Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad: Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: Deir ez-Zor and the wider east of Syria

NOTE: An archive of the Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad column can now be found here.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Introduction
On account of the border with Iraq, one might infer through common sense stronger links in Deir ez-Zor and the east with mujahideen in Iraq fighting under the command of Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who announced the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) in the first place. Thus, it might be predicted that ISIS has either taken over the eastern areas completely or is otherwise indistinguishable from Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN), as is the case in Raqqah.
The city of Deir ez-Zor
An overview of the evidence demonstrates a more complicated picture. In the city of Deir ez-Zor itself, it would appear that JAN and ISIS are two separate entities. This can be shown by the fact that there is no overlap in claimed operations for the two groups.
Thus, the main source for ISIS actions in Deir ez-Zor comes from the pro-ISIS channel ash-Sham, which put out a video of members of ISIS destroying a Shi’i mosque in Deir ez-Zor. Confirmation of ISIS responsibility is made clear by the fact that the opening speaker introduces those in the video destroying the mosque as members of ISIS.
Here is another video released by ash-Sham of ISIS gunmen executing two men in Deir ez-Zor, described in the video tag as ‘murtadeen’ (‘apostates’) and apparently guilty of crimes against Muslims. ISIS also appears to be playing a role in the ongoing battle for Deir ez-Zor airport between regime forces and rebels. Considering that those under the banner of the ‘Free Army/FSA’ are continuing to fight for the airport, it is likely that there is coordination in this operation between ISIS and other rebels.
JAN is also playing its own role in leading and coordinating operations with other rebels, despite what appeared to be a decline in evidence of JAN activity in Deir ez-Zor (contrasting with the western regions of the country) between Sheikh Baghdadi’s announcement of ISIS and Sheikh Aymenn al-Zawahiri’s letter of compromise between ISIS and JAN.
Thus, on 15 June, some rebel outlets reported that JAN along with the ‘Jamaat al-Tawhid wa l-Jihad’ had taken over the military court in Deir ez-Zor. Ugarit News says that the operation was a joint one between JAN and those under the banner of the ‘Free Army’, with additional mention of a joint JAN-‘Free Army’ takeover of a Bemo Bank building. Neither of these operations has been claimed for ISIS, and vice-versa as regards ISIS actions in Deir ez-Zor.[i]
Abu Kamal and the Kata’ib Junud al-Haq
Outside of Deir ez-Zor- in particular in eastern towns freed from regime control- there is not really a clear distinction between ISIS and JAN. The best case-in-point comes from the town of Abu Kamal on the Euphrates that is right on the border with Iraq, making links with jihadis in Iraq perfectly logical. During the upsurge in claimed ISIS videos in mid-May, one emerged purporting to show ISIS’ presence in Abu Kamal, allegedly showing operations by the ‘Kata’ib Junud al-Haq’ (‘Battalions of the Soldiers of Righteousness’- KJAH) based in Abu Kamal and with claimed affiliation to ISIS.
Later that month, another video emerged of an ISIS training camp for youths in Abu Kamal. For instance, at 0:33 in the latter video, some of the ISIS cub scouts are seen holding the ISIS banner with the inscription ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Sham’ in Arabic and English.
The clip also includes teaching children to disarm opponents of their weapons at close quarters, marksmanship and using sniper rifles. Moreover, there is the chanting of slogans such as ‘God preserve the Muhajireen’ (3:52), suggesting that some foreign fighters- and in this case I would in particular suggest Iraqis from the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)- have been involved in the running of the training camp.
The key to tracking developments as regards the ISIS-JAN relationship in Abu Kamal lies in KJAH, about which nothing in English has otherwise been written. A look at the group’s Facebook page is most revealing.  Originally, KJAH was set up as a front-group for JAN in Abu Kamal. This is apparent from their first logo that included the name of Jabhat al-Nusra underneath ‘Kata’ib Junud al-Haq.’
Furthermore, in March, a video was released purportedly showing dead Shabiha fighters in the town of ash-Shaddadi in Hasakah province. The speaker in the video mentions that the men were killed at the hands of ‘Kata’ib Junud al-Haq- Kata’ib Jabhat al-Nusra.’
Here is another video of the battalion coordinating operations with those identifying as the ‘Free Army’ in trying to take Kabajab from regime forces (in Deir ez-Zor province). Note that neither of these videos was released through al-Manārah al-Bayḍā, suggesting that like the JAN military council in Deraa, KJAH should in theory enjoy some degree of autonomy.
At the same time, KJAH’s sympathy- at the minimum- with Sheikh Baghdadi’s ISI was made clear with another emblem uploaded in March to mark a purported JAN offensive to take Homs. The name of Jabhat al-Nusra is inscribed as with the first logo but part of the ISI logo is incorporated, perhaps acknowledging KJAH’s debt to ISI (something that applies to JAN more generally).
A more glaring change came at the end of April- some three weeks after the announcement of ISIS- that saw KJAH drop JAN’s name from their logo entirely, making clear its affiliation to ISIS. Indeed, the impression of ISIS affiliation was strengthened by those two videos in May mentioned above.
The battalion also released a statement in mid-May- under its own name but openly claiming membership of ISIS- addressed to the people of Abu Kamal, notifying them that the battalion’s request for permission for students in Abu Kamal to sit their exams in Abu Kamal rather than in Deir ez-Zor had been turned down.

At the same time, the switch to ISIS name and imagery did not mean a rejection of or hostility towards JAN, as indicated by the fact the Facebook page uploaded a photo featuring JAN fighters and their logo on 10 May.
In any event, when Sheikh Zawahiri announced his compromise ruling in favor of maintaining JAN’s name, KJAH switched back to claiming affiliation with JAN, while maintaining on its Facebook page the logo adopted after Sheikh Baghdadi’s announcement of ISIS.
The most recent statement released by KJAH explicitly states affiliation as JAN’s wing in Abu Kamal, discussing a recent problem of residents of villages near Abu Kamal receiving weapons from regime forces in Deir ez-Zor.
KJAH is a good example of how defining the exact ISIS-JAN relationship in Syria can be difficult to describe in general terms. Certainly the changes in claimed logos and affiliations reflect the disputes at the leadership level of the jihad in Syria over the names of JAN and ISIS, but KJAH’s adoption of one or the other did not mean hostility to the other name or banner, regardless of the battalion’s composition.
Further, besides the praise of ‘Muhajireen’ being taught in the then KJAH/ISIS camp in Abu Kamal, one should note that some of KJAH Facebook postings appear to have been made in Baghdad, adding credence to my hypothesis of strong links between the mujahideen in Abu Kamal and Iraqi fighters, if not the presence of Iraqi mujahideen in Abu Kamal.
If that be the case, then Abu Kamal presents an example of how views on JAN and ISIS are not always predictable according to a foreign-fighter vs. native Syrian dichotomy.

New statement from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's Muḥammad Suhayl Shāhīn: "Our Stance Concerning the Flag and Name Remains Unchanged"


That some news outlets sourcing the Associated Press and attributing a quote to me which states that the presence of foreigners can also be a part of the agenda then this allegation is completely false. I have not been asked this question and neither have I answered as such. Similarly, the said news agency and some other outlets have also written that the Islamic Emirate has shown consent with the removal of the name and flag of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan from its political office then this is also a baseless and fabricated allegation. I must state that we have not even conducted an interview with anyone in the past few days.
After this baseless report, I contacted the Associated Press which responded by saying that you have not said such a thing however we assumed as such. Therefore it is hoped the Associated Press corrects its report and desists from attributing quotes on bases of assumption while I here also reject this report.  Journalists must adhere to the ethics of Journalism and not attribute fabricated quotes to people.

 

Muhammad Sohail Shaheen

Member of political office of Islamic Emirate

14/08/1434

02/04/1392         23/06/2013

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al-Katāi’b Media presents a new video message from Ḥarakat al-Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn: “Series: Punish Them Severely to Disperse Those Who Are Behind Them, Part 3”

NOTE: For earlier parts in this video series see: #2 and #1.

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As-Saḥāb Media presents a new article from al-Qā’idah's Ustāẓ Aḥmad Fārūq: "[In] The Battleground Of Islam And Democracy, Victory Will Be For Ḥaqq"

OymDS
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Ustāẓ Aḥmad Fārūq — “[In] The Battleground Of Islam And Democracy, Victory Will Be For Ḥaqq”
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al-Imārah Studio presents new interview from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: "With the Spokesman in Qatar"


The flag of The Islamic Emirate which is decorated with the Islamic creed of لا اله الا الله محمد رسول الله ”, “There is no god but Allah and Mohammad (peace be upon him) is the Messenger of Allah”, is still hoisting there.
On Tuesday, 18th June, the office of the Islamic Emirate was officially inaugurated inside Qatar. It was widely welcomed by the Afghan Nation. A large number of our countrymen sent their messages of felicitations through the Alemara website and other social media and have considered this office as the sign of Mujahidin’s success and the end of occupation; but on the other side the Kabul administration has shown their strong opposition with the inauguration of this office particularly with the name and white flag of the Islamic Emirate, therefore, if you, the spokesman of the political bureau of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in Qatar, Dr. Mohammad Naeem, could please answer the following questions of the Alemara website! We will be thankful to you.
Alemara: Dr. Mohammad Naeem, the spokesman of the official bureau of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in Qatar, how would the Islamic Emirate make use of this office?
Answer: First of all, I would like to say that the inauguration of the political bureau of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in Qatar is great news, specially for the brave and courageous Mujahidin because whatever we possess, is just due to their persisting sacrifices that after 11 years, at last, the occupiers realized that the Islamic Emirate is a fact and a ground reality which can never be overlooked; while 11 years ago, the members of the Islamic Emirate had no right to live on the surface of earth, but today, it is recognized as a political force on the international level.
Now let me answer your query. This office will be used, as announced in the declaration which was read out on the first day of the inauguration of this office and was published through the Alemara website, for five main objectives:

  1. Negotiations and understanding for improving the relations with the world countries.
  2. Supporting a political solution which could guarantee the end of Afghanistan’s occupation and establishing an independent Islamic system of life there which is the aspiration and demand of the entire nation.
  3. Meetings with the Afghans in accordance with the need of time.
  4. Making contacts with the United Nations, international and regional organizations and non-governmental organizations.
  5. Issuing political statements regarding the existing political situation and providing them to the media.

Alemara: Will the Islamic Emirate pursue negotiations only with Americans through the office in Qatar or they will follow the policy of negotiations with other occupiers of Afghanistan?
Answer: Talks will be conducted with all sides involved in Afghanistan. Americans are mentioned mostly because they are on the top and in point of fact, the occupation was started by them; others supported it. 
Alemara: Mr. Mohammad Naeem, if you could explain the agenda of the forthcoming meeting with Americans; in this meeting, only the issue of exchange of prisoners will be discussed or other issues will also be brought under consideration; if the issue of exchange of prisoners will be discussed, what kind of prisoners, those who are kept inside the country or those who are abroad?
Answer: Let me clarify first that the Islamic Emirate has postponed that meeting which was under consideration due to various reasons. Whenever it will take place, it will be the first such meeting between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and America as known to all; and usually, in preliminary meetings, both sides exchange their views only, therefore, specific points of the agenda cannot be pointed out now. As far as the issue of prisoners is concerned, it is quite crucial and will definitely be discussed. The Islamic Emirate has determined to have discussions about all the prisoners of the Afghan Nation and endeavors for the release of all of them. As far as, the response of the other side is concerned, it will be seen later by all of us. 
Alemara: Mr. Dr. Naeem! Does the Islamic Emirate intend sooner or later to discuss the points of mutual interest for getting its relations better with the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan?
Answer: Why not! As the first paragraph of the declaration says, the Islamic Emirate will make the use of this office for improving its relations with all countries of the world and the neighbouring countries will be on the top of the list. 
Alemara: Does the Islamic Emirate want or anticipate to discuss the termination of Afghanistan’s occupation through this political office in Qatar with the Islamic Conference, the United Nations, Arab League, European Union and the Shanghai Pact?
Answer: In this regard, I would like to say that as the declaration say, the Islamic Emirate will make contacts with the United Nations and other international and regional and non-governmental organizations and will share its viewpoint for solving the issues of the people of Afghanistan. 
Alemara: The office of the Islamic Emirate in Qatar will remain on its previous stance over discussions with the Kabul admin or it has some plans under consideration, if you could explain?
Answer: As the Islamic Emirate has openly expressed in its declarations that the dilemma of Afghanistan has two main aspects; one is external which is related with the foreigners and the other is internal which is related with Afghans. Until the issue of the external aspect is not solved with the occupiers, it is useless to tackle the internal aspect. The third paragraph says that meetings with Afghans will also be held in accordance with the developments. 
Alemara: Whether the office in Qatar will hold negotiations with parties and political and intellectual figures inside Afghanistan apart from the dependent regime of Kabul?
Answer: As we told you earlier that the third paragraph of the declaration clearly says that meetings will be held with all Afghans according to the exigency of situation. It is worth mentioning that all this will take in the light of Islamic principles and keeping in mind the national interests of Afghans. 
Alemara: Our last question is about the rumors in media that due to the opposition and disappointment of the Kabul regime, the white flag and sign-board bearing the name of the Islamic Emirate are removed, if it is right, whether it is the infringement of the agreement regarding the inauguration of office or not?
Answer: It is a reality that the hoisting of flag and the sign-board of the Islamic Emirate troubled the Kabul administration. Let me say that the flag which was hoisted there, only the Islamic creed of “لا اله الا الله محمد رسول الله ” was written there and this the creed which cannot be denied by any Muslim.
In my opinion, if someone calls himself a Muslim, how can he oppose this creed and if someone opposes it then how can he call himself a Muslim. This creed should be accepted by each and every Muslim from the core of his hearth and I am sure that every Muslim does believe it and has a reverence for it. Allah Almighty says in His Holy Quran that “وکلمة الله هی العلیا”, “The creed of Allah is always superior.” One, who opposes this creed, is in fact opposing Allah Almighty and His Messenger, Mohammad (peace be upon him).
The flag of the Islamic Emirate which is embellished with “لا اله الله محمدرسول الله” is still waving there. Rumors of its lowering are only propaganda and the sign-board is changed neither, it is only shifted from one wall to the other.
From legal point of view, the Islamic Emirate has the right to hang a sign-board of its own inclination, because now it is the property of the Islamic Emirate and no one else has the right to make or dictate any alteration in it.
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Ṣawt al-Islām presents a new video message from Ḥizb al-Islāmī al-Turkistānī [Turkistan Islamic Party]: "The Express Mail of the Turkistān Mujāhidīn"

al-Andalus Media presents a new statement from al-Qā’idah in the Islamic Maghrib: "Condolences and Acquittal"

UPDATE 7/2/13 11:30 AM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic statement:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: al-Qā’idah in the Islamic Maghrib — “Condolences and Acquittal” (En)
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: al-Qā’idah in the Islamic Maghrib — “Condolences and Acquittal
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al-Jihād Foundation for Media Production presents a new video message from Nāṣir Ṣalāḥ ad-Dīn Brigades (PRC): “With the Immortals #2"

NOTE: Click here for the first part in this video series.

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Hizballah Cavalcade: Breaking Badr: Is Iraq’s Badr Organization Operating In Syria?

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

Breaking Badr: Is Iraq’s Badr Organization Operating In Syria?
By Phillip Smyth ([email protected])
Click here for a PDF version of this post
Due to many public funerals, a number of Iranian-backed Iraqi organizations (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hizballah, and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada stand as prime examples) have been identified as supplying combatants to fight in support of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria. However, the Badr Organization, an Iraqi group which has pledged its loyalty to Tehran, was absent from announcements involving Iraqis killed in Syria and has been rather murky on whether it is fighting in Syria.
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Figure 1: The Badr Organization Military Wing’s logo. Note its similarity to Lebanese Hizballah’s, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s, Kata’ib Hizballah’s and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ logos
In February, 2013, Hadi al-Amiri, leader of Iraq’s Badr Organization, said Turkey and Qatar were supplying Al Qa’ida and that this was a declaration of war against Iraq.[1] During a June 21, 2013 interview with Reuters, Amiri said the group was contemplating intervening in Syria and could not, “sit idle while the Shi’ites are being attacked”. [2] Regardless, after assessing posted material issued by the Badr Organization’s social media webpages, it is becoming clear the group may actually be involved in the fighting in Syria.
Beginning life as the Badr Brigade, the militia for the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Badr Organization split from SCIRI and became its own political group.[3] In 2006, the Council on Foreign Relations reported the Badr Organization had upwards of 10,000 militiamen.[4]
Before and after the split with SCIRI, the Badr Organization received heavy funding, training, and equipment from Iran.[5] The group is also unabashed about its close links with Iran, especially Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and Iranian proxy groups.
Despite material which affirms the group supports the actions of Lebanese Hizballah in Syria, the official Facebook page for the Badr Organization makes no mention that its militiamen may be also operating in Syria. Nevertheless, there are hints of involvement on the group’s page for the Badr Organization Military Wing, the Badr Organization’s militia. Throughout the Spring of 2013, the Badr Organization increased the level of supportive rhetoric for Lebanese Hizballah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hizballah, and Iran’s efforts in Syria.  A June 21, 2013 photo’s caption said the, “Badr Military Wing will defend Zaynab to the last mujahid”.
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Figure 2: Photo from the Badr Organization Military Wing’s Facebook saying the group will “Defend the Zaynab Shrine to the last holy warrior [mujahid]”.


Earlier, on April 22, 2013, The Badr Organization Military Wing produced and uploaded a song to YouTube. The song’s discription said it was, “A message from Badr to the unjust”and included the lyrics, “We will issue a death sentence against the Free Syrian Army (Jaysh al-Hurr) and no one will be able to defeat us.” The only images present during the music were those of a fighter armed with an RPG-7 in front of the Saydah Zaynab Shrine, the logo for the Badr Organization Military Wing, and the logo for the Badr Organization.
From May 5-9, 2013, a few photographs depicting Badr Organization fighters showing their “Soliderity” with members of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA) appeared on various pro-LAFA, Badr Organization, and pro-Lebanese Hizballah websites. LAFA has acted as the main front for pro-Iranian fighters inside Syria.
Nevertheless, Badr’s symbols are not a pervasive presence on LAFA or Liwa’a Zulfiqar’s social media websites. Since the group reportedly did not suffer any killed in Syria before June, coverage of the organization’s possible involvement with LAFA or Liwa’a Zulfiqar was muted. The group’s social media posts appeared to do little more than offer visible support for the actions of other pro-Iranian Iraqi groups operating in Syria.
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Figure 3: The photo was first posted on the Badr Organization Military Wing’s official and mirror Facebook pages. The photo shows Badr militiamen armed with Heckler and Koch MP5 submachine guns (though, it’s possible these are Iranian copies) and AK-47 style rifles.
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Figure 4: A photo first posted on Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s Facebook page claims to show Badr Organization militiamen studying a map of Syria. Most captions to go along with this photo claimed it was a photo to express solidarity with the defenders of the Zaynab Shrine.
However, the Badr Organization’s public statements regarding Syria grew louder after May 20, 2013. Immediately following attacks on buses carrying Iranian pilgrims near the Iraqi city of Tikrit, the Badr Organization Military Wing announced they would adopt a more threatening posture. [6] The statement said the “Plotters” of the attacks were the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and “The Zionist Entity” (Israel), and that they would face a swift retaliation. It is important to note that the same compendium of enemies is blamed by Iran and its proxies operating in Syria for being behind forces opposing the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Interestingly, notwithstanding the other, often more horrific bombings Iraqi Shia suffered, and other attacks launched by Sunni Islamists against Shia in Iraq, the Badr Organization appeared to draw a redline with the attack on the Iranians. It is also possible the targeted bus was not carrying Iranian pilgrims as reported, but Iranian advisors or fighters, which would further inflame a pro-Iranian proxy group like Badr.[7]
Based on the fact that other smaller Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia groups have sent fighters into Syria, it is possible the Badr Organization has also sent members. This possibility gained added credence on June 17, 2013 when the Badr Organization Military Wing announced a member had been killed “Defending the Saydah Zaynab Shrine”. Despite this announcement, it is still unclear whether the Badr Organization has committed sizable amounts of fighting men to the war in Syria.
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Figure 5: May 20, 2013 Badr statement threatening Saudi Arabia, Qatar, “The Zionist entity”, and the U.S.
The Badr Organization’s First Martyr In Syria?
Name: Yasin Muhammed al-Zayn (A.K.A. Hadi)
Death Announced: June 17, 2013. (He was declared killed on June 17, 2013). The Badr Organization Military Wing’s Facebook declared his death on June 18, 2013.
Notes: Only on the Badr Organization Military Wing’s official page was al-Zayn claimed as a member of the Badr Organization. On his martyrdom poster, it was claimed al-Zayn was killed in the Zayn al-‘Abideen neighborhood of Damascus while “Defending the Saydah Zaynab Shrine”. Other pro-Assad/pro-Iranian backed Shia organization Facebook pages did not mention his affiliation with the Badr Organization. Additionally, no footage of al-Zayn’s funeral could be located. A personal martyrdom page was also created (on June 18, 2013) for al-Zayn.[8] On the page, no mention of any Badr affiliations was made. Interestingly, his death was not claimed by Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas or Liwa’a Zulfiqar, the two groups Iraqi Shia have fought for in Syria.
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Figure 6: The Saydah Zanab Shrine’s golden dome features prominently in the background. No logos for the Badr Organization Military Wing were present on the martyrdom poster.
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The Badr Organization’s Imagry For Syria
The Badr Organization Military Wing has created a number of provocative online photos dealing with events in Syria. When compared to other Iranian proxies, they have exhibited the most blatant links to Iran’s Supreme Leader. It is possible the group may be setting-up a religious pretext for their [future] involvement in Syria by continually showing pictures of Khamenei. Khamenei had already given religious sanction for Shia fighters to engage in battle in Syria.[9]
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Figure 7: “Min Baghdad – al-Jadriat Labayk ya Zaynab” (“From Baghdad – al-Jadriya [a Baghdad neighborhood] We are here for you, O Zaynab”).
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Figure 8: A photo published by the Badr Organization Military Wing showing members of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. The image is attempting to convey that the Badr Organization has members within LAFA.
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Figure 9: Iran’s Supreme Leader waves and smiles as Badr Organization militiamen stand below him.
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Figure 10: This photo appeared on two pro-Badr Organization Military Wing pages on Facebook. Intriguingly, the photo is extremely blatant about the connection (logos from left to right) Asaib Ahl al-Haq, Lebanese Hizballah, the Badr Organization, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Kata’ib Hizballah share. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei looks out from the globe.
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Figure 11: Another online poster featuring the Badr Organization Military Wing and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. The background is a photo of Lebanese Hizballah marching with an added golden hue.

[1] Michael Knights, “Syrian and Iraqi Conflicts Show Signs of Merging”, March 7, 2013, Policywatch 2042, Washington Institute For Near East Policy, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/syrian-and-iraqi-conflicts-show-signs-of-merging. [2] See: https://www.trust.org/item/20130621144421-omxch. [3] See: https://en.aswataliraq.info/(S(clhorg45ylfsgrrhg3vbwlmb))/Default1.aspx?page=article_page&id=147369&l=1. [4] See: https://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraqs-militia-groups/p11824#p6. [5] See: https://www.mcclatchydc.com/2005/12/12/v-print/13157/iran-gaining-influence-power-in.html. [6] See: https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/mena/8-dead-in-iraq-bomb-attack-on-iran-pilgrims-officials-say. [7] Personal conversation with Michael Knights, June 24, 2013. [8] See: https://www.facebook.com/KlnaAlshhydAlmjahdYasynMhmwdAlzyn. [9] See: