GUEST POST: Gaidi Mtaani

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest authors and they do not represent the views of this websites administrator.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to Global Jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.
Past Guest Posts:



By Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn
Al-Shabbab introduced the world’s first Swahili jihadi magazine on April 5, 2012 called Gaidi Mtaani, meaning “On Terrorism Street.” In “On Terrorism Street” al-Shabbab subtly mocks the Kenyan army’s Operation Linda Nchi (“Defend the Nation”) by naming its own operation, Operation Linda Uislam (“Defend Islam”). The online magazine’s colourful style and well-edited and formatted articles places it among the elite of online Jihadist publications, similar to al-Qaeda’s now inactive Inspire and the Turkistan Islamic Party’s (TIP) Islamic Turkistan.
As always, the language of choice for this publication, Swahili, matters. Evidently, al-Shabbab wants to appeal to the Kenyan street. Al-Shabbab’s own constituency in Somalia would only understand Somali and, to a lesser extent, Arabic. Kenyan elites would be more attracted to an English publication than Swahili given that English is the language of education and the upper class in Kenya. Al-Shabbab may be trying to win over lesser-educated Muslims in Northern Kenya to al-Shabbab’s cause or to convince Kenyans of all stripes that the propaganda they see on television about the Kenyan army’s success in Somalia is untrue.
Alternatively, the publication may be a way for al-Shabbab to tell jihadis that al-Shabbab considers Kenya another one of its enemies, as evidence by the use of Swahili—not English, Somali or Arabic. On the Somali online jihadi forum, al-Qimmah, al-Shabbab has released other warnings to the Kenyan government, but the “Gaidi Mtaani” publication in Swahili, which was released on the Shamukh al-Islam forum, will reach a more diverse audience than statements on al-Qimmah.
Below is a summary translation of some of the main points included in the publication:
Operation Linda Uislam (Operation protect Islam)
Many Muslims believe that any attack on them (such as the incursion of Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) into Somalia) is instigated from the West. The basis that Kenya used to start the attack was not sufficient to justify its attack on al-Shabbab, but was part of the wider scheme of the influence of the unbelievers (kafir) of the Western world. The reason was a mere fabrication to validate their attack on Islam.
It is clear that the Western media has been successful in shading Muslim believers in a bad light. It has created an impression that the believers of God, who are fighting according to God’s will are followers and sympathizers of terrorism. The Western journalists are experts of deceit who have even managed to deceive some Muslims to believe their slander!
The fact is that they are trying to misrepresent the mujahidin by spreading false information and magnifying their small mistakes to look like big crimes. They are sowing a seed of hatred amongst them, their leaders and followers. On the other hand, they seem to praise the West and justify their wickedness. Therefore, Muslims are urged not to rely on such news sources until they are validated by true Islamic sources. However, some news such as that of weather can be relied on.
Protecting the Mujahidin
The prophet of God (Mohammad) says, “Whoever shall protect the reputation and name of his brother, God shall deliver his face from the furnace of jehannam (hell) at the day of judgement (from Al Tirmithi).” He continues saying that, “anybody who shall betray a fellow Muslim, his reputation shall be destroyed and God will forsake him at the time of need…” therefore Muslims are urged to defend their Muslim brothers all the time.
The British Betrayal of Muslims
History is very clear about how the British related with Muslims in the East African coast in the colonial period. The massacre, persecution and other inhumane acts that they did to Muslims are evidence of how they hate humanity. Their image today of being in the front line in defending human rights is superficial because underneath lies the crimes against humanity they perpetrated especially on Muslims. The British activities of fighting Islam are well known and are not a new thing. For example they took Palestine’s land and gave it to Jews. This is a proof that they can take land that duly belongs to Muslims and give it to their enemies.
In the case of East Africa; in 1895, the British government was given a coastal strip of 10 miles by the Sultans of Zanzibar. These Zanzibar leaders entered into a treaty which had one of its articles state that “Britain will not apply any Christian law on any party of the coast UNLESS Kenya attained independence or they consent to change the religion of the coast six months in advance.” These unwise poor sultans of Zanzibar made religion a commodity for transaction with the British authorities.
In the Lancaster meeting of 1962-63 which was to write the Kenya constitution, it was agreed that that coastal strip shall remain under the jurisdiction of the independent Kenyan government. We are not trying to mean or imply that the coastal Kenya should secede from the mainland Kenya. Not at all! We are trying to make the reader to understand how the Islamic religion was joked about.
Britain was a key player in dislodging Palestinians in favour of the Jews and selling the Muslim land in the Kenyan coast to the Kenyan government. Today the same thing is happening in Somalia where they are assisting to cast down Islam that is defended by al-Shabbab. They have been envying the Islamic growth in Somalia for the past 20 years, thus they now support the AMISOM, Ethiopian troops and now the KDF incursion into Somalia to disrupt the Islamic systems. But their efforts will not prevail over God.
The recent London Conference on Somalia was sponsored by Britain. The inner motive was to topple the Islamic systems by collaborating with Kenya together with other African countries and the world. If you carefully look at what is going on in Kenya and Somalia then you will vividly understand the real intention.
Just a few days before the conference, Kenya had given a contract to Total to start exploring oil on the coast. Later we saw British and American companies sign a contract to mine oil in Puntland. Moreover, just the other day we saw the Kenyan president, Ethiopian PM and the South Sudan president converge in Lamu to launch the construction of the Port of Lamu. It is sad that other nations are using the Somalia situation to advance their economic development instead of helping Somalia back to peace by strengthening Islam because Somalia was peaceful when it was under Islamic rule.
If Kenya is going to be the Israel of Africa and Somalia the Palestine of Africa then we must not allow that. Every Muslim wherever you are ask yourself whether you are defending Islam from attack by the unbelievers (kafir) or you are supporting the attack.
10 ways of recognizing an undercover spy

  1. He will disguise himself and start establishing friendship with the one he is interested in investigating just as a normal person.
  2. A few elements of lies will start surfacing. You will note this when he will use long explanations to defend himself whenever he contradicts himself. For example he may claim to be a college student and you may see him in a cyber cafe or the mosque

GUEST POST: Belgian Jihadis in Syria

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Past Guest Posts:
North Caucasus Caucus, “Turkish Fighters in Syria, Online and Off,” August 20, 2013.
Mark Youngman, “Book Review of David Malet’s “Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts”,” June 20, 2013.
Hazim Fouad, “Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj),” April 30, 2013.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.

Belgian Jihadis in Syria
By Pieter Van Ostaeyen
Belgium always had a bit of a dual relationship with its numerous immigrants from the Maghreb and Turkey. In the 1960’s Belgium heavily encouraged migration from Morocco and Turkey. They were seen as  cheaper work forces for the steel and coal industry, which made Belgium a crucial part of the precursor to the European Union and the integration of European economies.
When the heavy industry faded though, these immigrant families remained in Belgium. Currently, some of the third and fourth generation of these immigrants are people who  live on the margins of society. The Belgium government over the last several decades never really succeeded integrating the Islamic communities. In the late 1980’s and 1990’s Moroccon youth were renowned for crimes like drug-dealing, theft, and many of them were jobless yet drove around in big cars like Mercedes and BMW.
In one manifestations of the inability to integrate (or the lack of will to do so by some) during the last few decades, led to the creation of the Salafist movement Sharia4Belgium on March 3 2010. Their spokesman Fouad Belkacem (aka Abu Imran) was soon branded persona non grata on public fora. Under heavy public pressure and after several judicial actions against the group, Sharia4Belgium dissolved itself on October 7 2012.

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Photo 1: Fouad Belkacem, spokesman of Sharia4Belgium

Meanwhile the war in Syria had been raging for about a year and a half. Reports started appearing claiming European Muslims were fighting in Syria. It would only take a couple of months before the first Belgian and Dutch jihadis were identified. On February 16, 2013 another horrible video from Syria (first published by @hlk01) was posted. There was Dutch heard in the video. Later that week, the Dutch newspaper De Telegraaf, published an article claiming that Dutch security forces (AIVD) were already investigating the matter.
On March 7, Eurojust first confirmed that there were Belgians amongst the European jihadis in Syria. On March 15 and 16, 2013 Harald Doornbos and myself found three YouTube videos (originally posted by Halab News Network and since deleted by Google) in which I clearly heard some Flemish guys. Belgian media later picked up on this story. Later, the parents of Brian De Mulder and Jejoen Bontinck recognized their sons in the videos. The Belgian far right extremist party Vlaams Belang succeeded in luring in one of the families for their own propaganda and the father of Bontinck even went to Syria in search for his son. They all blamed Sharia4Belgium.
Since then reports about the Belgian jihadis appeared weekly. On April 10, 2013 the Belgian weekly magazine Knack published an article on the Belgian jihadis in Syria, claiming that already 12 of them were killed (these reports as of today remain unconfirmed). Here is an overview of those who died fighting in Syria or those who got arrested trying to get there.
On the 22nd of June, Belgian newspapers De Standaard and De Morgen gave an extensive overview of the developments concerning Belgian jihadis in Syria. This is all because of the announcement of the death of ‘Abd ar-Rahmān Ayāshī, a French-Syrian who had left Belgium back in 2012 after he was sentenced to 8 years in jail. ‘Abd ar-Rahmān Ayāshī became a battalion-leader of Suqūr as-Shām, leading about 600 in battle.

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Photo 2: ‘Abd ar-Rahmān Ayāshī

Ayāshī was the son of the Sheikh Bassām Ayāshī, a Syrian living in Molenbeek, Brussels. In the past the Ayāshī family was suspect to several investigations by the Belgian authorities (since September 2009).
A few months ago, the friend of Ayāshī, the French Raphael Gendron (at the right on this pic) was killed in Syria. Perhaps he was one of the first “Belgian” jihadis that got killed in Syria.

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Photo 3: ‘Abd ar-Rahmān Ayāshī and Raphael Gendron in Syria

In this video Sheikh Ayāshī reacts to the death of his “two” sons in Syria.
Here is a very recent interview with the killed battalion leader published on YouTube on June 23: 
[youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-lu9WFBEsrg&sns;feature=youtu.be]
There is no doubt that the deaths of Gendron and Ayāshī are the biggest losses among Belgian fighters in Syria.
Others proven killed are:

  • Sean Pidgeon (Brussels)
  • Tāriq Taqlitūn (Vilvoorde). He was killed in his apartment in Syria. His Belgian wife says he was allowed to pray one last time and then got executed.
  • According to Hans Bonte, mayor of Vilvoorde, at least two other (unidentified) youngsters from his city got killed recently
  • Another death in the ranks of Sharia4Belgium in Syria is Nur ad-Din Abouallal aka Abu Mujahid, allegedly killed in Syria around the 25th of July. His death was reported by his Belgian wife.

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Photo 4: Nur ad-Din Abouallal aka Abu Mujahid, Sharia4Belgium’s second man

  • August 21: Isma’il Amgroud, 22, Maaseik, Belgium. He left Maaseik early April and died in Syria in late June. He was the youngest of three who left Maaseik to fight in Syria. All of them were officially deleted from civil registrations.
  • August 22: Three inhabitants of Genk are arrested at the Greek-Turkish border. One of the arrested was a 26 year old Italian, who converted to Islam. One of the other men arrested was most likely his father. They returned to Genk and are under supervision of the authorities.
  • August 28: Hans Bonte, Mayor of Vilvoorde, in an interview in Belgian newspapers, claims that at least 25 youngsters from his city left or will leave for Syria.

Others still fighting in Syria:

  • About 33 members of the group Sharia4Belgium. Best known: Jejoen Bontinck, Brian De Mulder (both from Antwerp), and Hussayn Elouassaki aka Abu Fallujah (supposed leader of the Ansār Brigade of Majlis Shūra al-Mujahidīn near Aleppo – accused of a gruesome beheading)
  • About 150 to 200 Belgian fighters

As most research during the last half year pointed out it is believed that some Belgians joined Jabhat an-Nusra although most of them first aligned with Majlis as-Shura al-Mujahidin (currently a sub-group of ISIS) or Katībat al-Muhājirīn (led by the Chechen Jihadi Abū ‘Umar as-Shīshāni and recently merged with two other groups into Jaysh al-Muhājirīn wa-l-Ansār). Most Belgian jihadis appear to be fighting in or near Aleppo and Idlib. According to recent Belgian reports most of them were based in the village of Daret Izza in the Northern Aleppo province.
It is highly likely that as the Syrian conflict continues to go on there will be more fighters that will join up with the rebels. The Belgian government is worried for their return due to the possibility these newly trained fighters could then plot attacks on the homeland.
Pieter Van Ostaeyen
Master Medieval History 1999
Master Arabic & Islamic Studies 2003

GUEST POST: "Turkish Fighters in Syria, Online and Off"

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Past Guest Posts:
Mark Youngman, “Book Review of David Malet’s “Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts”,” June 20, 2013.
Hazim Fouad, “Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj),” April 30, 2013.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.

Turkish Fighters in Syria, Online and Off
By North Caucasus Caucus
Click here for a PDF version of this post
NOTE:
This piece provides a granular look at the backgrounds of Turkish citizens fighting in Syria, building on a recent article by Soner Cagaptay and Aaron Y. Zelin on the challenges Turkey may face in the future emanating from jihadis operating near Turkey’s southern border and the eventual return home of Turkish jihadis. While I have spent a considerable amount of time living, working and studying in Turkey, I am by no means an expert on Turkish jihadi groups or jihadi movements in general. I am a researcher on the politics of the Caucasus, but while researching foreign fighters in Syria from the Caucasus, I continually noted their engagement with Turkish jihadi material and felt it was an issue that needed further exploration.
INTRODUCTION
Over the last three decades, Turkish citizens have travelled to fight and die in conflicts both close and distant. Turkish citizens have fought in Iraq, Afghanistan (both against the Soviets and the United States), Bosnia, and the North Caucasus, sometimes occupying leadership positions in Islamist armed groups.  For example, Cevdet Doger (aka Emir Abdulla Kurd) was second-in-command of foreign fighters in the North Caucasus before his death in May 2011.
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Cevdet Doger and recovered Turkish identification tables, Source: sehidler.com
I will not venture to estimate how many Turkish citizens are fighting in Syria. In August 2012, Turkish journalist Adem Ozkose reported on the deaths of four Turkish fighters in Aleppo and said they were part of a group of 50 Turks fighting in that region. In the year since, it is conceivable that this number has grown along with Syria’s general population of foreign fighters.
SYRIA IN TURKISH ONLINE SPACES
There is a large amount of Turkish pro-jihadi material on Facebook relating to Syria. For example, the page, “Suriye İslam Devrimini Destekliyoruz,” (“We Support Syria’s Islamic Revolution”) has over 11,000 “Likes.” Al-Nusra Front (Nusret Cephesi in Turkish) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) both have Turkish language fan pages which are regularly shut down by Facebook but are always quickly reestablished. Turks interested in following jihadi activity in Syria are not wanting for online news coverage.
Just as Arabic-language material is translated and posted on Turkish-language sites, material from Turkish languages pages makes its way to Islamist users from other countries. For example, the pro-Islamist Turkish news website, Islah Haber, which regularly publishes news on Turkish fighter activity and deaths, uploaded an Arabic language video on 9 July 2013  that included several Turks speaking (with Arabic subtitles) about why they went to Syria. One fighter emphasized Assad’s killing of women and children and the hope of establishing a sharia-based state as a prime motivator.
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The caption identifies him as “Abdullah Azzam the Turk, connected to Thughur Bilad al Sham,” Source: Islah Haber
YouTube videos are sometimes used in recruitment efforts. The Russian language website, fisyria.com, released a video on 03 July 2013 from Emir Seyfullah, an ethnic Chechen and then-spokesman of ISIS-affiliate Jaish al-Muhajirin wa Ansar. In the video, Emir Seyfullah speaks in heavily accented Turkish, calling for Turks to come help establish sharia in the land of Sham; his speech is intercut with footage of Syrian military jets on bombing runs. Jamestown’s Mairbek Vatchagaev wrote that Seyfullah is from the Pankisi Gorge region of Georgia. However, it is possible that he lived in Istanbul before the war in Syria. Many former fighters from the North Caucasus continue to live in Turkey. This has led to violence in the past, such as the September 2011 assassination of two former fighters, allegedly by Russian security services, in Istanbul’s Zeytinburnu neighborhood.
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Screenshot of YouTube video about Turkish martyrs in Syria
The amount of material about Syria uploaded onto YouTube in all languages is nearly endless. However, one recent video provided insight into the extent of Turkish fighter involvement in Syria. On 05 July 2013, an account (now-deleted), associated with the Facebook page, “Suriye Devrimi Sehidleri,” (“Martyrs of the Syrian Revolution”) uploaded a video entitled, “Turkiyeli Sehidler” (Martyrs from Turkey). The video shows the images of 27 different alleged Turkish fighters killed in Syria.