Hizballah Cavalcade: Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 2

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here. Click here for part one of ‘Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria’.

By Phillip Smyth
Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 2
The latest installment of Iraqi Shia killed in Syria demonstrates a more publicly acknowledged level of Iranian involvement. Two bodies of Iraqi Shia fighters killed in Syria were returned to Iraq through the Iran-Iraq border. Family members of one of the dead Iraqis told the Associated Press that he had gone to Iran before heading to Syria.[1]
The make-up of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s (LAFA) — a Syrian-based Shia militant group—membership was also exposed. Demonstrating a slight departure from earlier martyrdom announcements, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) more broadly acknowledged that their fighters in Syria operate exclusively under LAFA’s moniker. Earlier announcements listed only one of AAH fighters as serving with LAFA.
Three of the Iraqis killed were reportedly not claimed as members by any Iraqi Shia parties (including pro-Iranian Iraq-based groups). This partially fits with LAFA’s narrative that they are staffed by volunteer fighters from throughout the Shia Islamic world. However, with the recent revelations, it becomes clearer that LAFA fighters are most likely vetted and trained by Iran before heading off to fight in Syria.
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Name: Ala’a Muhsen Shahib al-Tamimi
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 15, 2013. His death was first announced on Facebook.
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Name: Ali Abdul al-Wahid ‘Awlan
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 15, 2013. His death was first announced on Facebook on May 16, 2013.
Notes: Iran’s Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is pictured on the right and Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr is pictured on the left.
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Name:  Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki (A.K.A. Mohammed Aboud)
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 17, 2013. Funeral held on May 17, 2013.
Notes: According to Elaph.com, Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki was a 27 year old Iraqi from Basra. Elaph also said he was not claimed by any Iraqi organization as a member. It was also reported by the Associated Press that Aboud went to Iran before heading to fight in Syria. Maliki’s body and that of fellow fighter Hassan Ali Farhud were also transferred back to Iraq via Iran. Since it was announced he was killed fighting around Damascus’s Zaynab Shrine, it is possible he was fighting as a member of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. One released photo of Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki, which was posted on pro-Lebanese Hizballah and pro-Liwa’a Abu Fadl al Abbas Facebook pages, also claimed he belonged to Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas.
The released photo may also point to al-Maliki’s training influences. Holding the magazine of the rifle is a common fire-control technique used by Hizballah and is featured in a number of their propaganda videos.
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Name:  Hassan Ali Farhud
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas* (?)
Death Announced: May 17, 2013. Funeral held on May 17, 2013.
Notes: According to Al-Sumaria News, Farhud was a 32 year old from Basra, Iraq. His body, along with Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki (see above) were returned to Iraq via Iran. It is unknown whether he engaged in training in Iran or which group he served with. Since it was reported he was killed fighting around the Zaynab Shrine in Damascus, it can be assumed he was part of Liw’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. At the time this was written, no photos of Farhud were released.

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Name:  Diya Mutasher al-Issawi
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 5, 2013. Funeral held on May 6, 2013.
Notes: The Iraq-based Buratha News Agency reported the 30 year old was originally from Iraq’s Basra province. Issawi was not claimed by any Iraqi party as a member. Also, it is unknown whether Issawi was trained in Iran or elsewhere.

Untitled71 [1] “Bombings at Sunni mosque and funeral kill 47 in Iraq”, Associated Press, May 17, 2013,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqis-in-southern-city-mourn-2-shiite-fighters-killed-in-syria/2013/05/17/a53d1988-bece-11e2-b537-ab47f0325f7c_story.html.

Articles of the Week – 5/4/-5/17

Saturday May 4:
Major salafi faction criticizes Jabhat al-Nosra – Aaron Lund, Syria Comment: https://bit.ly/16EVNGY 
Sunday May 5:
Notes on the Tsarnaevs’ Radicalization – Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, al-Wasat: https://bit.ly/18HPVcH 
Monday May 6:
Al Qâ’idah casually mentions the death of its commander in Pâkistân – Mr. Orange’s War Tracker: https://bit.ly/ZKUaDL 
Adding the Ballot to the Bullet? Hezb-e Islami in transition – Borhan Osman and Thomas Ruttig, Afghanistan Analysts Network: https://bit.ly/11bUDSm 
Tuesday May 7:
Early notes on the first issue of the jihadist magazine, Azan – Charles Cameron, Zen Pundit: https://bit.ly/12dqAVP 
What Jihadists Thought About Boston: ‘Allah Akbar. Let’s Move On’ – Shiraz Maher and Samar Batrawi, Foreign Affairs: https://fam.ag/16SF2Z1 
Struggling to Adapt- The Muslim Brotherhood in a New Syria -Aron Lund, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: https://bit.ly/16qLpmS
Wednesday May 8:
Networks as strategic repertoires: Functional differentiation among Al-Shabaab terror cells – Christian Leuprecht & Kenneth Hall, Global Crime: https://bit.ly/10b0LHf 
Jabhat al-Nusra: A Self-Professed AQ Affiliate – Charles Lister, Jihadica: https://bit.ly/ZPCze3 
The Future of Al-Qaeda: Results of a Foresight Project – The Canadian Security Intelligence Service: https://bit.ly/11jP8kF 
The Myths of Radicalization – J.M. Berger, Intel Wire: https://bit.ly/11jV2Cl 
Friday May 10:
Expanding the Scope of Jihadology: Intro to the Hizballah Cavalcade – Phillip Smyth, Jihadology: https://bit.ly/ZUwP2D 
Church–State Regimes and their Impact on the Institutionalization of Islamic Organizations in Western Europe – Patrick Loobuyck, Jonathan Debeer, and Petra Meier, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs: https://bit.ly/13nbMq0 
Islamic Umbrella Organizations and Contemporary Political Discourse on Islam in Germany – Matthias Kortmann and Kerstin Rosenow-Williams, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs: https://bit.ly/13nbNKC 
Citizenship/Religious Expression in West: Comparative Analysis of Experiences of Muslims in France,Germany, and the United States – Jackleen M. Salem, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs: https://bit.ly/13nbS16 
Mosques and Municipalities in Belgium: Negotiating Urban Spaces – Corinne Torrekens, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs: https://bit.ly/13nbTlC 
Saturday May 11:
Hizballah Cavalcade: Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 1 – Phillip Smyth, Jihadology: https://bit.ly/10Nrc1z 
Monday May 13:
Salman al-Awdah: In the shadow of revolutions – Madawi Al-Rasheed, London Magazine: https://bit.ly/13dSr7i 
Jihadi Twitter Activism part 2: Jabhat al-Nusra on the Twittersphere – Nico Prucha and Ali Fisher, Jihadica: https://bit.ly/13eeZVy 
The Riyadh Compound Bombings: Ten Years, and Ten Lessons, Later – Thomas Hegghammer, Asharq al-Awsat: https://bit.ly/17Fvocv
Tuesday May 14:
Usama bin Ladin’s “Father Sheikh”- Yunus Khalis & the Return of AQ’s Leadership to Afghanistan – Kevin Bell, Combating Terrorism Center: https://bit.ly/17qXZlA 
How Twitter Is Messing With Al-Qaeda’s Careful PR Machine – Tony Busch, The Atlantic: https://bit.ly/10okSSd 
Standoff Between the Tunisian Government and Ansar al-Sharia – Aaron Y. Zelin, Washington Institute for Near East Policy: https://bit.ly/14l3rlS 
What’s in the names of terrorist groups (1): Jabhah al-Nusrah – Mr. Orange’s War Tracker: https://bit.ly/140f2Hl 
Wednesday May 15:
The moral maze: Dutch Salafis and the construction of a moral community of the faithful – Martijn de Koning, Contemporary Islam: https://bit.ly/12aTmpG 
Explaining the Western Response to the Arab Spring – Dan Byman, Journal of Strategic Studies: https://bit.ly/12aTPZb 
What is the Liwa’ Abu Fadl al-Abbas?: Assessing Syria’s Shia “International Brigade” Through Social Media Presence – Phillip Smyth, Jihadology: https://bit.ly/10pVVpz 
The Muslim Brotherhood Prepares for a Comeback in Syria – Raphaël Lefèvre, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace https://bit.ly/10qBOI0 
Thursday May 16:
Morocco’s Salafis: In Search of a Comprehensive Solution – Sanaa Karim, Sada Journal: https://bit.ly/16ku675 
Confronting Tunisia’s jihadists – Andrew Lebovich, The Middle East Channel: https://atfp.co/10ZY5Iy 
The ever-evolving al-Qaeda threat – Mitchell D. Silber, The AfPak Channel: https://atfp.co/184SOpr 
Friday May 17:
British Muslim youth: radicalisation, terrorism and the construction of the “other” – Orla Lynch, Critical Studies on Terrorism: https://bit.ly/10W0iux 
Hizballah Cavalcade: Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 2 – Phillip Smyth, Jihadology: https://bit.ly/18QCtpE 
Roman Catholic Approaches to the Qur’an since Vatican II – David Marshall, Islam and Christian–Muslim Relations: https://bit.ly/12BHjDJ 
Options and Strategies for Countering Online Radicalization in the United States – Peter R. Neumann, Studies inConflict and Terrorism: https://bit.ly/12BHpLI 
State-Sponsored Social Control of Illegitimate Social Movements: Strategies Used to Financially Damage Radical Islamic, Terrorist-Labeled Organizations – Samuel C. Lindsey and Michael J. Williams, Studies inConflict and Terrorism: https://bit.ly/12BHqPL 

The Islamic World Issues Study Center presents a new release: "Answers To The Open Interview With the Mujāhid Shaykh [Omar Hammami] Abū Manṣūr al-Amrīkī"

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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic World Issues Study Center — “Answers To The Open Interview With the Mujāhid Shaykh [Omar Hammami] Abū Manṣūr al-Amrīkī”
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To inquire about a translation for this release for a fee email: [email protected]

Minbar at-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād presents a new Fatwā from Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī: "What Is Your Advice With Regard To the Annual Conference To Be Held By the Brothers in Anṣār al-Sharī'ah in Tunisia?"


Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī — “What Is Your Advice With Regard To the Annual Conference To Be Held By the Brothers in Anṣār al-Sharī’ah in Tunisia?”
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To inquire about a translation for this fatwā for a fee email: [email protected]

New statement from al-Qā’idah in the Islamic Maghrib: "Some of the Organization's Operations That Runs Out Against the Enemies of the Ummah, the Millat, and Their Agents"

UPDATE 5/19/13 8:34 AM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic statement:
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=&0=& Despite of the wounds and trials, and the enemies gathering and the increase of the agents the knights of the Islam are still engaging the enemies of the Ummah and religion, in the Great Sahara and their agents in the northern front in Algeria, where the war is going on for more than twenty years, in order to establish the Sharia and for the Muslim peoples to retrieve its sovereignty over its resources that are plundered in the name of the law in broad day light, and this is the harvest of some of the recent campaigns of your brothers the mujahidin, the Almighty says: (Fight them, Allah will punish them by your hands and bring them to disgrace, and assist you against them and heal the hearts of a believing people -14- And remove the rage of their hearts; and Allah turns (mercifully) to whom He pleases, and Allah is Knowing, Wise -15-) Surah At-Tawbah.=&1=& 11 April 2013  A group of mujahidin planted two IEDs against a group from the polytheist army, the protectors of the thieves were in a combing mission and the explosion resulted in 3 dead and 2 wounded and that was on Al-Walayee road that links between the township of Bu’Kram and Talablat.=&1=&=&3=&=&4=&=&5=&=&6=&

Wednesday 5 Rajab 1434 A.H. corresponding 2013-05-15
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: al-Qā’idah in the Islamic Maghrib — “Some of the Organization’s Operations That Runs Out Against the Enemies of the Ummah, the Millat, and Their Agents”
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‘Umar Studio presents a new statement from the Teḥrīk-ī-Ṭālibān Pākistān’s Isḥān Allah Iḥān: "Claiming Responsibility for the Attack on the Election Campaign of Mounir Orakaza'i"

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بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم 

Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan – Statement No. 10


A Statement Claiming Responsibility for the Attack on the Election Campaign of Mounir Orakaza’i



Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the Universe, and may prayers and peace be upon the Messenger of Allah, his family, his companions and his allies. Thereafter
The attack against Mounir Orakaza’i did not happen because of his current political affiliations with the Society of the Scholars of Islam, instead it happened because of the crimes he had committed against Islam and the Mujahideen, and he handed over tens of the Arab Mujahideen to America, who remain captured in Guantanamo even now. He worked with dedication to spilling the blood of the tribal people in the last five years with the United Nationalist Movement, the Nationalist ‘Awami Party and the Pakistan People’s Party. Therefore we will not pardon him and leave him alive, Allah willing.
Note: The Shura Council of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan has appointed Hafiz Dawlat Khan, who is called Hafez Ahmad, as Emir of the Kurram Agency area, and the aforementioned operation was his first achievement.


Ihsanullah Ihsan
Spokesman
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

Allah is the Greatest

{But honour belongs to Allah and His Messenger, and to the Believers; but the Hypocrites know not.}

The Official Foundation for Production and Distribution
Umar Media
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan

Thursday 6 Rajab, 1434 A.H
16/05/2013
Source: (Echo of Jihad Center for Media)
The Global Islamic Media Front

Observing Mujahideen News and Inspiring the Believers

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Hizballah Cavalcade: What is the Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA)?: Assessing Syria’s Shia “International Brigade” Through Their Social Media Presence

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

What is the Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA)?: Assessing Syria’s Shia “International Brigade” Through Their Social Media Presence
By Phillip Smyth
Click here for a PDF version of this post
Making its first appearances in the fall of 2012, Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigades or LAFA) represents a new addition to the Syrian battlefield and serves as another example of increased sectarianism in the Syrian Civil War. The organization claims its role is to defend the Sayida Zaynab Shrine and surrounding Shia populated neighborhoods located in southern Damascus.[1] The group is made-up of a mixture of a small number of native Syrian Shia with a majority of foreign Shia Muslim fighters.
LAFA has also maintained an outward appearance which mirrors the same type of spirit once found with the volunteer International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War. Despite the presented narrative, this does not necessitate the group is an ad hoc collection of individual Shia Muslims. The group heavily utilizes fighters originating from Iranian-backed organizations (such as Iraq’s Kata’ib Hizballah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq), has uniformed personnel, new weapons, a recognizable leadership structure, and openly identifies with Lebanese Hizballah. These factors point to an extremely organized fighting group and deeper levels of Iranian involvement in the organization.
Unlike larger and more established militant Shia Islamist groups such as Lebanon’s Hizballah or Iraq’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, LAFA has no official website or official online forums. The group finds most of its internet representation through a mixture of quasi-official Facebook pages and YouTube stations. In fact, for the Western and Arabic-language press, LAFA’s existence only came to light when a YouTube music video featuring the group’s fighters was made public.[2] Thus, fifteen pro-LAFA Facebook pages, five Facebook pages associated with Lebanese Hizballah, one Hizballah forum, three pro-Muqtada al-Sadr forums, and five pro-LAFA/pro-Hizballah YouTube stations were reviewed for this study.
 “Labayka Ya Zaynab!”: Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s Messaging Campaign & Narrative



Designating itself firmly as a Shia militant organization, LAFA utilizes Shia Islamic imagery, slogans, and other symbols to push its case to Shia Muslims. As stated by the group and its supporters, the Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade’s main purpose is to “Defend the Saydah Zaynab Shrine”. Their specified raison d’etre, immediately projects an image of “Protectors” simply reacting to a foe bent on the destruction of Shi’ism.
A common chant heard and written by LAFA members and supporters is “Labayka Ya Zaynab!” (“We are here for you Zaynab”). The slogan directly refers to the defense of the Zaynab Shrine and has also become a rallying cry for Shia Islamist groups fighting in Syria. At funerals held for Lebanese Hizballah members killed in Syria, the same slogan regularly chanted. LAFA militants regularly say the phrase as they engage Syrian rebel forces. The cry reinforces the line that the group’s sole function is the protection of the Zaynab Shrine and that they are worthy of praise for their sacrifice for the entirety of Shi’ism.
The Shia Symbolism behind LAFA’s name originates with the story of Abu Fadl al-Abbas (A.K.A. Abbas Ibn Ali). Abu Fadl al-Abbas was a trusted and brave warrior who fought for his father, Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib.[3] Serving with Imam Husayn’s forces during the religiously important and historic Battle of Karbala, Abu Fadl al-Abbas had both of his arms cut off attempting to collect water for his besieged compatriots. Symbolizing his willingness to sacrifice and loyalty, until he was killed, Abbas continued to carry water back to his forces using his mouth.[4]
LAFA has attempted to utilize this story in their propaganda material. The image of a severed arm was actually featured in a number of pro-LAFA videos.[5] Additionally, the green flag on LAFA’s logo represents the flag Abu Fadl al-Abbas carried when he acted as flag bearer for Imam Husayn during the Battle of Karbala.
The story taps into the very roots of the Sunni-Shia split. For Shia, the Battle of Karbala symbolizes their rejection of oppressive Sunni rule. Combined with what appears to be a clear Sunni Islamist drive to dislodge Shia presence in Syria, for many Shia the story resonates in the contemporary sense. Since the shrine and neighborhoods LAFA claims to protect are surrounded by pockets of Syrian rebels, the field of battle is also reminiscent of the Battle of Karbala. With these prevailing themes, LAFA taps into the culturally important concept of Shia self-sacrifice. These themes were used extensively by Iran’s current leadership and has been refered to by some scholars as the, “Karbala narrative”.[6]
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Figure 1: Another example of LAFA pushing the “Israel/Jewish-Sunni Gulf Arab” or “Israel/Jewish-Takfiri” conspiracy narrative. A LAFA member steps on a paper reading “Al-Saudia/Qatar/Al-Khaleej” (“Saudi, Qatar, the Gulf”) which are positioned under a Star of David. (Source: Facebook).
While LAFA describes its enemy as “Takfiris” or as “Gulf and Israeli” supported enemies, it neither specifically targets Sunni Muslims as a whole, nor marks the entire sect as apostates. Instead, the group brands its Syrian rebel enemies (no matter their political orientation, tactics utilized, or how secular) as “Wahhabists”, “Terrorists” and/or “Extremists”. Moreover, a number of online LAFA supporters refer to all Syrian rebels as “Kafirun” (“infidels”).
A major propaganda event for LAFA occurred when one of its members raised a red banner over the Zaynab Shrine’s golden dome. The message portrayal appeared to be one of valiantly opposing their Syrian rebel enemy and of embodying the flag-bearing role of Abu Fadl al-Abbas. The raising of the red banner signified willingness to become a martyr since it is the symbolic color for martyrdom in Shi’ism.[7] At the time of this writing, the film of the LAFA militant raising the red flag has been re-edited into eight YouTube films.
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Figure 2: LAFA members and supporters raise a red banner reading “Ya Zaynab” (“O Zaynab”) over the shrine. (Source: Facebook).
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Figure 3: A photo of a LAFA member raises the red flag reading, “Ya Zaynab” (“O Zaynab”). (Source: Facebook).
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Figure 4: An example of the Zaynab Shrine in LAFA propaganda. “Liwa’a Abu Fadl Al-Abbas” is written in Arabic calligraphy. Wrapped around the shrine’s minaret is a flag reading, “Ya Zaynab” (“O Zaynab”). (Source: Facebook).
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Figure 5: 7.62×39 rounds (the round used in the AK-47) have been arranged to spell, “Ya Ali” (O, Ali). The Ali reference refers to Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib. For the Shia, he is considered the first Imam, his family. The ammunition also forms the Zulfiqar, Ali’s double pointed sword, which represents divinely guided power. (Source: Facebook).
Iranian-Backed Groups & Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
The foreign fighter element of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas has caught the attention of many analyzing the group. A key factor for new militia is that the majority of fighters killed come from both Iraq and Lebanon. The original parties they were aligned with were either beholden to Iranian radical ideology or created with Iranian aid. This factor points to a more direct Iranian involvement with the organization’s creation.
There has been a preponderance of reports citing large number of Iraqi Shia who have joined the group. Pro-LAFA social media is rife with many individuals praising Iraqi Shia efforts with the group. However, there have also been numerous Lebanese Shia—mainly Hizballah members—who fight or have fought with the group.
Journalist Nicholas Blanford identified that Hizballah involvement with the militia could be determined due to their utilization of semi-automatic fire, “a technique taught to Hezbollah combatants to improve accuracy and save ammunition”.[8] The clothing worn by LAFA members also points to another Hizballah-LAFA connection.[9] However, the links between the two organizations are far deeper than similar weapons techniques and uniforms.
As far back as August, 2012, there was unconfirmed evidence that Hizballah had positioned itself around the Zaynab shrine. At that time, Hassan Selim Meqdad, a Lebanese Shia was captured by Syrian rebels and was accused of being a Hizballah operative fighting in Syria. His family and Hizballah both denied the claims.[10]  When Meqdad was filmed, he told his captors he was one

Check out my new 'Policy Watch' for the Washington Institute: "Standoff Between the Tunisian Government and Ansar al-Sharia"


On May 10-11, Tunisian security services and police launched an unprecedented offensive against local Salafist group Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST), cracking down on members who were delivering public lectures or passing out their literature on the street. In response, AST leader Sheikh Abu Ayyad al-Tunisi made a veiled threat that youths would defend Islam in Tunisia just as they have in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, Iraq, Somalia, and Syria — an indirect warning of potential full-blown jihad. Such a development would be a major break from Abu Ayyad’s public strategy over the past two years, in which he has argued that Tunisia is a land of dawa (i.e., proselytizing and associated Islamic outreach activities), not armed jihad. AST’s third annual conference in al-Qayrawan this weekend could help determine if the latest incident becomes a tipping point toward open conflict or an opportunity for both sides to back down.
Click here to read the rest.

The Global Islamic Media Front presents a new article from Millat Ibrāhīm's Abū Usāmah al-Gharīb: "Denial of What Was [Allegedly] Published From My Tongue About Rotten Democracy"

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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Abū Usāmah al-Gharīb — “Denial of What Was [Allegedly] Published From My Tongue About Rotten Democracy”
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To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: [email protected]