, one in the black “ninja” outfit, the other row dressed in white, both marching in unison, shot in slow motion and from below. Keep in mind, it is a truism that what is filmed from below will appear larger, more imposing, more authoritative, and so forth. It’s stock footage for them because it came out so well.
Now consider the JN version by way of comparison. You hardly need a communication or media specialist to point out the differences – the outfits don’t match, the editing is jumpy, “professional” is hardly the word that leaps to mind here. But part of the reason it looks this

GUEST POST: TTP Says That Baghdadi’s Caliphate Is Not Islamic—But Is Anyone Listening?

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Click here to see an archive of all guest posts.

TTP Says That Baghdadi’s Caliphate Is Not Islamic—But Is Anyone Listening? 
By Dur-e-Aden
On June 15, 2015, the Taliban in Pakistan released a 66 page document in Urdu detailing why Baghdadi’s caliphate is not Islamic. While organized in the form of an academic paper, with a central thesis and scholarly citations, the document itself is hastily written and is an exercise in repetition. Nevertheless, it gives a glimpse into the strategic thinking of TTP, and indicates that they feel threatened enough by Baghdadi to release this statement.
The introductory paragraphs discuss the time of the Prophet, and contrasts Baghdadi’s actions against it. For example, when the Prophet was militarily weak in Mecca, he did not break any idols in the Kaaba since this would have opened up a war on multiple fronts. Moreover, he did not kill those hypocrites who claimed to be Muslims but were actually enemies of Islam, as people would have accused him of killing his friends and starting a civil war. In short, he was a pragmatic military strategist, and doing so didn’t entail that he was giving in to the kuffar (infidels). Today, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan see themselves as following this path by only fighting the occupying forces, while both Hanafi and Salafi Muslims reside on this land. However, ISIS’s actions against other Muslims, especially in the Nangahar province, from the Taliban’s perspective is benefitting the enemies of Islam.
The document then lists 24 reasons laced with religious references, both from the Islamic history of different caliphates, as well as the opinions of various Salafi and non-Salafi scholars. The central theme is that a caliph cannot be appointed without the consensus of the majority of the Umma. In the case of Baghdadi, neither the majority of the Muslim Umma, nor the majority of the Jihadi Umma, have pledged allegiance to him. The document lists examples of people such as Mullah Omar, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi, Abdollah Mohsini, Abu Qatada al-Falasteeni, as well as emirs of Al-Shabaab, AQAP, and South-east Asian militant groups, whose lack of support has rendered his caliphate to be invalid. Finally, even if Baghdadi claims to be elected by a Shura of representatives, how can a caliph that is supposed to be the leader of Muslims worldwide be selected only by a regional Shura?
The document goes on to discuss certain responsibilities of a caliph that Baghdadi is not equipped to carry out. For example, a caliph is supposed to defend all Muslims and create conditions where they can live in peace.  However, considering that Baghdadi himself is in involved in war, how can he protect Muslims worldwide, from Xinjiang to Morocco, who are embroiled in different conflicts? Furthermore, a caliph has to be involved in the day to day affairs of his people such as resolving disputes, collecting zakat from the rich to give to the poor, and making people follow Sharia. Baghdadi on the other hand, can’t even appear in public. While talking about these issues, the document refers to a Prophet’s saying, which states that “Both me (the Prophet) and God curse him who forcefully imposes his rule without the consent of the Muslims.”
The final part of the document challenges specific interpretations of ISIS with regards to the primary Islamic sources. TTP argue that all the “misguided” sects throughout history have quoted the texts to justify their ideological positions. For example, Mu’tazila believe that Quran is a created book because God says in the Quran that “God created everything.” Similarly, Barelvis claim that Prophet is present everywhere because Quran mentions, “And among you is his Messenger.” However, the TTP argues, these interpretations are still wrong. Therefore, when Baghdadi quotes the hadith which urges Muslims to pledge allegiance to their caliph or they would die in ignorance, it does not refer to his caliphate. It only refers to the caliphate of a specific Imam who is appointed according to Sharia, and whose appointment fulfills all the conditions of the bayah. As we (the TTP) have shown, that is not the case.
But is this document going to be effective in persuading people to not join ISIS? It is very unlikely. As both Graeme Wood and Hassan Hassan have argued, one of the important characteristics of ISIS’s ideology is that it is anti-clerical. Hence, going against centuries of established Islamic traditions, and directly to the text of Quran and the Hadith gives them a certain purity. As a result, when others claim that ISIS is not Islamic, they are not only immune to this messaging, but actually enjoy it. ISIS refers to the Prophet’s hadith which states that during the end of times, there will be 73 sects of Muslims, and only one of them will be the true one. Seeing so many other Muslim sects united against them actually proves their point. Therefore, when it comes to the new generation of jihadists, even those in Afghanistan and Pakistan can get motivated by ISIS’s peculiar religious ideology, accompanied by a winning narrative, illusions of grandeur, and a promise to be part of an historical project.
However, because Pakistan in particular has a plethora of jihadist groups, their core members are unlikely to shift their allegiance to ISIS, especially if they have fought for a particular cause for a long time (e.g. against India, against Coalition forces in Afghanistan, against Pakistani state etc.), and that cause has become central to their identity. Being part of a coherent organizational structure increases the likelihood that those members are clearheaded of what their short term goals are, and being part of a worldwide caliphate doesn’t appear near the top of their lists.
Finally, while this is true that some of the defectors from these established groups, such as the TTP itself, have pledged allegiance to ISIS; it should be noted that those members defected at a time when they were dissatisfied with their positions in the existing organization, and the organization was going through infighting. In other words, there might be an underlying opportunistic motivation for their defection, as opposed to an ideological one. Not to mention that Taliban comes from a Deobandi tradition within Islam, which is distinctive from the Salafist background of ISIS. This can spell good and bad news for ISIS. The good news is that they have helped ISIS in establishing a presence in the Af-Pak region. The bad news is that opportunistic fighters are more likely to accelerate the divisions within ISIS’s ranks as well, as they compete for money and power (the reasons that they left their previous organizations for). Moreover, they are more likely to neglect or disobey ISIS’s orders over the long run, especially if the ideological commitment to ISIS’s cause is absent.
Therefore for now, as far as this document goes, TTP might be preaching to an already convinced audience.
Dur-e-Aden is a PhD student at University of Toronto where her research focuses on rebel recruitment within Islamist insurgent organizations. She holds a MA in Political Science from University of British Columbia, and tweets @aden1990.

GUEST POST: The End of al-Qaeda

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Click here to see an archive of all guest posts.

The End of al-Qaeda
By Aimen Dean
Sources within Ahrar al-Sham stated that their allies in Jabhat al-Nusra have told them that AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri will relinquish his authority – or what left of it – over AQ branches globally and absolve them of their allegiance to him. The move was in response to the rising power of Islamic State in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Libya and Nigeria as well as new IS incursion into Yemen. AQ and Zawahiri can no longer offer any meaningful leadership and the trend among the two strongest and largest AQ branches (al-Nusra and AQAP) is that the association with AQ is no longer an asset when it come to local conflicts in Syria and Yemen, instead it is a hindrance and a liability.
While Zawahiri and AQ central command have been ineffective and side lined since the start of 2014 and with the rise of the IS, nevertheless they provided moral and legitimate voice for al- Nusra and AQAP in the face of IS expansion. The immediate implication for such move (once it happens) is that al-Nusra would be free to establish wider alliances within Syria and open the door again for its plans for an Islamic Emirate in northern Syria after Idlib was taken with the help of Ahrar al-Sham. The move will also help AQAP to abandon the al-Qaeda name and adopt once and for all the new name of “Ansar al-Sharia”. Both groups possess their own funding mechanism and have been (for several years) free financially from al-Qaeda Central Command. Nonetheless dissolving al-Qaeda will be seen as the end of an era and the beginning of a new chapter for both al-Nusra and AQAP (Ansar al-Sharia). AQIM were already dissolving and merging with other regional groups across the Sahara/North African region, therefore there will be limited strategic or logistical impact from this announcement.
Aimen Dean is a founder member of al-Qaeda, who changed tack in 1998 and became a spy for Britain’s security and intelligence services, MI5 and MI6

Check out my new piece at the Washington Post’s ‘Monkey Cage': "The Islamic State’s Model"

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The Islamic State announced several months ago that it was “annexing” territory in Algeria (Wilayat al-Jazair), Libya (Wilayat al-Barqah, Wilayat al-Tarabulus and Wilayat al-Fizan), Sinai (Wilayat Sinai), Saudi Arabia (Wilayat al-Haramayn) and Yemen (Wilayat al-Yaman). It is likely that the Islamic State plans to pursue a similar approach in Afghanistan and Pakistan following its announcement of accepting pledges of allegiance from former members of the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban to also try and “annex” territory there under the framework of a new wilayah called “Wilayat Khorasan.” On its face, this bold declaration of an expanding number of wilayat (provinces) resembles the announcements by al-Qaeda of creating numerous franchises in the mid-2000s. The Islamic State’s “wilayat” strategy differs in significant ways from al-Qaeda’s “franchise” strategy, however.
The academic literature has shed great light on the al-Qaeda franchising strategy. In a recent article Daniel Byman highlights a number of key factors within the al-Qaeda network regarding motivations for affiliation and franchising. Typically, affiliates joined up with al-Qaeda as a result of failure. Affiliation helped with financial support; offered a potential haven that could be exploited, along with access to new training, recruiting, publicity and military expertise; gave branding and publicity; and opened up personal networks from past foreign fighter mobilizations. It in turn helps al-Qaeda with mission fulfillment, remaining relevant, providing access to new logistics networks, and building a new group of hardened fighters.
But, Byman argues, those franchises often became as much a burden as an asset as local interests and views diverged with those of the parent organization. Leah Farrall argues that al-Qaeda increasingly came to view franchising “warily” in part due to its inability to always control its new partners such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as because of backlash from unsuccessful cooptation of organizations such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group or Egyptian Islamic Jihad. This is one of the reasons why, prior to Osama bin Laden’s death, the Somali jihadi group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen was not given franchise status. Bin Laden had apprehensions about the group’s utility due to past clan infighting and lack of unity. Following the death of bin Laden though, his replacement, Ayman al-Zawahiri, brought Shabab into the fold, but the results have been quite disastrous; Shabab has declined and also was in an internal feud between its foreign and local members. Will the Islamic State’s wilayat pose a similar burden?
There is one key difference between al-Qaeda’s and the Islamic State’s model for expansion. Al-Qaeda wanted to use its new franchises in service of its main priority: attacking Western countries to force them to stop supporting “apostate” Arab regimes, which without the support of Western countries would then be ripe for the taking. This has only truly worked out with its Yemeni branch, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). On the other hand, while the Islamic State does not have an issue with its supporters or grassroots activists attacking Western countries, its main priority is building out its caliphate, which is evident in its famous slogan baqiya wa tatamaddad (remaining and expanding). As a result, it has had a relatively clear agenda and model: fighting locally, instituting limited governance and conducting outreach. This differs from al-Qaeda’s more muddled approach – it hoped a local franchise would conduct external operations, but many times franchises would instead focus on local battles or attempts at governance without a clear plan, as bin Laden had warned. Moreover, the Islamic State has had a simple media strategy for telegraphing what it is doing on the ground to show its supporters, potential recruits and enemies that it is in fact doing something. This accomplishes more, even if it appears that the Islamic State is doing more than it actually is, in comparison with al-Qaeda’s practice of waiting for a successful external operation to succeed and then claiming responsibility after the fact.
How is this strategy working? So far, Libya and the Sinai appear to be the locations with the most promise, though the Islamic State’s presence in these areas should not be overstated. It certainly does not command the amount of territorial control as its base in Mesopotamia. That said, the Islamic State’s wilayat in Libya and the Sinai are following the same methodology on the ground and in the media as the Islamic State’s wilayat have in Iraq and Syria.
By contrast, its wilayat in Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have yet to show any signs of activity. It is certainly possible that the Islamic State is playing a long game and preparing its soldiers and bureaucrats for future jihad, governance and dawa (propagation of Islam), but there are reasons to be skeptical as well. Following Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s announcement of the expansion of the Islamic State in mid-November, its media apparatus took over the media departments of all the local wilayat outside of Mesopotamia. This highlights that, at least on the media level, the Islamic State is in full command and control.
Click here to read the rest.

The Clear Banner: French Foreign Fighters in Iraq 2003-2008

The Clear Banner sub-blog on Jihadology.net is primarily focused on Sunni foreign fighting. It does not have to just be related to the phenomenon in Syria. It can also cover any location that contains Sunni foreign fighters. If you are interested in writing on this subject please email me at azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.

French Foreign Fighters in Iraq 2003 – 2008
By Timothy Holman

Initial assessments by French and US intelligence from 2005, cited in press in 2008, evaluated that there was a significant risk of attacks by eventual returnees from the Iraq theatre. These assessments were drawn-up amongst early reports of hundreds of foreign fighters from Europe.i By 2008, the numbers of European foreign fighters had not reached the initially anticipated volumes and attacks had not materialized.ii In fact, French foreign fighters were now seeking to enter Afghanistan, having abandoned the idea of foreign fighting in Iraq as either too dangerous or as no longer being a ‘pristine jihad’.iii

The attention of French and other Western authorities turned to al-Qaeda core (AQC) members in the Af/Pak zone who remained active in planning and supporting attacks against the West, and later towards Yemen, where a rejuvenated al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), demonstrated deadly intent and resourcefulness in targeting the United States.iv The Iraq-era networks and their apparently diminishing threat slowly receded into the background as these AQ-affiliated entities focused their attention on attacking the West. The beginning of the conflict in Syria and the flood of European foreign fighters meant the Iraq-era networks were for the most part not a subject of study or analysis.v

The Paris and Toulouse attacks in France were perpetrated by foreign fighters with associations to jihadist networks that first came to the attention of the French authorities in the wake of the United States invasion of Iraq and a renewed surge in interest in foreign fighting. The French and Belgian authorities disrupted these networks in early 2005 (Buttes-Chaumont, Paris) and early 2007 (Artigat, Toulouse region and Brussels, Belgium). Despite the action and activities (arrests, trials and imprisonment) by the French authorities, members of the networks continued to associate, radicalize, and form new relationships, in the context of these evolving networks. In the cases of some, their intent moved from foreign fighting abroad, to attacking inside France.

The French Iraq-era Networks and Clusters

In September 2004, the French authorities opened a judicial investigation into what they termed the ‘filières irakiennes’ (Iraq networks). Six cases were brought to trial; the 19th network/ Buttes-Chaumont group, the Montpellier cluster, the Nice cluster, the Ansar al-Fath group, the Tours cluster, and the Artigat network.vi The 19th network sent the most individuals into Iraq. The Montpellier cluster sent two persons to Syria; one travelled to Iraq, the second desisted and returned to France where he was arrested. The Nice cluster network was an investigation into connections to individuals in the Kari network in Belgium, which also resulted in a trial and convictions. The Ansar al-Fath group was formed around a former Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) member and individuals he had met in prison. The group initially had the intention of engaging in foreign fighter activity but was redirected into domestic plotting through the instructions of a Syria-based Tunisian facilitator. The group then concentrated its energy into this activity; overseas travel was to Lebanon for training in explosives. The French authorities disrupted the group and the individuals imprisoned.vii In October 2006, three residents of Tours, France traveled to Damascus, Syria with the intention of crossing into Iraq to fight against United States (US) military forces. The three men were rapidly arrested by Syrian security forces as they sought to locate a smuggler to take them across border. They were eventually deported to France and tried.viii This cluster mostly closely resembles the types of individuals that would later participate in the Syria mobilization from France.ix

The Artigat network was a Toulouse-based entity, whose members congregated around a Syrian Afghanistan-veteran in the small town of Artigat. Others traveled to Cairo, Damascus, and in the case of one to Medina, in Saudi Arabia. The travel was for a combination of Arab-language training and to be able to live in countries perceived as better adapted to their faith.x Over-time some members became interested in foreign fighting. Attempts were made to enter Iraq using a Saudi Arabia-based facilitator, who had come into contact with the student based in Medina. The existence and activities of the group became well known to the general public following the 2012 attacks in southwest France by Mohamed Merah. Merah was friends with a core member of the group, and Merah’s brother and sister were also actively engaged in the network. The network continued to exist in some form even after the Toulouse attacks, and members associated with the network have traveled to Syria, including Merah’s sister.xi Since the network formed, participants have been involved in a combination of ‘hijra’, foreign fighting, and domestic terrorist activity.

The story of the 19th network is now well known following the Paris attacks.xii It has origins in Farid Benyettou’s contacts with individuals engaged in militant activity and el-Hakim’s travel to Syria and Iraq and relationships formed while living there. A group of comprised of friends and family members grew around Benyettou in their neighborhood in Paris. Incensed by the war in Iraq and images of Abu Ghraib, the network mobilized to send themselves to fight in Iraq. The group was eventually disrupted from 2004 onwards by a combination of arrests by the US, Syrians and French. A 2008 trial saw members sentenced with some released due to time-served while others returned to prison to see out the remainder of their sentences. In 2010, a small cluster of members through contacts made in prison sought to organize to free an imprisoned GIA bomb maker responsible for the 1995 metro bombings.xiii The planning was organized by a former Afghanistan networks facilitator, Djamel Behgal, who had been assigned to residence following the end of his prison term, while awaiting the result of court proceedings to expel him from France to Algeria. Some members of this group were tried and sentenced in 2013, while others were released due to lack of evidence. A third and final cluster formed between the remnants of the 19th network, and the Beghal cluster. This small cluster would go on to plan and execute the most lethal attacks in France since 1961.xiv

What happened to the French foreign fighters?

Thomas Hegghammer estimates that about 100 European foreign fighters travelled to Iraq.xv My preliminary research has found traces of approximately 54 names of foreign fighters from Europe, who traveled or tried to travel to Iraq from 2003 onwards. They originate from ten countries, nine in Western Europe and one in the Western Balkans. It is probable that there were more fighters, but to-date searches in press reports, judicial documents, martyrs lists, captured terrorist documentation and estimates of captured foreign fighters by the US military give a figure of 54 foreign fighters originating from Europe. This figure is a long way from the estimated 3000 Western Europeans who have traveled to Syria and more recently again to Iraq.xvi

A Preliminary Estimate of European Foreign Fighters in Iraq (2003-2008) and Syria (2011 onwards)


The Iraq numbers are calculated from known travelers to Iraq. The list includes some who were arrested in Syria while attempting to enter Iraq and others who reached Syria but returned home unable to find a facilitator. The Syria numbers come from press reporting or statements by governments compiled in late 2014. See blog post, “Black Math: Getting more from the Foreign Fighter Numbers”, October 10, 2014, https://acrossthegreenmountain.wordpress.com/2014/10/10/black-math-getting-more-from-the-foreign-fighter-numbers/. The French numbers exclude those wanting to travel and those in transit.

Despite the low absolute numbers, but similar to Syria, French foreign fighters formed the largest proportion – 39% – of the European contingent. According to my research there were 21 persons who traveled at least as far as Syria. Marc Trévidic estimates that there were 30 French foreign fighters but publicly available information currently exists for 21.xvii The French foreign fighters came in their majority from the Buttes-Chaumont network. The numbers used in the analysis that follows draw on the figure of 21, as there is some data on what happened to these fighters. The small sample size means that the observations from the analysis are tentative and subject to revision as more information becomes available.xviii

What Happened to the French Foreign Fighters in Iraq

Status

Number

Notes

Arrested in Syria

5

Two from the Artigat network and three from Tours cluster.
Dead

5

Four from 19th, and one from Montpellier
Imprisoned in Iraq

1

One from 19th (excludes second 19th member who escaped prison and returned to France, counted as a returnee)
Returnee

4

Three from 19th and one from Montpellier
Unknown

2

Individual who traveled possibly from Marseilles with Italy-based Tunisians, individual mentioned in Sinjar documents.
Unknown presumed dead

3

One from 19th, one from Nice cluster and one from Artigat network.
Unsuccessful

1

Associate of 19th who traveled later to Syria circa. 2007
Total

21

The majority of the French foreign fighters traveled in two waves to try and enter Iraq, 41% (9 fighters) in 2004 and 30% (6 fighters) in 2006. The largest number of successful entries was in 2004, when all of the foreign fighters were able to enter Iraq compared to 2006, when only one of the six travelers is reported to have successfully crossed from Syria into Iraq.

The data indicates that there were four returnees. The Montpellier grouping provided the first returnee, although, this individual’s status as returnee could be questioned, as he appears to have traveled as far as Syria and then renounced traveling further when he understood he could be tasked to carry-out a suicide bombing. The other three returnees came from the 19th network.

Three of the four returnees engaged in some form of domestic activity.

The Clairvoyant: Colonial Caliphate: The Ambitions of the "Islamic State"

Colonial Caliphate: The Ambitions of the “Islamic State”
By Aaron Y. Zelin
By now, many have seen the variations of maps that “Islamic State” (IS) activists have posted online showing aspirational future areas of conquest. This genre usually encompasses areas that have been under historical Caliphates shaded in black, including places such as Spain or Greece that do not even have a Muslim plurality of the population today. Ultimately, IS (as well as other Sunni jihadi groups) hopes the entire world comes under its dominion. This is nothing new. But what are IS’s short to medium-term goals and how are they attempting to achieve them?
In short: its slogan baqiya wa tatamaddad (remaining and expanding).
All of this, is of course, contingent on any level of success and legitimacy, which at this juncture will be difficult in the face of most Muslims rejecting its “Caliphate” announcement as well other Islamist groups including pro-al-Qaeda jihadis.
The “Caliphate project” is a unique enterprise and one that does not necessarily play by the same rules most follow, since ultimately its goal is to overthrow the Westphalian nation-state model and the post-World War II American international system. The announcement of the renewed “Caliphate” could signal something more akin to a colonial project where the “Islamic state” seeks to incorporate non-contiguous territories. Already in Iraq and Syria, the areas it has taken control of are not all contiguous. Therefore, it is plausible that factions or groups in other locales could conceivably take territory and, having pledged bay’a (an oath of loyalty) to the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, thereby expanding the State’s Caliphate.
Where Could This Occur? Would It Be Sustainable?
Beyond IS’s hope to “remain and expand,” I have a nascent hypothesis about its unique use of foreign fighters. Unlike al-Qaeda, which has mainly used its foreign fighter contingents to train, plan, and then execute attacks in the West or Arab countries over the years, IS might have bigger plans for them. While IS would have no problem with dispatching foreign fighters for terrorist attacks out of theater (more on this below), they might also order their foreign fighter cadres to build up capacities for the expansion of its state once they return home. Further, it may also use them to infiltrate and subvert al-Qaeda branches and cells as part of its broader war with al-Qaeda for supremacy over the global jihadi movement.
The Islamic State’s colonial Caliphate project would find the most fertile ground in the Northern Sinai, Eastern Libya, and some of the neighborhoods in poor areas of Western European cities that are Muslim-majority. None of this is inevitable. In fact, the Islamic State would have some serious difficulties in pulling it off, especially in Western Europe. But the jihadi movement has never let feasibility stand in the way of its ambitions. Like many jihadi strategists have proposed in the past, they would hope to set off a backlash that could lead to destabilization and chaos. This is exactly what jihadis thrive off. We have already seen failed attempts in England to establish “sharia zones” by local jihadis like the UK-based Anjem Choudary, who has cautiously spoken out in favor of the Caliphate claim.
Besides the Islamic State’s ideological and narrative appeal, one of the biggest sources of its strength comes from its economic independence. Due to the spoils of war and criminal enterprises, they are far less reliant on private donors than al-Qaeda. Why is this relevant? Unlike al-Qaeda, the Islamic State has funding and can use its extra coffers to offer money to potential affiliates. It is a new center that can give resources to the periphery. In recent years, al-Qaeda has had more difficulty doing that.
The Islamic State’s economic independence is also germane because many foreign fighters have criminal pasts and therefore would have experiences and have no issue with getting involved in criminal activities if and when they return home. Additionally, those outside the center of the Islamic State’s gravity can leverage the criminal networks in locales like the Sinai and Libya. There has already been signs that jihadis have attempted to graft onto those criminal networks with varying success.
Similarly, one could see a scenario where Europe’s foreign fighters — many of whom have deep criminal pasts — return home and set up business rackets and other illegal ventures in certain neighborhoods in areas where they are from and run them like mafia bosses or gangsters. This could lead to a chilling effect such as no-go zones where European police are not comfortable entering or operating. Again, this is all hypothetical and not the current reality, but setting up such independent economic hubs in “statelets” could further the reach of the Islamic State, which has no time frame on its project. The success of such an undertaking would likely have an easier chance of working in the Sinai/Libya scenario due to lack of full state writ already.
Baghdadi’s Target Countries?
Following the announcement of the Islamic State’s self-proclaimed Caliphate, its leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi delivered a Ramadan address, which was filled with the usual jihadi platitudes. It also included specific “shout outs” to areas where Muslims are suffering and could be a clue to areas it hopes to expand its influence or compete with al-Qaeda. For instance, Baghdadi specifically notes the suffering of Sunnis in Burma, the Philippines, Indonesia, Kashmir, Bosnia, the Caucasus, Palestine, Egypt, East Turkistan (China), Iran, France, Tunisia, and Central African Republic. There is already known public support for the Islamic State or has foreign fighter networks that have fed itself in Iraq and Syria in the Philippines, Indonesia, Bosnia, the Caucasus, Palestine, Egypt, Iran, France, and Tunisia. Therefore, if one wants to look to areas that are not in surrounding countries to Iraq or Syria these are potentially more immediate targets.
Closer to home, though, the Islamic State hopes to expand its reach in terms of linking up contiguous territory over “Sykes-Picot” borders. More recently, for the first time publicly the Islamic State has announced a presence in the Qalamoun region on the Lebanese-Syrian border as well as claiming responsibility for an attack in Beirut. If it hopes to expand into Lebanon, it will have to compete with the Qaeda-aligned Abdullah Azzam Brigades, which has years of experience recruiting. Similarly, while there has been support in Ma’an, Jordan for the Islamic State, this is a minority sentiment in the broader Jordanian jihadi current, which has been closer to and more supportive of Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria.
The biggest prize beyond targeting Israel (more on this below) would be provoking violence against the Saudi regime and claiming Saudi territory. The majority of the 1,400+ Saudis that have gone to fight in Syria (and now Iraq) have joined the Islamic State rather than Jabhat al-Nusra. Additionally, hundreds in the last decade fought with the group when it was called al-Qaeda in Iraq. Among them, some then went onto fight with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). There are also number of its foreign fighters that have returned home and other soft support inside the Kingdom. Therefore, it is possible that the Islamic State may rely on those already inside Saudi, Yemen, and its own soldiers in Iraq to create a three-pronged attack. While the Saudi government would have air superiority, it has no significant experience in quelling an insurgency (though Saudi has been successful in counterterrorism

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GUEST POST: Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s Social Media Activity in 2014

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Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s Social Media Activity in 2014
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Oren Adaki
Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST), the country’s foremost salafi jihadist group, has experienced a significant change in fortunes over the past year. A year ago it was able to operate legally in Tunisia, and concentrated primarily on undertaking dawa (evangelism) to win young Tunisians to its cause. However, a rise in violent incidents carried out by salafists caused tensions between AST and the state to spike. Relations between AST and Tunisia reached a point of no return in late July 2013, when in a five-day period secularist politician Mohammed Brahmi was murdered and salafists killed eight members of the security forces, five of whom had slit throats. The government cracked down on the group after those incidents, designating it a terrorist organization, banning its activities, and arresting its members.
AST has been an innovator among jihadist groups in its use of social media. Thus, as it attempts to recover from the blows inflicted upon it by the Tunisian state, its social media activities may provide some important clues. This analysis begins by examining AST’s social media activity related to events in Tunisia before turning to AST’s perspective on issues further afield, such as the Syria jihad. MEMRI has also produced a recent report on AST’s Facebook page that is worth noting.
Rejection of the Terrorism Designation
AST vehemently opposes its designation as a terrorist group by the Tunisian government. Its main line of argument is that the group has humanitarian projects and enjoys the widespread support of other Muslims. A tweet that AST sent from its official account on January 1, 2014 purported to show “what you don’t see in the media about Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia.” It linked to a video of AST’s community service projects, in which the group distributed medical supplies and repaired public infrastructure. The video emphasized in particular very young children (seemingly elementary or middle school age) tackling these service projects while wearing bulky orange vests identifying them as doing this work under AST’s banner.
In a similar vein, on March 10 AST asked in a tweet: “Does Ansar al-Sharia truly frighten the Muslims of this nation?” The tweet included a link to a different video on AST’s community service efforts, including testimonies from sick people whom AST helped. One blurry-eyed old man offering his testimony states that he has diabetes; the camera pans down to reveal that the toes on his left foot have been amputated.
Further making a bid to show the support they enjoy, on February 21 AST tweeted an invitation to participate in their campaign asking “who are my helpers in the cause of Allah,” with participants using the Arabic-language hashtag #Support_for_Ansar_al-Sharia_in_Tunisia.
 
 
AST social media article
A graphic promoting the “Who are my helpers in the cause of Allah” public relations campaign, tweeted February 21, 2014.
AST received support from a variety of circles, which the group posted to its Twitter feed. On February 25, it tweeted a photograph of a handwritten sign leaning against an automatic weapon, with a flag of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in the background. The sign reads: “Support for Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia from the soldiers of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham.”
AST social media article
Another representative photograph posted as part of the campaign, on February 26, featured a handwritten sign held up in front of a Saudi mosque that read: “Support for Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia,” attributing this support to “your brothers from the Land of the Two Holy Mosques.” (For more coverage of AST’s “who are my helpers in the cause of Allah” campaign, see MEMRI’s report, referenced above.)
AST social media article2
Anti-Government Propaganda
Another aspect of responding to the crackdown has been disseminating anti-government propaganda. Some of this propaganda has been supplied by outside scholars, including Abu Qatada al-Filistini, who has longstanding and deep connections to AST emir Abu Iyad al-Tunisi. Abu Iyad spent time in the United Kingdom, where Abu Qatada was also based, during his exile from Tunisia. Some jihadist forums have portrayed Abu Iyad as Abu Qatada’s “disciple,” and one AST member described Abu Qatada as “probably the most influential” jihadist theorist who has the group’s ear.
On January 21, AST posted a message from Abu Qatada, titled “An Important and Urgent Message to Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia,” to all its social media platforms, including Twitter. Part of Abu Qatada’s message is devoted to attacking Ennahda, the Islamist political party that opted to work through electoral politics. Abu Qatada said that although Ennahda and AST seemingly share a common goal of “establishing Islam,” Ennahda moved in the “direction of the secularists,” and in the course of negotiations over the new Tunisian constitution accepted that sharia would not be the country’s source of law. According to Abu Qatada, Ennahda—which was in power when the crackdown on AST began—went even further astray “in their pursuing you [AST members] and attributing to you false actions that were used as an excuse to chase you and imprison you, and even to kill you.” Abu Qatada said that because Ennahda has allied itself with the secularists, it therefore shares in their judgment and fate.
AST social media article2
This graphic was tweeted on January 21, 2014,and includes excerpts about Ennahda from Abu Qatada’s message.
Thereafter, AST continued to press the theme that the Tunisian government had aligned itself with infidelity. On May 10, a tweet and accompanying graphic called on Muslims to fight the “leaders of infidelity,” and argued that Islam’s “powerful ability to protect itself” was the characteristic that would ultimately produce a victory.
AST social media article3
On May 20, AST posted a graphic titled “So that the nation will learn…” The accompanying text explained that “we do not label the tyrants infidels, nor do we repudiate them nor antagonize them and their friends due to their imprisoning, torturing, and persecuting us.” Rather, it explained that they label their opponents infidels “due to their imprisonment of monotheism and their detaining the sharia.” This statement reflects AST’s prioritization of its interpretation of sharia: it is unambiguously the most important value for which the group stands, and its suppression is more important to members, according to this statement, than even being subjected to imprisonment or torture.
These statements reflected AST’s understanding of both the general situation that it confronted as well as the clash of values between the group and the government. But some of its statements instead deal with specific incidents, such as “A Word of Truth and an Outcry in the Valley,” which was posted on April 15, addressing a recent raid in Rouhia in which security forces’ raid of a mosque resulted in the arrest of 40 salafists, reportedly including returnees from Syria. AST’s statement is one of solidarity with the arrested salafists, claiming that the group “follows what is occurring to you moment by moment, and we share in your pain and anguish.” Describing the Rouhia raid as one of the “crimes of the tyrannical Tunisian regime,” the statement describes a pattern of “harassment, intimidation, displacement,” as well as “the violation of the sanctity of homes and of women.” The statement calls on the people of Rouhia

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