Check out my new article for War on the Rocks: “A Globally Integrated Islamic State”

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The Islamic State today looks different than it did five years ago and is far more integrated now as an organization amongst its global network than al-Qaeda ever was. It has been 10 years since the Islamic State announced itself as a caliphate and more than five years since it lost its last vestige of territory in Syria. However, with the Islamic State back in the news due to an increasing external operations capacity (with attacks in IranTurkey, and Russia this year as well as numerous broken up plots in Europe), there is a fundamental misunderstanding of how the group operates today. In many ways, it is either incorrectly viewed through the lens of how al-Qaeda operates (a decentralized branch network), since it had previously been a part of al-Qaeda’s global network, or based on how the Islamic State operated when it was at its prior zenith when it controlled territory in Iraq and Syria. It is also likely why some within the U.S. government may have misinterpreted signals intelligence by pushing the idea that the Islamic State leader targeted in Somalia at the end of May, Abd al Qadir Mumin, became the group’s caliph. These changes in the past five years are crucial for policymakers to understand because the way the threat presents itself today will look different from how policymakers dealt with the issue last decade when much of the focus was on the Islamic State’s territorial control in Iraq and Syria.

The most important body for understanding the Islamic State today is its General Directorate of Provinces, which has previously been based in Syria, but new information suggests that at least at the highest levels of it might now have centrality in Somalia. When one understands that structure, the Islamic State’s actions globally make more sense. It is also why we see far more interaction and connection between its various wilayat (provinces) today than in the past. In many ways, the key aspects that animate the Islamic State as an organization (governance, foreign fighter mobilization, and external operations) remain, they have just moved from primarily being based out of or controlled by its location of origin in Iraq and Syria to being spread across its global provincial network. Its aims remain the same, even if the organization has adapted to a changed environment. It is also why the challenge from the Islamic State today is different from the past and why it is in some ways also more resilient now to pressure than before.

This makes the challenge of the Islamic State more difficult from a security perspective than in the past when there was the ability to primarily zero-in on its efforts in Iraq and Syria. Today, only focusing on Iraq and Syria or any other province independent of understanding its connections to other parts of the group’s global network will lead to missing crucial details due to expediency. This is why, although it is understandable that the United States has shifted a lot of its manpower and budgeting to more existential and larger problem-sets such as China and Russia, it would be a mistake to neglect the Islamic State as a continuing, but evolving security challenge. Therefore, it is still useful to continue to have and add more funded government positions across different agencies and departments to focus on tracking this threat to better get ahead of the next surprise. Otherwise, mistakes of misinterpretation will be made as in the past.

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The Islamic State’s Third Bayat Campaign

Previously, I tracked the bayat campaign for Abu Ibrahim after Abu Bakr’s death and then for Abu al-Hasan after Abu Ibrahim’s death. This post will do the same with the announcement of Abu al-Hasan’s death and Abu al-Husayn al-Husayni al-Qurashi as the new leader of the Islamic State. As I said in the original post:

There are two main reasons for this: 1. pledges are leader-specific rather than group-specific and thus need to be renewed with each succession and 2. it is a way to legitimize al-Qurashi’s rule and create a media event so that the group can promote itself as it transitions to a new phase.

The first reason is also something that IS pointed to when it began to overtly feud with al-Qaeda (AQ) in 2013, by saying that following Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s death, his successor Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir gave baya to the newly created Islamic State of Iraq’s leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and even after Abu ‘Umar was killed, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over in 2010 and then Usamah Bin Laden was killed in 2011, Abu Bakr never publicly gave baya to Ayman al-Zawahiri, even if al-Zawahiri claims he gave it to him privately. Therefore, from the perspective of IS this whole process is not trivial, but important for legitimacy of its leadership and to potentially weed out any insubordination before it manifests into something larger as it already did in the past vis-a-vis AQ.

This post will be updated with the latest official pledges.

December 1, 2022: 

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Sambisa Region

Wilāyat Khurāsān

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – al-Buhayrah Region

December 2:

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – al-Faruq Region

Wilāyat al-Shām

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Banki Region

December 3: 

Wilāyat al-Yaman

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Krenoa Region

Wilāyat al-‘Irāq

Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Azawagh, Tri-Border, and Burkina Faso Regions

December 4: 

Wilāyat al-Ṣūmāl

Wilāyat Wasaṭ Ifrīqīyah

Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Anderamboukane Village

December 5:

Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Central Nigeria

Wilāyat al-Shām

Wilāyat Bākistān

Wilāyat Mūzambīq

Wilāyat Wasaṭ Ifrīqīyah – Beni Region

December 7, 2022:

Tūnis

Wilāyat al-Hind – Kashmir

Wilāyat Mūzambīq – Nangade Region

December 8, 2022:

Lubnān

December 14, 2022:

Wilāyat Saynā’

December 17, 2022:

Wilāyat Sharq Asīā

December 19:

Wilāyat Lībīyā

New video message from The Islamic State: “And The [Best] Outcome Is For The Righteous – Wilāyat Wasaṭ Ifrīqīyyah”

For prior parts in this video series see: Wilāyat al-Ṣūmāl, TūnisWilāyat TurkīyāWilāyat LībīyāAzerbaijanWilāyat KhurāsānWilāyat al-QawqāzWilāyat Sharq AsīāWilāyat Saynā’, and Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah. The title of this release is in reference to a part of Qur’anic verses 7:128, 11:49, and 28:83.

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Source: Telegram

To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]

The Islamic State, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Militancy Over the Past Decade

Yesterday, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for its first attacks in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In one of the claims, IS states that these attacks occurred within its so-called ‘Wilayat Wasat Ifriqiya’ (Mid/Central Africa). Wassim Nasr notes that Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has talked about this ‘wilayah’ previously in his August 22, 2018 speech. Interestingly, in al-Baghdadi’s speech following the announcement of IS’s self-proclaimed Caliphate in July 2014, he mentions the Central African Republic, but not the Democratic Republic of Congo. CAR has been a topic jihadis in general have discussed more so than DRC historically.

As Caleb Weiss highlights however, there is a history of connections between IS and some militant groups in the country. Since this is such an under-covered phenomenon, I thought it would be useful to share resources related to this topic to help contextualize and better understand it based on content I have saved over the years. It is not a ton, but better than nothing. If anyone wants to add anything to the following dossier let me know and I will post it so there is a fuller picture. From oldest to most recent.

January 17, 2013:

Authorities on alert after al-Shabaab, Ugandan militants join forces

July 1, 2014:

U.S. imposes sanctions on Islamist group in Congo for targeting children

January 9, 2015:

The Rise of ADF-NALU in Central Africa and Its Connections with al-Shabaab – The Jamestown Foundation

February 19, 2015:

New insights on Congo’s Islamist rebels – The Washington Post

May 11, 2015:

Congo seeks extradition of Islamist rebel chief from Tanzania – Reuters

September 27, 2016:

Jihadis in Congo? Probably not

December 26, 2016:

Rebels Blamed for Killing 25 With Machetes in Congo

December 8, 2017:

Islamist attack kills at least 15 UN peacekeepers and five soldiers in DRC – The Guardian

February 23, 2018:

Congo Army gruesomely destroys base of Islamist rebel group – Business Insider

May 24, 2018:

AU confirms ISIS infiltration in countries, including Somalia – Shabelle

July 31, 2018:

The Islamic State in East Africa

November 2, 2018:

Violence and Viruses_ How a Poorly Armed Insurgency in the Congo Poses a Global Threat – Jamestown

November 14, 2018:

Inside the ADF Rebellion A Glimpse into the Life and Operations of a Secretive Jihadi Armed Group

November 15, 2018:

Financier of Islamic State paid money to rebel group in eastern Congo: report – Reuters

November 24, 2018:

U.S. says receives credible terrorist threat against facilities in Congo – Reuters

December 3, 2018:

Threat from Islamic State-Affiliated Group Reason DRC US Embassy Closed

December 4, 2018:

The tentative ties between the Allied Democratic Forces and ISIS

December 7, 2018:

Militants kill at least 18 civilians in Congo’s Ebola zone – Reuters

February 9, 2019:

Trends in the Spread of Radical Islam in Africa: The Case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo – Modern Diplomacy

April 18, 2019:

Islamic State claims attack in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – FDD’s Long War Journal

Islamic State claims: