My new 92-page booklet has been published: “The Age of Political Jihadism: A Study of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham”

Abstract:

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a group previously linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and to al-Qaeda, has evolved in ways that challenge accepted views of “jihadism.” Now ruling over territory in Syria’s northern Idlib and western Aleppo governorates, it functions more like a government than a nonstate actor, and HTS leader Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani is seeking the group’s removal from the U.S. State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. But HTS is hardly anodyne. The group still espouses extremist beliefs that glamorize terrorism abroad, and its fighters fire rockets into civilian areas controlled by the Assad regime. Moreover, HTS hosts other designated groups in its territory, including Jamaat Ansar al-Islam, Katibat Imam al-Bukhari, and Katibat al-Tawhid wal Jihad.

In this thought-provoking Policy Focus, illustrated with photographs of HTS personalities and personnel, jihadism expert Aaron Y. Zelin digs deep into the group’s past before reckoning with the implications of Jawlani’s request. Whatever the U.S. decision, he suggests, political jihadism is here to stay.

Click here to read the 92-page booklet.

Early Reviews:

Check out my new article for the ISIS Reader website: “Tunisians of the Iraq Jihad and How That Set the Stage for the Syrian Jihad”

Nestled into the ISIS Reader: Milestone Texts of the Islamic State Movement is a brief mention of a Tunisian that went by kunya Abu Usamah al-Tunisi. Based on primary source research for my own book, Your Sons Are At Your Service: Tunisia’s Missionaries of Jihad, Abu Usamah came to Iraq at the latest in early 2004 and fought in the Battles of Fallujah where his close relationship with both Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir led to his rise in the organization: first as the military leader of Baghdad’s southern belt and later as the leader of Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin (MSM)/the Islamic State of Iraq’s (ISI) entire foreign fighter operation. His closeness to al-Zarqawi and al-Muhajir might also help explain why Abu Usamah appeared as one of the masked individuals in the video that showed the beheading of the American Nicholas Berg in May 2004. More importantly, the fact that Tunisians held high-level positions, especially ones related to foreign fighting, helps explain why so many Tunisians would later become connected to these networks that helped recruit people to fight in Iraq, Libya, and Syria after 2011. Abu Usamah would eventually be killed in a U.S. airstrike in the city of Musayyib, in Babil Province, on September 25, 2007, along with a number of other senior ISI leaders.

Although many Tunisians partook in jihadism prior to the Iraq war, the war inspired a new generation and cadre of individuals. For example, Hasan al-Brik, who would become Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia’s (AST) head of dawa after the 2011 Tunisian revolution, traveled to Iraq in 2003. Like many others, he did not actually make it into Iraq, but rather took charge of a safe house in Syria where individuals were vetted before travelling to Iraq. For the Tunisians who survived, many, including al-Brik, would be arrested in Syria (and elsewhere) and rendered back to Tunisia to be placed into its prison system. Tunisia’s prisons in the seven to eight years before the revolution would be crucial for bringing together the first generation of Tunisian jihadis associated with Afghanistan and Europe-based networks and the second generation more associated with Iraq and the GSPC/AQIM networks. This prison exchange between the first and second generations of Tunisian jihadis would provide AST’s base for activities after the 2011 revolution and later the foreign fighter mobilization to Iraq, Libya, and Syria to either join Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, Jabhat al-Nusrah, or the Islamic State.

My book provides a lot of details on the Tunisians that joined the Iraq jihad, around 5,000 words in all. Due to that length and the focus of the ISIS Reader on primary sources, this post will highlight some details based strictly on research derived on this network from primary sources. However, if you want the entire picture, chapter four of my book gets into the entire history and story in full.

Click here to read the rest of this post.

New release from Abū Yaḥyā al-Lībī: "Private Message to Abū 'Umar al-Bagdādī"

This private correspondence, which has now been leaked online is originally from April 5, 2007.

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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Abū Yaḥyā al-Lībī — “Private Message to Abū ‘Umar al-Bagdādī”
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To inquire about a translation for this release for a fee email: [email protected]

Bibliography on the History and Evolution of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

For those that need a refresher or are new to the subject. Let me know if I missed anything important. — Flag of al-Qaeda in Iraq.svgNvrJg Articles: Aaron Y. Zelin, “A Closer Look at ISIS (Part I),” September 10, 2013. Aaron Y. Zelin, “A Closer Look at ISIS (Part II),” September 11, 2013. Aaron Y. Zelin, “Al-Qaeda Disaffiliates with the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham,” February 4, 2014. Aaron Y. Zelin, “Announcing An Islamic State in Syria,” April 9, 2013. Aaron Y. Zelin, “The ISIS Guide to Building an Islamic State,” June 13, 2014. Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Return of Sunni Foreign Fighters in Iraq,” June 12, 2014. Abdul Hameed Bakier, “Internet Jihadists React to the Deaths of Al-Qa`ida’s Leaders in Iraq,” May 3, 2010.
Abdul Hameed Bakier, “Islamic State of Iraq Brings Internet Propaganda to the Streets,” April 24, 2010. Abdul Hameed Bakier, “Jihadis Ask How the Mujahideen Will Control an Islamic State of Iraq,” August 6, 2009. Andrea Plebani, “Ninawa Province: Al-Qa`ida’s Remaining Stronghold,” January 13, 2010.
Brian Fishman, “The Islamic State Returns to Fallujah,” January 10, 2014. Clint Watts, “ISIS’s Rise After al Qaeda’s House of Cards – Part 4 of “Smarter Counterterrorism”,” March 22, 2014. Cole Bunzel, “Caliphate Now: Jihadis Debate the Islamic State,” November 25, 2013. Cole Bunzel, “Introducing the “Islamic State of Iraq and Greater Syria”,” April 9, 2013. Cole Bunzel, “The Islamic State of Disobedience: al-Baghdadi Triumphant,” October 5, 2013. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Bridget Moreng, “Al-Qaeda’s Offensive Against Iraq’s Sahwa,” September 30, 2013. Douglas A. Ollivant and Brian Fishman, “State of Jihad: The Reality of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,” May 21, 2014. Gary Gambill, “Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi: A Biographical Sketch,” December 16, 2004. Gordon Corera, “Unraveling Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda Connection,” May 5, 2005. Letta Taylor, “Before the Fall: ISIS was wreaking havoc in Mosul long before it took over the city,” June 13, 2014. Matthew Levitt, “Zarqawi’s Jordanian Agenda,” December 16, 2004. Michael Knights, “The ISIL’s Stand in the Ramadi-Falluja Corridor,” May 29, 2014. Mr. Orange’s War Tracker, “Abû Bakr al-Baghdâdi and his possible Môsul past,” June 13, 2014. Murad Batal al-Shishani, “The Dangerous Ideas of the Neo-Zarqawist Movement,” September 3, 2009. Murad Batal al- Shishani, “The Salafi-Jihadist Movement in Iraq: Recruitment Methods and Arab Volunteers,” December 2, 2005. Nathaniel Rosenblatt, “ISIS’ Plan to Govern Syria – And What the US Should Do About It,” October 31, 2013 Pascale Combelles Siegel, “Islamic State of Iraq Commemorates its Two-Year Anniversary,” October 15, 2008. Sam Wyer, “The Islamic State of Iraq’s “Destroying the Walls” Campaign,” September 21, 2012. Reports: Benjamin Bahney, Howard J. Shatz, Carroll Ganier, Renny McPherson, and Barbara Sude, “An Economic Analysis of the Financial Records of al-Qa’ida in Iraq,” 2005. Brian Fishman, “Dysfunction and Decline Lessons Learned From Inside Al-Qa`ida in Iraq,” March 16, 2009.
Brian Fishman, “Fourth Generation Governance: Sheikh Tamimi defends the Islamic State of Iraq,” March 23, 2007.
Brian Fishman, “Redefining the Islamic State: The Fall and Rise of Al-Qaeda in Iraq,” August 2011.
Clint Watts, “Foreign Fighters: How are they being recruited?,” 2008.
Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo, “Iraqi Insurgent Media- The War Of Images And Ideas,” June 2007.
Jessica D. Lewis, “al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking The Walls Campaign, Part I,” September 2013.
Jessica D. Lewis, “al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent: The Breaking The Walls Campaign, Part II,” October 2013.
Jessica D. Lewis, “AQI’s “Soldiers’ Harvest” Campaign,” October 9, 2013.
Jessica D. Lewis, “The Islamic State of Iraq Returns To Diyala,” April 2014.
Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, “Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look At the Sinjar Records,” January 2008.
Nibras Kazimi, “A Virulent Ideology in Mutation: Zarqawi Upstages Maqdisi,” September 2005.
Nibras Kazimi, “The Caliphate Attempted: Zarqawi’s Ideological Heirs, their Choice for a Caliph, and the Collapse of their Self-Styled “Islamic State of Iraq”,” July 2008.
Nibras Kazimi, “Zarqawi’s Anti-Shia Legacy: Original or Borrowed?,” November 2006.
Reuven Paz, “The Impact of the War in Iraq On the Global Jihad,” March 2005.
Journal Articles:
Ahmed S. Hashim, “The Insurgency in Iraq,” 2003.
Benjamin W. Bahney, Radha K. Iyengar, Patrick B. Johnston, Danielle F. Jung, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Howard J. Shatz, “Insurgent Compensation: Evidence from Iraq,” May 2013.
Christopher Hewitt and Jessica Kelley-Moore, “Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A Cross-National Analysis of Jihadism,” 2009.
George Michael and Joseph Scolnick, “The Strategic Limits of Suicide Terrorism in Iraq,” 2006.
Matthew Levitt, “Foreign Fighters and Their Economic Impact: a Case Study of Syria and al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI),” September 2009.
Mohammed M. Hafez, “Jihad after Iraq: Lessons from the Arab Afghans,” 2009.
Mohammed M. Hafez, “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq- How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies,” 2007.
Mohammed M. Hafez, “Suicide Terrorism in Iraq: A Preliminary Assessment of the Quantitative Data and Documentary Evidence,” 2007.
Petter Nesser, “Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe,” September 2006.
Truls Hallberg Tønnessen, “Training on a Battlefield: Iraq as a Training Ground for Global Jihadis,” 2008.
Edited Volumes:
Brian Fishman (ed), “Bombers, Bank Accounts and Bleedout al-Qa’ida’s Road In and Out of Iraq,” July 22, 2008.
Books:
Asiem El Difraoui, Al-Qaida par l’image. La prophétie du martyre, 2013. Jean-Charles Brisard, Zarqawi: The New Face of Al-Qaeda, 2005. Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom, 2007.

al-Furqān Media presents a new video message from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām: “Messages from the Land of Epic Battles #17"

UPDATE 2/3/14 8:15 AM: Here is an Arabic transcription of the below video message:
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām — “Messages from the Land of Epic Battles #17″ (Ar)
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NOTE: For prior parts in this series see: #16#15#14#13#12#11#10#9#8#7#6#5#4#3#2, and #1.

NvrJg

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To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]

New statement from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām: "Position on the Initiative of Shaykh al-Muḥaysinī"

NvrJg

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

قال الله تعالى: {الَّذِينَ يُبَلِّغُونَ رِسَالاتِ اللَّهِ وَيَخْشَوْنَهُ وَلا يَخْشَوْنَ أَحَدًا إِلاَّ اللَّهَ وَكَفَى بِاللَّهِ حَسِيبًا} [الأحزاب: 39].

الحمد لله ربّ العالمين والصلاة والسلام على إمام المجاهدين نبيّنا محمّد وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين وبعد…

فقد طُرحت في وسائل الإعلام مبادرةٌ قال صاحبها مشكوراً إنه يسعى من خلالها لوقف الاقتتال الحاصل بصورة رئيسية بين الدّولة الإسلاميّة في العراق والشام ومجموعة الكتائب والفصائل والعصابات التي أعلنت الحرب الغادرة عليها، وقبل التطرّق لردّنا على المبادرة نقول ابتداءً:

إنه من الخطأ البيّن الفادح إطلاق القول بأنّ القتال الحاصل الآن في الشام هو قتال بين مجاهدين في سبيل الله وأنه قتال فتنة، بل قد يكون ذلك القول من تلبيس الحق بالباطل والعياذ بالله، فهل الكتائب التي تقاتل تحت مظلّة هيئة أركان سليم إدريس وائتلاف الجربا وغيرها من المسمّيات التي لا تُخفي منهجها العلماني العفن ورفضها لتحكيم الشريعة أو أي طرحٍ لمشروع إسلاميّ ولو بالاسم هم مجاهدون في سبيل الله؟

هل عصابات جمال معروف وخالد حياني وأحمد عفش وغيرهم من المفسدين وقطاع الطرق ومطايا آل سلول ومخابرات أمريكا وفرنسا مجاهدون في سبيل الله؟

هل المجرمون واللصوص الذين غدروا ودهموا بيوت المهاجرين واعتدوا على أعراض المرابطين وقطعوا الطرق عليهم وانتهبوا أموالهم وذبحوهم بدمٍ بارد ثم ألقوا أجسادهم في الآبار، هل هؤلاء مجاهدون في سبيل الله وقتالهم قتال فتنة؟

وليس يصحّ في الأذهان شيءٌ    إذا احتاج النّهار إلى دليل

لقد مورست حملة دعائية خبيثة ضخمة لتشويه صورة المجاهدين طمست الحقائق ولبّست على الناس الأمور وسوّغت الجرائم التي ارتكبت ضدّ الدّولة الإسلاميّة وزينت الوجوه الكالحة القبيحة لمرتكبيها، وكان من أبرز ما اتهمت به الدّولة الإسلاميّة زوراً أنها تُكفّر المسلمين في الشّام وأنها لا تتحاكم في خصوماتها مع الفصائل والكتائب المسلحة لشرع الله ولا حول ولا قوّة إلا بالله.

وحتى تتبيّن للمسلمين في الأمّة طبيعة هذا الصراع في الشّام وحقيقة الأطراف التي تُحارب مشروع الدّولة الإسلاميّة، وتكون لمثل هذه المبادرات أرضيةٌ صلبة يُنطلق منها لتترك آثاراً وتؤتي ثماراً ملموسة بعيداً عن النفخ الدّعائي الذي لا يأتي في الغالب بخير وتستثمره أبواق الإعلام الفاجر، فإنّنا نطلب من أصحاب هذه المبادرة وغيرها أنْ يلتزموا هم أولاً ثمّ يُلزموا الأطراف المعنية بهذه المبادرات أمرين مهمّين:

أولاً: بيان الموقف الشرعي الصريح بلا مواربة من المناهج المناقضة لتحكيم الشريعة الإسلاميّة في الشّام كـ “الديمقراطية” و”العلمانية”، والهيئات والمجالس التي تمثلها علانيةً كهيئة الأركان والائتلاف الوطني والمجلس العسكري وغيرها من المسمّيات التي تدعو بلا خفاء لبناء دولة لا تحكم بشرع الله، تحت غطاء ما يسمّى بـ “الدّولة المدنيّة”.
وما يترتّب على ذلك من الموقف الشرعي الصريح الواضح تجاه الجماعات والفصائل والتكتلات المنضوية تحت هذه المسمّيات أو المرتبطة بها أو تقاتل على الأرض تحت رايتها، وما يجب على الجميع في كيفية التعامل معهم ومع رموزهم.

ثانياً: بيان الحكم الشرعي الصريح للأنظمة الحاكمة في المنطقة كالحكومة الأردنيّة والسعوديّة والقطريّة والإماراتيّة والتركيّة وغيرها، وما يترتّب على ذلك من موقف شرعيّ تجاه الجماعات والفصائل التي تتعامل مع هذه الحكومات أو مع مخابراتها أو مع مخابرات الدّول الغربية كأمريكا وفرنسا وغيرها، أو تُعين هذه الحكومات وأجهزة المخابرات لتنفيذ مشاريعها الخبيثة في الشام.

فإن حددت الأطراف المعنية موقفا واضحا من هاتين المسألتين وأعلنت ذلك على الملأ، فسيكون بعدها وضع الترتيبات القضائية وما يتبعها من إجراءات خاصّة بهذه المبادرة أو غيرها أمراً هيّناً بإذن الله، وإننا لنحسبُ أنّ تبيان الموقف الشّرعي في هذه المسائل واجبٌ في هذه المرحلة الخطيرة على أيّ جماعة جهادية تقاتل في سبيل الله أو تنسب نفسها لفسطاط المجاهدين في سبيل الله، حتى يعرف الجميع مواطن أقدامهم ومع من يتعاملون، وليحيى بعدها من حيّ عن بيّنة ويهلك من هلك عن بيّنة.

وإلى أن يتمّ الاتفاق على هاتين المسألتين من قبل الأطراف التي وافقت على المبادرة، فإنّ سياسة الدّولة على الأرض مستمرّة بإذن الله في قتال من يُقاتلها والاقتصاص ممّن ظلمها وكسْرِ شوكته بلا هوادة، والكفّ عمّن كفّ عنها وحاد بسلاحه واعتزل قتالها مهما عظُم جُرمه، حقناً للدماء وإمضاءً لمبادرة أمير المؤمنين حفظه الله والتي أعلنها في خطابه الأخير، وحتى يتفرّغ الجميع لقتال العدو النّصيريّ المجرم المتربّص.

والله أكبر
{وَلِلَّهِ الْعِزَّةُ وَلِرَسُولِهِ وَلِلْمُؤْمِنِينَ وَلَكِنَّ الْمُنَافِقِينَ لا يَعْلَمُونَ}

الاثنين الموافق 26 ربيع الأول 1435 للهجرة
27 كانون أول 2014

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To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]

Ajnād Foundation For Media Production presents a new release from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām: “Recitation of Sūrat al-Ḥashr and al-Mumtaḥanah"

NvrJg
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām- “Recitation of Sūrat al-Ḥashr and al-Mumtaḥanah”

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To inquire about a translation for this recitation for a fee email: [email protected]

al-I’tiṣām Media presents a new video message from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām: “A Window Upon the Land of Epic Battles #43"

NOTE: For prior parts in this series see: #42#41#40#39#38#37#36#35#34#33#32#31#30#29#28#27#26#25#24#23#22#21#20#19#18#17#16#15#14#13#12#11#10#9#7#6#5#4#3#2, and #1.

NvrJg

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To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]

al-Furqān Media presents a new audio message from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām’s Abū Bakr al-Ḥussaynī al-Baghdādī: "God Knows and You Do Not Know"

UPDATE 1/25/14 11:44 PM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic audio message and transcription:
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Abū Bakr al-Ḥussaynī al-Baghdādī — “God Knows and You Do Not Know” (En)
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UPDATE 1/20/14 9:24 PM: Here is an Arabic transcription of the below audio message:
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Abū Bakr al-Ḥussaynī al-Baghdādī — “God Knows and You Do Not Know” (Ar)
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NvrJg
Abū Bakr al-Ḥussaynī al-Baghdādī- “God Knows and You Do Not Know”

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