Search Results for: gaidi mtaani

GUEST POST: Book Review of David Malet's "Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Past Guest Posts:
Hazim Fouad, “Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj),” April 30, 2013.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
—
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A Review of David Malet’s Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts, Oxford University Press, 2013.
By Mark Youngman
In David Malet’s new book, Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts he seeks to expand discussion of the involvement of foreign nationals in insurgencies beyond the contemporary focus on Islamic extremists and to place transnational jihadists in a broader historical context.  Through a rigorous methodology and in-depth case studies, he challenges simplistic explanations for the transnational insurgent phenomenon and identifies a defensive framework common to recruitment messages, regardless of conflict type.  Although the methodology employed faces certain challenges, this work succeeds in making a valuable and – given current events in Syria – timely contribution to our understanding of transnational insurgencies.
The Salience of Ethnicity
Out of 331 conflicts contained within two databases that provide the basic data for analysis – the Correlates of War (COW) Instrastate War 1816-1997 and Uppsala-PRIO Intrastate Conflict 1946-2005 databases – Malet identifies 70 involving transnational insurgents.  These are coded according to whether the conflict was ethnic or not, and whether the foreign fighters were of the same ethnicity as the insurgent group, creating four conflict types:  Diasporans (Type 1: ethnic conflict, coethnic fighters); Liberationists (Type 2: ethnic conflict, non-coethnic fighters); Encroachers (Type 3: nonethnic conflict, coethnic fighters); and True Believers (Type 4: nonethnic conflict, non-coethnic fighters).  Four case studies, each representative of one of the types, put the flesh on the bone:  the Texas Revolution (1835-36); the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939); the Israeli War of Independence (1947-49); and Afghanistan (1978-1992) and the subsequent activities of transnational jihadists.
Neither Money Nor Martyrdom 
Malet challenges the theory that mercenary motives are sufficient for understanding the decision to join, noting that promises of material reward are often not credible and would be undermined by efforts to secure foreign funding.  On the contrary, recruiters “typically explicitly inform volunteers prior to their enlistment that their services will bring minimal, nonguaranteed payments.”  Nor do Islam, promises of martyrdom, or ethnic kinship offer universal explanations, since “most foreign fighters are secular; they and others have shared neither ties of ethnic kinship nor homeland with the local insurgents they joined.”
Instead, Malet finds that “insurgencies try to recruit foreign fighters by framing distant civil conflicts as posing a dire threat to all members of a transnational community” shared by foreign recruits and insurgents.  In other words, recruitment messages utilize a defensive framework, and reframe conflicts as threatening a different group when seeking to expand their appeal.  Ethnicity is not the only value uniting recruits and insurgents and, in fact, transnational insurgencies occur most often in nonethnic conflicts.  However, recruitment usually occurs via social networks linking these transnational communities, and “potential recruits are generally highly connected to these identity subgroups rather than to their wider national society.”  Malet also finds that transnational insurgencies are disproportionately effective, although “it may simply be the case that the best organized and most effective insurgencies were those that also had the capacity to recruit abroad.”
The Challenges of Data 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty facing Foreign Fighters is one common to many studies of political violence, and one that the author himself acknowledges:  scarcity of data.  Information was insufficient to allow for an evaluation of the differences between successful and unsuccessful recruitment campaigns, since failed recruitment efforts are rarely documented.  Data quality is not uniform over time, meaning that the involvement of foreign fighters in some conflicts was also likely not documented.  And case studies were selected not just for their representativeness, but also for the availability of records.
Other weaknesses are inherent to the methodology:  Any attempt to slot social conflicts into tidy categories will fail to capture all the complexities and nuances of those conflicts.  Coding conflicts as ethnic or otherwise – when ethnicity can play an important role even in nonethnic conflicts – is just one example.  The coding system also does not really allow for the possibility of a conflict itself – rather than its messaging – shifting from one type to another (for example, from Type 2 to Type 4), unless a specific event, such as a change of government, marks the shift.  Nevertheless, any classification system would face these difficulties, and almost all are clearly acknowledged by the author himself.
A Solid Foundation
Overall, Foreign Fighters represents a carefully researched and well-caveated study.  Current and future conflicts may provide greater opportunity for testing the universality of the defensive framing and for identifying other commonalities and differences in recruitment.  The conflict in Syria – which involves transnational insurgents fighting for both sides and for divergent motives – will certainly present an interesting test case.  But Malet’s work has provided a solid platform for future debate.
Mark Youngman is  a postgraduate studying terrorism at the University of St Andrews, specializing in Russia’s North Caucasus

GUEST POST: Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: Raqqah Governorate

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Past Guest Posts:
Hazim Fouad, “Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj),” April 30, 2013.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
–
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
A couple of weeks ago I wrote on emerging signs of an apparent split in some respects between Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS). What other evidence has emerged since then? Here I will just focus on the rebel-held city of Raqqah and the wider Raqqah Governorate.
For one thing, the nature of the channel ‘ash-Sham’, which has put out a number of videos purportedly showing members of ISIS, has now become clear. While its now-terminated Youtube profile gave the impression that ash-Sham is run by someone in the United States, the channel is actually based in the city of Raqqah.
Here is an advertisement board put out by ash-Sham in Raqqah, with the slogan ‘Together, let us spread our Shari’a.’ In effect, the channel is a media front for ISIS in Raqqah, and so ash-Sham’s Facebook page also uploaded a photo of the entrance to ISIS’s security office in Raqqah, together with a view of the interior of the office.
More generally, the presence of ISIS supporters can be observed in videos of rallies in Raqqah. For instance, in this video clip of a 24 May demonstration for Qusayr in Raqqah, an ISIS banner can be seen, though it should also be noted that some of the protestors are also waving JAN flags, alongside others who hold FSA flags and one demonstrator for Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya (HASI), which was the main group of rebel battalions that took over Raqqah in March.
Here is another video clip of protests in Raqqah on that day, again featuring an ISIS banner alongside an ISIS flag, together with HASI and FSA banners.  Note also this photo of one of the processions in solidarity with Qusayr with two ISIS flags in the background.
Further, on 31 May, a Friday protest was held in Sayf ad-Dawla street under the name of ‘Our Red Lines’ (alluding to the Obama administration’s shifting of the ‘red line’ on the use of chemical weapons in Syria). Here too one can observe an ISIS flag alongside FSA flags and white banners with the Shahada in black, signifying the realm of Islamic law.
Some inferences can be drawn here. First, whatever ideological differences the protestors and activists in Raqqah may have (and as I have noted before, there is a secular and anti-sectarian trend in the city), cooperation and accommodation rather than mutual hostility remain the norm at demonstrations, particularly those organized around common causes like solidarity with the rebels in Qusayr.
True, some activists in Raqqah have also protested against the rise in Shari’a courts, but to the extent that ISIS and other groups compete to win the support of locals, the competition for ‘hearts and minds’ is generally being pursued peacefully.
The second point to note is that the presence of JAN flags alongside ISIS symbols at demonstrations illustrates that posing an antagonistic JAN-ISIS dichotomy can be simplistic. Some of the activists aligned with ISIS and JAN may simply view each other’s names and banners as mere synonyms.
In a similar vein to JAN’s distribution of works by the likes of Abd al-Wahhab I have noted previously, ISIS is also offering study circles for the Qur’an and life of the Prophet at various mosques. Further, now that the presence in Raqqah has been established for some time, ISIS has taken upon itself to exercise jurisdiction over perceived criminals and regime agents.
The latter was shown with the widely-circulated execution video last month of three men accused of being officers in Assad’s forces, while an example of the former has recently come to light with ISIS’s arrest of a man identified as ‘Ahmad al-Assaf’, accused by ISIS of leading a gang responsible for stealing motorcycles and cars in Raqqah.
One further point suggesting continuity between ISIS and JAN in the Raqqah area and a relationship more or less along the lines of seeing the two there as synonymous is the issue of the northern border town of Tel Abyad. This town was the site of clashes between the northern Farouq Battalions and JAN at the end of March, most likely over control of border access points and resources.
Renewed clashes appear to have emerged in Tel Abyad at the end of May, only this time between Farouq (or the recently formed Liwaa Mustafa) and ISIS, with the latter then taking the initiative to distribute a notice with the ISIS insignia to residents on their right to report on and complain about misconduct by any of the mujahideen.
In short, the case of the city of Raqqah and the surrounding area is indicative of the complexity on the ground of the relationship between JAN and ISIS. In some places elsewhere in Syria, there is probably antagonism between those adopting the JAN label and others the ISIS symbols, but the picture in Raqqah and Raqqah governorate is one of continuity between ISIS and JAN.
Most importantly, the modus operandi of those identifying as ISIS- increasingly prevalent in Raqqah city rather than the banner of JAN- is not fundamentally different from JAN. Ultimately, it is ISIS’ actions on the ground that matter more than a name and flag.
Thus, I do not see a gradual shift to ISIS from JAN in the Raqqah area as having a significant impact for fighters and activists in sympathy with al-Qa’ida. Deeds- and not symbols or names- will decide their fortunes.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University. His website is https://www.aymennjawad.org. Follow on Twitter at @ajaltamimi

GUEST POST: Jabhat al-Nusra's Relations With Other Rebels After the Bay'ah to Zawahiri

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Past Guest Posts:
Hazim Fouad, “Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj),” April 30, 2013.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
—
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Much discussion arose last month when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of the Iraqi al-Qa’ida branch Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) declared that his group and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) are in fact one and the same, prompting Sheikh Jowlani of JAN to reply that he was not consulted on this decision, while pledging allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri and making clear the links between ISI and JAN.
It is likely that the decision to have an ISI-JAN merger announced was Zawahiri’s idea. From this likely supposition, many commentators claimed a turning point in JAN’s fortunes in Syria for the worse. Thus did Brian Fishman attempt to draw an analogy with Iraq, asserting: “It wouldn’t be the first time he [Zawahiri] botched the terror group’s strategy in the region.”
Fishman’s analogy is that the al-Qa’ida pledge in Iraq inevitably translated to brutalization of local Sunnis, which, along with “U.S. pressure” on al-Qa’ida, proved the decisive turning point against al-Qa’ida after the rise of the Sahwa (Awakening) movement. Hence he concludes, “For better or worse, the reckoning between al-Qa’ida’s Syria affiliate and other rebel groups is beginning.”
However, I contend that this view is well overblown. “Syria is/is not Iraq” is of course a statement frequently brought up in common debates over whether the outside world should intervene in militarily or provide lethal aid to rebel forces. The problem is that the general debate over comparisons of Syria to Iraq does not appreciate that the dynamics of how the civil war progressed in Iraq are vastly different from Syria.
Iraq’s sectarian civil war was focused on what might be termed a decisive ‘Battle for Baghdad’ between rival Sunni and Shi’a militias, with the former- demographically in a minority- believing that Sunni Arabs were in fact the majority and could win that civil war. By the end of 2006, large-scale ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from Baghdad had convinced many insurgents who had been working with al-Qa’ida that they could not win, and hence a key driving force behind the turn against al-Qa’ida.
On a side note, I should point out that the belief in a Sunni Arab majority in Iraq is by no means dead, and is back on the ascendancy, being promoted by some mainstream Sunni Arab politicians like Osama al-Nujaifi and by groups organizing demonstrations such as Intifada Ahrar al-Iraq (IAAI).
IAAI is essentially the activist wing of the neo-Ba’athist Naqshibandi militia movement. Concomitant with that belief in a Sunni Arab majority is the notion of marching on Baghdad to retake the city and calling for jihad, sentiments apparent at IAAI protests in areas like Hawija and Tikrit.
In any case, the development of Syria’s civil war is not analogous. For one thing, the timescale is much greater than in Iraq, and Sunni insurgents in Syria are not a minority who falsely believe they are in the majority.
False analogies with Iraq aside, an overview of statements made by various other rebel groups as well as developments on the ground show that nothing has changed for the worse for JAN. Beginning with the issue of statements on JAN’s pledge of allegiance to Zawahiri, the sentiment can be summarized as follows: ‘While we appreciate your efforts against the regime, we do not believe a pledge of allegiance to al-Qa’ida is in anyone’s interests.’ Thus, not a repudiation of JAN itself, but just al-Qa’ida.
Consider, for example, a statement (courtesy of Charles Lister) put out by a Deir ez-Zor battalion known as the Jaish al-Tawhid, which is aligned with the Salafist rebel coalition called the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF). The statement read: “As for Jabhat al-Nusra’s allegiance to al-Qa’ida, this is a matter for their concern, even though we do not support them [in it] as they have come to hold this view, and we recognize that Jowlani’s pledge of allegiance to Sheikh al-Zawahiri is a course of action that does not achieve legitimate interests.”
In a similar vein, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya– one of the largest battalions in the SIF- recently put out a statement indicating that they did not approve of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a merger between ISI and JAN, saying that his announcement was not done in consultation with any proper religious authorities in Syria.
At the same time, the battalion made clear its appreciation of “the self-sacrifice and courage of Jabhat al-Nusra in battles and its good deeds and the goodness of its treatment of the people,” declared to be advancing “the interests of the Ummah.”
Notably, the statement recognizes the risks of conflict spreading in the wider region, but makes clear that “this does not constitute an arbitrary judgment for the artificial borders between the sons of the Ummah.” In other words, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya does not see the notion of an ideological project beyond Syria’s borders as somehow illegitimate.
Coming to reactions outside this Salafist framework, we have the case of a statement put out immediately after JAN’s al-Qa’ida pledge by a self-proclaimed Free Syrian Army military council in the Damascus area, indicating that while JAN is not part of its structure, “its role in the defense of our oppressed people facing the regime of the tyrant [Assad] is valued.”
The al-Furqan Brigades likewise weighed in on JAN’s pledge of allegiance to al-Qa’ida. Their statement cited Qur’an 5:51, “O you who believe, do not take the Jews and Christians as friends; they are in fact friends of each other. And whosoever among you takes them [as friends] is one of them; and verily God does not guide the people of wrongdoers.”

GUEST POST: Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin: Between Israel and Hamas

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Past Guest Posts:
Hazim Fouad, “Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj),” April 30, 2013.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
—
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
In recent weeks and months there has been a cacophony of Salafi protest that has swept Gaza against the ruling Hamas government related to treatment of prisoners, corruption, and ability to practice Islam as they see fit. One of the groups speaking out has been Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin fi Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis, a jihadi organization that is sympathetic to al-Qaeda’s worldview. By glomming onto a mainstream Salafi cause, MSM is attempting to co-opt individuals to gain a stronger footing within Gaza to challenge Hamas (albeit only at the political and not military level yet), whom they view as an enemy similar, though, on a lesser level than Israel.
Background
Following a cross-border attack on Israel carried out by one Egyptian and one Saudi fighter, the organization’s formation was first declared on 19 June 2012, which was announced in a video released from the Sinai Peninsula, featuring seven fighters. The two attackers read their martyrdom wills in the video as well.
In the first part of the video, the speaker in the center reads out a statement and begins by invoking Qur’an 61:4, ‘Verily does God love those who fight in his path in a row as though they were a firm edifice,’ followed by references to standard global jihadist themes such as the necessity of implementing the Shari’a on Earth and reviving the glory of the Ummah.
The Majlis also appeals to fellow Muslims in countries like Lebanon, Jordan, as well as the ‘Syrian Muslim people- the mujahid [people] brutalized under the control of the idolatrous, criminal Nusayri [derogatory term for ‘Alawite’] regime.’
The flag used is identical to the one pioneered by al-Qa’ida’s Iraqi branch known as the Islamic State of Iraq, and the group praises ‘Sheikh Osama Bin Laden’ in its founding statement.  Yet, while the al-Qa’ida affiliation thus illustrated is not in doubt, the group’s primary focus to attack Israel has been evident from the beginning.
This is apparent in the reference to the obligation of ‘the people of Tawhid [monotheism]’ to heed the ‘screams of al-Aqsa and the moans of prisoners under the grip of the enemy Jewish cowards.’ The founding statement includes in its conclusion a call for God to defeat ‘the Jews and the kuffar.’
In a video from October of last year, the Majlis likewise vowed to fight the Jews as enemies of God. In the wake of an April 2013 rocket attack on Eilat, the group released a video, part of which featured scenes of Jews praying at the Western Wall, denounced by the Majlis as the ‘Judaization of al-Aqsa.’ The video then continues with the recurring theme of treatment of Muslim prisoners by Israel.
MSM and Hamas
The focus on Israel is also made clear by the fact that the organization maintains a presence among Salafist jihadists located in the Gaza Strip. In light of Hamas’ detention and torture of jihadist individuals, the Majlis has on more than one occasion raised the issue of Hamas’ conduct towards Salafist militants.
For example, a senior Salafist in Gaza affiliated with the Majlis recently affirmed: ‘We will continue the jihad regardless of the stance of Egypt or Hamas,’ adding that the Majlis has ‘precise knowledge on the complete cooperation between Egypt and Hamas in the war against the Salafists.’
In a similar vein, the Majlis recently released a statement calling for the release of all Salafist detainees held prisoner by the Hamas government: ‘Everyone who has a free voice and noble pen, and everyone who has a living conscience and faith should raise his voice to pressure the dismissed government to put a stop to its pursuit against the rights of its mujahideen.’
Criticism of Hamas has been a recurring theme in Salafist discourse. A very noteworthy example is a Salafist-Jihadist video (NB not from an al-Qa’ida affiliate) from about a year ago that purports to document evidence on numerous counts of Hamas’ perpetrating- in the words of the video title- ‘massacres…in Gaza against the Salafist mujahideen.’
For example, at 17:40 onwards, the video offers a purportedly intercepted radio transmission from the leadership of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades giving orders to destroy houses and a mosque frequented by Salafists with missiles.
Like the affirmation to continue jihad despite perceived Egypt-Hamas cooperation against Salafist militants, the latest call by the Majlis for Hamas to release Salafist detainees comes following the killing by Israel of a Majlis militant called Haitham Ziyad al-Meshaal, now commemorated as a ‘martyr’ in a video released by the organization.
The day before Haitham was assassinated, relatives of imprisoned Salafist militants in Gaza held a demonstration calling on Hamas’ security forces to release their detained kinsfolk. The al-Qa’ida flag’s presence may indicate that some of the imprisoned fighters in question are members of the Majlis.
It turns out that Haitham, who was targeted as a suspect behind the rocket attacks on Eilat, had once been a member of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades but according to the Majlis, left out of disillusionment with Hamas’ participation in ‘the game of democracy’ (a reference to the 2006 legislative elections that were judged to be free) and its ‘removal of the divine Shari’a.’
One should compare this sentiment with a statement from the group that condemned Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and some Salafist parties (e.g. Egypt’s an-Nour) for entering into the ‘mud of democracy.’ Here is a photo of Haitham from his funeral

GUEST POST: "Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj)"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Past Guest Posts:
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
—
By Hazim Fouad
In 2012 the Salafist TV Channel “al-Rahma” screened a debate between two representatives of the so called “al-Salafiyya al-Jihādiyya” and two members of “Jamāʿat Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya”, one of the oldest Salafist institutions in Egypt. The debate sheds some light on the ideological differences, especially with regard to the acceptance of the political and legal system in post-revolutionary Egypt.
Introduction
The toppling of Hosni Mubarak[i]  in 2011 has led to an increased space for debate about the role of Islam in society and politics in Egypt. Several persons who had been sentenced over terrorism charges were released from prison and are now participating in this debate. One of the most ardent questions is how and to what extent sharia shall be implemented in the political system. This debate is not new. It was already an issue back in the seventies when groups like “al-Jamāʿāh al-Islāmiyya” revolted against what they perceived as an un-Islamic regime. What is new is on the one hand, the relatively open space in which such discussions take place. On the other hand, it becomes obvious that not every group, which can be labeled Islamist or even Salafist is automatically opposed to the concept of a civil state and laws not directly derived from the sharia.
This article tries to provide an in depth analysis of a three hour television debate which was screened in 2012 on the Egyptian Salafist TV Channel “al-Rahma”[ii] between two representatives of the so called “al-Salafiyya al-Jihādiyya”, a broad current comprising movements close to the ideology of “al-Qāʿidāh”, and two members of the “Jamāʿat Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya”, one of the oldest Salafist institutions in Egypt.[iii] It will be shown that the former actually use similar arguments “al-Jamāʿāh al-Islāmiyya” has used before to explain their complete rejection of the current political system, [iv] while the latter appear to be much more accommodating, though still at odds with the notion of democracy. The debate also sheds some light on the legitimacy of violence, as carried out by groups such as “al-Qāʿidāh”.
The first of its kind
The program begins with the moderator stating that rather than a contentious debate, this talk is supposed to be a calm discussion about jihadist thought and the first of its kind in Egypt. He then introduces the participants of the debate. The current of the so-called “al-Salafiyya al-Jihādiyya” is represented by Aḥmad Fuʾād ʿAshūsh and Jalāl al-Sharqāwī. ʿAshūsh is the leader of “al-Ṭalī’a al-Salafīyya al-Mujāhidīyya Ansār al-Sharīʿāh” in Egypt, an organization ideologically close to “al-Qāʿidāh”.[v] He had openly declared his loyalty to Usāma bin Lādin and Aymān al-Ẓawāhirī and appeared in several videos published by “al-Qāʿidāh”.[vi] Al-Sharqāwī has appeared together with Muḥammad al-Ẓawāhirī, the brother of Ayman al- Ẓawāhirī, in a press conference concerning the viewpoint of “al-Salafiyya al-Jihādiyya” on the constitution.[vii]
The other side is represented by Jamāl al-Marākibī and ʿAlāʾ Saʿīd. Al-Marākibī has been the former general president of the “Jamāʿat Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya”, one of the oldest salafist institutions in Egypt, established in 1926. He is also a member of the “Shura Council of Scholars in Egypt”, which was set up by prominent Salafist scholars in 2011.[viii] Saʿīd is a preacher from Suez and supporter of the Salafist “al-Aṣālāh Party”.
Acceptance of laws perceived as un-Islamic
The debate starts with ʿAshūsh clarifying his positions with regard to the current constitution and laws, which govern Egypt. He states that the current reality is a product of the West’s infiltration of Muslim lands and those Muslims, which have been affected by Western ideas (al-mustaghribīn) and therefore not the result of a pure Islamic development. The Egyptian jurisdiction is based on the Napoleonic Code, which follows the philosophy of utilitarianism (al-nafʿiyya) developed by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham. With the application of this positive or man-made law (al-qānūn al-waḍʿī), the Sharia had been suspended since 1883. ʿAshūsh voices harsh criticism towards Muḥammad ʿAbduh, one of the key leaders of Muslim reformist thought and Mufti of Egypt at the turn of the 20th century, who had allegedly used these un-Islamic laws as a basis for his legal judgments. He summarizes his point by saying: “Our position is the complete rejection (al-rafḍ al-tām) of the rule of this law”.
Al-Marākibī begins his answer by admitting that ʿAshūsh is correct by saying that a Muslim country has to be governed by the sharia. But he argues for a more nuanced understanding of the word “law” (qānūn), which for him is an umbrella term, comprising multiple areas such as the law of inheritance or the law of guardianship, both of which are in his view in accordance with the sharia.
He also points to the fact that the sharia can be categorized into issues, which are definite (qaṭʿī) and those, which can be subject to interpretation (dhannī). There are some words for example, whose meaning is debated and not uniformly defined. The point of contention al-Marākibī sees is the question of how to change the reality Muslims in Egypt live in. Citing the founder of his movement Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiqqī and the Azharite Hadith scholar Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir, he says that this matter has to be solved through preaching (daʿwah). The applied method (manhaj) has to be to look first after those parts in the law that violate the sharia and then to change them via other laws instead of using violence. Jihad for him is the revival of the sharia and curbing the ignorance towards it, a process which in his eyes started in Egypt already over a hundred years ago.
This relativizing viewpoint of al-Marākibī seems to be unacceptable to ʿAshūsh. He replies that if only a single paragraph violates the sharia, the whole law becomes void (bāṭil). He goes on to ask about the position of all the other Islamic movements towards this positive law, which in his view is clear unbelief (kufr), since it allows sexual intercourse between a father and his daughter. Replying to the question of al-Marākibī where exactly the law legitimizes

GUEST POST: Famous Anasheed: ‘Madin Kas-Sayf’ by Abu Ali

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.
Past Guest Posts:
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
—
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
When it comes to media articles on jihadism, one of the least explored aspects is the phenomenon of anasheed (‘songs’ [sing. ‘nasheed’]- distinguished in this context by lack of use of musical instruments as per a widely held Islamic view that instruments are haram). Of the munshid artists who produce songs of this type, one of the most prominent is Abu Ali, of Saudi origin.
While Aaron Zelin regularly provides links to more recent anasheed, I decided to translate the lyrics of one of Abu Ali’s most well-known songs: ‘Madin kas-sayf’ (‘Sharp Like The Sword’): famous at least in jihadist circles. The tune is in fact identical to another nasheed he composed, entitled ‘It blew like the wind’– a song that does not refer to jihad but rather calls for the revival of the Ummah’s glory and encourages believers to seek knowledge and help each other out (in the Youtube video linked to for ‘It blew like the wind’, the user has misidentified it as ‘Sharp like the Sword’).
Given the glorification of suicide bombing that becomes very clear towards the end, the reference to ‘the occupier’ and al-Aqsa, one might expect that this nasheed was composed around the time of the Second Intifada, which saw numerous instances of suicide bombings. Yet the earliest instance I know of its use is in a 48-minute video released by the Somali al-Qa’ida affiliate Harakat ash-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, entitled ‘Labbayka ya Osama’ (‘I am at your service, oh Osama’) in 2009 (H/T: Phillip Smyth).
Here is a translation:
‘Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel that tear through his wall with fright.
He has rejected humiliation and has arisen, weaving his pride with might.
Like a weary fugitive has his day concealed him and passed by in concealment.
Like the roaming star, his orbit falls on the path of glory.
He was once not satisfied with the world at all, and injustice is his oppressor.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the night, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut  of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel that tear through his wall with fright.
He hearkened unto glory when Al-Aqsa summoned its revolutionaries.
He chanted, filled with longing for death, and proceeded to play his lute.
The occupier set up his trickery, and his broker was seduced by it.
He molded the words as promises, he embroidered his dialogue with deception.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel tears through his wall with fright.
They cultivated his path in fright, they imposed his blockade with starvation.
So he advanced; cunning did not divert him, even as it summoned its false steps.
How preposterous! He makes a truce until he should wipe away his shame with might.
A volcano of faith; this Talmud is his frenzy.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the wave in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the billows, sparkling.
Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel that tear through his wall with fright.
So he [the occupier] built his strongholds in fear, he raised his walls in them.
So he [the mujahid] blew himself up among them in anger; he fixed his nails in them.
You see him as splinters of fire; a commando makes his raid.
He did not slow down his pace until he carried out his decision in death
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel that tear through his wall with fright.’
Explanatory Notes:
Taghut- An Islamic term used to describe idolatry and error. It is one of a group of words that occur in the Qur’an with the –ut termination (cf. ملكوت- ‘kingdom’, especially as in the ‘Kingdom of God’). In the 19th century, Geiger contended that the word is of Rabbinical Hebrew origin, since, he said, ‘no pure Arabic word’ ends with the –ut termination. In any event, the etymology is a matter of much dispute; for an attempt to connect the term with Ethiopic, see this discussion by Gabriel Said Reynolds.
Ababeel– Mentioned in Qur’an 105:3 (in the chapter known as ‘The Elephant’). These are apparently birds sent by God against an Aksumite force that tried to conquer Mecca in the 6th century, driving off the invaders with stones.
How preposterous! He makes a truce until he should wipe away his shame with might– Appears to be a reference to how some Islamist militants interpret the concept of hudna (Arabic for ‘ceasefire’). The idea is to sign a truce with your enemy and then wait until you think you have the upper hand, at which point you should resume hostilities.
Alternative Reading (Update and Revision: 26 May 2013)
On account of the quality of the recording, multiple interpretations can arise as regards the transcription of the Arabic lyrics. I have listened to this nasheed a number of times and I think one can propose some plausible alternatives:
*- Alternatively, this line could be transcribed as ‘نازل طاغوت الدنيا, لا يملك غير حجارة’ (‘He has clashed with the Taghut of the world. He has possession of nothing except stones’). The next line would then be referring to how he throws those stones, presumably at the occupier.
Translation of Arabic lyrics by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, who is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University. His website is https://www.aymennjawad.org

Jihadology presents Top Posts and Most Video Plays in 2012

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

For previous posts in this series see:

–

Top Posts
New book from Omar Hammami [Abū Manṣūr al-Amrīkī]: “The Story of an American Jihādī, Part 1″
As-Saḥāb presents a new video message from al-Qā’idah’s Dr. Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī and Amīr of Ḥarakat al-Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn’s Shaykh Mukhtār Abū al-Zubayr: “Glad Tidings: Announcement of Ḥarakat al-Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn Officially Joining al-Qā’idah”
New statement from the Amīr of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Mullā Muḥmmad ‘Umar: “Message of Felicitation on the Occasion of ‘Īd al-Fiṭr”
New video message from Omar Hammami [Abū Manṣūr al-Amrīkī]: “Urgent Message”
Kavkaz Center presents a new video message from Dokku Umarov: “Holding a Meeting and Visiting a Base of the Mujāhidīn”
al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s al-Malāḥim Media releases Inspire Magazine Issue #8 and #9
As-Saḥāb Media Production releases second edition of Dr. Ayman aẓ-Ẓawāhirī’s “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner”
As-Saḥāb Media presents a new video message from al-Qā’idah’s Dr. Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī: “Onward Oh Lions of Syria”
Issue #1 of a new Swahili magazine: “Gaidi Mtaani”
al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s al-Malāḥim Media releases Inspire Magazine Issue #5
Most Video Plays
Dr. Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī — “Onward Oh Lions of Syria”
Dr. Ayman al-Ẓawāhirī and Shaykh Mukhtār Abū al-Zubayr — “Glad Tidings”
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — “Fulfillment of the Vow #2, Part 2″
Ibn Taymīyyah Center for Media — “Rally Carried Out by the Heroes of the Sinai- Support For the Oppressed Brothers in Syria”
Majlis Shūrā al-Mujāhidīn Fī Aknāf Bayt al-Maqdis — “Scenes From the Bombing of the Sites and the Jewish Settlements”
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — “Fulfillment of the Vow #1”
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — “Battle of Revenge for the Free of ash-Shām (Syria)”
Mountainous Sector of Wilāyah Dagestān of the Caucasus Emirate — “Mujāhidīn Ambush in Tsumada District”
Dokku Umarov — “Holding a Meeting and Visiting a Base of the Mujāhidīn”
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — “Beginning of the End #3- Aleppo and The Battle of Glory”

GUEST POST: Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.
Past Guest Posts:
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
—
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi
“The popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain have not only shaken the foundation of the authoritarian order in the Middle East, but they have also hammered a deadly nail in the coffin of a terrorism narrative which has painted al Qaeda as the West’s greatest threat,” Fawaz Gerges of the London School of Economics opined in definitive tones in January 2012. Peter Bergen, the bestselling author and CNN terrorism analyst, shares that sentiment, describing Osama bin Laden’s death and the events popularly known as the “Arab Spring” as “the final bookends” of the Global War on Terror. “It’s hard to think of anything that’s more seismic in terms of undercutting al Qaeda’s ideology,” he said, than the combination of these two developments. Other Western commentators believe the Arab Spring has helped the forces of jihadism. Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA unit that pursued bin Laden, said at a book festival in Edinburgh, Scotland, that the Arab Spring “delighted al Qaeda,” and has been “an intelligence disaster” for the United States.
Gerges and Bergen are representative of one side of a debate raging in the West over the impact of the Arab Spring on the threat of al Qaeda–inspired terrorism; Scheuer represents another side, with many gradations between their polarized outlooks. Yet, although informed observers’ perspectives on the impact that the Arab Spring will have on al Qaeda and other salafi jihadi groups differ, they are seemingly unanimous in believing that the effect of these uprisings will be profound. Unfortunately, one important voice has been marginalized from this debate: that of salafi jihadis themselves.
A review of prominent articles and analyses on the topic, some of them quite worthwhile, makes the marginalization of the jihadis’ perspective clear. Analysis of the Arab Spring’s impact on al Qaeda is often structural in nature, as is the case with Seth Jones’s observation in Foreign Policy that the revolutions may produce weak states, which social science literature suggests are more likely to become “fertile ground for terrorist groups.” Although Jones quotes from al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri, that quotation is intended to show that al Qaeda has designs for the Arab Spring rather than to comprehensively illuminate the group’s perspective and strategic thought. Eugenio Lilli’s structural analysis in the Journal of Terrorism Research reaches a more optimistic conclusion, that democracy is “still one of the best weapons to fight the threat of Islamic terrorism.” Lilli quotes Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Qaddafi’s warnings that their fall could bolster extremist forces, but he neither quotes nor cites the views of a single jihadi figure since the revolutions began.
Some analyses focus on internal dynamics within the jihadi movement. For example, William McCants’s informative Foreign Affairs piece “Al Qaeda’s Challenge” discusses, among other things, the manner in which Islamists who vote and Islamist parliamentarians pose problems for al Qaeda’s outlook. McCants hones in on a few discrete aspects of al Qaeda’s thought that are challenged by the new Islamist embrace of electoral politics, rather than assessing the group’s current perceptions of the Arab Spring. Still other contributions describe on-the-ground developments spurred by the Arab Spring that may strengthen or undermine al Qaeda. Such pieces may contribute when they offer rich descriptions, but they are less concerned with how jihadis see developments, and jihadi thinkers are rarely quoted in this genre.
Jihadi perceptions of the Arab Spring are important not because we can take their viewpoint as the definitive reading of these events, but rather because the U.S. has often encountered problems over the past decade when it has failed to understand the adversary. It could likewise be a grave error to declare what the events of the Arab Spring mean for the future of jihadi activities without understanding how the other side in this conflict perceives them.
This article addresses this gap in the literature through an analysis of 101 documents produced by salafi jihadi thinkers within a year following the movement’s first statement on the uprising in Tunisia (a January 13, 2011 statement from Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud). These documents include statements released by spokesmen, interviews with the movement’s intellectual leaders, and discussions on Web forums. Of course, there is no unified jihadi movement with something resembling a collective conscience. There are conflicting and competing groups; nor do they possess a unified view of the Arab Spring. But within the first year of public statements, there was more agreement than disagreement. Jihadi observers had a largely optimistic outlook on the revolts, seeing the Arab Spring as “a tsunami” capable of sweeping away regimes throughout the region and beyond. These observers believed that they were presented with new opportunities, and have begun to outline a methodology for taking advantage of these opportunities.
A Pan-Islamic Uprising
Jihadi observers see the events in the Arab world as a pan-Islamic uprising, one that may quickly extend beyond Arabic-speaking countries. This was apparent even in the first statement that a jihadi group released on the events of the Arab Spring, the aforementioned document from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud. “Your battle you fight today,” Wadoud told the Tunisians, “isn’t alienated from the general battle the Muslim umma is engaged in against its external and domestic enemies.”
Jihadi observers were ahead of the curve in predicting that Egypt would be next. On January 21, four days before the demonstrations that would topple Hosni Mubarak began, Kuwait-based commentator Hamid bin Abdallah al Ali wrote that the Egyptian regime “has an appointment with a coming and imminent pain.” He stated that the coming demonstration would “transfer the pains which afflicted the Arab peoples onto the tyrants, and transfer the authority back to the people, just as Tunisia did.” Ali’s assessment proved to be more accurate than that offered by U.S. officials, including the American secretary of state.
Jihadi observers generally agree with the assessment of Jordanian Islamist Akram Hijazi, who said on January 26 that “the Arab people are

EXCLUSIVE GUEST POST: The Indonesian Jamā'ah Islāmiyyah's Constitution (PUPJI)

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.
The below guest post is from the Australian Jack Roche who is a former member of Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah. Roche was trained in an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan and was arrested in November 2002 for a plot against the Israeli Embassy in Canberra, Australia. Roche later said that he did not intend to carry out the plot.  After his arrest Roche helped provide vital information and intelligence on al-Qaeda and Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah. Roche was convicted to four and a half years in prison, and was released in May 2007 after serving his time. Below he explains Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s constitution based on his perspective and background. He also has provided an English translation of the entire constitution, which you can read here.
Past Guest Posts:
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
—
PUPJI: Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jamaah Islamiyah (General Guidelines for the Struggle of (an/the) Islāmic Group)
By Jack Roche
PUPJI was a document produced by the Indonesian based group JI, that is, Jamaah Islamiyah – the Islāmic Group. Once produced, production was merely the photo-copying, scanning or retyping of an extant original. It was only available to high-ranking members within the group (as attested to by Nasir Abas [a former high ranking member of JI] in his book)…‘the Amir of Al Jamaah al Islāmiyah, daily executive Amir (a person who has authority like the Amir), members of the Markaziy (Majlis Qiyādah Markazīyah) – Central Command Administration, and regional leaders as well as staff members (Majlis Qiyādah Wakālah – Proxy Command Administration)’.[1] [2]
In order to partially answer why it was that PUPJI was not made available to rank and file members, it is perhaps prudent to refer to a statement given by Nasir Abas:
‘…knowledge of PUPJI is restricted to the level of leader and above alone. Other members are guided and given instructions without the knowledge that those guidelines and instructions originate from the book of guidelines for the daʿwah of Al Jamaah al Islāmiyah, namely PUPJI, and without in fact having any knowledge of PUPJI. Likewise also, not all members of the Al Jamaah al Islāmiyah organization have ever physically seen the book of PUPJI but there are those who have knowledge of its existence or have heard of it but never actually seen it.’[3]
Whilst this does not completely answer the question of why the restricted availability of PUPJI, it does signpost guidance and instruction within JI being given by those personnel that have been made privy to PUPJI. Were it to be the case that copies of PUPJI were made available to each and every member of JI, then without correct supervision all manner of individual interpretations would abound. Such a system would be no system at all other than a form of anarchy. The distribution of PUPJI is therefore a managerial strategy, one that aligns itself with Islāmic methodology (namely that command comes from above) and ‘those personnel that have been made privy’, that is those individuals who possess a reasonably high degree of Islāmic knowledge and/or knowledge of the mechanisms and objectives of JI as a whole as well as leadership skills, are tasked with disseminating the precepts contained within PUPJI towards those members of JI tasked under their care.
PUPJI describes itself as,…‘a general objective that is able to provide a systematic overview for the motivational steps of a jamāʿah that integrates careful, objective standardized principles and operational measures’. This clause of PUPJI gels with the description given by Nasir Abas, that it was ‘…conferral of a systematic illustration of the Jamaah’s steps which are cohesive between the principal values (Islām) and the undertaking of actions that are prudent, guided, and regulated’.[4] It is within this context that it acts as a ‘guide-book’ or ‘book of guidelines’ for the workings of a/the jamā‘ah – that is a group that functions within and along Islāmic principles. For these reasons one often hears it described as JI’s constitution.
JI was officially formed around January of 1993 when some members of NII (Negara Islām Indonesia – Islāmic State of Indonesia) group broke away from its leadership. The breakaway members were ‘lead’ by ‘Abdullāh Sungkar and Abū Bakar Ba’asyir. Many of the members of NII had undergone training in Afghanistan under the auspices of such individuals as Shaikh ‘Abdur-Rabb rasul Sayyaf. Whilst the members of JI were now detached from NII, they were still able to make use of whatever facilities were available for training in Afghanistan.
As a group/organization, NII possessed ‘state statutes’.[5]  This is something that is often overlooked when examining the genealogy of JI, that is it is seldom made mention of. These ‘state statutes’ had been drawn up by, amongst others, S. M. Kartosoewirjo when he proclaimed the Islāmic Nation of Indonesia (NII) in a regional area in West Java on the 7th of August 1949. According to Nasir Abas, they were in book form and known as ‘Pedoman Dharma Bhakti’ (Negara Islam Indonesia) – ‘Manual of Devotional Obligations’ (Islāmic State of Indonesia) and ‘Qanun Asasi’ (sometimes referred to as Qanun Azasi) – ‘Founding Principles’ or ‘Statutes’, ‘Constitution’).[6]
In fact, ‘Pedoman Dharma Bhakti’ was a conglomeration of a number of smaller publications. These included, ‘Qanun Azasi’, ‘UU Hukum Pidana’ (Criminal Laws), ‘Maklumat Imam’ (Edicts of the Leader), ‘Maklumat Militer’ (Military Edicts), ‘Maklumat Komandemen Tertinggi’ (High Command Edicts), ‘Statement Pemerintah’ (Government Statement), and ‘Manifesto Politik’ (Political Manifesto). It is reasonable to determine that PUPJI was in fact a revised version of those publications.
Whilst ‘Pedoman Dharma Bhakti’ was written in Indonesian, PUPJI was written in both Indonesian and Arabic, wherein the main text is Indonesian and ‘references’ being in Arabic. ‘References’ within the document are quotations from Al Qur‘ān and the aḥādīth (‘sayings’) or Sunnah (sayings, non-sayings, actions or non-actions of the Prophet Muḥammad).
I was taught in 1996/97 that the principles upheld by JI towards the individuals within the group, and as such inculcated and practiced, were in accordance with those adhered to and upheld as belonging to the ‘aqīdah (belief) of the Ahlus Sunnah wa’l Jamā‘ah minhajus-Salafuṣ-Ṣāliḥ. The beliefs of the Ahlus Sunnah wa’l Jamā‘ah is the belief and method of that which the Messenger of Allāh came with, and how his Ṣaḥābat understood this belief and their application of this method.
Ahlus Sunnah wa’l Jamāfiah minhajus-Salafuṣ-Ṣāliḥ is explainable as:
Those who adhere to the Sunnah [of the Prophet Muḥammad] and who are assembled together in a group and who follow the methodology and practices of the Pious Predecessors. The ‘Pious Predecessors’ are the 1st three generations of Muslims, namely:

  1. The Prophet Muḥammad and his Ṣaḥābat (companions who followed the Prophet Muḥammad in his application of the Deen (religion) of Islām);
  2. The Tābi‘īn (followers of the Ṣaḥābat);
  3. The Tābi‘at-Tābi‘īn (followers of the followers of the Ṣaḥābat)].

The basis of Ahlus Sunnah wa’l Jamā‘ah is upon such aḥādīth as:
It was narrated from ‘Awf bin Mālik that the Messenger of Allāh said: “The Jews split into seventy-one sects, one of which will be in Paradise and seventy in Hell. The Christians split into seventy-two sects, seventy-one of which will be in Hell and one in Paradise. I swear by the One in Whose Hand is the soul of Muḥammad, my nation will split into seventy-three sects, one of which will be in Paradise and seventy-two in Hell.” It was said: “O Messenger of Allāh who are they?” He said: “Al Jamā‘ah – The main body.” (Sunan Ibnu Mājah 3992).
And:
“…adhere to my sunnah and the sunnah of the rightly guided caliphs…” (Sunan At-Tirmidhī 2685).
The general principles espoused within PUPJI are influenced by the likes of such people as Muḥammad bin ‘Abdul-Wahhāb, Abū’l A‘lā Maudūdī, and Sayyid Qutb. This would also have been the case for many of the precepts contained within the ‘state statutes’ of NII. However, since PUPJI was drawn up in 1996, its precepts were also influenced by the likes of ‘Abdullāh fiAzzam, Ayman Aẓ-Ẓawāhirī, and Usāmah bin Lādin, amongst others. This influence is in no small part due to the presence of NII members under training

New statement from the The Muslim Youth Center: "End Humiliation of Muslims!"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin


Mererani, (1/08/2012) – MYC in Kenya, Tanzania and Somalia is increasingly concerned at the impunity that the Kuffar Kenyan government enjoys in the name of fighting the war on terrorism in humiliating our Muslim brothers and sisters in Kenya. As part of AQEA, MYC is advising its members in East Africa to be alert at all times and prepare for the weeks ahead as our brothers Al-Shabaab in Somalia commence battle with the Kuffar coalition.
Recently, on 30/07/2012 the Kuffar conducted an illegal raid on a cyber café at Mumbai shopping mall in Majengo. Immediately, the Kuffar asked the cyber café customers who was a Muslim and who were Christians. The Christians were release without charge and the Muslims were all arrested on terrorism-related charges. MYC is currently trying to establish more details of the brothers arrested. It is clear now that using a cyber café if you are a Muslim in Kenya in now a crime.
The raid on Monday was another attempt to weaken the Muslim Ummah in Kenya and make Muslims slaves to the Kuffar.  This objective is but a Kuffar dream that will never happen.
MYC is urging the Kuffar Kenya security agencies to listen carefully to Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali’s (May Allah protect him to complete his jihad against Kenya) video message on humiliating Muslims in Kenya. In his message he warned Kenya to stop humiliating Muslims. MYC also reminds the Kuffar Kenya security agencies to read and re-read the first edition of “Gaidi Mtaani.  The message there is clear. The impunity that Kenya seeks to enjoy in humiliating Muslims will end with Muslims rising up against you under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali. Our struggle against you is a struggle past on from generation to generation.
To MYC members in Kenya and Tanzania, we ask you to remain alert and prepared. May Allah make you all firm in this religious struggle against the Kuffar.
MYC
Press Office
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