The Clairvoyant: Turks Or Uyghurs Arrested In Indonesia?

Earlier this week, reports surfaced that four Turks had been arrested in Poso, Indonesia related to links with the Islamic State. It was later revealed though that in fact they were Uyghurs from Xinjiang, China. Why the confusion? There is actually a relatively simple answer to this, which was recently provided by a jihadi online that also helps us better understand some of the processes for how individuals are making their way toward Syria.

According to an individual that uses the name Abdullah Abu Bakr, Uyghurs have a difficult time obtaining Chinese passports to travel abroad. I personally cannot attest or know the veracity of this claim since I do not follow Chinese policies on this issue closely. That said, if one takes it as stated, because of this, these wannabe Uyghur foreign fighters then create fake passports, specifically from Turkey. He then claims they venture to Malaysia or Thailand where they might spend some time in prison, but afterwards because they were caught with these fake Turkish passports they are then deported to Turkey. Once in Turkey, according to him, Turkish officials view the Uyghurs as Turkic peoples and therefore allow them to safely stay in Turkey, which then allows the Uyghurs to safely get into Syria. This again raises questions about Turkish potential in enabling of the foreign fighter flow into Syria. He then warns that if any of this process gets snuffed out then the individuals attempting to fight jihad in Syria (and/or Iraq) will get sent back to China and face prison there. In part, this is likely why Indonesia at first believed the individuals arrested were from Turkey.

Of course, he does not mention Indonesia, but I do not see why this process couldn’t have played out there as well, whereby individuals from Xinjiang using fake Turkish passports traversed to Indonesia. Once there, the hope being to be deported then to Turkey so they can make easy entrance into Syria. This illustrates not only the efforts that go into trying to get to Syria, but also highlights that there is a network of individuals that has created a system to try and get individuals over there even if the process might take some time, arduous, and risky. It also likely shows that there are more interlinked connections between the different jihadi facilitation networks in south/southeast Asia as well as how they then connect back to the facilitation networks based in Turkey and/or the Arab world.

What the Syrian conflict has done is regenerate old networks, connect separate past networks that now overlap, and the creation of new ones that are now part of the broader echo system related to global jihadism. These connections created for going to join up to fight in Syria/Iraq will also be important for any potential returnees and/or the use of external operations if it is in the cards either for the Islamic State or al-Qaeda’s branch Jabhat al-Nusra. All of this just highlights that there is a very sophisticated methodology for ways in which individuals not so close to Syria get there that helps not only those that want to get there, but cements key relations that could be relevant to future jihad in south/southeast Asian countries.

As-Saḥāb Media presents a new release from al-Qā’idah’s Shaykh ‘Aṭīyyat Allah al-Lībī: “Indisputable Answers for Turkish Jihādīs”


Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh ‘Aṭīyyat Allah al-Lībī — “Indisputable Answers for Turkish Jihādīs”



To inquire about a translation for this release for a fee email:

GUEST POST: “Turkish Fighters in Syria, Online and Off”

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.

Past Guest Posts:

Mark Youngman, “Book Review of David Malet’s “Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts”,” June 20, 2013.

Hazim Fouad, “Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj),” April 30, 2013.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.

Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.

Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.

Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.

Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.

Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.

Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.

Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.

Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.

Turkish Fighters in Syria, Online and Off

By North Caucasus Caucus

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This piece provides a granular look at the backgrounds of Turkish citizens fighting in Syria, building on a recent article by Soner Cagaptay and Aaron Y. Zelin on the challenges Turkey may face in the future emanating from jihadis operating near Turkey’s southern border and the eventual return home of Turkish jihadis. While I have spent a considerable amount of time living, working and studying in Turkey, I am by no means an expert on Turkish jihadi groups or jihadi movements in general. I am a researcher on the politics of the Caucasus, but while researching foreign fighters in Syria from the Caucasus, I continually noted their engagement with Turkish jihadi material and felt it was an issue that needed further exploration.


Over the last three decades, Turkish citizens have travelled to fight and die in conflicts both close and distant. Turkish citizens have fought in Iraq, Afghanistan (both against the Soviets and the United States), Bosnia, and the North Caucasus, sometimes occupying leadership positions in Islamist armed groups.  For example, Cevdet Doger (aka Emir Abdulla Kurd) was second-in-command of foreign fighters in the North Caucasus before his death in May 2011.


Cevdet Doger and recovered Turkish identification tables, Source:

I will not venture to estimate how many Turkish citizens are fighting in Syria. In August 2012, Turkish journalist Adem Ozkose reported on the deaths of four Turkish fighters in Aleppo and said they were part of a group of 50 Turks fighting in that region. In the year since, it is conceivable that this number has grown along with Syria’s general population of foreign fighters.


There is a large amount of Turkish pro-jihadi material on Facebook relating to Syria. For example, the page, “Suriye İslam Devrimini Destekliyoruz,” (“We Support Syria’s Islamic Revolution”) has over 11,000 “Likes.” Al-Nusra Front (Nusret Cephesi in Turkish) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) both have Turkish language fan pages which are regularly shut down by Facebook but are always quickly reestablished. Turks interested in following jihadi activity in Syria are not wanting for online news coverage.

Just as Arabic-language material is translated and posted on Turkish-language sites, material from Turkish languages pages makes its way to Islamist users from other countries. For example, the pro-Islamist Turkish news website, Islah Haber, which regularly publishes news on Turkish fighter activity and deaths, uploaded an Arabic language video on 9 July 2013  that included several Turks speaking (with Arabic subtitles) about why they went to Syria. One fighter emphasized Assad’s killing of women and children and the hope of establishing a sharia-based state as a prime motivator.


The caption identifies him as “Abdullah Azzam the Turk, connected to Thughur Bilad al Sham,” Source: Islah Haber

YouTube videos are sometimes used in recruitment efforts. The Russian language website,, released a video on 03 July 2013 from Emir Seyfullah, an ethnic Chechen and then-spokesman of ISIS-affiliate Jaish al-Muhajirin wa Ansar. In the video, Emir Seyfullah speaks in heavily accented Turkish, calling for Turks to come help establish sharia in the land of Sham; his speech is intercut with footage of Syrian military jets on bombing runs. Jamestown’s Mairbek Vatchagaev wrote that Seyfullah is from the Pankisi Gorge region of Georgia. However, it is possible that he lived in Istanbul before the war in Syria. Many former fighters from the North Caucasus continue to live in Turkey. This has led to violence in the past, such as the September 2011 assassination of two former fighters, allegedly by Russian security services, in Istanbul’s Zeytinburnu neighborhood.


Screenshot of YouTube video about Turkish martyrs in Syria

The amount of material about Syria uploaded onto YouTube in all languages is nearly endless. However, one recent video provided insight into the extent of Turkish fighter involvement in Syria. On 05 July 2013, an account (now-deleted), associated with the Facebook page, “Suriye Devrimi Sehidleri,” (“Martyrs of the Syrian Revolution”) uploaded a video entitled, “Turkiyeli Sehidler” (Martyrs from Turkey). The video shows the images of 27 different alleged Turkish fighters killed in Syria. Some of the photos included full names, some noms-de-guerre, and others include hometowns in Turkey. The Turks in the video came from many different parts of the country, but eastern Turkey stood out, particularly Gazianatep, Diyarbakir, and Adana. The men ranged in age from as young as 17 to old men with long grey beards. Below is additional detail on three of the fighters, each case providing interesting insight into the different roles Turkish foreign fighters are playing in Syria, as well as insight into their backgrounds in Turkey.



Headline from Yalova regional news website, “A martyr killed by Assad’s soldiers is buried,” Source:

Ahmet Zorlu, with his long hair and goatee is one of the most recognizable faces on Turkish jihadi social media. Since his death, his image regularly appears in al-Nusra Front Turkish language fan pages and other pro-jihadi Turkish language media.

The 30-year-old, also known as Emir Ahmed Seyyaf, was killed along with four other Turkish fighters in an operation in Han el-Asel, near Aleppo in March 2013. Zorlu, reportedly a leader of a group of Turkish fighters, likely arrived in Syria a few months prior to the battle in Han el-Asel.

After his death, his body was returned from Syria to his hometown of Yalova, south of Istanbul on the shores of the Marmara Sea. A large funeral was held at the Yalova Central Mosque, and he was buried in the city’s cemetery. A video of the funeral can be found here. The return of the body across the border, as well as the highly visible and public nature of the funeral and burial, indicate that his “martyrdom” was not a closely guarded secret.


Banner photo from Turkish language al-Nusra Facebook fan page: the text reads, “The lands of Sham love martyrs.”


Originally from Adiyaman Province, Abudrrahman Koc is the oldest of the three men, sporting a long greying beard before he arrived in Syria. Koc was a community leader, serving as president of a religious NGO named Garip Der (Garipler Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği or Guraba Muslims Association). As recently as June 2012, Koc spoke at a large forum organized by Ozgur Der (Freedom Association) entitled, “We Have Brothers in Prison.” Established in 2010 and based in the conservative Fatih neighborhood of Istanbul, Garip Der organized the printing and delivery of religious literature to imprisoned Muslims.

Koc arrived in Syria in early January 2013. A video of Koc, likely taken shortly after his arrival in Syria, shows him awkwardly taking target practice and discussing the beautiful weather. A sniper reportedly killed Koc during an attack on the Mengh Airbase near Azaz on 02 July 2013. A group of 12 Islamic NGOs (a list can be found here) organized prayers for Koc and other martyrs killed in Syria and Afghanistan at the Fatih Mosque in Istanbul on 07 July 2013. The general director for Ozgur Der, Ridvan Kaya, delivered a eulogy on Koc followed by a march. Marchers carried a banner bearing Koc’s face along with pictures of Zorlu and other martyrs.


Left: Koc speaking at Ozgur Der event in June 2012, Source: Time Turk
Right: Koc (left) poses with two other fighters, Source: Haksozhaber

At least one of Koc’s associates from Garip Der went with, or followed, him later to Syria. Yakup Senatas, a Kurd from the southeastern town of Siverek was reportedly killed in Syria several weeks after Koc on 25 July 2013 also in the fighting at Mengh Airbase. Photos of the two men appeared on social media soon after Senates death. One photo at a rally in Istanbul show—Koc leading a group of protestors while Senates holds a banner.


Koc (center) speaks into megaphone while Senates holds banner, Source: Facebook


Metin Ekinci died fighting in Aleppo in August 2012. His death was initially reported on Syrian state television, where his Turkish state ID was aired along with a photo of his body. A funeral service was held in Ekinci’s native Bingol Province at the Haci Hasip Mosque, and published the text of a special sermon given in Ekinici’s honor. Before going to Syria, Ekinci had been connected with at least one religious NGO. In November 2011, Ekinci spoke at an Izmir, Turkey-based organization, Ilim; Der (Wisdom Foundation). The content of the speech was relatively moderate and focused on basic religious issues. Ilim; Der is an Islamic research and cultural foundation. Its website produces a number of lectures with Saudi and other Arab religious figures with Turkish subtitles. The most interesting aspect of Ekinci’s martyrdom is the fact that his brother, Azad Ekinci, was one of the most wanted men in Turkey less than ten years earlier.


Left: YouTube video of Ekinici speaking at Ilim;Der Right: Ekinci in Syria. Screenshot is from “Turkiyeli Sehitleri” video.


Azad Ekcinci was implicated in the 20 November 2003 bombing of the HSBC building in Istanbul, part of a series of al-Qaeda linked bombings in that city which killed 57 people. He was identified as being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and had a code name: “Abu Nidal.” It was later reported that Azad Ekinci died in a suicide attack in Iraq in January 2004, though law enforcement officials in Istanbul denied these claims.


As Zelin and Cagatay pointed out in their article, Turkey could face some serious issues as the conflict in Syria continues—concerns stemming from the uncertainty of where jihadis will turn their attention once the fight is over in Syria. Fighters’ connections to various charities and NGOs suggest at least an informal network of supporters among more conservative religious elements in Turkey. As the conflict drags on, it is likely that Turks will continue to travel to Syria to fight and establish links to the international jihadi networks that dominate the fighting in Syria’s north.


Man carries picture of Ahmet Zorlu at march at Fatih Mosque, 07 July 2013, Source: HaksozHaber

North Caucasus Caucus is written by a Washington, D.C.-based analyst. Views here are his alone. Read more at

Check out my new article at CNN co-authored with Soner Cagaptay: “Turkey’s Jihadi Dilemma”


In late May, the Turkish government uncovered a plan to use Sarin gas as part of a potential bomb attack in southern Turkey. Al Qaeda’s branch in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), was allegedly behind the plot, and the subsequent arrests highlighted the increasing trouble jihadi radicals could pose for Ankara. Indeed, the longer Turkey turns a blind eye to jihadi rebels crossing its territory into Syria, the more likely there will be blowback.

The reality is that providing jihadists access to a neighboring country can result in unintended consequences as radicals ultimately bite the hand that feeds them, something Pakistan should have learned over Afghanistan, and Bashar al-Assad has discovered as Syria-backed al Qaeda elements from Iraqi territory have turned against the regime in Damascus.

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Fursān al-Balāgh Media presents a new issue of The Islamic World Magazine #7-8

NOTE: For previous issues see: #6#5#4#3#2, and #1.


Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic World Magazine #7-8



To inquire about a translation for this magazine issue for a fee email:

New statement from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: “Communiqué About the Release of Turkish Captives”

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan released 4 out of the 8 Turkish prisoners showing its good will, human and Islamic sympathy and regard for the Muslim Turkish Nation who were apprehended sometime ago by Mujahidin of the Islamic Emirate. The remaining 4 persons will also be released in the near future.

The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan anticipates that the Turkish government will reciprocally express its good will and will take such measures which will consequently result in bringing the Afghan and Turkish Muslim masses close to each other and amplification of the devout brotherhood between them.


The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

3/7/1434 A.H. (lunar) ——- 23/2/1392 A.H. (solar)

13/5/2013 A.D.



Check out my new Foreign Policy piece co-authored with Daveed Gartenstein-Ross: “Uncharitable Organizations”

In 1997, employees of the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF), a Saudi-based charity, were mulling how best to strike a blow against the United States in East Africa. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, one employee indicated that the plan they hatched “would be a suicide bombing carried out by crashing a vehicle into the gate at the Embassy.” A wealthy foundation official from outside the region agreed to fund the operation.

The employees’ plans would go through several iterations, but AHIF would eventually play a role in the ultimate attack. In 1998, simultaneous explosions ripped through the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya — attacks eventually traced back to al Qaeda operatives. Prior to the bombings, a former director of AHIF’s Tanzanian branch made preparations for the advance party that planned the bombings, and the Comoros Islands branch of the charity was used, according to the Treasury Department, “as a staging area and exfiltration route for the perpetrators.” The ultimate result was deadly: 224 people killed and more than 4,000 wounded.

This was, of course, before the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent crackdown on wealthy Islamist charity organizations such as AHIF, which provided a large portion of the funding that made international terrorism possible. As a monograph produced for the 9/11 Commission noted, prior to 9/11, “al Qaeda was funded, to the tune of approximately $30 million per year, by diversions of money from Islamic charities and the use of well-placed financial facilitators who gathered money from both witting and unwitting donors.”

But despite all the efforts made to shut down such groups, Islamist-leaning international charities and other NGOs are now reemerging as sponsors of jihadi activity. In countries like Tunisia and Syria, they are providing the infusion of funds that have allowed extremist groups to undertake the hard work of providing food, social services, and medical care. Jihadists, meanwhile, have discovered that they can bolster their standing within local communities, thereby increasing support for their violent activities. And governments are struggling to keep up.

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