Search Results for “but if they fight you”

The Clear Banner: Update on the Finnish Foreign Fighter Contingent

Posted on October 18, 2014 by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: For prior parts in the Clear Banner series you can view an archive of it all here.

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Update on the Finnish Foreign Fighter Contingent
By Juha Saarinen
In early September, the Finnish Interior Ministry released its newest situation overview on violent extremism in Finland. The report included the most recent official estimates of the number of Finnish volunteers in Syria and Iraq. The contingent currently consists of:

at least 44 individuals (although this was increased to 45 in mid-October), of whom 36 are men and 8 are women

31 individuals with Finnish citizenship

17 different ethnic backgrounds

individuals mainly from the larger cities in Western [e.g. Turku and Tampere] and Southern Finland Provinces [e.g. Greater Helsinki Region]

Elsewhere, it has also been revealed that…

age range among the volunteers is between 18 and 50, but majority are in their twenties.

However, less than ten Finland-originated individuals in Syria are minors. At least one Finnish child has been born in the conflict zone, and one Finnish citizen in Syria is pregnant.

The estimation is based on individuals who have been identified by the FSIS. However, the overall number is likely higher, as not all individuals who have travelled from Finland to Syria and Iraq have come to the authorities’ attention. According to Helsingin Sanomat (HS), a Finnish newspaper, there may be as many as 55 individuals in the conflict zone, and some – particularly those of the jihadist persuasion – have taken their families with them. According to the Foreign Ministry, there are several Finnish children in IS-controlled areas. Additionally, at least one Finnish female jihadist has given birth in Syria, while another one is currently pregnant.
It is not clear how many of the 44-55+ individuals qualify as foreign fighters – i.e. individuals without pre-existing links to the conflict zone who are seeking to take part in an armed insurgency. The estimation includes an unknown number of humanitarian aid workers, possibly mercenaries, and members of the Syrian or Iraqi diaspora based in Finland, who may have travelled back to take part in the civil war or alleviate its impact in some capacity. However, the FSIS estimates that majority of these individuals are seeking to participate in armed conflict.
Equally, it is not clear how many volunteers or foreign fighters have either joined or support the Islamic State (or why), but according MTV3 News the FSIS believes those who have joined IS are “extremely radical”. It is likely that the majority of Finnish foreign fighters have joined IS – particularly among those who have travelled to Syria after summer 2013. Other groups that Finnish foreign fighters have joined are Jabhat al-Nusra and Kataib al-Muhajireen (before they became Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar).
Some Finland-originated individuals who do not qualify as foreign fighters, e.g. women who either have accompanied their husbands or travelled to the conflict zone in an individual capacity, clearly support the IS. Out of the four women I have identified (out of eight), all identify strongly with the IS, although their connection to and any possible role within IS remain unclear.
The FSIS has recently estimated that there are around 20 individuals who have returned, although they offered no information regarding their role or affiliation in the conflict zone. The recent FSIS revelation came in the aftermath of Finnish authorities arresting and detaining four returnees (one in absentia) in early October under Chapter 34a (Terrorist offences) of the Finnish Criminal Code. They had allegedly joined and fought with the Islamic State.
Initially the four individuals were suspected by the Finnish National Bureau of Investigation for murder with terrorist intent in addition to other terrorism-related crimes. According to NBI chief investigator Mika Airaksinen, these charges were not connected to a specific homicide but rather connected to participating in the armed operations of a terrorist organization. However, the three individuals are currently detained only on suspicion of preparation of an offence to be committed with terrorist intent and provision of training for the commission of a terrorist offence, recruitment for the commission of a terrorist offence, and preparation of an offence to be committed with terrorist intent, respectively. The fourth individual, who was detained in absentia, is still suspected of committing murder with terrorist intent.
In terms of casualties, at least three Finnish casualties have been reported. These are “Marwan” (died June 2013), “Abu Anas al-Finlandi” (died February 2014) and “Muhammad” (died June 2014). However, according to HS, there may be as many as many as five or six Finnish fatalities.
This leaves around 20-30 Finnish individuals in the conflict zone, majority of whom are likely foreign fighters affiliated with the Islamic State. It is highly likely that these individuals mainly reside and operate in Syria, although two Islamic State-affiliated Finnish jihadist foreign fighters claim to have travelled to Iraq. This information, however, cannot be independently verified at this point.

The Clear Banner: “For Our Freedom and Yours?”: The Lack of Central European Foreign Fighters in Syria

Posted on May 30, 2014 by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: For prior parts in the Clear Banner series you can view an archive of it all here.
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“For Our Freedom and Yours?”: The Lack of Central European* Foreign Fighters in Syria
*Central Europe is understood here as a bloc of formerly communist states, which are NATO and EU members (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria) plus the three former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
By Kacper Rekawek, PhD
“For Our Freedom and Yours” is one of the Polish national mottos first unveiled during the anti-Russian rebellion of the early 1830s. Its standing was augmented by the subsequent participation of the current author’s countrymen in different conflicts around the globe – from the Hungarian Revolution of 1848 to all battlefronts of the Second World War. Nonetheless, Poles fought as foreign fighters in earlier conflicts as well – be it the wars waged by the revolutionary France in Italy in the late 1790s (the song by the so-called Polish “legionaries” fighting alongside the French against the Habsburg Austria is Poland’s national anthem) or during the American War of Independence. The latter conflict produced one of Poland’s and possibly the world’s, most famous foreign fighter – Tadeusz Kosciuszko, a national hero to both Poles and Americans, whose monument stands yards away from the White House in Washington D.C.
Such strong and emphatic tradition of participation in foreign conflicts could, theoretically, result with scores of Polish volunteers ready and willing to fight for the cause of freedom around the globe. At the end of the day, citizens of the state, which regained its political sovereignty only in 1989 would be expected to remain zealously enthusiastic about aiding others in their quest for freedom. The same could be said about the societies of Poland’s Eastern and Southern neighbours or former communist countries, which are now all members of the European Union and NATO. Just as they all often offer and market their experiences of transformation from dictatorial regimes to liberal and prosperous democracies as interesting examples to all of the world’s democrats, different individuals from Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia could be expected flock to the banners of non-violent or armed movements or organisations advocating independence or democracy. However, it has not happened and neither the stereotypically romantic Poles or more pragmatic Czechs, just to name two of Central Europe’s nations, made names for themselves either as foreign activists or foreign fighters. Moreover, they seem to be missing out on the fight some of their Western European, Eastern European, or Balkan (as detailed in the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation estimates) peers are waging against the Assad government in Syria. Let us investigate why this is the case and study the counter-terrorism implications such situation poses for the countries of Central Europe.
There had been individual cases of foreign fighters from the region making their trek to wage jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s (Poland reports 3 such cases). The individuals were not religiously, but rather politically motivated – in theory, the war in Afghanistan offered a meaningful opportunity for those wanting to take the fight directly to the “Russians.” It is worth remembering, however, that the opposition to communist regimes in Central Europe was entirely non-violent and such endeavors gained very little traction amongst the members of the likes of the Polish Solidarity or the Czechoslovak Charter 77. On top of that, Central and Eastern Europeans could get to battlefields in exotic places (like Afghanistan, but also in other countries in Asia or the Middle East) more easily as advisors to the local army, embedded with the Soviet troops, than as foreign fighters (e.g. the current author interviewed a Hungarian general who served as an advisor to the Syrian military in 1982). The logistical, financial, and bureaucratic obstacles while living under police states modelled on the Soviet Union would simply be insurmountable even for the most enthusiastic, but very small in number, prospective volunteers wishing to go to Afghanistan. For these reasons, the Poles who participated in this conflict used different Western European countries as launching pads for their forays into Afghanistan.
One could argue that the post-1989 reality of Central Europe should offer a marked change for potential foreign fighters emanating from this region. The aforementioned obstacles were disappearing and as the Central European countries were plugging themselves into the global economy, they and their citizens were becoming more and more aware of the world around them. Some activists and do-gooders embraced humanitarian and relief efforts in e.g. the Balkans, but very few felt the need to help fight for someone else’s freedom in the ranks of foreign rebel or insurgent groups. Not that there was no sympathy for e.g. the Chechens, who just like the Afghans a decade earlier, were fighting what in the minds of especially many Poles, Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians initially constituted a struggle for independence of their homeland against the Russian invaders. This seemingly popular common Russian denominator, however, failed to ignite a phenomenon akin to the mobilization of Islamist foreign fighters in Western Europe for the civil war in Syria – only a handful of Poles, and hardly any Czech, Slovak, Hungarian or Bulgarian etc., trekked to Chechnya. The smaller, but perhaps more emphatically, at least initially, pro-Chechen, Baltic states are sometimes rumoured (as there is hardly any reliable data available) to have contributed more – some sources even mention allegedly Lithuanian female snipers fighting on the Chechen side. Moreover, after 9/11 and especially the Beslan school siege, much of the initial goodwill for Chechnya in Central Europe simply vanished. The alleged journalistic scoop of two prospective Polish fighters training in the Polish mountains for the hardship of the North Caucasus from 2012 or the 2009 Lithuanian alleged female suicide bomber, said to have been run from Chechnya and to be deployed against a military target in Russia, effectively constitute the most recent, but also farcical examples of “foreign fighting in the Caucasus” phenomenon on behalf of the Central Europeans.
The downfall of the Chechen cause in Central Europe, however, is not yet complete. Degi Dudayev, the son the late Dzhokhar Dudayev lives in Lithuania, and the the World Chechen Congress held its meeting in Poland in 2010. These are, however, forces seen as “secular” and in opposition to the Islamists of the Caucasus Emirate. After the horrors of Beslan, mobilizing support for this entity along the old anti-Russian lines of support in Central Europe became almost an impossibility and not only due to the fact of the world’s revulsion with “Chechen” terrorist acts, but also because the Emirate would not, in contrast to the Chechen rebels beforehand (see: the case of the late Aleksander Muzyczko, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian Right Sector who fought in Chechnya on the rebel side in the First Chechen War), accommodate non-Muslim foreign fighters. Thus one would have to be a Muslim even if they wanted to oppose Russia in e.g. North Caucasus or after 2011 in Syria where the rebels are fighting a Russia-backed Assad government. This seemingly trivial conclusion seriously reduced the potential number of foreign fighters from Central Europe as there are simply very few Muslims residing in the region.
There are traditions of Muslim communities in Central Europe, e.g. the tiny Polish Tatar community, present in the country from the late 17th century, residing in the North East of Poland. Many Bosniaks moved to Slovenia (richest part of Yugoslavia) in search of jobs and settled there, and there, of course, exists a sizable Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Additionally, almost all of the countries of the region have a history of close ties (also in supporting terrorist groups) with some Middle Eastern states, which co-operated with the Soviet bloc before 1989. For this reason, one can find the likes of Libyans, Syrians, Palestinians or e.g. former members of the Middle Eastern communist parties currently based in the region. They are, however, very small in number, usually secular and most of them are by now more than well integrated into the societies of the region. Their numbers are not swollen by any waves of new immigrants who, when they make it to Europe, prefer to stick to Western and Northern Europe where more of their peers, perhaps also family members, are based and where they have a chance of a more prosperous existence. Conversions to Islam are not unheard of, but far from numerous and as a result, some Muslim communities in Central Europe are so small that they do not even possess a luxury of a Mosque around, which its members could rally.
Those communities, are often poorly organized or riven with petty rivalries between the “old” Muslims and the converts, profess moderation, but are susceptible to more radically Islamist influences from abroad – neighbouring Western European countries where Muslim communities are stronger (e.g. Sweden and Finland vis-à-vis the Baltic states) or directly via funding from the Middle East. This, to an extent, is their foot in the door as far the Muslim community in Europe is concerned and theoretically a chance for their more militant members to link up with their peers in Western Europe. However, the numerical starting base is so low that we are yet to see examples of Central Europeans

The Clear Banner: Update on Finnish Foreign Fighters

Posted on May 29, 2014 by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: For prior parts in the Clear Banner series you can view an archive of it all here. For Juha’s first post at Jihadology on the history, background, and the early mobilization of the Finnish contingent click here.

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Update on Finnish Foreign Fighters
By Juha Saarinen
Despite the fact that an unprecedented number of foreign fighters from Finland traveled to Syria since 2012, very little is known about the individuals who have taken part in the conflict. When I previously wrote about the Finnish foreign fighter contingent in Syria in March, only four out of the 30+ “war volunteers” who had travelled to Syria had been covered in the Finnish media.Since then, information on only two new individuals – a Finnish-Syrian humanitarian worker regularly travelling to Syria to deliver aid, and a Finnish convert to Islam doing humanitarian work in Aleppo who was allegedly imprisoned by the FSA in early 2014 – has come to light. According to the most recent estimates from late March, this still leaves at least 24-34 foreign fighters completely unaccounted for.
Over the past eight months, I have collected data on Finnish foreign fighters. This has led to a list of 11 individual profiles of confirmed foreign fighters, most of whom identify with ISIS. These profiles are listed below, and they contain at least some information on individual fighters’ background, activity in Syria, and group affiliation. However, the list is hardly exhaustive as it includes around a fourth of the 30-40+ individuals currently estimated to have travelled to Syria from Finland.
unnamed
The already known individuals
“Muhammad” moved to Finland from Somalia with his family in 1993 when he was two-years-old. He grew up in Finland, where he received his education, most recently attending a vocational school in the Helsinki Metropolitan area. He lived in Espoo and exhibited some signs of radicalization before traveling to Syria via Turkey in December 2012, where he joined a radical Islamist group operating in north Syria. He is an ISIS fighter and still active in Syria – most recently near Al-Hasakah in early May. He is allegedly not interested in returning to Finland.
“Marwan” was a young convert to Islam from Turku in his early twenties. His mother was Finnish and his father was from Namibia. Before leaving for Syria, he had recently finished his compulsory military service in Finland and expressed a desire to study Islam abroad. He traveled to Syria via Turkey with his wife “Aisha” during summer 2012, when he joined an unidentified rebel unit in northern Aleppo—allegedly with other Finns. He was reportedly killed in a clash between Syrian rebels and Syrian government forces in Aleppo in June 2013. Prior to his death, he had likely fought at least near Idlib in spring 2013.
“Rami” was born in early 1990s to a Finnish mother and a father from an unidentified Arab country. He lived in Helsinki before traveling to southern Turkey in July 2013 – and presumably continuing to Syria. He grew up and was educated in Finland, converting to Islam as a teenager. Prior to his conversion, he had problems at school, suffered from alcohol abuse, and had exhibited some criminal behavior. Although he has reportedly denied being in Syria, his mother believes he has traveled there. Before traveling abroad, he had asked the imam at his local mosque about traveling to Syria.
The most recent Finnish casualty is “Abu Anas al-Finlandi”. He was born in the early 1990s and resided in Espoo. He traveled to Syria in late 2013, most likely via Turkey. He was killed in a battle between the Free Syrian Army and ISIS in February 2014, according to a Twitter account linked to ISIS. There are few details about his profile, but he likely converted to Islam either late 2011 or during 2012. It is likely he held some extremist political views prior to his conversion to Islam, and he was connected to the anarchist community in the Helsinki region.
New Additions to the Contingent
“Guhaad” is a Finnish-Somali man in his early 20s. He lived in Espoo before traveling to Syria, most likely via Turkey between spring and fall 2013, and he had joined ISIS by winter. He presumably has a combat role and has travelled at least to Raqqah and Manbij in 2014, and he is presently living in the latter. He and “Muhammad” are close friends.
“Lauri” is a Finnish convert to Islam from Espoo who travelled to Aleppo in June 2013. He was allegedly imprisoned in January 2014 for two weeks by FSA troops. In an interview in late April he stated his intention to continue his work in Syria, most likely in and around Aleppo. However, his current status or whereabouts are unknown. Lauri traveled to Syria with his wife, but nothing is known of her.
“Aisha” is “Marwan’s” widow. She had a baby two weeks before Marwan’s death while in Syria. Not much is known about her background, other than she too was a convert to Islam, around 20 years old, and originally from Espoo even though she lived in Turku with her husband prior to traveling to Syria. It was reported in August 2013 she was looking to return to Finland, but her current whereabouts are unknown. She re-activated on social media in spring 2014 and has occasionally shared jihadist propaganda. She presently identifies with ISIS, which suggests her husband – whose affiliation in Syria is unknown – may have joined and fought for ISIS and/or other jihadist groups prior to his death.
“Maryam” is a young Finnish Somali woman from Vantaa. She had attended a polytechnic school around Helsinki metropolitan area before travelling to Syria at some point between December 2013 and March 2014.Maryam is married, but it is not entirely clear whether her husband has accompanied her to Syria. She strongly identifies with ISIS, and has at least travelled to Manbij and Raqqah while in Syria.
“Isra” is a young Finnish woman, presumably of Somali descent. Not much is known about her, other than she identifies with ISIS, and may have travelled to Syria between winter 2013 and spring 2014. She also often shares graphic content depicting the suffering of civilians in Syria on social media.
“Rami A.” is a member of the Syrian diaspora in Finland who has regularly traveled to Syria in the past 18 months to deliver humanitarian aid, mainly in and around Aleppo and Idlib. According to him, he moves in Syria with Liwa al-Tawheed. At least in the last trip which took place in spring 2014, he was accompanied by “Hashim,” presumably another member of the Syrian diaspora in Finland from the Helsinki metropolitan area, but not much is known about him.
What do we know about the Contingent?
Overall, the tally of identified foreign fighters is now eleven, which is a significant increase but still leaves the majority of the contingent unaccounted for. However, the possibility that the list may include false positives cannot be excluded, as in most cases available or shared information cannot be independently verified.
These findings correlate with official statements. The majority of Finnish fighters are young Sunni Muslim men who were either born in Finland or moved there at a very young age, and there are also young Finnish men who have converted to Islam. Also, entire families have likely departed Finland to travel to the conflict zone, “Aisha” and “Marwan” being one such case. It is also possible that “Maryam” has travelled to Syria with her husband, while the marital status of “Isra” is unknown. It is also possible that some women from Finland have traveled to Syria alone, but it cannot be confirmed at this time.
Most the foreign fighters are from the Helsinki metropolitan area, and at least two are from Turku. This is hardly surprising as majority of the Muslims living in Finland live in or around the Helsinki region. There are known radicalized Muslims in Helsinki, as well as other large Finnish cities such as Tampere and Turku. Interestingly, no foreign fighters from Tampere have been identified thus far.
Again, not much is known about the Finnish fighters’ activities in Syria. However, majority of the fighters included here identify with ISIS, and thus live and/or operate around areas either controlled or contested by ISIS, mainly in or near Manbij and Raqqah. Previously, Idlib and Aleppo have been popular destinations. Out of the five identified foreign fighters with combat roles, only one has joined an unidentified group, but his wife presently identifies with ISIS, which may suggest her husband had joined and fought with a jihadist group in Syria, presumably affiliated with ISIS.
Majority of the foreign fighters identified here identify with ISIS, and majority of these are Somali. It is likely that ISIS-affiliated

GUEST POST: Damned if They Do, Damned if They Don’t: The Gordian Knot of Europe’s Jihadi Homecoming

Posted on April 22, 2014 by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Click here to see an archive of all guest posts.
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Damned if They Do, Damned if They Don’t: The Gordian Knot of Europe’s Jihadi Homecoming
By Zach Goldberg
Introduction
The homecoming of Europe’s jihadi volunteers (or émigrés) from Syria remains an enduring source of public disquiet. That battle-hardened and radicalized Muslim-European passport holders would return to leverage acquired “skills” at home is a specter haunting law enforcement across the continent. A recent discovery by French police of some 1000+ grams of explosives, nails and bolts in the apartment of a recently repatriated Jihadi émigré, did little to assuage such concerns.
Understandably, many European governments are throwing down the gauntlet on returning and hopeful émigrés, as well as their facilitators. Britain’s head of counter-terrorism at the Crown Prosecution Service, for instance, has threatened to deal “robustly” with any such individuals, threatening sentences of life-imprisonment and/or revoking their citizenships. Other countries have followed suit. In October, Holland established a legal precedent when it convicted and sentenced a would-be 22 year old émigré–publicly identified as ‘Omar H’–to a year in prison on charges of planning “arson or explosions” and adhering to “Jihadist ideas.” And most recently, in March, a French court slapped prison sentences ranging from 2-5 years on three Muslim citizens—previously arrested trying to board a plane for Turkey—for “criminal association with the intent to commit terrorist acts.”
On the face of it, the crackdown is common sense: better to take prospective ‘ticking time-bombs’ off the street than leave tragedy to chance. Unfortunately, the infusion of global jihadis into a European prison system teeming with Muslims may create medium to longer-term issues.
‘Prison Emirates’: Appraising the Problem
Prior to his 4-month jail sentence for car theft, an 18-year old French-Algerian Khalid Kelkal did not “know how to write and read Arabic.” Once behind bars, Khalid affirmed to himself: “I must not waste my time. There was a Muslim Brother with us…I learned Arabic fast.” Khalid quickly found his niche among the “tight-knit group” of Muslim cellmates. It was like he experienced a “great opening of the spirit.”
In 1995 that charm revealed its true colors when Khalid was convicted both for the murder of a moderate Muslim cleric as well as the attempted bombing of a high-speed rail link between Paris and Lyon.
The extent of prisoner radicalization in Europe is certainly debatable. Like any other terrorism related issue, the discourse has its share of alarmists and skeptics. But regardless of one’s stance, it’s important not to equate radicalism with terrorism; the two aren’t invariably synonymous. Radicalism is certainly a sine qua non for terrorism—yet it need not express itself as such. Beliefs don’t always manifest themselves through acts of terrorism.
Thus, assessing the scope of prisoner radicalization is a muddy undertaking. One can very well ‘radicalize’ in prison and—though he/she may periodically contribute to dubious Islamic ‘charities’– go on to live a virtually ‘non-violent’ lifestyle. Moreover, as was the case of Muslim-convert and failed shoe-bomber Richard Reid, one can also have his/her initial religious exposure in prison and only after (perhaps even years later) gravitate towards the realm of extremism.
That said, Islam—particularly its extremist iteration—is a growing fixture in many European prisons. In the UK, despite constituting just 4.7% of the population, Muslim inmates have doubled to nearly 12,000 in the past decade and now represent 14% of the custodial population. The situation in France, where that figure is estimated to range between a whopping 70-80%, is even worse. This phenomenon is, to varying degrees, the rule rather than the exception throughout much of Europe (see chart below). And considering that Islam has become “the fastest growing religion among prisoners in Europe,” non-Muslims going in may be Muslims going out.
The etiology of the above is complicated and cannot be thoroughly articulated in brief. Suffice it to say that Europe’s Muslim youth are beset by a host of social, cultural, and economic barriers that render lives of crime a seductive alternative. Unable to obtain meaning or purpose in their lives, they chase a transient, impish fix (i.e. drugs, theft, gangs) to numb the pain. When confined to a cell, however, that emptiness has nowhere to hide. With plenty of time to brood over their ontological vacuums, they long for a way to fill it. And Islam, with the brotherly endearment and communal belonging it bestows, is a potent filler.
In and of itself, the preponderance of Islamic embrace in prisons is innocuous—if not beneficent. In fact, one studyof Muslim converts in British penitentiaries found that Islamic faith provides inmates “with a moral framework from which to rebuild their lives,” while instilling a self-imposed discipline that, in turn, “gives prison authorities a convenient force in helping them maintain order.” However, given the hermeneutical nescience of these religious neophytes (as in the case above), the risk they’ll fall under the sway of pseudo-‘Sheikhs’ and those proselytizing a more radical Islamic persuasion, cannot be ignored.
Admittedly, the overwhelming majority of Muslim inmates won’t see their beliefs consummate through acts of terrorism. However, the adoption of radical creed, at a minimum, nurtures that eventuality. And the more that imbibe ideological chauvinism, the more room the violent ‘minority’ has to grow. As argued below, the increasing ingress of global jihadi veterans into the prison system could play a significant role in mediating such a trend.
Empirical Cases
Among the more notable prison-jihadi examples is Muktar Ibrahim, the leader of the July 21st London Bomb plot who adopted extreme Islamism while in prison for gang related violence in the 1990s. In Spain, prison radicalization proved integral to the hatching of the 2004 Madrid train bombings by a “loosely affiliated cluster of childhood

GUEST POST: Ayman al-Zawahiri on Jihadist Infighting and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

Posted on April 21, 2014 by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Click here to see an archive of all guest posts.
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Ayman al-Zawahiri on Jihadist Infighting and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
On April 18, a jihadist social media user tweeted links to two parts of an Al-Sahab Establishment for Media Production interview with al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri. Entitled “Reality Between Pain and Hope,” the interview’s first part was 54 minutes and 15 seconds, while the second part was 28 minutes and 45 seconds. Since the interview was first posted by a social media user rather than Al-Sahab, this appears to be a leak, similar to the recent leak of an unpublished Adam Gadahn video criticizing the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) following the death of al-Qaeda emissary Abu Khalid al-Suri.
Given analysts’ focus on recent jihadist infighting in Syria, it is worth noting Zawahiri’s comments on the matter, and on ISIS more broadly. ISIS was, of course, famously expelled from al-Qaeda in a pronouncement that the jihadist group issued in early February.
Zawahiri on Jihadist Infighting
In the interview, Zawahiri is asked about infighting among jihadist groups in Syria. His response is thunderous yet non-specific about which individuals or factions are responsible for the problems. Zawahiri blames the infighting on “the control of whims, ignorance, and injustice over some people,” and further suggests that jihadist factions in Syria may have been infiltrated, perhaps by intelligence services or else just by “misguided advice” and “bad incitement among the mujahedin.”
Asked about al-Qaeda’s efforts to end the infighting, Zawahiri renews the organization’s demands for addressing these disputes. At the time ISIS was expelled from al-Qaeda, they had been ordered to undergo arbitration with other mujahedin factions. While paying lip service to the arbitration process, ISIS in fact refused to comply. Zawahiri renews his calls for arbitration, stating that jihadists should refer their dispute to an independent sharia commission capable of obliging the conflicting factions to submit to its rulings.
Zawahiri implies that there could be severe consequences for factions who refuse to submit to arbitration. He says that all mujahedin and supporters of jihad should “take a stance of promoting virtue and preventing vice against all those who delay the work of this commission, ignore responding to it, or do not abide by its decisions.” In referring to the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice, Zawahiri makes clear that he is speaking of drastic measures: the withdrawal of legitimacy and financial and moral support from factions who fail to submit to arbitration. “Stripping off the legitimacy is a very serious thing,” Zawahiri says. He points to Algeria, where “the legitimacy was revoked from the militant Islamic group”: Zawahiri is referring to the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which al-Qaeda played a role in helping the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) splinter group to supplant. After GIA’s legitimacy was stripped from it, Zawahiri says, “it vanished.”
Though Zawahiri’s words are clearly intended as a warning to ISIS, he denies that he is speaking of them. “I do not address here an organization in itself or a group in particular,” Zawahiri says. Instead, he claims that his statement is a general one meant for all the mujahedin and their supporters. Indeed, he includes himself among the emirs whose commands should not be followed if their orders transgress God’s dictates. “Neither al-Zawahiri nor al-Jawlani [Jabhat al-Nusra’s leader] nor al-Baghdadi [ISIS’s leader] will protect you from God’s punishment if you wage aggression against your mujahedin brothers,” Zawahiri says.
Zawahiri says that jihadists joined the fight in Syria to “make the word of God supreme and to make the word of the infidels humiliated,” and thus they should be wary of being used by commanders “in their disputes over powers, ranks, positions, or gains.”
Zawahiri’s comments on jihadist infighting point to possible approaches al-Qaeda may adopt in dealing with ISIS, including the potential for a strategy of delegitimizing its leadership and drying up its funding streams. There is evidence to suggest that al-Qaeda has already been following this approach, but Zawahiri’s language and prioritization of arbitration and cohesion among the mujahedin also leaves open the possibility of a cooperative relationship or reconciliation with ISIS emerging. (Since a lot of behind-the-scenes maneuvering is occurring, my analysis in this piece doesn’t attempt to determine probabilities, but instead to understand the thrust of Zawahiri’s message.)
On the Split with ISIS
The interviewer asks Zawahiri about the justifications for al-Qaeda’s expulsion of ISIS. Zawahiri articulates two rationales. First, he notes that al-Qaeda is focused on the U.S. and its allies, while being cautious to shed Muslim blood. “We avoid the operations where impermissible blood may be shed in the markets, mosques, and residential areas and even among the jihadist groups,” Zawahiri says. He notes that the purpose behind al-Qaeda’s issuance of a general guidance for jihadist action was to unify the ummah, and taking Muslim blood can thwart that goal. “It is not possible to unify the ummah if we have the image of a tyrant and a usurper of its rights,” Zawahiri says, thus implying that this is ISIS’s image.
Zawahiri’s second rationale for expelling ISIS is that it failed to abide “by the fundamentals of teamwork.” Asked to explain this point, Zawahiri points to ISIS’s declaration of states without getting permission in advance and its failure to submit to the arbitration process.
Zawahiri emphasizes the need for al-Qaeda to maintain its image in order to propagate its message, describing the jihadist group as “a message before it is an organization.” Noting that al-Qaeda’s goal is to serve as a role model for the ummah, Zawahiri warns that the ummah won’t trust them if it “finds that we fight over spoils of war before achieving empowerment.” Further, al-Qaeda’s enemies will exploit such failures. As evidence of this, Zawahiri refers to Hizballah leader Hasan Nasrallah’s statement “in which he justifies fighting to support the criminal regime in the Levant” on the basis that Nasrallah “seeks to protect the people in the Levant against the crimes of the takfiris.”
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and an adjunct assistant professor in Georgetown University’s security studies program. The author or volume editor of thirteen books and monographs, he holds a Ph.D. in world politics from the Catholic University of America and a J.D. from the New York University School of Law.

Hizballah Cavalcade: Bahrain’s Saraya al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya: Militants of the February 14 Youth Coalition

Posted on March 15, 2014 by phillsmyth

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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Bahrain’s Saraya al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya: Militants of the February 14 Youth Coalition

By Phillip Smyth

Figure 1: Saraya al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya’s logo.

Saraya al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya (The Popular Resistance Brigades or SMS), sometimes also called Saraya al-Muqawama (The Resistance Brigades), was listed by the government of Bahrain as a terrorist organization following the deadly March 3, 2014 bombing. The group, along with fellow militant group Saraya al-Ashtar, claimed responsibility for the attack. SMS has been operationally active and publishing its activities online since April 2012. Importantly, Saraya al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya does not hide that they are affiliated with one of the main anti-government protest groups, the February 14 Youth Coalition (which was also listed as a terrorist organization by the government of Bahrain). This is hardly a minor connection, since, both the February 14 Youth Coalition and SMS have also distributed images sharing one another’s logos, organized events (such as protests) together, and share a similar narrative. Other militant groups—namely Saraya al-Ashtar and Saraya al-Mukhtar—have only vaguely claimed to represent links to protestors, let alone main protest organizations.

In June 2013, the Bahraini government accused the February 14 Youth Coalition of having a “spiritual leader” based in Karbala, Iraq and of, “frequently travel[ing] between Iran, Iraq and Lebanon to obtain financial and moral support as well as weapons training.” However, Bahraini authorities provided little substantiating evidence dealing with claims of Iranian or Iranian proxy involvement. Nevertheless, according to Iranian reports, February 14 Youth Coalition representatives have thanked Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei for his comments supportive of their activities. Iranian media has also expressed their support for the “revolutionary activities” of the Bahraini group. Despite these pronouncements, the actual relationship between Iran and the February 14 Youth Coalition, particularly dealing with any attempts at training or equipping militant elements attached to the organization, is still unknown.

Figure 2: Both the February 14 Youth Coalition and Saraya al-Muqawama al-Sha’biya’s logos on a promotional image released onto multiple February 14 Youth Coalition pages.

Figure 3: SMS supporters carry the group’s flag during a march.

Figure 4: SMS and February 14 Youth Coalition supporters march together and carry February 14 Youth Coalition flags.

Initially, the February 14 Youth Coalition did not embrace violence. However, after publishing a series of “warnings” to the Bahraini government, Gulf Arab states (namely, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) which have deployed forces to Bahrain, and foreigners recruited into the Bahrain’s internal security forces (often referred to by the group and other Bahraini militants as, “mercenaries”), the coalition issued communiques demonstrating they would choose a more militant path of “resistance.” In a January 27, 2012 English-language statement made by a February 14 Youth Coalition affiliated page, the group issued a statement reading:

“We have so far preserved our right to use force for self-defense, hoping that would make you hesitant from attacking peaceful protestors, women and children. However, common sense and human logic do not seem to work on you…Our people have decided to bring an end to the illegitimate regime…We shall take no responsibility for whatever might happen to the mercenaries after this final warning.”

Three months after this announcement, SMS pushed for a response to the holding of the controversial 2012 Bahrain Grand Prix Formula 1 race. The group released images urging protestors to throw the gas (the group claimed it was poisonous) used by Bahraini police at the race cars. However, no armed action was taken against the race by SMS. It is likely that in such an early stage of development and combined with Bahraini government crackdowns, the group was unable to act.

Figure 5: One of SMS’s English language posters calling for action against the 2012 Grand Prix race.

Narrative Structure

SMS considers its fighters to be “jihadists,” refer to their attacks as “jihadist operations,” and believe they are fighting a “jihad against the infidel Khalifas [Bahrain’s ruling royal family].” While the message of jihad is repeated in many SMS statements, these statements do not share the same level of more complicated religious and ideological messaging found with other non-Bahraini Shia jihadist elements.

SMS also lacks a specific goal for what type of government will rule in Bahrain following a theoretical collapse of the currently ruling Khalifa royal family. Still, this has not stopped the group from constructing complex narratives via militant activity for their enemies.

Following Saraya al-Ashtar’s and SMS’s claim of responsibility for the March 3, 2014 bombing (which killed two Bahraini police officers and a police officer sent by the United Arab Emirates [UAE] to Bahrain), SMS used the opportunity to criticize government claims that forces of the Peninsula Shield Force were being used in conjunction with local Bahraini police forces to counter protests and riots.

Sent to Bahrain in 2011, the Peninsula Shield Force included hundreds from the Saudi military and the UAE’s police force. Officially, these units claimed they were not involved in internal matters in Bahrain and were only interested in securing strategic bases and locations from “external influence.” Regardless, the death of a UAE police officer attached to Bahraini police served as a propaganda coup for SMS.

The timing of the SMS’s bombing claim and messages which proceeded it also fit into a broader message dealing with the Peninsula Shield Force and particularly Saudi Arabia. SMS has demonstrated a specific ire for the Saudis. The organization’s communiques have called Saudi Arabia the “usurper of land,” “occupiers,” and have stated their operations are to “purge the land of its Saudi and Khalifa occupiers.”

In part, this may tie back to February 14 Youth Coalition links to Saudi Shia activists. Researcher Fredric M. Wehrey noted that an “important attribute of the February 14 Youth Coalition is its strong affinity with Shi’a activists in neighboring Saudi Arabia.” Wehrey went on to explain how coordinated protests were conducted by Bahraini and Saudi groups out of solidarity. The February 14 Youth Coalition’s and SMS’s links to the Saudi Shia is also important when viewed in context with announcements by fellow militant organization, Saraya al-Mukhtar. Saraya al-Mukhtar has issued a number of announcements saying they share the cause of the “people of the [Saudi] Eastern Region” –an area heavily populated by Saudi Shia. The shared narrative may demonstrate deeper links between Saraya al-Mukhtar, SMS, and the February 14 Youth Coalition.

Figure 6: A poster released by the February 14 Youth Coalition asking, “Who are the terrorists?” The photo shows Saudi forces crossing the King Fahd Causeway which links Bahrain to Saudi Arabia.

As part of the view casting the Saudis as foreign occupiers, activists from SMS and the February 14 Youth Coalition have drawn parallels between Israel and Saudi Arabia; accusing both counties of using the same techniques of occupation. Prior to a series of March 2014 protests against “Saudi occupation”, the February 14 Youth Coalition and SMS circulated images attempting to link Saudi Arabia and Israel as fellow occupying states. This also extended into the realm of February 14 Youth Coalition partisans attempting to directly link the causes of Palestinian and Bahraini demonstrators.

Figure 7: The Israeli flag flies behind Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock (left) while a bulldozer is shown destroying the 400 year old Amir Mohammed Braighi Mosque with a Saudi flag behind it (right). The latter incident occurred in 2011 along with the Bahraini government destruction of other Shia mosques. This picture was used as a tool to organize activists for protests and events against the “Saudi occupation.”

Figure 8: A poster showing a Bahraini protester (with February 14 Youth Coalition) and a Palestinian activist. The former looks to the now demolished Pearl Roundabout statue, the latter looks to the Dome of the Rock. The picture attempts to show a unity of purpose and cause between Palestinian and Bahraini demonstrators.

Symbols of the “Popular Resistance”

Figure 9: SMS protesters at a February 14 Youth Coalition event demonstrating against “The Saudi Occupation.”

Shia symbolism is heavily featured in the group’s logo. The most prominent image is the symbolic hand of Shia leader Abbas Ibn Ali; son of the first Shia imam and loyal aid and military leader for the third Shia imam, Husayn ibn Ali. Serving as Husayn’s flag bearer during the historic Battle of Karbala, Abbas’s hand was cut off by one of the forces of Yazid, the reviled leader of the Umayyads, as Abbas went alone to collect water for Husayn’s dehydrated camp. Abbas went on to fight singlehandedly until his other arm was cut off by sword strikes from Yazid’s forces and was then killed. Abbas’s loyalty and steadfastness until being cut down remains an important message for many Shia Muslims.

Another unique feature from the logo is that “The Sacred Defense” is written within the symbolic hand of Abbas. This helps convey that the group’s conflict with the government is viewed as both a defensive and religiously justified action. Intriguingly, the Shia jihad in Syria and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) have (by Shia actors) both been described as “The Sacred Defense.”

Behind the

New statement from the Kavkaz Center: "Clarifying Position In Connection With Ongoing Discord In Syria"

Posted on March 7, 2014 by Aaron Y. Zelin

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In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful!
Recently, the Kavkaz Center received many letters in connection with its information policy regarding the continuing discord in Syria.
In addition, some sites and forums, as well as social networks, periodically discuss KC’s position on the issue. At the same time, in letters and discussions, the opinions of the authors are diametrically opposed.
In general, these views could be divided into three groups:
1. The group, which accuses the KC that it “does not like the ISIL”, “is from the outset opposed to the ISIL and against an Islamic state”, “conveys false reports”. And that KC does not expose the “apostasy of Islamic Front”, and other “apostate groups”.
2. The group, which accuses the Kavkaz-Center that it does not expose “all crimes committed by the ISIL properly”, that the KC ignores the truth about “the cruelty of ISIL” and thus “contributes to discord” because “many young Mujahideen have been deceived by the slogans of the ISIL and they are used against Muslims”.
3. The group which supports and shares the information policy of the Kavkaz Center.
In this regard, the editorial staff of the KC felt it necessary to clarify its position and to answer some of the charges.
First, the Kavkaz Center is an Islamic political information site covering events in the Ummah, the Caucasus, as well as in the world and Russia. We consider it important to inform Muslims about these events, evaluate them, interpret and explain their motives, so that Muslims adequately evaluate the processes and can properly respond to them.
The importance of this work can be estimated at least by the fact that many Muslims, and even some among Mujahideen, still express incomprehension why the KC pays “so much attention to events in infidel countries”.
Secondly, we DO NOT hate the ISIL. We believe that the very idea of the Islamic State is right! However, in our opinion, the methods of its implementation, the ideology of takfirism, leaving the battle against infidels and starting the battle against Muslims, violence and mass executions, undermine on the vine this idea and provoke hostility and hatred from the population of Levant, which not only promotes the idea of the ISIL, but on the contrary – leads to a collapse.
We believe that the policy (or rather – the lack of policy as such) and methodology of implementation of the idea of an Islamic State in Levant is extremely flawed and plays into the hands of the enemies. Although, once again, the very idea of an Islamic State is correct in our opinion and we support it.
We supported the Islamic state long before those who now consider ourselves the only conductors of this idea, and are not going to turn away from this path.
Third, with respect to the discord in Levant, we share the views of the Command of the Army of Emigrants and Supporters, expressed in the latest speech of Emir Salahuddin al-Chechen.
We believe that the way out would be a recognition the single Sharia Court for all groups of Mujahideen with mandatory subordination of its decision, a union, a rejection of personal ambition and arrogance, and aiming weapons against infidels and not against each other.
However, even a semi-literate person understands that the disengagement between Mujahideen and rebels (nationalists, democrats, Saudi-sponsored groups and associations, groups financed by the west, etc.) is inevitable. This can be seen today, but as soon as the forces of infidels (Shiites, Assadites, Alawites, etc.) are weakened or defeated, this disengagement may acquire the character of a war. Clashes that occur today are only the first signs as compared to what might occur “after the victory over Assad”.
That is why even now, we must become a uniting power for all the Muslims (all Islamic Mujahideen groups), rather than one group trying to impose with force its views, ideas and rule for the others. First and foremost, this concerns the ISIL and the Nusrah Front. The presence of a strong united force among Mujahideen could prevent an internal war after the elimination of the Assad regime.
Fourth, for the most part, we deliberately do not publish materials in any way to affect the ongoing issue of discord, including the materials related to the ISIL.
However, we sometimes, albeit rarely, publish separate statements and addresses of the main leaders of Mujahideen groups such as the Nusrah Front (al-Joulani), the ISIL (Abu Bakr Baghdadi), the AES (Salahuddin al-Chechen), and we deliberately do not publish materials from other emirs/leaders, including information from their websites.
In the future, we will probably publish statements and appeals of lower-level emirs and other groups, but it will depend on the content of the texts. If we see it fit, then we will publish it – if not, then we will not.
We also publish appeals and statements of some scholars, whose opinions and positions we share. And we do not publish the views of those scholars whose position we do not share.
In general, we publish materials that we see fit and do not publish material that we believe are unnecessary and harmful, including those coming from websites that support one or another group.
Speaking about discord/infighting, we mean primarily the confrontation between Islamic groups. As for secularist groups and groups supported by the Saudis and the west, the opposition to them is a natural manifestation of ideological hostility. But the fact that these clashes occur in a situation and time, disadvantageous for the Mujahideen, is a result of failures in the policy of the ISIL leaders, if it is unaccompanied by other motives.
Fifth, we deliberately do not engage in polemics and do not respond to attacks on the KC, because we believe it is flawed and would only lead to increased hostility and hatred. We try to avoid it, even though we have what to answer, to show, and to blame with specific evidences.
We also do not accept insults of some emirs and their websites that they accuse us of not publishing them (allegedly, due to dislike or enmity), and we address to them and say – you are mistaken.
We call on Allah to witness and declare love for the sake of Allah for every sincere Mujahid on the path of the Jihad. We remind every Muslim, every Mujahid, reading these lines – We have one faith, one qibla, one Prophet (pbuh).
Sixth, a few words to those who accuse us of “working for the west”. We treat these charges without emotion. Especially, because it is not only us who are accused. For example, many believe that the ISIL is an Iranian Shiite project, aimed at undermining the Jihad in Syria.
So it does not surprise us, since we hear all kinds of accusations since the start of the KC 15 years ago.
We were accused of working for al-Qaeda and the Mossad, for the FSB and the CIA. Remember, that all these accusers were and are professional propagandists and liars, political opponents and enemies, as well as amateurs in “kitchen conspiracies”.
If someone does not know, we say that in working for the west (America and so on) we are now accused, along with Russian invaders, by Shiites and Raafidis of Iran (for example, here).
So have a look in what company you are yourselves in first, before throwing mud at us.
Seventh, we do not intend to debate on this explanation. We made our position clear. Whoever accepts it, accepts. Whoever rejects, rejects.
And in conclusion:
Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds!
Kavkaz Center
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GUEST POST: Azerbaijani Foreign Fighters in Syria

Posted on January 28, 2014 by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Click here to see an archive of all guest posts.
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Azerbaijani Foreign Fighters in Syria
By North Caucasus Caucus
Introduction
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Figure 1. An Azerbaijani fighter stands next to a captured tanker truck from the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) in Syria, Source: APA
Stories about Azerbaijanis fighting in Syria have appeared semi-regularly in the Azerbaijani media throughout 2013. Recent events have unleashed a flood of commentary, however, with at least seven Azerbaijanis killed during fighting between the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and the Islamic Front on 03 – 04 January 2014, including a 14-year-old boy from Azerbaijan’s exclave of Nakhchivan. Now many political and religious pundits in the country have commented on or turned their attention to Azerbaijanis going to fight in Syria. The Azerbaijani government is beginning to take more public actions.
Terrorism and religious extremism have always remained marginal issues in Azerbaijan’s domestic politics, and accurate information is difficult to come by. Many of the details about plots and alleged plots often come from court reporting or detailed statements put out by the Ministry of National Security (MNS). The Azerbaijani government often overplays terrorism cases, in part as a way to solicit cooperation from the United States and other western countries.
The civil war in Syria is far different than previous conflicts in which Azerbaijanis have participated. For the first time, Azerbaijani fighters are speaking directly to audiences within Azerbaijan and elsewhere through videos and posts in social media. They are even able to interact continuously with their friends in Azerbaijan. No longer are researchers reliant solely on court documents or televised confessions, the validity of which are sometimes questionable. With more primary source material, an interesting and more richly detailed picture is emerging.
History of Azerbaijani Jihadi Activity: Afghanistan and Chechnya
Azerbaijanis have participated in a number of conflicts around the world – most notably in Chechnya and Afghanistan (though the author has found no reports of Azerbaijanis fighting in Iraq). Azerbaijan’s population of nine million is approximately 60% Shi’a and 40% Sunni and has overall low levels of religiosity. It comes as a surprise to most Azerbaijanis that their countrymen would participate in jihad.
The MNS arrested 70 Azerbaijani citizens between 2001-2003 for attempting to travel to Chechnya. In a list complied by the author—based on media reports and video montages of Azerbaijani martyrs put out by extremist media outlets—between 1999 and 2013, at least 33 Azerbaijanis died in the North Caucasus, mainly during the years of the heaviest fighting (1999-2005), and at least 23 Azerbaijanis were killed in Afghanistan (including at least one suicide bomber). 200-250 Azerbaijanis reportedly fought in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2009, Azerbaijani police arrested 13 people for illegally crossing the border back into Azerbaijan from Iran after reportedly fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
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Figure 2. Left: INTERPOL released a red arrest notice for Jabir Mustafayev for terrorism charges; Right: Mustafayev appeared in a video honoring all the Azerbaijani fighters killed abroad in the period of 2007-2009, Source: YouTube
Azerbaijanis were even represented in the leadership of some prominent groups in Afghanistan and the North Caucasus. Azer Misirxanov aka Ebu Omer, who was killed in a US airstrike in 2009, was a high-ranking member of Taifetul Mansura in Afghanistan, led by Serdal Erbasi (aka Ebu zer), a Turkish citizen. Misirxanov, originally from the village of Khalafli in Jebrail District, had previously fought in the North Caucasus and was even arrested in 2001 but was released after only a year in prison for unknown reasons.
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Figure 3. Azer Misirxanov (aka Emir Ebu Omer, right) appears with Serdal Erbasi in a 2009 video, Source: YouTube
First Appearance of Azerbaijani Fighters in Syria: Late 2012
The first report of an Azerbaijani fighter in Syria came in mid-August 2012 from a French journalist reporting in Aleppo. A Turkish war correspondent taken prisoner in Syria in May 2012 also reported seeing Azerbaijanis fighting with the Free Syrian Army.
The first concrete cases were in fall 2012. According to identification documents, including a passport and driver’s license that were photographed and posted online, Zaur Islamov was 37 years old and from the northern Azerbaijani city of Qusar, which borders Dagestan. The earliest known posting of Islamov’s photos was on 9 September 2012 on the forum, Shabka Ansar al-Mujahideen (Mujahideen Supporters’ Network). Islamov’s name was also included on a pro-Assad Facebook page listing “terrorists” killed in various battles. At least one of the Azerbaijani fighters killed in Syria was part of Azer Misirxanov’s group in Afghanistan. In 2009, an Azerbaijani court sentenced Araz Kangarli to two and half years in prison for illegally crossing the border between Azerbaijan and Iran, weapons possession, participation in an illegal armed group for two months in 2008, and committing an illegal act overseas. He only served one year before being released and in November 2012 his mother received a phone call that her son had been killed.
In Press Medya, a Turkish pro-Syrian opposition news website, released photos of four Azerbaijani fighters killed in battle and several photos of living fighters. These pictures made it clear that more than just a handful of Azerbaijanis were in Syria. Since the end of 2012, reportedly around 100 Azerbaijanis have been killed in Syria. Based on media reports and postings by jihadi media outlets, the author has recorded 41 Azerbaijanis who have fought in Syria, 30 of whom were killed. Of course, the participation of many fighters is never recorded.
Where do they come from?
For a researcher on violent extremist groups in Azerbaijan, the hometowns of many of the fighters in Syria do not come as a surprise. They line up with the hometowns of Azerbaijanis who have fought in Chechnya or Afghanistan, as well as the locations of counter-terrorism operations within the country.
Based on media reporting and the author’s own database of biographical data, Azerbaijanis fighting in Syria primarily come from Baku, Sumqayit, and smaller towns in northern Azerbaijan such as Qusar, Xudat, Xacmaz, Zaqatala, and Qax. Press reporting has mentioned specifically the villages of Kohne Xacmaz, Muxax in Zaqatala District and the village of Quhuroba in Xacmaz District as being important hometowns of foreign fighters. An article in the newspaper Musavat claimed that around 30 fighters came from Muxax alone. At least one fighter came from Terter (where in December 2008, three men wearing military uniforms attacked a military post in order to seize weapons for use in terrorist attacks). Sumqayit, the large industrial city just north of Baku, appears to be the most important source of Azerbaijani foreign fighters.
Connections of Hometowns of Foreign Fighters to Previous Terrorism
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Figure 4. Map of Foreign Fighters Hometowns, Source: Google Maps
Sumqayit
Sumqayit has played a role in nearly every story on terrorism in Azerbaijan. In 2007, police claimed they broke up a group based in Sumqayit known as the “Abu Jafar” group. It was reportedly led by Naielm Abdul Kerim al-Bedevi, a Saudi citizen. Azerbaijani security services reported that al-Bedevi had been living in Sumqayit since 2001 and had travelled repeatedly to the North Caucasus.
In 2008, Russian and Azerbaijani media reported that Ilgar Mollachiyev helped establish a branch of the Dagestani “Forest Brothers” in Azerbaijan, creating two jamaats – one in Sumqayit and the other in Quba/Qusar. According to two alleged members of the group, Taleh Maherramov and Samir Babayev, Mollachiyev illegally crossed into Azerbaijan from Russia on 19 July 2008 along with an Arab known as “Dr. Muhammed,” traveling to Baku and Sumqayit. In August 2008, Mekhtiyev ordered Elnur Bashirov and another member of the group to attack the Abu Bakr Mosque, the most popular Sunni mosque in Azerbaijan (which has remained closed since the attack). The attack sparked a huge response from Azerbaijani security services against the pious Sunni community as a whole.
The Sumqayit jamaat was supposed to carry out robberies in Baku in order to gather the means to obtain weapons in order to commit attacks. A reported member of Emin Shikhaliyev explained during his trial that the Sumgayit jamaat was created not in order to commit crimes in Azerbaijan, but rather to provide help to the mujahideen in Afghanistan and Chechnya.
Members of the group in September-November 2008 visited the village in Balakan District on the border with Georgia where

GUEST POST: Belgium’s Syria Fighters ~ An Overview of 2012 and 2013 (II)

Posted on January 25, 2014 by Aaron Y. Zelin

[1] Te Ou means Where are you in French. This fighter isn’t identified further.

GUEST POST: Belgium’s Syria Fighters ~ An Overview of 2012 and 2013

Posted on January 24, 2014 by Aaron Y. Zelin

Total	Identified	Sharia4Belgium	ISIS	Jabhat an-Nusra
336	68	28	10	1

If we exclude the alleged Sharia4Belgium-members we get a quite different picture. On group affiliation the information still is very scarce as we only know for less than 10 % of the cases involved.

Total	ISIS	Jabhat an-Nusra	Suqur as-Sham	Liwa Shuhada Idlib
336	21	5	5	1

For some we also have an indication of their whereabouts; 17 out of 29 are in Aleppo province, 6 of them in Idlib. The youngest who left were five 16 year old boys from Brussels and Vilvoorde; there is some doubt whether one of them was actually 15 when he left. The age of the Belgian fighters ranges from 15 to 68 (if we include Sheikh Bassam al-Ayashi who lived in Brussels for years and currently resides in Syria). If we don’t add al-Bayashi’s age, the next in line is his son Abd ar-Rahman al-Ayashi and Raphael Gendron (both killed in clashes with regime forces at the age of 38). The average age of the Belgian fighters would be about 23.5. At least 17 minors went to Syria, about four returned. One of them got dragged back to Belgium by his mother. Ten of these minors are from the capital Brussels and the nearby city of Vilvoorde.
This brings us to the cities that seem to be “affected” by their citizens leaving for Jihad in Syria.[2] This topic is a bit controversial as some cities deny their inhabitants are connected with the Jihad in Syria. In our sample data we find 81 individuals from 8 different cities:

Brussels	Vilvoorde	Antwerpen	Mechelen	Genk	Maaseik	Willebroek	Roeselaere	Luik
29	18	12	14	3	3	1	1	1

So it is clear that the capital Brussels is overrepresented when it concerns foreign fighters. Vilvoorde, Mechelen and Antwerp are next in line. Some loners seem to have left from Roeselaere (in the western part of Flanders) and from Luik (Liège in Wallonia). The majority of the Belgian fighters however are all from the axis Antwerp, Mechelen, Vilvoorde, and Brussels. If we plot these on a basic GoogleMap (with a little detour via Willebroek) this would be the result:
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And indeed, the action radius of Sharia4Belgium stretched from Antwerp to Brussels.
The main concern of government officials is the return of these, once active, fighters to their hometowns. If we take a closer look at who returned we can conclude the following (based again on publicly available information); 28 at least have returned to Belgium from Syria (4 of them never reached Syria as they were arrested at the Turkish border). One of them, Hakim Elouassaki, was wounded in Syria and returned home for medical care. On January 23th some Belgian newspapers reported on two pregnant Belgian fighter’s wives being helped back home by the Belgian government. As both were married to known members of Sharia4Belgium their repatriation was probably conditional; return in exchange of information on the ones remaining in Syria.
Returned from Syria (by affiliation):

Sharia4Belgium	ISIS	Jabhat an-Nusra
9	6	2

Returned from Syria (by city):

Antwerp	Willebroek	Vilvoorde	Genk	Luik	Brussel
6	1	5	3	1	1

The reported death-count thus far:

7 members of Sharia4Belgium
6 residents of Brussels
6 residents of Vilvoorde
And at least one from both Maaseik and Mechelen

At this point it seems the Belgian fighters lost about 38 men and women since December 2012. A bit more than ten percent that is. But about 270 Belgian fighters are still there. A lot of information is yet to be disclosed.
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[1] By new media we mean Social Media canals like Twitter, YouTube, Facebook and even Google+ [2] This topic is a bit controversial as some cities deny their inhabitants are connected with the Jihad in Syria.

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