Category: Hizballah

Hizballah Cavalcade: Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir: A New Shia Militia Operating In Aleppo, Syria

Posted on by phillsmyth

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir: A New Shia Militia Operating In Aleppo, Syria
By Phillip Smyth ([email protected])
Click here for a PDF version of this post
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Figure 1: The logo for Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir. The group’s name is stylized into a pattern which includes the Lebanese Hizballah/Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps style symbol of a fist gripping an AK-47. (In Gold) “Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir” (‘Ammar Ibn Yasir Brigade) and (in blue) “Al-Muqawama al-Islamiya” (“The Islamic Resistance”).
Since the first announcement of organized Iraqi Shia fighting on behalf of the Assad regime in Syria, their geographic displacement in the country was often matched with their propaganda statements. Both Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas and Liwa’a Zulfiqar have stated on their multitude of social media platforms, videos, and through photographs, that their primary area of operation is Damascus. In particular, the Saydah Zaynab Shrine features heavily in their propaganda and the groups are self-proclaimed “Defenders” of the Shrine.
However, with the creation of Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir (‘Ammar Ibn Yasir Battalion or LAIY), the “Defenders of the Saydah Zaynab Shrine” narrative is now encompassing an organization which—according to its statements and other sources—does not operate in Damascus or directly maintain a presence at the Saydah Zaynab Shrine. In fact, LAIY advertises the fact that it is operating in the areas surrounding the northern Syrian city of Aleppo. In videos released by the group onto YouTube, the films’ titles proclaim LAIY fighters are present in rural sections of Aleppo. While this could not be independently confirmed, it would appear the group is attempting to cast another narrative that LAIY is the pro-Assad Shia militia organization which handles combat operations in the Aleppo area.
The fact the group is announcing it is operating in Aleppo is very important when assessing the manner Iranian-backed Shia militias have been utilized in Syria. Initially, most analysts and journalists have acknowledged these groups have fought around the Saydah Zaynab Shrine in Damascus or, as with Lebanese Hizballah, fought at Qusayr. This represents a major departure from the accepted line and shows that Iraqi-staffed Shia militias are likely operating in other urban areas throughout the country.
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Figure 2: Since the creation of LAIY’s official Facebook page, the group has made attempts to demonstrate they are posting statuses from Aleppo.
Initially, LAIY announced their presence to the world through the creation of a Facebook page made at the end of May, 2013. The page only posted basic status updates including quotes from Lebanese Hizballah General Secretary and in a blatant display of their loyalty to Iran, postings of two photographs featuring Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The caption for one of the photographs read, “Labayka ya Khamenei” (“We are here for you, O Khamenei”). Other early photographs emphasized the same “Defenders of the Saydah Zaynab Shrine” narrative first promoted by Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas and Lebanese Hizballah.
The logic behind the continuance of the “Defenders of the Saydah Zaynab Shrine” narrative for a group not directly defending it, is likely a way to express that despite LAIY not directly defending the shrine, the very fact they are countering anti-Assad forces in other parts of Syria helps save the shrine. Extending the narrative in this way allows for later potential announcements addressing the presence of other pro-Assad Shia militia in other areas of Syria. The rhetoric also acts and as a blanket explanation for why the groups’ directly cooperate and back the regime of Bashar al-Assad. For LAIY’s messaging campaign, it is key to demonstrate that backing Assad on all fronts means the Saydah Zaynab Shrine and other Shia religious structures will be protected.
Off of the internet, LAIY made its presence known in the same way Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada did during the Spring of 2013; Via extravagant funeral cum demonstrations for fallen members of the organization. On June 4, a large funeral in Iraq’s Maysan was held for seven members of LAIY. Like Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, at the group funeral, representatives from the organization announced they would defend shrines, “All over the world”.[1]
LAIY has also exhibited a number of advanced messaging strategies. When the organization was announced, it already had its own song (posted below), a symbol, fighters dressed in similar combat fatigues, and a clear messaging strategy to address its presence in Syria.


LAIY’s Name
Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir takes its name from ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir. Described by historian Matti Moosa as, “one of Ali’s [considered by Shia to be the Islamic prophet Muhammed’s true successor for leadership of the Muslim community] most zealous companions and champions”, Yasir is revered by Shia for his loyalty.[2]
The group’s name also references the tomb of ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir which was located in Raqqa, Syria. The tomb was blown-up by Sunni Islamist rebels forces in March, 2013. These forces also recorded the destruction of the tomb and distributed their video online.[3] The video then made its rounds on pro-Assad media outlets. In terms of narrative development, the adoption of the name of a destroyed Shia shrine in Syria further underlines the line the group previously established as, “Defenders of shrines”.
Nevertheless, there have been no specific mentions of the destruction of ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir’s tomb via the group’s statements to the media or through their social media presence.
LAIY’s complete name is, Al-Muqawamah al-Islamiya fi Iraq Liwa’a ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir Hizballah al-Nujaba’ (The Islamic Resistance In Iraq ‘Ammar Ibn Yasir Brigade Hizballah Movement of the Outstanding). Adding further complication to the group, LAIY claims to be a part of Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba’ or Harakat al-Nujaba’ (The Hizballah Movement of the Outstanding). This group, in and of itself, is also new. Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba’ draws its name from the regularly used “Hizballah” term, a name found and utilized by a multitude of Iranian-backed organizations. It has also added that it is a “Harakat” or “movement”, most likely a way to appear as if it has greater numbers. The addition of the term, “al-Nujaba’” (plural for “The Outstanding”) references a term sometimes used in relation to the return of Imam al-Mahdi (for Shia, the Mahdi will return in a messianic form and establish a truly just earthly regime).[4]
LAIY’s Links, & Ideology
Based on the large amount of imagery, videos, and direct statements praising Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei and repeated insistences where the group has said it is, “at Khamenei’s service”, LAIY does not hide its allegiance to Iranian leadership and ideology. The utilization of the exact “Defense of the Saydah Zaynab Shrine” narrative, honed by Lebanese Hizballah, Iran, and Iran’s many Iraqi Shia proxies—Many of whom have contributed fighters to the battle in Syria—also demonstrates a mirroring of larger Iranian strategies.
Sheikh Akram al-Kaabi, a founder and leader of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, an Iranian-backed organization which has lost members in Syria, has also featured prominently in LAIY propaganda. Al-Kaabi has described as a “Leader” by the group’s Facebook page and on posters the group has issued. The link to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq further suggests LAIY and Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba’ may be front groups for other existing Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia parties. Additionally, imagery used for martyrdom posters matches those found with Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. These posters normally feature Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr and Iranian Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei with a dark background or one featuring the Saydah Zaynab Shrine (see: Hizballah Cavalcade’s Roundup of Iraqi’s Killed in Syria, Parts 1, 2, and 3).
The utilization of the phrase, “Islamic Resistance” has also been a hallmark for Iranian-created organizations and has made a strong presence among the multitude of groups under Tehran’s guidance. Lebanese Hizballah calls itself, “Al-muqawama al-islamiya fi lubnan” (“The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon”).[5] Both Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hizballah have characterized themselves as the “Islamic Resistance in Iraq”.[6]

Hizballah Cavalcade: The Songs of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas: Militant Iraqi Shia Music & Syria

Posted on by phillsmyth

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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The Songs of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas: Militant Iraqi Shia Music & Syria
By Phillip Smyth ([email protected])
Click here for a PDF version of this post

Remember the war against Franco?

That’s the kind where each of us belongs.

Though he may have won all the battles,

We had all the good songs.

–        Tom Lehrer, “The Folk Song Army”, 1965.

*Note: The author has counted at least thirty different songs available online which have been produced to praise LAFA. Most of these songs were not included due to their lack of popularity in LAFA social media circles.
When journalist Nicholas Blanford first announced Iraqi Shia were fighting alongside the forces of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, his main source for this assessment was a music video.[1] From a period extending from fall 2012-summer 2013, Shia Islamist organizations operating in Syria have released more music videos and have been actively using them in a complex messaging strategy.
The utilization of musical propaganda has been a key propaganda strategy used by radical Shia Islamist organizations.[2] Lebanese Hizballah has employed a number of bands to sing songs promoting the group’s narrative since the 1980s. In 2008, the Iraqi government found the songs made for Muqtada al-Sadr so threatening, they banned them.[3]
Due to Shia Islamist involvement in the Syrian Civil War, Iraqi Shia who favor Muqtada al-Sadr and pro-Iranian Shia parties, have produced a wide variety of songs praising Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA). These songs are often overtly sectarian and offer blatant threats against the Syrian rebels.
The Iraqi-produced music videos, created to honor Iranian-backed Shia fighters attached to LAFA, also occupy a strange ideological gray-area. The singers often praise and or have praised Muqtada al-Sadr and the Liwa’a al-Yum al-Mawud (the Promised Day Brigade). However, Sadr has not publicly supported Shia militiamen fighting in Syria.[4] Some of the same musicians who sing for LAFA, have also backed organizations which have fought Sadr, namely Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH).[5]
Other Iraqi influences are quite extensive in newly made music about LAFA, including the musical rhythm styles. Demonstrating that these songs are aimed at an Iraqi audience, they are often sung in the Iraqi dialect of Arabic. All of the singers and songwriters who have made these songs have also had extensive background experience singing for Shia Islamist organizations, performing religious songs, and have gained the majority of their fans from their online presence.




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Figure 1: ‘Ali al-Muwali poses for a picture which includes the Saydah Zaynab shrine.
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Figure 2: Muwali has not hidden his links to Liwa’a al-Yum al-Mawud. In his left hand, the group’s logo is visible.
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Figure 3: Muwali singing to Sadr supporters.
Released on September 5, 2012, the music video which first burst onto the scene carrying the message of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas was “Ya Zaynab” by ‘Ali al-Muwali. While the initial music video did not receive as much attention in pro-LAFA social media circles, a more popular edit of the song with a new music video quickly became well-known. Appearing on YouTube at the end of December, the new video and song soon became the anthem for LAFA.  It is clear from the song’s lyrics, music video, and time of release that its creation was timed to coincide with further announcements about the group’s existence.
While the initial music video was less popular than the re-edited LAFA video, the song clearly promoted a militant message. Prior to singing about LAFA, singer of “Ya Zaynab”, ‘Ali al-Muwali had made a number of songs dedicated to praising attacks against U.S. and Coalition troops in Iraq. These songs appeared to be created for Liwa’a al-Yum al-Mawud. Muwali’s personal Facebook page includes two “Likes” for Liwa’a al-Yum al-Mawud Facebook pages.

Another early song and music video utilized by Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas first appeared online in early February 2013. The song emerged on YouTube and in forums under a variety of titles. However, the primary title it was given was, “Liwa’a Abu Fadl in Syria Third Release”. It’s probable the singers and songwriters came from the same groups found in other videos on this post.
As with LAFA’s edited music video for “Ya Zaynab”, this song’s video showed footage of LAFA fighters engaged in combat and samples from a film about the Battle of Karbala. The song also featured threats against the Free Syrian Army and overt messages appealing to Shia-identity. “Liwa’a Abu Fadl in Syria Third Release” was later used as background music in a video showing members of Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada inspecting dead Syrian rebels (see the first video on the post).
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Figure 4: Pro-LAFA Iraqi singer, Muhammed Abu ‘Azrael al-Karbalai.

Between April-May, 2013 a number of songs were released by Iraqis praising the Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigades. “Dedicated to the Abu Fadl al-Abbas Shia Brigade”, was released in mid-May by Pro-Muqtada al-Sadr singer Muhammed Abu ‘Azrael al-Karbalai on Iraqi Shia forums.[6] It warned the rebel Free Syrian Army, telling them “Do not cross the line…We will silence you” and also praised the Syrian army, “O Syrian army, focus and show them what you can do” The song also expressed fears of what would happen if the forces of Bashar al-Assad did not win, saying, “Oh, [Syrian] army, God knows what will happen if you fail!”

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Figure 5: Muhammed Helfi stands in front of a picture of Husayn, one of the most important figures in Shia Islam.
Another LAFA song, performed by Muhammed al-Helfi was called, “Zealous to Defend Saydah Zaynab”. Helfi, an Iraqi Shia and pro-Sadr singer (he has also performed with pro-Sadrist singer Laith al-Ruba’ie) adopted Shia identity messaging and delved into conspiracy narratives to explain the war in Syria. In the song, al-Helfi rehashes claims of a “Saudi and Jewish” conspiracy against the Shia. The narrative presented matches those produced by LAFA and other Iranian-backed organizations. “We are all for Zaynab”, Helfi sings, “we know the difference between precious and cheap…We get rid of the cheap…We Shia know our worth.”

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Figure 6: Abbas al-Khazali.
Another Iraqi-produced song was dedicated specifically to Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas on April 6. The song threatens Syrian rebels and praises Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. In fact, LAFA’s Sung by Abbas al-Khazali, the music video shows Shia fighters dressed in similar combat gear as LAFA and armed with M16A2 rifles. There is also a shot of these Shia fighter-cum-singers capturing and abusing what can be presumably Sunni Islamist or Free Syrian Army fighters. The theme of capturing and abusing “Enemies of Shi’ism” has been a prevalent theme in songs released by Iraqi singers since April.

On April 19th, a pro-LAFA song was posted to YouTube. Much of the footage used showed LAFA operations, but when the music video begins, the main messaging thrust is one of Shia power over Sunni enemies. Men (assumedly Shia fighters) storm a building and forcibly detain these enemies. Later in the song, the singer calls Saudi Salafist Sheikh Adnan Al Aroor, “Black” (i.e. holding a black ideology).
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Figure 7: An Ahmed Fatimi CD cover.

Ahmed Fatimi, another Iraqi singer, also sang a song in praise of the “Defenders of Zaynab”. The music video utilizes photographs of LAFA members and commanders first put online between the fall of 2012-spring 2013.


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Figure 8: Ali al-Delfi and Ahmed al-Sa’adi pose on the cover of one of their 2012 CDs.
One of the first LAFA songs to be released in 2013 (March 5) was made by Ali al-Delfi and Ahmed al-Sa’adi. The song immediately became popular on forums and Facebook pages devoted to LAFA and other Iranian-backed Shia groups in Iraq. Demonstrating the song’s reach, in of the few pieces of video footage taken of LAFA fighters in Syria, the song was played on one of the fighter’s phones while LAFA was setting-up a sniper position.

On May 5, 2013, Ali al-Delfi and Ahmed al-Sa’adi released a song entitled, “Operetta for the Righteous”. The song was dedicated to the Iranian-backed Iraqi group, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH).  Pointing to closer links between some Iraqi singers and the organizations they sing about  the fact that new

Hizballah Cavalcade: Breaking Badr: Is Iraq’s Badr Organization Operating In Syria?

Posted on by phillsmyth

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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Breaking Badr: Is Iraq’s Badr Organization Operating In Syria?
By Phillip Smyth ([email protected])
Click here for a PDF version of this post
Due to many public funerals, a number of Iranian-backed Iraqi organizations (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hizballah, and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada stand as prime examples) have been identified as supplying combatants to fight in support of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. However, the Badr Organization, an Iraqi group which has pledged its loyalty to Tehran, was absent from announcements involving Iraqis killed in Syria and has been rather murky on whether it is fighting in Syria.
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Figure 1: The Badr Organization Military Wing’s logo. Note its similarity to Lebanese Hizballah’s, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s, Kata’ib Hizballah’s and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ logos
In February, 2013, Hadi al-Amiri, leader of Iraq’s Badr Organization, said Turkey and Qatar were supplying Al Qa’ida and that this was a declaration of war against Iraq.[1] During a June 21, 2013 interview with Reuters, Amiri said the group was contemplating intervening in Syria and could not, “sit idle while the Shi’ites are being attacked”. [2] Regardless, after assessing posted material issued by the Badr Organization’s social media webpages, it is becoming clear the group may actually be involved in the fighting in Syria.
Beginning life as the Badr Brigade, the militia for the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Badr Organization split from SCIRI and became its own political group.[3] In 2006, the Council on Foreign Relations reported the Badr Organization had upwards of 10,000 militiamen.[4]
Before and after the split with SCIRI, the Badr Organization received heavy funding, training, and equipment from Iran.[5] The group is also unabashed about its close links with Iran, especially Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and Iranian proxy groups.
Despite material which affirms the group supports the actions of Lebanese Hizballah in Syria, the official Facebook page for the Badr Organization makes no mention that its militiamen may be also operating in Syria. Nevertheless, there are hints of involvement on the group’s page for the Badr Organization Military Wing, the Badr Organization’s militia. Throughout the Spring of 2013, the Badr Organization increased the level of supportive rhetoric for Lebanese Hizballah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hizballah, and Iran’s efforts in Syria.  A June 21, 2013 photo’s caption said the, “Badr Military Wing will defend Zaynab to the last mujahid”.
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Figure 2: Photo from the Badr Organization Military Wing’s Facebook saying the group will “Defend the Zaynab Shrine to the last holy warrior [mujahid]”.


Earlier, on April 22, 2013, The Badr Organization Military Wing produced and uploaded a song to YouTube. The song’s discription said it was, “A message from Badr to the unjust”and included the lyrics, “We will issue a death sentence against the Free Syrian Army (Jaysh al-Hurr) and no one will be able to defeat us.” The only images present during the music were those of a fighter armed with an RPG-7 in front of the Saydah Zaynab Shrine, the logo for the Badr Organization Military Wing, and the logo for the Badr Organization.
From May 5-9, 2013, a few photographs depicting Badr Organization fighters showing their “Soliderity” with members of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA) appeared on various pro-LAFA, Badr Organization, and pro-Lebanese Hizballah websites. LAFA has acted as the main front for pro-Iranian fighters inside Syria.
Nevertheless, Badr’s symbols are not a pervasive presence on LAFA or Liwa’a Zulfiqar’s social media websites. Since the group reportedly did not suffer any killed in Syria before June, coverage of the organization’s possible involvement with LAFA or Liwa’a Zulfiqar was muted. The group’s social media posts appeared to do little more than offer visible support for the actions of other pro-Iranian Iraqi groups operating in Syria.
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Figure 3: The photo was first posted on the Badr Organization Military Wing’s official and mirror Facebook pages. The photo shows Badr militiamen armed with Heckler and Koch MP5 submachine guns (though, it’s possible these are Iranian copies) and AK-47 style rifles.
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Figure 4: A photo first posted on Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s Facebook page claims to show Badr Organization militiamen studying a map of Syria. Most captions to go along with this photo claimed it was a photo to express solidarity with the defenders of the Zaynab Shrine.
However, the Badr Organization’s public statements regarding Syria grew louder after May 20, 2013. Immediately following attacks on buses carrying Iranian pilgrims near the Iraqi city of Tikrit, the Badr Organization Military Wing announced they would adopt a more threatening posture. [6] The statement said the “Plotters” of the attacks were the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and “The Zionist Entity” (Israel), and that they would face a swift retaliation. It is important to note that the same compendium of enemies is blamed by Iran and its proxies operating in Syria for being behind forces opposing the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Interestingly, notwithstanding the other, often more horrific bombings Iraqi Shia suffered, and other attacks launched by Sunni Islamists against Shia in Iraq, the Badr Organization appeared to draw a redline with the attack on the Iranians. It is also possible the targeted bus was not carrying Iranian pilgrims as reported, but Iranian advisors or fighters, which would further inflame a pro-Iranian proxy group like Badr.[7]
Based on the fact that other smaller Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia groups have sent fighters into Syria, it is possible the Badr Organization has also sent members. This possibility gained added credence on June 17, 2013 when the Badr Organization Military Wing announced a member had been killed “Defending the Saydah Zaynab Shrine”. Despite this announcement, it is still unclear whether the Badr Organization has committed sizable amounts of fighting men to the war in Syria.
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Figure 5: May 20, 2013 Badr statement threatening Saudi Arabia, Qatar, “The Zionist entity”, and the U.S.
The Badr Organization’s First Martyr In Syria?
Name: Yasin Muhammed al-Zayn (A.K.A. Hadi)
Death Announced: June 17, 2013. (He was declared killed on June 17, 2013). The Badr Organization Military Wing’s Facebook declared his death on June 18, 2013.
Notes: Only on the Badr Organization Military Wing’s official page was al-Zayn claimed as a member of the Badr Organization. On his martyrdom poster, it was claimed al-Zayn was killed in the Zayn al-‘Abideen neighborhood of Damascus while “Defending the Saydah Zaynab Shrine”. Other pro-Assad/pro-Iranian backed Shia organization Facebook pages did not mention his affiliation with the Badr Organization. Additionally, no footage of al-Zayn’s funeral could be located. A personal martyrdom page was also created (on June 18, 2013) for al-Zayn.[8] On the page, no mention of any Badr affiliations was made. Interestingly, his death was not claimed by Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas or Liwa’a Zulfiqar, the two groups Iraqi Shia have fought for in Syria.
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Figure 6: The Saydah Zanab Shrine’s golden dome features prominently in the background. No logos for the Badr Organization Military Wing were present on the martyrdom poster.
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The Badr Organization’s Imagry For Syria
The Badr Organization Military Wing has created a number of provocative online photos dealing with events in Syria. When compared to other Iranian proxies, they have exhibited the most blatant links to Iran’s Supreme Leader. It is possible the group may be setting-up a religious pretext for their [future] involvement in Syria by continually showing pictures of Khamenei. Khamenei had already given religious sanction for Shia fighters to engage in battle in Syria.[9]
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Figure 7: “Min Baghdad – al-Jadriat Labayk ya Zaynab” (“From Baghdad – al-Jadriya [a Baghdad neighborhood] We are here for you, O Zaynab”).
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Figure 8: A photo published by the Badr Organization Military Wing showing members of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. The image is attempting to convey that the Badr Organization has members within LAFA.
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Figure 9: Iran’s Supreme Leader waves and smiles as Badr Organization militiamen stand below him.
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Figure 10: This photo appeared on two pro-Badr Organization Military Wing pages on Facebook. Intriguingly, the photo is extremely blatant about the connection (logos from left to right) Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Lebanese Hizballah, the Badr Organization, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Kata’ib Hizballah share. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei looks out from the globe.
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Figure 11: Another online poster featuring the Badr Organization Military Wing and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The background is a photo of Lebanese Hizballah marching with an added golden hue.

[1] Michael Knights, “Syrian and Iraqi Conflicts Show Signs of Merging”, March 7, 2013, Policywatch 2042, Washington Institute For Near East Policy, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syrian-and-iraqi-conflicts-show-signs-of-merging. [2] See: https://www.trust.org/item/20130621144421-omxch. [3] See: https://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(clhorg45ylfsgrrhg3vbwlmb))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147369&l=1. [4] See: https://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraqs-militia-groups/p11824#p6. [5] See: https://www.mcclatchydc.com/2005/12/12/v-print/13157/iran-gaining-influence-power-in.html. [6] See: https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/mena/8-dead-in-iraq-bomb-attack-on-iran-pilgrims-officials-say. [7] Personal conversation with Michael Knights, June 24, 2013. [8] See: https://www.facebook.com/KlnaAlshhydAlmjahdYasynMhmwdAlzyn. [9] See:

Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad: "HAMAS and Syria"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: An archive of the Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad column can now be found here.
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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Introduction
The past couple of weeks has seen Hamas’ tensions with Hezbollah come to the forefront despite past cooperation as the former has urged the latter to withdraw from the Syrian conflict immediately. At first sight, one may be tempted to accuse Hamas of hypocrisy on the basis of widespread rumors of the group’s involvement in Syria in aid of the rebels against the Assad regime. But how far, if at all, is Hamas really participating in the civil war?
Mainstream Media Reports
The main basis for claiming Hamas involvement in Syria lies in a few reports in media outlets. Thus in April the British newspaper The Times claimed Izz ad-Din al-Qassam fighters were training rebels in Damascus- citing anonymous Western diplomats. In the same month, the Kuwaiti paper ‘As-Sayaasah al-Kuwaitiya’ claimed that Hamas was preparing to send a thousand fighters from Lebanon into Syria to take on Hezbollah.
More recently, Rania Abouzeid wrote a piece for The New Yorker on arming rebels of Syria where she claimed in passing that rebels in Idlib had produced projectiles resembling the Qassam rocket, attributing the production to the provision of know-how from Hamas. Abouzeid offered no source for the conveying this information to her.
The problem with these claims is that they are all second-hand in nature, and they have all been denied vigorously by Hamas, whose leadership stresses an official policy of non-intervention in the Syrian conflict, even as Hamas officials abandoned Syria out of alienation from the Assad regime’s harsh repression against the mainly Sunni Arab uprising.
Hamas and the Social Media of Jihadis and other Rebels
Outside of the scanty media report testimony, claims of Hamas fighters’ presence in Syria primarily come from pro-regime media. For instance, one video was circulated recently of a Syrian soldier beside the bodies of several men, whom the soldier claimed were Hamas fighters and showed a photo of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin that one of the men purportedly had as proof.
In contrast, one can find extensive first-hand evidence of Hezbollah involvement even from before the Battle for Qusayr, most notably through pro-Hezbollah social media (Twitter, Facebook and chat forums) featuring photos of Hezbollah ‘martyrs’ killed in Syria. Far more reliable evidence by any measure than rebel media circles. By the same standard, the only real way to ascertain a Hamas presence in Syria is through acknowledgement in rebel media organs, jihadist organs, and so on.
Yet such acknowledgement is sorely lacking. There are of course many cases of Palestinian martyrs killed in Syria while fighting for rebel forces, but they are of a Salafist orientation in line with the rebel-battalion coalition known as the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), rather than the Muslim-Brotherhood-alignment of Hamas.
From Gaza itself, I have counted only two martyrs via forums and social media. One of them- called Mohammed Ahmad Quneiṭa– had gone to Syria some months before his death, participating in battles and training rebels. He is said to have been a commander in the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.
There are also conflicting reports as to whether he was acknowledged by Hamas in Gaza as one of its own: here is one report from the pro-regime site ‘Syria Now’ that claims so, pointing to the alleged acknowledgement of Quneiṭa as definite proof of Hamas involvement in Syria, besides giving citations from a ‘Syrian military source.’ Here is another Arabic news report that claims Hamas acknowledged the fighter.
However, the pro-regime site Zanobia denies that Hamas acknowledged him. Zanobia claims that Quneiṭa went on to become leader of a Jabhat al-Nusra contingent in the Idlib countryside near the Turkish border, but Hamas did not support his enterprise and apparently tried to dissuade him from doing so.
On balance, I am inclined to go with Zanobia’s account, for there is nothing in pro-Hamas social media to corroborate the claim of the group’s acknowledgment of him. It is merely on the basis of Quneiṭa’s apparent senior connections within Hamas that Zanobia takes as proof of Hamas involvement in Syria on the side of the rebels.
It is also of interest to note that the authoritative jihadi news agency- Dawaa al-Haq- claims that Quneiṭa was dismissed from the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades for going to Syria to fight jihad. The entire report is worth reading, with claimed citations of close friends of Quneiṭa that purportedly show that despite his membership in the Qassam Brigades, he was always more sympathetic to the Salafi circles at odds with Hamas, such that he had even been arrested a number of times.
The other Gazan martyr- Niḍal al-Ashi– was a Salafist fighter killed in the Aleppo area and was claimed by jihadi sources to have been subject to persecution by Hamas’ security services, including time served in Hamas prisons for firing rockets at Israel and involvement in a plot to assassinate the former head of the International Relief Agency in Gaza.
Salafis in Syria and Hamas
Indeed, the Hamas-Salafist rivalry in Gaza has not escaped the notice of the SIF or al-Qa’ida-aligned battalions like the Katiba al-Muhajireen, both of which have issued statements criticizing Hamas for alleged mistreatment of Salafist mujahideen in Gaza.
Neither acknowledges any Hamas contribution to aiding the uprising against Assad. The SIF in particular made its sentiment clear as its statement was released with a subheading ‘On Hamas’ betrayal of the Syrian revolution’. The SIF then accused Hamas of still being beholden to Iran, noting Hamas officials’ denial of involvement in Syria.
Summary Analysis
In short, we can say at most that to the extent that any Hamas fighters have been involved in Syria, they have been doing so without approval from the Hamas leadership, and either travel to the country from abroad out of their own accord- perhaps with Hamas in Gaza passively allowing this- or could be left-behinds from Hamas’ evacuation of Syria. This is quite far removed from the level of Hezbollah’s involvement in the civil war.
In any event, attempting to infer a Hamas presence from rebel tactics can be easily explained by the fact that many Palestinian fighters of Salafist orientation were once Hamas-aligned and then defected.
Conclusion: Hamas, Syria and the Wider Region
Examining Hamas’ stance vis-à-vis Syria is important for analyzing the group’s wider position in the region. While it is conventional to talk of Hamas’ shift to the ‘Sunni bloc’, the reality is that the group is very much in a state of limbo, with all sides harboring some form of reservation towards it.
Iran- angered by Hamas’ withdrawal from Syria and abandoning of Assad- has drastically cut financial support for the group. Salafist factions in Gaza and Syria accuse it of collaborating with Egyptian intelligence to suppress true jihad against Israel. One particularly egregious accusation came from an Egyptian Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen commander in the Sinai, who claimed some Hamas military leaders fund takfiri terrorists.
Egypt, which has now given a green light for citizens to fight in Syria, has not been any more relaxed about border controls with Gaza, preoccupied with economic troubles at home and concerned about security threats posed by militants in the Sinai with links to Gaza.
Finally, Gulf states like Qatar have not been all that forthcoming on aid promises to Gaza, such that the Hamas government there faces its own financial crisis.
While Hamas’ popularity may flare up every time there is a conflict with Israel, the fact is that the group is more isolated than ever, with few reliable friends in the region. If Hamas is going to get more involved in Syria, then the Egyptian and Qatari governments in particular will at the minimum have to demonstrate a greater willingness to aid the Hamas government in Gaza.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University. His website is https://www.aymennjawad.org

Hizballah Cavalcade: Liwa’a Zulfiqar: Birth of A New Shia Militia in Syria?

Posted on by phillsmyth

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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Liwa’a Zulfiqar: Birth of A New Shia Militia in Syria?
By Phillip Smyth ([email protected])
Click here for a PDF version of this post
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On June 5, 2013, the same day Lebanese Hizballah declared victory at the Battle of Qusayr, a page for a new Damascus-based Shia militia group, Liwa’a Zulfiqar (LZ or the Zulfiqar Battalion), was created on Facebook. The group asserts it is, “Assigned to protect religious shines, especially the Saydah Zaynab [shrine]”. This claim is also held by Syria’s other main Shia militia, Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA). However, Liwa’a Zulfiqar is not competing with Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. In fact, most of its members and leadership appear to have been drawn from LAFA. Furthermore, Liwa’a Zulfiqar does not hide the fact that it was created out of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. Along with new photographs, the new group has repackaged older LAFA photographs and claimed them as representations of the new group.
LZ’s formation results in a number of questions: Is Liwa’a Zulfiqar a genuinely new organization? Could it be another front for LAFA? Was LZ’s formation representative of something else going on within the ranks of Shia fighters in Syria?
Based purely on social media data, it appears LZ is less of a new organization, and probably a LAFA front or part of LAFA. At best, the group could be a repackaging of LAFA fighters into a new group which serves the same functions and cooperates closely with LAFA and the Syrian army. At the same time, the group could be little more than a web-based propaganda vehicle. Since the creation of a new organization would generate the sense that larger numbers of capable Shia fighters are flooding into Syria, LZ’s propaganda function may also be aimed directly at rebel morale.
Using unnamed sources, Al-Hayat newspaper reported the majority of LZ’s fighters have come from Muqtada al-Sadr’s Liwa’a al-Yum al-Mawud (Promised Day Brigades), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib Hizballah.[1] The latter two groups have suffered casualties in Syria and have also been integral pieces of LAFA. If LZ is an actual organized entity, it has already established itself as primarily Iraqi Shia staffed. It is unknown whether the Iraqi make-up of the group is a deliberate measure to create a separate purely Iraqi staffed organization. However, based on LAFA’s history of having a membership of mixed nationalities, it is unlikely the group has been formed to suit such a purpose.
Still, new evidence about LZ’s origins may have come to light via a June 19th Reuters report.[2] Liwa’a Zulfiqar may instead be the outgrowth of infighting pitting Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s Syrian commanders, Assad militias, and trained Iraqi fighters who comprise a large chunk of LAFA’s membership. Citing claims by Iraq-based Shia militants, Reuters reported, “Two Iraqi fighters and three Syrian Shabiha died” in a short battle pitting local Assad’s forces against Iraqi Shia fighters. As a result, “divisions fester and Iraqi combatants have formed a new brigade, refusing to fight under Syrian command”. It is possible Liwa’a Zulfiqar is the “new brigade” mentioned in the report.
If Liwa’a Zulfiqar was established due to the infighting, it is highly probable that the old LAFA command and military apparatus has been replicated and simply given a new name. This would explain the repackaging of LAFA photographs and the claims that LAFA leadership now comprises LZ’s leadership.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that LAFA and LZ would still be reliant on the cooperation of Assad’s forces. Heavy weapons provided to them by the Syrian army, including tank and artillery support, will still be necessary for LZ to mount any offensive or effective defensive operations. Furthermore, supplies for the group need to be funneled through the Assad regime, so a working relationship with Assad’s forces would be necessary.
Importantly, LAFA does not appear to have an interest in heightening any split. LAFA’s official Facebook page even announced the creation of LZ and posted some of their photographs. Also, LZ does not hide their support for the Assad regime. If a split resulting in the creation of LZ really did arise, it appears it was mitigated to the extent that the discord did not spill into public spheres, namely social media.
Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas & Liwa’a Zulfiqar’s Shared Members
Since the creation of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas and the creation of multiple social media (primarily Facebook) pages to market the group and its goals, very few of the group’s members have been photographed or named. However, LAFA’s leadership were often photographed (without their faces obscured) and claimed as group leaders. This has also been the case for LZ, which has publicized the leadership element of the organization.
Demonstrating its extremely close links to LAFA, LZ’s announced commanders were and may possibly still be LAFA leaders. This further points to the possibility LZ is little more than a subgrouping of fighters who operate under the main header of LAFA. Then again, it could also demonstrate the organization is a replication of LAFA with more Iraqi leadership.
LZ claims Abu Shahed and Abu Hajar as acting as a commanders (ranks were not given). Yet, these two commanders are already well-known to those following LAFA. In fact, the two have both been presented as LAFA leaders.

  • Abu Jafar al-Assad (Abu Jafar): Often shown in LAFA’s photographs as a sniper. Abu Jafar is now named as a leading fighter for Liwa’a Zulfiqar. Photographs of Abu Jafar have been widely circulated on pro-Assad, pro-LAFA, Hizballah, and Syrian rebel websites. He’s most often affiliated with LAFA.
  • Abu Hajar: Originally claimed as “Al-Qa’id” for LAFA. Abu Hajar was prominently displayed on many pro-LAFA websites.
  • Abu Shahed: Originally listed as a “Mujahid” (holy warrior) for LAFA. Abu Shahed is now listed as a commander for LZ.

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Figure 1: A banner featuring (shown wearing camouflage fatigues) Abu ‘Ajeeb (left), Abu Shahed (center), Abu Hajar (right) are pictured together as the leadership for LAFA. The photo of the banner was first posted on Facebook on June 6, 2013, 24 hours after the announcement of the creation of Liwa’a Zulfiqar.
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Figure 2: Abu Hajar and Abu Shahed stand together in the Saydah Zaynab Shrine.
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Figure 3: Abu Shahed, shown in an April, 2013 LAFA photograph. In the picture he is wearing a desert pattern MARPAT style uniform. The photo has been reposted on LZ’s Facebook.
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Figure 4: Abu Jafar al-Assad takes aim with an M16A1 style rifle. Another LZ/LAFA militiaman also takes aim with an FN FAL. A Bashar al-Assad patch is fastened to Abu Jafar’s arm.
Symbolism
The creation of Liwa’a Zulfiqar and their symbol also coincided with the creation of a new symbol for Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. LAFA’s new logo was first adopted on the group‘s official Facebook page on May 31, 2013. Both logos include stylized images of crossed Zulfiqar-style swords. The dome of the Saydah Zaynab Shrine also features prominently.
It is important to note that both logos are quite similar in design. It can be assumed that this was not likely due to unoriginality, but instead was done to demonstrate common themes.  The adoption of these new symbols is a clear example of the both organizations attempting to capitalize on the fate of the Saydah Zaynab Shrine and on placing clearly Shia symbols as centerpieces of their respective organizations.
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Figure 5: Liwa’a Zulfiqar’s logo (Left).
Figure 6: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s new logo (Right).
What’s In A Name?
As with Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas, Liwa’a Zulfiqar’s name has deep roots within Shia Islam.  According to Shia tradition, the Zulfiqar was a sword which originally belonged to the Islamic prophet Muhammad. According to Shia tradition, the legendary double tipped sword had immense strength and was passed on to Imam ‘Ali by Muhammed as he lay dying. For Shia, the handover of the sword connoted the passing of the mantle of Islam’s leadership to ‘Ali. The sword also formed a central facet for ‘Ali’s renowned status as a warrior.[3]
A popular traditional Shia saying, which invokes Imam Ali and the Zulfiqar says, “La fata illa ‘Ali, la saif illa zulfiqar” (“No victor like Ali, no sword except the Zulfiqar”).[4] Jennifer G. Wollock also notes the Zulfiqar’s near mystical qualities saying, “[Zulfiqar is] famous in its own right…[J]ust as King Arthur’s sword Excalibur or Roland’s Durandal…[I]n the West.”[5]
For Shia Muslims, the Zulfiqar and its significance did not simply disappear with the assassination of ‘Ali. It is believed the sword is the weapon to be wielded by the Mahdi, Shi’ism’s messianic figure who will usher in a time of justice and end oppression.[6] For Shia, particularly Twelver Shia, the Mahdi is the true ruler of earth—the final Imam—hidden by Allah and set to return. Contemporarily, the messianic theme of connecting the Zulfiqar to the Mahdi is also still popular with many Shia.[7]
Accordingly, the Zulfiqar’s powerful symbolism is being wielded by LZ to demonstrate power, commitment to the protection of Shi’ism, traditional Shia themes, messianic motifs, and as a military symbol.
The Fighters of Liwa’a Zulfiqar
Interestingly, LZ’s photographic posts for their fighters seem to include shots of them dressed in desert-pattern camouflage. LAFA members photos are more generally seen in woodland and urban themed MARPAT-style camouflage clothing. The emphasis on the desert pattern uniforms may be LZ’s attempt to posit a clear and visible difference from LAFA.
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Figure 7: The fighter’s white turban and beard indicate he may hold the status

New statement from the ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzām Brigades: "On the Aggression of the Party of Iran"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

UPDATE 6/17/13 4:58 PM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic statement:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzām Brigades — “On the Aggression of the Party of Iran” (En)
__________

—
tqlvS
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzām Brigades — “On the Aggression of the Party of Iran”
___________

Hizballah Cavalcade: “Divine Victory” in Qusayr: Hizballah Promotes Their Success on the Web

Posted on by phillsmyth

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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“Divine Victory” in Qusayr: Hizballah Promotes Their Success on the Web
By Phillip Smyth ([email protected])
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Figure 1: The green text on the sign reads, “Nasr Mubarak” (“Blessed Victory”); the red reads, “Al-Qusayr 2013”.
Throughout the month of May and into early June, the Battle for Qusayr pitted numerous rebel factions against the combined might of the Syrian military and Lebanese Hizballah. This period also witnessed Hizballah Secretary General Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah finally admit that Hizballah forces were not simply fighting to “Protect [Shia] shrines” or to “Defend Lebanese Shia border villages”.[1] Instead, all of Syria would be Hizballah’s battlefield until victory. As fighting in Syrian heated-up, Nasrallah promised to Hizballah supporters (on May 25, 2013), “I say to all the honorable people, to the mujahedeen, to the heroes: I have always promised you a victory and now I pledge to you a new one in Syria”.[2]
In many ways, the promise of victory in Syria harkened back to Nasrallah’s 2006, “wa’d sadiq” (“Truthful promise”). At the time, Hizballah’s leader had, before the July-August war, sworn he would undertake an operation to free prisoners in Israeli jails (namely, Samir Quntar).[3] The war was the summation of his promise. Following the war, Nasrallah’s “Truthful promise” became a common quasi-religious cum ideological narrative. With the 2006 war over, the phrase, “Divine victory”—a claim that the 2006 Hizballah-Israel war resulted in a Hizballah victory— was combined with “Truthful promise”. In turn, they both became common slogans utilized by Hizballah.
In an effort to demonstrate continuity with the narrative, Hizballah is reusing these themes once again in Syria.
The announcements of June 6, 2013, demonstrating Qusayr had been taken, resounded through Hizballah’s network of Facebook and forum pages. No more than an hour after it was declared that Qusayr had fallen to Assad’s and Hizballah’s forces, Hizballah partisans had already created numerous photos to praise the operation. Few photos of Hizballah fighters in Qusayr were released, but the video and photographic material which was made public emphasized a much more sectarian presentation of Hizballah’s fight for Syria.
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Figure 2: Hizballah supporters envisioned Google producing a doodle to commemorate the group’s victory in Qusayr. The Google logo is in Hizballah’s green and yellow color scheme. Google’s “L” has been replaced by a round of ammunition. Additionally, the slogan featured on the top of Hizballah’s flag (which is Quran 5:56) has been placed above Google’s logo– “Indeed, the party of God are they that shall be triumphant”. A Hizballah fighter stands off to the left viewing a sign reading, “Welcome to Kossayr [sic]”. The date of the victory (June 5, 2013) is featured in the search-bar.

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Figure 3: Hizballah supporters hand out candies. The sign reads “Al-Qusayr Saqatat” (“Qusayr has fallen”). Following Hizballah’s conquest of Qusayr, this photo became a common addition on most pro-Hizballah, pro-Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas, and a number of pro-Assad Facebook pages. Pro-rebel social media also featured the photograph in an effort to establish Hizballah’s hubris.
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Figure 4: Hizballah supporters drive in a convoy flying Hizballah, Syrian (Assad pattern), and Iranian flags to celebrate the fall of Qusayr. This photo was later removed from the original Facebook page it was posted.
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Figure 5: Jubilant Hizballah fighters roll through Qusayr on a pickup truck. This photo was featured on 7 major pro-Hizballah Facebook pages and a number of pro-Assad Facebook pages.
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Figure 6: Hizballah supporters have tried to establish the Battle of Qusayr as a victory which is the equivalent to Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon and the end of the 2006 Hizballah-Israel War (which Hizballah calls a “Divine Victory”).
Videos:
A commonality in all videos is that of open celebration. The firing of weapons, fireworks, and demonstrations involving vehicle convoys are omnipresent in released footage.  Videos representing a clear sectarian-based shift also took center stage. Most importantly was one video of Hizballah fighters raising a banner reading, “Ya Husayn” (“O Husayn”) over the minaret of a captured Sunni mosque in Qusayr. The Hizballah fighters then chanted, “Labayka ya Husayn” (“We are here for you, O Husayn”). The clip was spread quite openly over Hizballah’s numerous Facebook, forum, and other social media sites and was then picked up by pro-rebel groups and other Arab media organs. In some ways, the video demonstrates that Hizballah views Qusayr as a Shia victory more than just a victory for the organization.





[1] See: https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/26/world/middleeast/syrian-army-and-hezbollah-step-up-raids-on-rebels.html?pagewanted=all [2] See: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/lebanon/10081209/Two-rockets-aimed-at-Hizbollah-area-of-Beirut-leaves-at-least-four-people-wounded.html [3] See: https://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-08-04/news/0608040294_1_sheik-hassan-nasrallah-hezbollah-tel-aviv/2. Quntar was held in an Israeli prison for a 1979 terrorist attack on Nahariya, Israel, During the attack, Quntar murdered a 4 year old and her father. See: https://lisagoldman.net/2008/07/22/samir-kuntar-in-his-own-words/

Hizballah Cavalcade: Iran’s Losses In the “35th Province” (Syria), Part 1

Posted on by phillsmyth

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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Iran’s Losses In the “35th Province” (Syria), Part 1
By Phillip Smyth
Click here for a PDF version of this post
“Syria is…[Iran’s] 35th province and a strategic province for us. If the enemy attacks us and wants to take either Syria or Khuzestan, the priority for us is to keep Syria…If we keep Syria, we can get Khuzestan back too, but if we lose Syria, we cannot keep Tehran.” –Mehdi Taeb, a high-level Iranian cleric speaking to to Iran’s Basij (paramilitary group attached to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps), February, 2013.[1]
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Iran’s (Iraqi and Lebanese) Shia proxies are not the only groups losing members due to their involvement in combat in Syria. Iran is actively contributing infantry personnel to bolster regime of Bashar al-Assad. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force (IRGC-QF); Iran’s long-arm used to create, command, bolster Tehran’s proxies, and execute attacks overseas, has been rather active in Syria.[2] Their movements have not simply been limited to acting as behind-the-scenes guides for proxy or Assad’s forces. In fact, the IRGC-QF has engaged in combat and taken a number of casualties and their losses are becoming increasingly more public.
Back in August, 2012, 48 Iranian “Pilgrims” were kidnapped by Syrian rebels, when they were heading to the Saydah Zaynab Shrine.[3] Rebel forces accused these men of all being IRGC fighters.[4] It was later reported by the Iranians that the group included “Retired” IRGC members.[5] Rebels have also accused the IRGC of acting as commanders for Lebanese Hizballah’s May, 2013 offensive in Qusayr.[6]
Following Lebanese Hizballah’s official May recognition of their full-involvement in Syria, it would appear that Iran is not only becoming more open about their involvement, but also utilizing many of the same narrative points first honed by its regional Shia proxies.
February, 2013, witnessed the loss and public funeral of a senior IRGC-QF commander in Syria. It was claimed by Tehran he was simply working on “Reconstruction projects” in war torn Aleppo. Even with such a high-profile death, little additional information was offered by Iran regarding their activities in Syria.
However, In June, three IRGC members were claimed by Iranian sources to have been killed while operating around Damascus’s Saydah Zaynab Shrine. Proclaiming IRGC members have been killed defending the shrine recycles the exact narrative Lebanese Hizballah and other Iraqi Shia groups have been utilizing for many months. This line also demonstrates that Tehran has become more comfortable with using sectarian-based messaging to convey why it is willing to lose men in the Syrian war.
Based on the released data regarding killed IRGC-QF members, it is likely that Summer-Fall 2013 may witness several more announcements and public funerals.
As opposed to previous Hizballah Cavalcade posts, this post did not rely on the monitoring of social media, forums, or other sources. Instead, announcements of death and photographs were taken from official and officially approved Iranian sources.
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Name: General Hassan Shateri (A.K.A. Hossam Khoshnevis)
Death Announced: February 13, 2013. It was claimed by Iranian media that Shateri was killed in Syria on February 12, 2013. His funeral was held on February 15, 2013.
Notes: Shateri was a high-level IRGC-QF leader and the highest ranking Iranian killed in Syria. His work with Lebanese Hizballah (and possibly other Iranian-backed organizations in Iraq) was of great importance to the Iranians.[7] This connection was displayed openly at his funeral with funeral-goers waving Lebanese Hizballah flags and placing a Lebanese Hizballah flag on his casket.
Iran’s English-language PressTV reported that Shateri was killed, “by unknown gunmen as he was traveling by road from Syria to Lebanon.” Iran also blamed “Suspected Israeli agents” for Shateri’s death.[8]
Mashregh News posted a number of photos showing Shateri going about his duties in Lebanon (one is reposted here).[9] In Iranian media, the narrative used to explain Shateri’s tasks in Lebanon and Syria was that he was an overseer for the reconstruction of south Lebanon (from damage suffered during the 2006 Hizballah-Israel War). Additionally, Iranian-government-backed Fars News Agency described Shateri’s presence in Syria as the result of, “Reconstruction and development projects” he was working on in Aleppo.[10]
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Name: Lt. Colonel Amir Reza Alizadeh
Death Announced: May 4, 2013 (It was announced Alizadeh was killed in Syria on May 1, 2013).
Notes: Iranian reports claimed Alizadeh was killed by an explosion which occurred outside of the Iranian embassy in Damascus. The bombing, according to Iranian state media, was orchestrated by, “Wahhabi terrorists”.[11]  Alizadeh’s funeral was held in Rudsar, Iran.[12]
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Name: Mehdi Khorasani
Death Announced: June 10, 2013
Notes: Since Shanaei and Khorasani had a shared funeral service, photos for both are located after the entry for Shanaei. Iran’s Damghan News published a full album of funeral photographs. However, the link did not work two days after the photos were posted. Shanaei and Khorashani were pictured together holding AK-47 type rifles in front of the Saydah Zaynab Shrine. Their funeral was the first group funeral (for two or more killed) held in Iran for personnel killed in Syria.
Name: Ali Asqar Shanaei
Death Announced: June 10, 2013
Notes: Shanaei and Khorashani were pictured together holding AK-47 type rifles in front of the Saydah Zaynab Shrine. Their funeral was the first group funeral (for two or more killed) held in Iran for personnel killed in Syria.
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Name: Muhammed Husayn Atareh
Death Announced: June 10, 2013
Notes: Atareh’s casket included numerous IRGC symbols. It was also claimed that Atareh was killed in fighting around the Saydah Zaynab Shrine.
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Name: Amir Kazem Zaydeh
Death Announced: June 9, 2013
Notes: Iran’s Mashregh News claimed Zaydeh was killed by a bomb during “Clashes with terrorists”.[13]

Untitled224 Untitled225 [1] See: https://iranpulse.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/02/1346/head-of-ammar-strategic-base-syria-is-irans-35th-province-if-we-lose-syria-we-cannot-keep-tehran/ [2] See: https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr854/text [3] See: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9451858/Syria-48-Iranian-pilgrims-kidnapped-from-bus-travelling-to-Damascus-airport.html [4] See: https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Tehran-warns-Syrian-rebels-to-free-captive-Iranians [5] See: https://www.voanews.com/content/retired-iranian-revolutionay-guards-among-those-kidnapped-in-syria/1475622.html [6] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C03FDXqkOkI. Reportedly, this is an intercepted radio transmission. [7] See: https://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9107144510 [8] See: https://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/02/14/288857/irgc-commander-assassinated-in-lebanon/ [9] See: https://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/193817/%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B5%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%B1%DB%8C [10] See: https://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&Id=391473 [11] See: https://www.ido.ir/n.aspx?n=13920222001. [12] See: https://www.mehrnews.com/detail/News/2046534. [13] See: https://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/222075/%D9%BE%D9%8A%DA%A9%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B8%D9%85%E2%80%8C%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AE%D8%A7%DA%A9-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3

New article from Shaykh Ḥussayn bin Maḥmūd: "al-Quṣayr and the Battle of Destiny"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله معزّ الإسلام والمسلمين ومذلّ الشرك والمشركين ، والصلاة والسلام على قائد المجاهدين وسيّد الأوّلين والآخرين وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين ومن تبعهم بإحسان إلىيوم الدين ..
عند فتح الأطلس العربي والنظر في خارطة سورية لن يجد الباحث “مدينة القصير” على الخارطة لسبب بسيط ، وهو : أن هذه المدينة ليست بالحجم الذي يؤهلها لأن تكون ضمن المدن التي تعلّم في الخارطة ، فهي مدينة صغيرة ذات كثافة سكانية منخفضة نسبة للمدن السورية .. تقع القصير بين حمص والحدود اللبنانية الشمالية الشرقية وهي أقرب إلى الحدود اللبنانية منها إلى مدينة حمص ..إن الحدود المشتركة بين سوريا ولبنان كبيرة ، والمدن القريبة للحدود اللبنانية كثيرة ، فلماذا الإستماتة في الظفر بالقصير من قبل النصيرية ورافضة حزب حسن نصر !!
لعل من الأسباب أن القصير بعيدة كل البعد عن حدود فلسطين ، فتركيز القتال فيها يحفظ أمن يهود ويُبعد الخطر المحدق بهم من قبل المجاهدين الذين لا يريد اليهود أن يعتادوا القتال قرب حدود فلسطين ، فمصلحة يهود تقتضي إبعاد المجاهدين عن حدود فلسطين قدر المستطاع ، فابتعاد حسن نصر عن مركزه وثقله في الجنوب وخوض معركته في الشمال ما هو إلا للحفاظ على أمن يهود .. 
هناك أمرآخر تكلمت عنه بعض الصحف والقنوات الدولية ، وهو أن القصير مفتاح شمال غرب سوريا ، أو الساحل السوري الذي يطمع النصيرية إقامة دولة لهم فيها حال انتصار المجاهدين ، والحقيقة التي لا بد أن يعيها من قرأ التأريخ : أن النصيرية لم يكونوا ليطمعوا بهذا إن لم تكن هناك وعود غربية (فرنسية على وجه التحديد) بذلك ، فالفرنسيون تبنوا النصيرية منذ قرون وهم من أتى بهم لسدة الحكم في سوريا ، والنصيرية أحقر من أن يبنوا دولة في الشام دون مدد الغرب الصليبي وموافقة اليهود .. إذا كان هذا هو مخطط القوم فإن احتلال القصير تمهيد لمحاصرة مدينة حمص وريفها ..
سبب آخر يجعلهم يستميتون في احتلال القصير ، هو : الهزائم المتتالية للجيش النصيري في الشام والتي أدت إلى انهيار الروح المعنوية لأفراد هذا الجيش ، فتضخيم معركة القصير وإحراز تقدم فيها يعد بمثابة طوق نجاة للحالة المعنوية المتردية لجنود النصيرية ، وبعد تورّط حسن نصر وإرسال جنوده إلى سوريا وتكبده خسائر كبيرة في الأرواح وحدوث انشقاقات في حزبه وأصوات تنادي بعودة جنوده أراد هذا الأخير أن يحرز أي نصر في الشام حتى يخرج من هذه الهوة التي سقط فيها ، ولذلك ألقى بأكثر ثقله في القصير ظناً منه أنها معركة سهلة كون المدينة صغيرة وقريبة من لبنان وليس فيها كثافة سكانية عالية ..
وربما أراد النصيرية والرافضة الحد من شدة ضربات المجاهدين في دمشق وحلب وبقية المدن الكبرى بإشغالهم بمدينة بعيدة نسبياً عن هذه الجبهات ، فالتهديد بمجزرة في القصير كفيلة بجلب انتباه الفصائل المجاهدة وخلط أوراقها وسحب بعض جنودها من الجبهات لاستنقاذ المسلمين في هذه المدينة ، وهذا ما حصل فعلاً ..
ماذا تعني القصير بالنسبة للمجاهدين ؟
الحقيقة أن القصير معركة معنوية أكثر منها معركة استراتيجية أو حتى تكتيكية ، وما يهم المجاهدين هو إخراج سكان القصير المسلمين منها والحفاظ على حياتهم ، فهذه المدينة لا تعني شيئاً من الناحية العسكرية أكثر من كونها رفع للروح المعنوية للروافض والنصيرية ، ولعل إدراك المجاهدين لهذا الأمر جعلهم يستبسلون في الدفاع عنها ليحرموا النصيرية هذه الروح ولينكوا فيهم ويكبدوهم خسائر في الأنفس والعتاد .. 
إن هذا القصف المتواصل والكبير لمدينة القصير كفيل بإسقاط المدن الكبيرة – بل وبعض الدول -في يد المعتدي ، ولكن المجاهدون ضربوا للعالم أمثلة رائعة في الصمود والتضحية لاستنقاذ النساء والأطفال في مدينة تهطل عليها الصواريخ كالمطر ، ويحاصرها الأعداء كالطوق ، وتدكها المدافع من كل الإتجاهات تضرب كل شيء دون تمييز ، ومع ذلك استطاع المجاهدون إخراج الكثير من سكان المدينة ، وبقي بعضهم ليحرموا عدوهم حتى من الفرحة المزيّفة ، وهذا ما لم نسمع به في تأريخ المعارك ، إلا القليل ..
تتجلى آيات الله تعالى في معركة القصير ، فهي معركة استدراج لأعداء الله أكثر منها معركة استنزاف للمجاهدين ، وهناك الكثير من المصالح التي سيجنيها المجاهدون من هذه المعركة التي هي وبال على أعدائهم من حيث لا يشعرون ، وهذا مصداق قول الله تعالى {وَيَمْكُرُونَ وَيَمْكُرُ اللهُ وَاللَّهُ خَيْرُ الْمَاكِرِينَ} (الأنفال : 30) ، وسيرى المسلمون نتيجة هذه المعركة رأي العين في الأيام القادمة بإذن الله ، ولولا خشية اطّلاع أعداء الله على هذه الكلمات لذكرت بعض المصالح المترتبة من هذه المعركة ، والتي أعمى الله عنها أعين أعداءه ..
لعله من المناسب توجيه بعض الكلمات لإخواننا المجاهدين في سوريا يستأنسون بها ويرون ما يصلح فيأخذوا به ، وهذا من باب أداء بعض الواجب الذي لهم علينا : 
1- لقد أجمع أهل العلم قاطبة على كفر النصيرية وردتهم عن الدين ، فمالهم ودمهم وذراريهم حلال للمسلمين ، فاقتلوا رجالهم واسبوا نسائهم وذراريهم ، فكل ذلك حل لكم ابتداءً ..
2- لا تمنعكم حدود اصطنعها عدوكم أن تنالوا من عدوكم اللبناني في عقر داره ، فالدار دار حرب ، فلا تكن بيوت المسلمين هي المهدمة فقط ، ولا أبنائهم هم المقصوفون فقط ، والله تعالى يقول {وَإِنْ عَاقَبْتُمْ فَعَاقِبُوا بِمِثْلِ مَا عُوقِبْتُمْ بِهِ} النحل : 126) ، فمن قتل أطفالكم جاز لكم قتل أطفاله ، ومن هدم بيوتكم جاز لكم هدم بيته ، وأيما جماعة ذات شوكة استحلت

Ibn Taymīyyah Center for Media presents a new article from Abū Sulaymān al-Filisṭīnī: "Strength of the Field Officer and Repeating the Experience of 'Ḥizb Allah' in the Protection of the Jews"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Abū Sulaymān al-Filisṭīnī — “Strength of the Field Officer and Repeating the Experience of ‘Ḥizb Allah’ in the Protection of the Jews”
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