New article from Dr. Iyād Qunaybī: "To the Brothers of Aḥrār al-Shām"

إلى إخوتنا أحرار الشام السلام عليكم ورحمة الله. بعد مناصحة إخوتنا في الدولة أثار بعض الإخوة المتابعين تساؤلا عن قضية أبي جعفر رحمه الله في دير قانون، وقالوا أن رجلا من حركة أحرار الشام قتله ومع ذلك لم تحاكمه الحركة، شبيها بما حصل مع أبي عبيدة البنشي رحمه الله حسب كلام الإخوة. وما أعرفه من بيان أصدرته الحركة في حينه أن المشتبه في أنه القاتل فصل من الحركة لعدم استجابته لأمر المثول أمام محكمة شرعية. لكن لعله تبقى تساؤلات الإخوة: هل تابعت الحركة الموضوع بشكل كاف من وقتها؟ وهل كان بإمكان الحركة توقيفه بالقوة ومحاسبته وتقديمه لأولياء المقتول؟ وهنا أطلب من إخواننا في حركة أحرار الشام أن يبينوا مجريات القضية وما اتخذوه من إجراءات فيها، لعلهم يشفون صدور إخوانهم، أو –إن تبين أن هناك تقصيرا- فيضم العبد الفقير صوته إلى صوت إخوانه ليطالبهم بحزم أكثر في الموضوع. ولولا أن عديدين من المتابعين ذكروا الحادثة ونسبوا إلى الإخوة ما لا يتناسب مع بيانهم السابق الذي فصلوا فيه من يشتبه أنه الجاني، لولا ذلك لما أعلنت هذه النصيحة. وليعلم إخواني أن المناصحة العلنية بحد ذاتها لا عيب فيها، إذ أننا نسعى في ذلك إلى تقريب وجهات النظر وإعطاء الفرصة لكل طرف أن ينفي ما قد يُنسب إليه بغير حق، وأن نتعاون على إنصاف المظلوم وحث من عليه حق إلى المسارعة في أدائه ولو بضغط من إخوانه المحبين للجهاد وأهله. وإني أرى ذلك أفضل من “الطبطبة” التي تَـخِيط على الجرح دون علاج: إذا ما الجرح رُم على فساد    تبين فيه إهمال الطبيب لكن المناصحة العلنية المرفوضة هي التي تبالغ في الأمر وتضخمه وتغري السفهاء والدخلاء لينفخوا في كير الفتنة، والتي يبني عليها صاحبها استنتاج أن علاج الجرح في عضو يكون ببتره!! وأعلم أني أقل من المنصوحين شأنا لكن علمنا نبينا وحبيبنا صلى الله عليه وسلم أن ((الدين النصيحة)) فلما سؤال: (لمن؟) قال: ((لله ولرسوله ولأئمة المسلمين وعامتهم))…وبما أني من عامة المسلمين فأحب أن أنصح أحبائي وإخوتي المدافعين عن دين الأمة وعرضها من كل الفصائل. وكلمة أخيرة أقولها: أحيانا يعتب المرء على حبيب وفي نفسه أن الناس يدركون محبته لحبيبه هذا، فلا يرى حاجة إلى أن يوضح هذه المحبة قبل العتاب على اعتبار أنها معروفة. بينما حقيقة الأمر أن كثيرين يخفى عليهم حبه لأخيه فيظنون العتاب بغضا ونفورا، لحداثة عهدهم بصاحب العتاب وقلة معرفتهم به. وإني هنا أقول ما ظننته معروفا من قبل: أنا أحب إخوتي المجاهدين من كل فصيل، وأتشرف بخدمتهم والذب عنهم، واحتملت نتيجة ذلك من قبلُ وقد أحتمل المزيد في أي وقت، ولهم من ولايتي ومحبتي بقدر ما يَظهر من حبهم لله ولرسوله ودفاعهم عن دين الله تعالى ورأفتهم بعباد الله. ونصحي لهم ليس عن بغضاء ولا نفور. بل كما قال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: ((المؤمن مرآة أخيه، يكف عليه ضيعته ويحوطه من ورائه)). والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله.

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Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad: Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in Raqqah: Demonstrations and Counter-Demonstrations

NOTE: An archive of the Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad column can now be found here.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
In a previous post for Jihadology I documented how looking at evidence from Raqqah Governorate basically illustrates that the designations of Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) are interchangeable in that area. The latest controversy that has emerged in the city of Raqqah itself further demonstrates this conclusion.
The controversy began with videos that came to light of a sit-in demonstration being held by some women in front of what the channel Aks Alser termed ‘the headquarters of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham.’ The grievances focus on calls for ISIS to release close family members from detention, with one woman holding a placard entitled ‘I want a piece of my liver’ (i.e. an idiomatic expression for ‘I want my son/offspring’).
The woman who first speaks at length in the video holds a sign saying ‘Where is my son?’. The lady to her right holds a sign asking ‘Where is my brother?’ As for the speaker, she mentions how men from rival battalions like the Kata’ib al-Farouq[i] have been detained with no knowledge of their fate, with some having been held for up to a whole month now.
Similarly, another video [H/T: @Syrian_Scenes] emerged showing demonstrations ‘in front of the headquarters of Jabhat al-Nusra,’ where a young girl first appeared, crying about the fact that her father- himself a rebel fighter- had been detained with ‘that Jabha’ for more than a month. By ‘Jabha’ (‘front’), she is presumably referring to ‘Jabhat al-Nusra’, as she also mentions how they are ‘Islamiyeen’ (‘Islamists’). In her pleas for her father, the young girl was one of the figureheads for the protests.
To be sure, the protestors shown in this video are religious, but they clearly do not subscribe to a comprehensive Islamist program, and only the Free Syrian Army flag is to be observed here.
Some Arabic news channels like al-Arabiya seized upon news of these protests, prompting a response from activists in JAN and ISIS circles. Most notably, here is a statement released by a pro-JAN activist based in Syria who uses the handle @9amar_1.
She begins by complaining of the spreading of slanderous attacks on ‘the mujahideen of the Islamic State [of Iraq and ash-Sham][ii] and Jabhat al-Nusra, especially in light of what is transpiring from the protests in Raqqah in front of the headquarters of the Islamic State, by which also Jabhat al-Nusra has faced accusations- for general distortion- in the media,’ later singling out al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera in particular for incitement against the mujahideen.
She goes on to explain how the ruling of Syria by a ‘Nusayri regime’ has distanced the people from religion. As for those whom ‘the Islamic State has arrested,’ she justifies the detention by asserting that said prisoners ‘have exceeded the boundaries of Shari’a.’
One conclusion to note from this activist’s statement is the importance of not generalizing about the ISIS-JAN relationship in terms of what activists in these ideological circles. It is quite clear that @9amar_1 views ISIS and JAN as working for the same goals but the naming is a matter of personal preference and completely interchangeable.
In turn, it is clear that a conflation of JAN-ISIS in terms of the naming of the headquarters outside of which were protests and the faction against which the protests took place indicate how ISIS and JAN in Raqqah are essentially one and the same.
In Raqqah itself, further evidence of an ISIS-JAN unity became clear in the counter-demonstrations on the ground. Here is one such video, featuring several youths holding the banners of Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya (which, to recall, was the main group of battalions responsible for the rebel takeover of Raqqah in March), ISIS and the general flag of jihad.
The video itself is entitled ‘Syrians’ response to the al-Arabiya report against Jabhat al-Nusra, Raqqah.’ In the video, the speaker sarcastically asks, ‘Where is the Arab Jabha?’- a clear retort to denunciations of JAN. He concludes by making clear that the only worthy slogan is the Shahada. Here is another video of a recent counter-demonstration, featuring the banners of Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya, JAN and ISIS.
These videos form a marked contrast with footage of demonstrations from Raqqah before. While it is evident that the numbers in these rallies and counter-rallies are fairly small in comparison to the protests based on common causes like solidarity with the rebels fighting for Quṣayr, they mark for the first time a true demarcation based on ideology, whereas in earlier demonstrations I documented banners and factions from across the spectrum could be seen.
At the same time, it is apparent that ISIS/JAN in Raqqah does not think it can assert itself in the face of ideologically-opposed protestors by means of an armed confrontation. Notice how the demonstration outside its headquarters was entirely left alone, even as the group has made its show of strength clear with spectacles like the execution of three men in a public square, accused of working for the Assad regime.
However, if the rallies and counter-rallies continue, it may well be that no concord can be reached again whereby FSA and ISIS flags feature side-by-side in rallies, and instead a situation emerges as in Aleppo where ISIS and other sympathetic factions have their own separate marches.
The recent developments should also debunk the false dichotomy posed by some commentators of ‘Salafist nationalist’ Syrian Islamic Front [SIF] groups like Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya versus transnational jihadist groups (cf. my overview of statements put out by various factions on Sheikh Jowlani’s bayah to Sheikh Aymenn al-Zawahiri).
To sum up, the recent wave of demonstrations in Raqqah only reinforces the point that in this part of Syria, ISIS and JAN are interchangeable. Further, it illustrates how groups like Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya of SIF can on the ground display more affinity with overtly transnational jihadist groups than commonly thought. The current tensions are unlikely to spill into overt bloodshed between rival battalions in Raqqah itself, but that could well change when such rivalries are on display in the border town of Tel Abyaḍ.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum. His website is https://www.aymennjawad.org. Follow on Twitter at @ajaltamimi
Notes

[i] Farouq Battalions in Raqqah Governorate have a long-standing rivalry with JAN/ISIS, centering on border control at Tel Abyaḍ. See my post here and Shami Witness’ article here. [ii] In discourse within Syria, it is common to abbreviate ‘Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham’ to just ‘State of Islam’ (literal translation here) or ‘Islamic State.’

Check out my new article with Charles Lister for Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel: "The Crowning of the Syrian Islamic Front"


Hezbollah’s victory in Syria in the Battle of Qusair was a wake up call for many pro-Islamist actors in the Arab world. In response, Qatar — through Yusef al-Qaradawi and Al Jazeera as well as key Egyptian Islamic leaders — has gone on the offensive. These players have publicized key Islamist factions, especially the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) as well as called for jihad as a necessary duty for all. Through these actions, one of the key winners has been the SIF, a Salafi umbrella formation, which is arguably the best fighting force within the opposition.
The SIF, led by its principal constituent force, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya (HASI), coordinates extensively with the al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (and though skeptical of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, coordinates with it in Aleppo), but also with all other Syrian rebel groups. While it is more than willing to fight alongside groups loyal to the so-called Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Syrian National Coalition, it expressly rejects their rights to represent the entire Syrian opposition. The SIF’s insistence in a future Syria becoming an Islamic state ruled by sharia contradicts the objectives expressed by the wider moderate opposition. Although it has not issued any direct threats outside Syria, the SIF is opposed to any external intervention in Syria by any Western state and its leader has threatened attacks on any foreign military force entering Syria, supportive or opposed to President Bashar al-Assad.
In the past two weeks, the SIF’s leader, Hassan Aboud Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi, has publicly appeared for the first time in an Al Jazeera interview, attended a conference of senior Muslim clerics in Cairo calling for jihad (the only Syrian rebel leader present), and spoke on the Egyptian Salafi TV station al-Nas. It appears that key players with vested interests in Qatar and Egypt’s clerical community are attempting to anoint the SIF as the leaders of the Syrian revolution.
Click here to read the rest.

Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad: "HAMAS and Syria"

NOTE: An archive of the Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad column can now be found here.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Introduction

The past couple of weeks has seen Hamas’ tensions with Hezbollah come to the forefront despite past cooperation as the former has urged the latter to withdraw from the Syrian conflict immediately. At first sight, one may be tempted to accuse Hamas of hypocrisy on the basis of widespread rumors of the group’s involvement in Syria in aid of the rebels against the Assad regime. But how far, if at all, is Hamas really participating in the civil war?
Mainstream Media Reports
The main basis for claiming Hamas involvement in Syria lies in a few reports in media outlets. Thus in April the British newspaper The Times claimed Izz ad-Din al-Qassam fighters were training rebels in Damascus- citing anonymous Western diplomats. In the same month, the Kuwaiti paper ‘As-Sayaasah al-Kuwaitiya’ claimed that Hamas was preparing to send a thousand fighters from Lebanon into Syria to take on Hezbollah.
More recently, Rania Abouzeid wrote a piece for The New Yorker on arming rebels of Syria where she claimed in passing that rebels in Idlib had produced projectiles resembling the Qassam rocket, attributing the production to the provision of know-how from Hamas. Abouzeid offered no source for the conveying this information to her.
The problem with these claims is that they are all second-hand in nature, and they have all been denied vigorously by Hamas, whose leadership stresses an official policy of non-intervention in the Syrian conflict, even as Hamas officials abandoned Syria out of alienation from the Assad regime’s harsh repression against the mainly Sunni Arab uprising.
Hamas and the Social Media of Jihadis and other Rebels
Outside of the scanty media report testimony, claims of Hamas fighters’ presence in Syria primarily come from pro-regime media. For instance, one video was circulated recently of a Syrian soldier beside the bodies of several men, whom the soldier claimed were Hamas fighters and showed a photo of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin that one of the men purportedly had as proof.
In contrast, one can find extensive first-hand evidence of Hezbollah involvement even from before the Battle for Qusayr, most notably through pro-Hezbollah social media (Twitter, Facebook and chat forums) featuring photos of Hezbollah ‘martyrs’ killed in Syria. Far more reliable evidence by any measure than rebel media circles. By the same standard, the only real way to ascertain a Hamas presence in Syria is through acknowledgement in rebel media organs, jihadist organs, and so on.
Yet such acknowledgement is sorely lacking. There are of course many cases of Palestinian martyrs killed in Syria while fighting for rebel forces, but they are of a Salafist orientation in line with the rebel-battalion coalition known as the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), rather than the Muslim-Brotherhood-alignment of Hamas.
From Gaza itself, I have counted only two martyrs via forums and social media. One of them- called Mohammed Ahmad Quneiṭa– had gone to Syria some months before his death, participating in battles and training rebels. He is said to have been a commander in the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.
There are also conflicting reports as to whether he was acknowledged by Hamas in Gaza as one of its own: here is one report from the pro-regime site ‘Syria Now’ that claims so, pointing to the alleged acknowledgement of Quneiṭa as definite proof of Hamas involvement in Syria, besides giving citations from a ‘Syrian military source.’ Here is another Arabic news report that claims Hamas acknowledged the fighter.
However, the pro-regime site Zanobia denies that Hamas acknowledged him. Zanobia claims that Quneiṭa went on to become leader of a Jabhat al-Nusra contingent in the Idlib countryside near the Turkish border, but Hamas did not support his enterprise and apparently tried to dissuade him from doing so.
On balance, I am inclined to go with Zanobia’s account, for there is nothing in pro-Hamas social media to corroborate the claim of the group’s acknowledgment of him. It is merely on the basis of Quneiṭa’s apparent senior connections within Hamas that Zanobia takes as proof of Hamas involvement in Syria on the side of the rebels.
It is also of interest to note that the authoritative jihadi news agency- Dawaa al-Haq- claims that Quneiṭa was dismissed from the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades for going to Syria to fight jihad. The entire report is worth reading, with claimed citations of close friends of Quneiṭa that purportedly show that despite his membership in the Qassam Brigades, he was always more sympathetic to the Salafi circles at odds with Hamas, such that he had even been arrested a number of times.
The other Gazan martyr- Niḍal al-Ashi– was a Salafist fighter killed in the Aleppo area and was claimed by jihadi sources to have been subject to persecution by Hamas’ security services, including time served in Hamas prisons for firing rockets at Israel and involvement in a plot to assassinate the former head of the International Relief Agency in Gaza.
Salafis in Syria and Hamas
Indeed, the Hamas-Salafist rivalry in Gaza has not escaped the notice of the SIF or al-Qa’ida-aligned battalions like the Katiba al-Muhajireen, both of which have issued statements criticizing Hamas for alleged mistreatment of Salafist mujahideen in Gaza.
Neither acknowledges any Hamas contribution to aiding the uprising against Assad. The SIF in particular made its sentiment clear as its statement was released with a subheading ‘On Hamas’ betrayal of the Syrian revolution’. The SIF then accused Hamas of still being beholden to Iran, noting Hamas officials’ denial of involvement in Syria.
Summary Analysis
In short, we can say at most that to the extent that any Hamas fighters have been involved in Syria, they have been doing so without approval from the Hamas leadership, and either travel to the country from abroad out of their own accord- perhaps with Hamas in Gaza passively allowing this- or could be left-behinds from Hamas’ evacuation of Syria. This is quite far removed from the level of Hezbollah’s involvement in the civil war.
In any event, attempting to infer a Hamas presence from rebel tactics can be easily explained by the fact that many Palestinian fighters of Salafist orientation were once Hamas-aligned and then defected.
Conclusion: Hamas, Syria and the Wider Region
Examining Hamas’ stance vis-à-vis Syria is important for analyzing the group’s wider position in the region. While it is conventional to talk of Hamas’ shift to the ‘Sunni bloc’, the reality is that the group is very much in a state of limbo, with all sides harboring some form of reservation towards it.
Iran- angered by Hamas’ withdrawal from Syria and abandoning of Assad- has drastically cut financial support for the group. Salafist factions in Gaza and Syria accuse it of collaborating with Egyptian intelligence to suppress true jihad against Israel. One particularly egregious accusation came from an Egyptian Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen commander in the Sinai, who claimed some Hamas military leaders fund takfiri terrorists.
Egypt, which has now given a green light for citizens to fight in Syria, has not been any more relaxed about border controls with Gaza, preoccupied with economic troubles at home and concerned about security threats posed by militants in the Sinai with links to Gaza.
Finally, Gulf states like Qatar have not been all that forthcoming on aid promises to Gaza, such that the Hamas government there faces its own financial crisis.
While Hamas’ popularity may flare up every time there is a conflict with Israel, the fact is that the group is more isolated than ever, with few reliable friends in the region. If Hamas is going to get more involved in Syria, then the Egyptian and Qatari governments in particular will at the minimum have to demonstrate a greater willingness to aid the Hamas government in Gaza.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University. His website is https://www.aymennjawad.org

New statement from the Syrian Islamic Front's Ḥarakat Aḥrār al-Shām al-Islāmīyyah: "Clarification on the Declaration of the 'Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām' and Its Implications for the Domestic and Regional Arena"

UPDATE 5/6/13 1:36 PM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic statement:
In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful.
Praise be to God and prayers and peace upon the messenger of God.
We were surprised, just as many were surprised, by what Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, released concerning the announcement the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. We were similarly surprised by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s response, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, in which he pledged allegiance (bay’ah) to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda.
Given that we are watching with interest the implications of the event – and what it means in terms of its large impact on the internal and regional arenas – we wish to record some important points that make our position clear on what has come out. We take the approach of offering advice (al-nush) and admonition (al-tazkir):
1: We in the Islamic Ahrar al-Sham Movement are keen on concentrating efforts and unifying them in the battle to topple the aggressive Assad enemy, as nothing except for faith (iman) is more required and nothing comes before it.
2: God has set forth the legitimate norms (sunan) and universal laws to establish rightly guided states. Whoever breaches the laws is deprived of their consequences(note: this line was unclear to me). Religious leadership (al-imamah) over Muslims must have ability and authority to secure its interests. This does not exist among any of the factions and brigades on the ground.
3: The “emirate” is a method – enunciated in God’s law – to unify the message and the ranks, but it is not an end in itself. What al-Baghdadi announced did not unify the scattered groups and it did not reconcile conflicting factions, and this is what is called “corruption of the situation” among religious scholars. This is when what resulted from a ruling is the opposite of what is originally intended.
4: No one in this country – no religious scholars or sincere Islamists and FSA brigades working on the ground – was consulted in the announcement of the state. This opens up the field for anyone to announce initiatives on their own according to how they see fit
5: As such, the two announcements will drag parties into the conflict that do not serve – as we see it – the people’s revolution and Jihad. The principle is to not expand the scope of the conflict and to concentrate on fighting the Assad regime, undermining its pillars of support, and stopping its aggression.
Our wounded people. When we saw Jabhat al-Nusra’s dedication and valor in battle, their charity and their good treatment of the people, it was thought that they would continue being altruistic and serving the interests of the nation.
Based on what has preceded, we ask both parties to get a sense of the magnitude of the event, the danger of regionalizing the conflict in this way, and bringing in other parties. This is not based on arbitrary distinctions between members of the Islamic nation, but an objective reading of the situation. It is a presentation of what we see as being in the best interests of Muslims and their Jihad against the tyrant of Syria.
Lastly, we in the Islamic Ahrar al-Sham Movement announce that the establishment of a rightly guided Islamic state that rules its subjects with justice is a goal that we strive to achieve through legitimate means. As such, we take care to heed the requirements of the situation and the state of the Islamic nation, which has concealed its religion for a half century. We ask God to guide us rightly in both thought and action and to grant our nation what is best. He is the protector and enabler, praise be to God, lord of the worlds.
Saturday 05/04/2013
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Ḥarakat Aḥrār al-Shām al-Islāmīyyah — “Clarification on the Declaration of the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām’ and Its Implications for the Domestic and Regional Arena”
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Check out my new Foreign Policy piece co-authored with Daveed Gartenstein-Ross: "Uncharitable Organizations"


In 1997, employees of the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF), a Saudi-based charity, were mulling how best to strike a blow against the United States in East Africa. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, one employee indicated that the plan they hatched “would be a suicide bombing carried out by crashing a vehicle into the gate at the Embassy.” A wealthy foundation official from outside the region agreed to fund the operation.
The employees’ plans would go through several iterations, but AHIF would eventually play a role in the ultimate attack. In 1998, simultaneous explosions ripped through the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya — attacks eventually traced back to al Qaeda operatives. Prior to the bombings, a former director of AHIF’s Tanzanian branch made preparations for the advance party that planned the bombings, and the Comoros Islands branch of the charity was used, according to the Treasury Department, “as a staging area and exfiltration route for the perpetrators.” The ultimate result was deadly: 224 people killed and more than 4,000 wounded.
This was, of course, before the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent crackdown on wealthy Islamist charity organizations such as AHIF, which provided a large portion of the funding that made international terrorism possible. As a monograph produced for the 9/11 Commission noted, prior to 9/11, “al Qaeda was funded, to the tune of approximately $30 million per year, by diversions of money from Islamic charities and the use of well-placed financial facilitators who gathered money from both witting and unwitting donors.”
But despite all the efforts made to shut down such groups, Islamist-leaning international charities and other NGOs are now reemerging as sponsors of jihadi activity. In countries like Tunisia and Syria, they are providing the infusion of funds that have allowed extremist groups to undertake the hard work of providing food, social services, and medical care. Jihadists, meanwhile, have discovered that they can bolster their standing within local communities, thereby increasing support for their violent activities. And governments are struggling to keep up.
Click here to read the rest.

Check out my new piece for the Washington Institute’s Policy Watch: "The Syrian Islamic Front: A New Salafi Force"


The second half of 2012 saw increased radicalization of the Syrian armed opposition, particularly in the north and east. What began as a mainly secular force with the creation of the umbrella Free Syrian Army has slowly fragmented into Islamist splinter factions, including Suqur al-Sham, Kataib Ahrar al-Sham (KAS), and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). Designated a terrorist organization by Washington in early December, JN has received the most attention, but little has been said about KAS, another popular Salafi-jihadist group whose strength and support continue to grow in Aleppo, Idlib, and elsewhere. On December 21, KAS announced the creation of a new umbrella fighting force called the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF). Given this group’s increasing prowess on the battlefield and ideological similarity to JN, Washington must develop a better understanding of its capabilities and reach.

WHO THEY ARE

In the statement and video proclaiming the SIF’s creation, spokesman Abu Abdul Rahman al-Souri declared that the group followed extremist Salafi doctrines and planned to topple the Assad regime and its allies, after which it would institute its interpretation of sharia (Islamic law). According to him, this would mean establishing institutions focusing on political matters, dawa (Islamic advocacy), cultural education, and humanitarian relief.
The SIF is made up of eleven brigades, including KAS (which operates throughout Syria), Harakat al-Fajr al-Islamiyah (which operates in and around Aleppo), Kataib Ansar al-Sham (in and around Latakia), Liwa al-Haqq (in Homs), Jaish al-Tawhid (in Deir al-Zour), Jamaat al-Taliah al-Islamiyah (in rural parts of Idlib), Katibat Musab bin Umayr (in rural parts of Aleppo), and the Damascus-area groups Katibat Suqur al-Islam, Kataib al-Iman al-Muqatilah, Saraya al-Maham al-Khasa, and Katibat al-Hamzah bin Abdul Mutalib. The latter five brigades have little to no battle record posted online, which suggests they are not real players on the ground.
At the end of its December statement, the SIF emphasizes that it is open to other Islamist organizations joining its cause, and the accompanying video shows the front’s fighters in action in Damascus, Homs, Hama, Idlib, Aleppo, and Deir al-Zour, among other places. Since then, the SIF and JN have been at the forefront of several key battles, including the recent liberation of Taftanaz airport, a jailbreak in Idlib, and efforts to take Jisr al-Shughour.
The video also shows the SIF’s humanitarian relief efforts, such as paving new roads and clearing old ones, baking bread for the increasing number of needy Syrians, and supplying foodstuffs. Other soft-power efforts include Quranic recitation contests for children. In addition, the video highlights two of the main actors financing these efforts: the Humanitarian Relief Fund (IHH), a government-linked Turkish NGO with ties to Hamas, and Qatar Charity, another government-linked NGO.
Click here to read the rest.

Check out my new al-Wasat post: "The Syrian Islamic Front’s Order of Battle"

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The second half of 2012 saw the radicalization of the Syrian rebel opposition. What started as a mainly secular force with the creation of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) slowly fragmented into Islamist cleavages with groups like Suqur al-Sham, Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra, among others fighting independently outside the banner of the FSA. While much due attention has been given to Jabhat al-Nusra, which was designated as a terrorist organization by the United States in early December, little has been discussed on another popular Salafi-jihadi group: Kata’ib Ahrar al-Sham (KAS). On December 21, it announced the creation of a new fighting force that brought together small jihadi factions under the banner of the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF).
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New article from Shaykh Abū Basīr al-Ṭarṭūsī: "A Note on the Charter of the Syrian Islamic Front"

الحمد لله رب العالمين. استُوقِفتُ على ميثاق الجبهة الإسلامية السورية، فألفيت فيه خيراً كثيراً ولله الحمد، على ملحوظات طفيفة تقتضي النصيحة تسجيلها: 

ــ قالوا تحت عنوان الفصل الرابع، النقطة الثانية:” تعظيم حرمة المسلم، وتجنب الحكم عليه بكفر أو فسق أو بدعة إلا بدليل وبرهان من أهل العلم “.

قلت: لو قيل:” إلا بدليل وبرهان من كتاب الله تعالى، وسنة رسوله صلى الله عليه وسلم “، لكان صواباً، وأدق وأحسن.

ــ في النقطة السادسة من نفس الفصل، قالوا:” الاهتمام بأمر المسلمين في كل أنحاء سوريا …”.

قلت: لماذا فقط في سوريا .. ولماذا لا يكون الاهتمام بالمسلمين .. في سوريا .. وغير سوريا .. في الأرض كلها .. قال تعالى:[ إِنَّمَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ إِخْوَةٌ ]الحجرات:10.

وفي الحديث فقد صح عن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم أنه قال:” المؤمنُ من أهلِ الإيمان بمنزلة الرأسِ من الجسد، يألَمُ المؤمنُ لما يُصيبُ أهلَ الإيمان، كما يألَمُ الرأسُ لما يصيبُ الجسدَ “.

وقال صلى الله عليه وسلم:” ترى المؤمنين في تراحُمِهم وتوادِّهم، وتعاطُفِهم، كمثلِ الجسدِ إذا اشتكى عضواً تداعى لهُ سائرُ الجسدِ بالسَّهرِ والحُمَّى “.

وقال صلى الله عليه وسلم:” المؤمنون كرجلٍ واحدٍ، إذا اشتكى رأسَهُ اشتكى كلُّه، وإن اشتكى عينَهُ اشتكى كلُّه “.

وقال صلى الله عليه وسلم:” المسلمُ أخو المسلمِ لا يَظلِمهُ ولا يُسْلِمه …”؛ أي لا يُسلمه للظلم والقهر، وعدوان الأعداء .. وغيرها كثير من النصوص الشرعية التي تؤكد على الأخوة الإيمانية الإسلامية، وأن المسلمين لا يجوز إلا أن يكونوا كرجل واحد .. على اختلاف جنسياتهم، وقومياتهم، ولغاتهم، وأوطانهم، وألوانهم.

فعلى أهمية الإشارة إلى أن هذه الجبهة سورية المنشأ .. لا ترتبط ولا تنتمي إلى أي مسمى خارجي .. غير مسمى الإسلام .. إلا أنه من المهم أيضاً الإشارة إلى الاهتمام بالمسلمين وقضاياهم في الأرض؛ كل الأرض.

ـــ في النقطة الثامنة من نفس الفصل، قالوا:” للمرأة من الحقوق مثل ما للرجل، وعليها من الواجبات ما عليه …”.

قلت: وهذا خطأ بالنقل والعقل .. ولو قِيل:” الأصل أن للمرأة من الحقوق مثل ما للرجل، وعليها من الواجبات مثل ما عليه، إلا ما فرق النص الشرعي بينهما “. لكان صواباً، وأدق وأحسن.

ويمكن أن تُصاغ هذه الفقرة بتعبير آخر أيضاً، فيُقال:” الأصل في الخطاب الشرعي أنه ملزم للرجل والمرأة سواء، إلا ما خصص النص الشرعي؛ فقال هذا للرجل دون المرأة، وهذا للمرأة دون الرجل “.

وقولهم:” مع مراعاة ما يميز المرأة عن الرجل من خصوصيات شرعية “، لا يُذهب الإشكال .. كما أنه لا يُغني عن القيد أو الاستثناء الذي أشرنا إليه.

ــ قولهم تحت عنوان أهداف الجبهة: “العمل على تمكين الدين في الفرد والمجتمع والدولة”، جيد .. لكن لا يُغني عن التصريح بإقامة دولة إسلامية عادلة تحكم بما أنزل الله.. وهذا ما لم يُذكَر من جملة الأهداف!

حفظ الله إخواننا في الجبهة الإسلامية السورية.. ونصرهم.. وكثّر سوادهم.. وسدد خطاهم لما فيه خير البلاد والعباد، اللهم آمين.

جزى الله الشيخ خيراً على المناصحة ورفعت ملحوظاته للقيادة.

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New article from Dr. Iyād Qanībī: "A Look at the Charter of the Syrian Islamic Front"

الحمد لله والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله وبعد

فهذه مقال قد أتبعه بآخر، أحاول فيه مناقشة مواثيق بعض الجماعات الإسلامية في سوريا مناقشة سريعة، راجيا من إخواني مراعاة ما يلي:

1 لسنا منتسبين إلى جماعة بعينها، وإنما يهمنا إعانة كل المشاريع الإسلامية الهادفة إلى نصرة المستضعفين في سوريا ومن ثم تحكيم شريعة الله عز وجل، ومناصحة هذه المشاريع وجمع كلمتها.

2 الحكم على ميثاق جماعة ما بالخطأ والصواب سيكون بمعزل عن واقعها، ليس لأن الواقع غير مؤثر في فهم الميثاق، وإنما لأننا نعتمد في ذلك أسلوب التفكيك ثم التجميع. فنوضح ما نراه حقاً وباطلاً في المفردات ثم عند جمع القطع في صورة متكاملة فإن العمومات تخَصَّص والمطلقات تقيَّد والتضارب يظهر. وأنا أترك مهمة تجميع المفردات لغيري ممن هم أكثر متابعة، آملاً أن يساعدهم ما أكتب هنا ولو قليلا.

أنا –إياد قنيبي- لست متخصصا في الساحة السورية ولا متابعا لكافة تفاصيل تصرفات وعلاقات وبيانات الكتائب المقاتلة وتطور مواقفها يوما بيوم. بل معلوماتي عن ذلك كله قليلة جدا. وهذا مهم للغاية لمن يقرأ كلامي هنا.
وإنما آمُلُ من مناقشة المواثيق مناصحة إخواني المشاركين في صياغتها، وتعزيز ما فيها من خير، ومطالبتهم بسد نقائصها حيث وجدت، وتقريبا بين العاملين في الساحة بحيث لا يختلفون في غير موطن الاختلاف… ولو كان هذا بإسهام بسيط.

قد يكون الميثاق المعلن لجماعة ما مقبولاً لكنه لا ينسجم مع واقعها. وحينئذ فبدلاً من رفض ميثاقها لمخالفة واقعها له، فإنا نميل إلى إقرار ما كان صواباً منه ومطالبتها بتبيان مبهماته ثم إلزامها بموافقة واقعها له، فذلك أقرب إلى الإنصاف وأجدر بحصول اجتماع الكلمة. وإلا اختلفنا وافترقنا دون فهم ما نختلف عليه!

5 نذكر الجماعات العاملة في الساحة دعوة وجهاداً أن هنا فصائل في ساحات أخرى كأفغانستان والعراق كان لها مواثيق تثلج الصدور، لكنها انحرفت انحرافات تبدو بسيطة في البداية أدَّت بها في نهاية المطاف إلى ممالأة المحتل ومحاربة إخوة العقيدة. فلسان الحال أبلغ من لسان المقال، ولا شك أننا نرى الانضواء تحت المشاريع الدولية نقيصة وانحرافاً ينذر بعاقبة غير حميدة، فنسأل الله لإخواننا المجاهدين جميعا البعد عن ذلك ونرجو لهم السداد والرشاد.

6 مقياسنا في تقييم ميثاق أية جماعة هو موافقته لدين الله تعالى، وخاصة في مسألة العصر التي حصل عليها التنازع، ألا وهي الاحتكام إلى شريعة الله تعالى وآليات الوصول إليه. وإلا فمسائل إغاثة المنكوبين وتحقيق العدل ومقاصد الشريعة العامة فهي مما لا تختلف عليه مواثيق الجماعات التي ترفع شعاراً إسلامياً.
ثم الثناء على موافقة ميثاق ما للشريعة في صياغاته لا يعني بالضرورة تأييدها تأييداً مطلقاً في كل ما تفعل: إنما هو مناقشة علمية مجردة للأدبيات المعلنة.

7 سنضطر إلى الاختصار لشدة الانشغال. فلا يعتب علينا إخواننا بأننا لم نعط موضوعاً ما حقه. فليس بالإمكان أحسن مما كان, وتأجيل الحديث إلى حين الفراغ يقلل الفائدة.

ما أكتبه هنا هو حتى تاريخه (الاثنين 09-ربيع الأول-1434 الموافق 21-1-2013)، وما يحدث بعد ذلك فــــــ ((ما شهدنا إلا بما علمنا وما كنا للغيب حافظين)).

وقد أبديت رأيي سابقاً في بيان أبي محمد الجولاني قائد النصرة. أما اليوم فنظرة سريعة في ميثاق الجبهة الإسلامية السورية وفق الله الجميع وسددهم.

فأقول بعد الاستعانة بالله تعالى:

1) حمل بيان الجبهة الإسلامية السورية –نسأل الله أن يسدِّدها ويجبر نقصنا ونقصها- عبارات جيدة صريحة في تحكيم الشريعة، مما يجعله من المواثيق التي يمكن قبولها قبولا مجملا مع مناقشة جزئياتها والسعي في تحسينها، بخلاف المنهجيات التي تنادي بالدولة الديمقراطية التي تجعل سيادة الشعب حاكمة على كل شيء، بما فيه الشريعة.

من هذه العبارات السديدة في بيان الجبهة:

“الرؤية: بناء مجتمع إسﻼمي حضاري في سوريا، يُحكم بشرع اﷲ الذي ارتضاه لهم”.

وأيضا: “وتعتبر الهيئة الشرعية هي الضابط الشرعي لكافة أعمال الجبهة وقراراتها ملزمة للجبهة”.

وبغض النظر هنا عن انسحاب أو عدم انسحاب هذه العبارة على مؤسسة الحكم فيما بعد التحرير، وعن المناقشة الفقهية لكون الشورى ملزمة أو غير ملزمة للحاكم المسلم، فإن ما يهمنا في هذه العبارة أنها لا تجعل المرجعية التشريعية للغالبية الشعبية، بل لهيئة تستمد شرعيتها من الشريعة.

وكذلك عبارة: “اﻹسﻼم هو دين الدولة، وهو المصدر الرئيس والوحيد للتشريع”

عدا عن عبارات أخرى محمودة في هذا البيان.

2) حمل البيان عبارات محتملة تحتاج تفسيرا، مثل:

“تقوم مرجعية هذا الميثاق على أصول الشريعة وقواعدها الكلية ومقاصدها العامة”

وعبارة “اﻷخذ بالتدرج المرحلي المنضبط”

وعبارة: “سنعمل بكافة اﻷساليب الشرعية الممكنة على أن ﻻ يكون في البﻼد أي قانون يخالف الثوابت المعتمدة في الشريعة اﻹسﻼمية”

وهي عبارات لا تُقبل ولا تُرفض حتى يتم تفسيرها، خاصة وأن لها مفاهيم معهودة في الأذهان علقت من التجربة المصرية. فما يحتاج تفسيرا هو “أصول الشريعة وقواعدها ومقاصدها” و”التدرج المنضبط” و”الأساليب الشرعية الممكنة” و”الثوابت المعتمدة”.

وقد يقول قائل أن هذا ليس الأوان المناسب لتفسير المجملات، وذلك دفعاً للخلاف واستعداء الأعداء. لكن لا يخفى إخواني أنها الآن سوق يعرض كل فيها بضاعته ويجتذب فيها المقاتلين وعامة الناس إلى منهجه، خاصة وأن البيان يتكلم بنفس من يريد أن ينضوي الآخرون تحت جناحه –وهو أمر لا يذم ولا يمدح لذاته- ففي مثل هذا المقام لا بد من التفصيل ليتخذ المستهدفون بهذا البيان مواقفهم على بينة، وإلا فلنقبل منه إجماله ثم إن وجدنا في مواثيق غيره من الجماعات ما هو أصرح فهي ميزة له عنه عن الميثاق المجمل في مواضع منه.

ونقول للجبهة: هل المقصود بهذا الميثاق حمل الفصائل الأخرى وعموم الناس على التعاون معكم في حربكم ضد النظام الأسدي المجرم؟ إن كان كذلك فالميثاق كاف في إلزام القوى الإسلامية بهذا التعاون.

أم أن المقصود به دعوة الفصائل الأخرى إلى الانضمام إليكم في مشروع دولة ما بعد الأسد؟ وهذا ما يفهم من صياغات الميثاق مثل عبارة (وجوب أن يكون للتيار اﻹسﻼمي صوت موحد يعبر عن مطالبه…) والسياقات المشعر بأن الجبهة هي هذا الصوت… وحينئذ فإننا نلتمس منكم التفصيل والبيان للمحتملات.

فمع تفهمنا التام لحرصكم على ألا تخسروا بعض الفصائل بالخوض في التفاصيل التي قد لا تجتمع عليها الكلمة، إلا أننا ندعوكم إلى أن تأخذوا بالحسبان فصائل أخرى وأفرادا يودون أن يكونوا على بينة من تفاصيل مشروعكم ومنهجكم وقد يكونون أولى باهتمامكم ومحاولات استقطابكم.

3) حمل البيان صياغات