NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
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Past Guest Posts:
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
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By Hazim Fouad
In 2012 the Salafist TV Channel “al-Rahma” screened a debate between two representatives of the so called “al-Salafiyya al-Jihādiyya” and two members of “Jamāʿat Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya”, one of the oldest Salafist institutions in Egypt. The debate sheds some light on the ideological differences, especially with regard to the acceptance of the political and legal system in post-revolutionary Egypt.
Introduction
The toppling of Hosni Mubarak[i] in 2011 has led to an increased space for debate about the role of Islam in society and politics in Egypt. Several persons who had been sentenced over terrorism charges were released from prison and are now participating in this debate. One of the most ardent questions is how and to what extent sharia shall be implemented in the political system. This debate is not new. It was already an issue back in the seventies when groups like “al-Jamāʿāh al-Islāmiyya” revolted against what they perceived as an un-Islamic regime. What is new is on the one hand, the relatively open space in which such discussions take place. On the other hand, it becomes obvious that not every group, which can be labeled Islamist or even Salafist is automatically opposed to the concept of a civil state and laws not directly derived from the sharia.
This article tries to provide an in depth analysis of a three hour television debate which was screened in 2012 on the Egyptian Salafist TV Channel “al-Rahma”[ii] between two representatives of the so called “al-Salafiyya al-Jihādiyya”, a broad current comprising movements close to the ideology of “al-Qāʿidāh”, and two members of the “Jamāʿat Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya”, one of the oldest Salafist institutions in Egypt.[iii] It will be shown that the former actually use similar arguments “al-Jamāʿāh al-Islāmiyya” has used before to explain their complete rejection of the current political system, [iv] while the latter appear to be much more accommodating, though still at odds with the notion of democracy. The debate also sheds some light on the legitimacy of violence, as carried out by groups such as “al-Qāʿidāh”.
The first of its kind
The program begins with the moderator stating that rather than a contentious debate, this talk is supposed to be a calm discussion about jihadist thought and the first of its kind in Egypt. He then introduces the participants of the debate. The current of the so-called “al-Salafiyya al-Jihādiyya” is represented by Aḥmad Fuʾād ʿAshūsh and Jalāl al-Sharqāwī. ʿAshūsh is the leader of “al-Ṭalī’a al-Salafīyya al-Mujāhidīyya Ansār al-Sharīʿāh” in Egypt, an organization ideologically close to “al-Qāʿidāh”.[v] He had openly declared his loyalty to Usāma bin Lādin and Aymān al-Ẓawāhirī and appeared in several videos published by “al-Qāʿidāh”.[vi] Al-Sharqāwī has appeared together with Muḥammad al-Ẓawāhirī, the brother of Ayman al- Ẓawāhirī, in a press conference concerning the viewpoint of “al-Salafiyya al-Jihādiyya” on the constitution.[vii]
The other side is represented by Jamāl al-Marākibī and ʿAlāʾ Saʿīd. Al-Marākibī has been the former general president of the “Jamāʿat Anṣār al-Sunna al-Muḥammadiyya”, one of the oldest salafist institutions in Egypt, established in 1926. He is also a member of the “Shura Council of Scholars in Egypt”, which was set up by prominent Salafist scholars in 2011.[viii] Saʿīd is a preacher from Suez and supporter of the Salafist “al-Aṣālāh Party”.
Acceptance of laws perceived as un-Islamic
The debate starts with ʿAshūsh clarifying his positions with regard to the current constitution and laws, which govern Egypt. He states that the current reality is a product of the West’s infiltration of Muslim lands and those Muslims, which have been affected by Western ideas (al-mustaghribīn) and therefore not the result of a pure Islamic development. The Egyptian jurisdiction is based on the Napoleonic Code, which follows the philosophy of utilitarianism (al-nafʿiyya) developed by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham. With the application of this positive or man-made law (al-qānūn al-waḍʿī), the Sharia had been suspended since 1883. ʿAshūsh voices harsh criticism towards Muḥammad ʿAbduh, one of the key leaders of Muslim reformist thought and Mufti of Egypt at the turn of the 20th century, who had allegedly used these un-Islamic laws as a basis for his legal judgments. He summarizes his point by saying: “Our position is the complete rejection (al-rafḍ al-tām) of the rule of this law”.
Al-Marākibī begins his answer by admitting that ʿAshūsh is correct by saying that a Muslim country has to be governed by the sharia. But he argues for a more nuanced understanding of the word “law” (qānūn), which for him is an umbrella term, comprising multiple areas such as the law of inheritance or the law of guardianship, both of which are in his view in accordance with the sharia.
He also points to the fact that the sharia can be categorized into issues, which are definite (qaṭʿī) and those, which can be subject to interpretation (dhannī). There are some words for example, whose meaning is debated and not uniformly defined. The point of contention al-Marākibī sees is the question of how to change the reality Muslims in Egypt live in. Citing the founder of his movement Muḥammad Ḥāmid al-Fiqqī and the Azharite Hadith scholar Aḥmad Muḥammad Shākir, he says that this matter has to be solved through preaching (daʿwah). The applied method (manhaj) has to be to look first after those parts in the law that violate the sharia and then to change them via other laws instead of using violence. Jihad for him is the revival of the sharia and curbing the ignorance towards it, a process which in his eyes started in Egypt already over a hundred years ago.
This relativizing viewpoint of al-Marākibī seems to be unacceptable to ʿAshūsh. He replies that if only a single paragraph violates the sharia, the whole law becomes void (bāṭil). He goes on to ask about the position of all the other Islamic movements towards this positive law, which in his view is clear unbelief (kufr), since it allows sexual intercourse between a father and his daughter. Replying to the question of al-Marākibī where exactly the law legitimizes
