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The Clear Banner: Belgian Fighters In Syria and Iraq – November 2014

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: For prior parts in the Clear Banner series you can view an archive of it all here. Also for earlier updates on Belgian foreign fighters see: September 2013, January 2014 I and II, and May 2014.
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Belgian Fighters In Syria and Iraq – November 2014
By Pieter Van Ostaeyen
 
Some demographics:
Islam is the largest minority religion in Belgium, it is estimated that about 6% (about 630.000 people) of Belgium’s total population are Muslims. In the 1960’s, when Belgium still was recovering from the total devastation of World War II, the country invited thousands of Moroccan and Turkish immigrants to work in the heavy industry which at that time dominated the Belgian economy. Most of these unschooled people had relatively well-paid jobs in the steel industry or coal mines. The guest-worker program was abolished in 1974, yet a lot of these people stayed in Belgium and brought in their families taking use of the family reunification laws. Today the Muslim population keeps on growing due to marriage migrations.
In 1974 Islam was officially recognized by the Belgian government as a subsidized religion; from 1996 onwards the Belgian Muslim community has been represented by the Muslim Executive of Belgium.1 Although this first generation of Muslims seems to have integrated quite well in Belgium, this surely doesn’t stand for their children and grandchildren. Cities like Antwerp, Mechelen, Vilvoorde, and Brussels now have important minorities of descendants of these guest-worker immigrants. As such one would say this isn’t problematic at all, taking into respect on how their parents and grandparents managed to build a career and family.
However, in the 1980’s and 1990’s Belgium started facing increasing problems and mishaps with its Muslim immigrant community. Cities like Mechelen in the 1990’s were known as hubs of petty theft and drug dealing (especially by Moroccan Berbers dealing hashish). More and more of these youngsters were cruising the city with expensive cars like BMW’s and Mercedes’s. It was commonly known these cars were paid with drug-money. At that time, the city of Mechelen was referred to as ‘Chicago at the river Dijle’2, due to its extreme crime rates. Other Flemish cities were facing the same problem. In Antwerp the district of Borgerhout was known as Borgerokko because of its high amount of inhabitants from Maghrebi origin. Brussels, Belgium’s capital, had entire no-go zones. It is in this climate of fear and mutual mistrust that extreme right wing parties like Vlaams Blok (now Vlaams Belang) thrived. On the federal elections of Sunday November 24th, 1991, out of the blue Vlaams Blok gained around 6.5 % of the votes. The tone of voice was set for the years to come; using slogans like ‘adapt or get lost’, Vlaams Blok profited highly from the general mistrust amongst the Belgian public towards the Muslim community.
In the course of the next few years Vlaams Blok started building up its anti-Islamic theme, criticizing Muslims on head scarves, the slaughter of sheep on ‘Eid festivities and the fact they didn’t manage to integrate in our society. They easily disregarded the fact it was mainly because of political parties and narratives as their own that the Muslim society in Belgium had little or no chance to assimilate or let alone integrate. In the course of the next few years Vlaams Blok was forbidden and reappeared as Vlaams Belang. As such the name was dropped but the rhetoric remained the same; intolerance and latent racism in Flanders grew steadily.
It should be noted that well before Belgium was confronted with its huge amount of fighters engaged in the war in Syria (and later Iraq), the country already was a main supplier of Jihadist Fighters. On September 10th, 2001, the suicide attack on Ahmed Shah Masoud, leader of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan was conducted by a Belgian Muslim. And even before 9/11 Belgians played a quite important role in international Jihad. Several Belgians were engaged in GICM (Groupe Islamiste Combattante Marrocaine) and GIA. Shaykh Bassam al-Ayashi, the oldest Belgian fighter in Syria, who once was suspected to be a main al-Qaeda recruiter now is leading his own little branch of Suqur as-Sham in Northern Syria.
As one of the main reasons for all, these Belgians involved all refer to the Belgian policy on its inaptitude to integrate the Muslims in our democratic society. These guys don’t see us as being democratic; they rather see how Muslims are being oppressed on what they consider to be their basic rights. The fact that Belgium forbad the face-veil or Niqab, headscarves are forbidden in schools and in public service, next year private Halal-slaughter will no longer be allowed, and so on. It is a message even confirmed by Sharia4Belgium’s spokesman Fouad Belkacem. In a statement he recently published from prison, he states: If I look back upon these days I think about the arrogance and the deep-rooted islamophobia of the Belgian State […] The head-scarf ban in 2009 hit us like an atom bomb […] For almost 50 years we saw humiliated Muslims beg for basic rights […].3
It is in reaction to these general sentiments that Sharia4Belgium was founded on March 3 2010. The group was inspired by other European Salafi groups that already existed such as Islam4UK, at that time led by the radical Islamist preacher Anjem Choudary. In its founding notes Islam4UK stated: [the group was] established by sincere Muslims as a platform to propagate the supreme Islamic ideology within the United Kingdom as a divine alternative to man-made law, and to convince the British public about the superiority of Islam […] thereby changing public opinion in favor of Islam in order to transfer the authority and power […] to the Muslims in order to implement the Shari’a (in Britain).4 A very similar discourse was spreading among radical Muslims in Belgium. As such, Sharia4Belgium copied a lot of the rhetoric of Anjem Choudary and other inspiring leaders of Islam4UK. Sharia4Belgium denounced democracy and stated it wanted to introduce the Shari’a in Belgium.
Fouad Belkacem explains in his statement who is leaving for Jihad in Syria:
A. The Migrants for the case of Allah. These believers seek to please Allah wherever possible. They believe that the highest value after worshipping the unity of Allah is the blessed Jihad. Jihad doesn’t mean Holy War, this term stems from Christianity and its Crusades. May Allah give this brothers what they seek.
B. The Migrants against suppression. They are the ones who left because of the injustice they daily lived in Belgium. A lot of practicing Muslims every day feel the injustice from the government and society.
C. A new live, a new beginning. A lot left for Syria to start a new life. The fact that a lot of youngsters prefer to live under bombs than in “hospitable, warm Flanders” as such is another proof against the government. Everything seems better than Belgium.
D. Sense of justice. The last group is that of the pious Muslims who could no longer bear the injustice done to their brothers. They want to contribute, how futile it may be.5
This general resentment against Belgiums policy against its Muslim community is also confirmed by the Belgian researcher Montasser AlDe’emeh. In the Belgian weekly Knack of September 23, 2014, Montasser published part of his interviews with a Belgian Islamic State fighter:
In Belgium daily they make new laws against Muslims. A Niqab ban, a headscarf ban and soon maybe a ban on beards and some Mosques? Why can’t our sisters wear a headscarf? […]Politicians, teachers at school, people at work, they

The Clear Banner: "Update on the French Volunteers in Syria"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: For prior parts in the Clear Banner series you can view an archive of it all here.
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Update on the French Volunteers in Syria
By Stéphane Mantoux
The phenomenon of French jihad in Syria began to get media exposure in 2013, two years after the beginning of the revolution, the civil war, and the intervention of foreign fighters alongside insurgents. For France, the magnitude of the phenomenon is unprecedented, far exceeding the Iraqi or Afghan experience. Departures are accelerating since the summer of 2013 and did not appear to have been hampered by the conflict between the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). Persons involved in jihad have some commonalities, including radicalization via the Internet and social networks, but typical profile does not really exist for French jihadists: they are actually quite varied. With few exceptions, departures are not carried out by organized networks or veterans of radical Islam in France: they are often individual, spontaneous and so for the most unpredictable. The issue of the return of the French jihadists concerned authorities, and a first attempted attack on French soil has probably been thwarted in February 2014, being the fact this time of members of the baptized “Cannes-Torcy” cell. Faced with this painful problem, calls from families and concerns inside the population, the French government proposed, April 23, 2014, a plan to fight against departures in Syria that has not convinced many experts, answering probably to a need for communication on the subject. This is an update of my first article that will discusses the evolution of recruitment in France from February until early June 2014 : the building of a “family jihad“, the acceleration of recruitment with the formation of a French brigade in JN and probably within ISIS, and attempts by the French government to send signals more or less suitable for jihadists.

Family Jihad: women, children, but also girls in Syria

A new trend is linked to jihad in Syria phenomenon: the departure of girls. Anissa, 22, was converted under the influence of a friend of his school in Bordeaux. She married a young Muslim presented by an imam met on Skype and left a farewell letter to his mother. Dozens of French are affected by this phenomenon: Ly, 19, a student from Senegal, left with her baby of 15 months. She is accompanied by a schoolgirl, 17, of Epinay, who stole the credit card from her father to finance the trip1. At the same time, at the end of February 2014, a 14 year-old girl from Grenoble was arrested at the airport Lyon-Saint-Exupéry as she was about to fly to Istanbul. Placed in a home, she fled before being caught again the next day. This is the third minor at least trying to reach Syria in January 2014 after a 15 year old girl who managed to make it to Syria2. Nora, 16, has gone on January 23; her brother says she was manipulated by others and, in mid-March, she regrets her departure in Syria3. Her brother went once to bring her back in February4; he went to the Turkish border, he succeeded in a second attempt in April 2014 to go to Syria and to see his sister two times5. At the end of March, Barbara Marie Rigolaud, a French 35-year-old from Nanterre, was arrested by the PYD (Kurdish party that controls areas in north-northeast Syria) near Aleppo. She had joined JN after having belonged to ISIS. She arrived in Syria in May 2013 with her husband and four children6. Also in March 2014 the mother of Assia, the girl of 23 months led by his father since October 2013 in Syria, launched numerous calls for help. Sahra, a 17-year-old from Lézignan-Corbières (Aude, southwestern France), would have run away and joined Syria since March 11. She would be shipped to Marignane in a flight to Turkey. On March 14, she confirmed to her brother that she is in the Aleppo region. Sahra, who practiced Islam for at least one year, had apparently prepared her départure7. Along the same lines, a young schoolgirl, 16, with the dual French and Algerian nationalities, living in Troyes, is reported in Syria by his parents on April 8, 2014, radicalized only in few months. She would have received as Sahra a sum of money in cash by an intermediary to pay her travel8. She was stopped in Germany before she could reach Syria.

Ongoing recruitment in early 2014

France Info interviews in February 2014, two French who have gone to fight in Syria, Abu Chaak, 24, and Abu Dahuk, 26. They say they are from the Paris region, fighting in the Aleppo region and belong to ISIS. Dahuk is among the first French arrived in Syria at the beginning of 2013 ; he plans not to return to France to carry out attacks but to die as a “martyr” on Syrian soil9. In March, Seif al-Qalam, a young man of 27 who also comes from the Paris region, who fought for ISIS before joining JN (he arrived on site in July 2013 with his wife and children), claiming that the latter group includes a brigade composed entirely of French (a hundred men?) which he is part. That would be the French who have imposed this solution for reasons of linguistic understanding. These men want to fight in Syria and did take the fight to France if it had operations against them10. Mid-February, Bilel, a man with a degree in economics and volunteer firefighter in Grenoble, was killed in fighting in Homs. He had gone to Syria in July 2013 with his brother and several others French volunteers for jihad ; he was clearly radicalized after a breakup. There, he joined JN and takes the « nom de guerre » of Abu Al-Siddiq Tounsi11. 22 March 2014 a French national, Sylvain Decker, was arrested by Moroccan police in Rabat. He was part of a network of recruitment for jihad, particularly in Syria, who worked in both Spain and Morocco12. A draft of a terrorist attack due to a veteran Syrian Jihad is probably foiled in south-eastern France. The DCRI had discovered on 17 February 2014 900 grams of explosives in a building near Cannes, drop point for a member of the Cannes-Torcy cell arrested a few days earlier. The young man, Ibrahim B., had gone to Syria in September 2012, with two others, thus escaping the dragnet of the DCRI for the cell. Abdelkader T., one of the companions of Ibrahim, was arrested in Italy January 16, 2014. Ibrahim B. would have returned the same time in France, having fought as others in JN. On 11 February, he was arrested in the building where the explosives were discovered later13. At the end of April 2014 a young man in his twenties, claiming to be a former French soldier in a regiment of infantry paratroopers, is seen in a video posted on Youtube14. On April 30, the Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve indicates that 285 French are currently in Syria, and is concerned about an increase of 75% of the total in a few months. One hundred jihadists have returned to France and 5 were killed15. The next day, a 37 year old Algerian, regular resident in France, was expelled on suspicion of recruiting in France for jihad in Syria. He was arrested by Turkey on board a bus taking a group of French to Syria. He was close to two other men living in Savoie, like him, known to have participated in routing volunteers to Afghanistan and sentenced in February 201116.

The plan of the French government: a communication operation?

April 23, 2014, the French government unveiled a plan to fight against the departure of young people in Syria, including an attempt to ensure early detection of potential candidates for jihad. Finally, the plan provides a hotline of crisis for parents welcomed by professionals, and consider the reintroduction of the authorization to leave the country for minors (measure eventually discarded). Human intelligence and cyber security will be leveraged to identify individuals likely to radicalize17. However, for Wassim Nasr, a journalist specializing in jihadists, these measures come ten years too late. He does not believe in the effectiveness of the alert platform for parents. He also calls to treat the phenomenon as a criminal problem; and indeed, the profiles are varied, too many to be reduced to this assumption, especially since as he points out, all candidates initially do not necessarily have to return to France to carry out attacks. The problem is political, and linked to the position of the French State in Syrian conflict18. David Thomson, RFI journalist and author of a book on French jihadists published in March 201419, confirms that the profiles are very different. If the initial motivations are just as varied, jihad in Syria is unprecedented in modern history, for France, because of the access to the battlefield and the easy use of social networks. He explains how the first contingent of twenty French arrived from late 2011 and 2012, carried an air call via social networks and led to the mass influx that we see in particular in the past year. It also confirms that there is a brigade of French in JN. The link of the jihadists to social networks and different ways from those of previous jihad are the difficulty of preventing the phenomenon and even following it when the jihadists are returning on French soil. The only red line not to cross, according to him, is the threat of attacks on the national territory. At that time, the government intervenes, but prefers to otherwise monitor these social networks, or forums, because they are also intelligence sources. Besides the net of jihadists, who go through many social networks, is almost impossible to control. The only positive effect he sees in the government’s plan is the creation of a plan for parents, but a

GUEST POST: Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (Carlos Bledsoe): A Case Study in Lone Wolf Terrorism

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Click here to see an archive of all guest posts.
–
Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (Carlos Bledsoe): A Case Study in Lone Wolf Terrorism
By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
June 1, 2009 was a Monday. Shortly after 10:00 a.m., Private William Long, 24, and Private Quinton Ezeagwula, 18, stood outside the joint Army-Navy recruiting center in northwestern Little Rock, Arkansas, taking a smoke break. The two young men, who were working at their hometown recruiting center before moving on to their first duty station, spoke of where that first assignment would take them. Long said that he would be leaving for Korea the following Monday; Ezeagwula was bound for Hawaii a day earlier, on Sunday.
Untitled
Figure 1: Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad at the time of his arrest.
As they made conversation, a black Ford Sport Trac sport utility vehicle pulled around from the commercial parking lot adjacent to the recruiting station, and the SUV’s window rolled down. Ezeagwula thought he heard the driver say something, so he turned and looked toward the driver, a black male in his mid-twenties.
Almost immediately, the driver—Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, formerly  known as Carlos Bledsoe—began firing at the soldiers with a SKS semi-automatic rifle. Long collapsed, and would be declared dead upon arrival at the hospital. Ezeagwula was hit in the back and torso, and dropped to his knees. He crawled back toward the recruiting station, seeking shelter from the gunfire. Muhammad continued shooting through the recruiting station’s window, hoping to hit the fifteen Army and civilian personnel inside. His SUV then drove off.
Though this initially appeared to be a routine drive-by shooting, Muhammad made his motivations clear after Little Rock police apprehended him. He said that he was a practicing Muslim, and was motivated to carry out the shooting by the injustices of U.S. foreign policy. It soon became obvious that the shooting had been an act of lone wolf jihadist terrorism.
This article examines the Muhammad case in detail. I conducted field research in Little Rock, Arkansas, in the summer of 2012. Before traveling there, I read all available court documents and media reporting related to Muhammad’s attack, making note of figures who seemingly had special insight into him and the attack, and interviewed Muhammad’s father (Melvin Bledsoe) by telephone. In Little Rock, I interviewed prosecutor Larry Jegley; Lt. Carl Minden of the Pulaski County detention facility; guards who worked at the facility during Muhammad’s incarceration; and Jim Hensley, an attorney who was part of the defense team. I also visited the detention facility, where I was given access to the administrative segregation wing where Muhammad had been held, and I was able to gain access to the files that the prosecution used in this case.
The article thus documents a great deal of information that has not been made public previously, including Muhammad’s violent tendencies prior to his conversion to Islam, the extent to which the FBI was aware of Muhammad before his attack, the manner in which he continued his jihad even while incarcerated (assaulting inmates and guards), and the fact that he was able to convert another inmate. The article also provides rich detail on the evolution of Muhammad’s religious ideology during his radicalization.
Muhammad’s Early Life and Conversion
Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad was born as Carlos Bledsoe on July 9, 1985, andgrew up in Memphis, Tennessee. His family operated a tour company, Twin CityTours, and Muhammad began to assist the family business when he was eight yearsold. He would interact enthusiastically with customers. ‘‘He grew up in the business,’’ Muhammad’s father, Melvin Bledsoe, told me. ‘‘He came to work in the summers,after school was out.’’
There are two different accounts of Muhammad’s upbringing. One is the family’s view that he was a typical American boy. Describing his son as a ‘‘fun kid,’’ Bledsoe explained:‘‘He loved to have fun, he was a practical joker, he loved high fashion clothes,rap music, girls. Typical young boy.’’ The family had a couple of dogs duringMuhammad’s youth: it had an American Eskimo until he was twelve, but after itwas killed by a neighbor’s dog, the family bought a golden retriever. The AmericanEskimo was one of the memories that neighbor Curnelia Crutchfield emphasized after news of Muhammad’s shooting became public, telling the media that he ‘‘seemed likehe was a good kid. He was a happy-go-lucky kid. I remember he had a white dogand they were the best of friends.’’
Muhammad graduated from high school in 2003, and went to college atTennessee State University in Nashville. He wanted to get a degree in business administration, and eventually run thefamily business. Melvin Bledsoe and his wife hoped their son could givethem an early retirement.
The other account of Muhammad’s upbringing, told by Muhammad himself, is significantly darker. Speaking to a psychologistwith the Arkansas Department of Human Services, Muhammadrecalled that he was suspended from school several times for fighting, and characterizedhimself as ‘‘a gang member.’’ Several people I interviewed were dismissive of the claim that he had been in a gang. However, records from the Shelby County, Tennessee Sheriff’s Office suggest that there may be merit to Muhammad’s claim. A police report from February 2002 describes an incident in which Muhammad was punched in the face by a man named Derrick Moore, who claimed Muhammad had threatened him. The report notes that Muhammad and Moore had in the past been ‘‘affiliated’’ with a gang called the Vice Lords.
Muhammad was involved in a couple of other violent incidents before leaving for college. In August 2002, he entered a barbershop and told a man named Derrick Cathey to step outside to fight. Cathey refused, and barbershop employees told Muhammad to leave. He later returned with two other men, and a knife was pulled during the course of the ensuing altercation. And in May 2003, another driver struck Muhammad’s car. Muhammad jumped out of his vehicle and started hitting the other driver’s rear passenger window with chrome-plated brass knuckles. Muhammad yelled, ‘‘Bitch I’m gonna kill you, get out, I’m going to kill you when I get your address.’’ Officers who arrived on the scene found the brass knuckles in Muhammad’s left rear pocket during a pat-down.
Of course, this involvement with violence as a teenager doesn’t mean Muhammad would inevitably have committed murder absent his encounters with Islamic extremism. His defense lawyer, Jim Hensley, told me that if Muhammad hadn’t been captured by this fringe ideology, ‘‘I don’t think he ever would have murdered anybody.’’ (Muhammad fired Hensley before trial, but Hensley continued to serve as an informal consultant to Muhammad’s father.) On the other hand, prosecutor Larry Jegley thought that Muhammad might have ended up a killer even without drifting into Islamic radicalism. ‘‘It’s possible,’’ Jegley said, that he might not have killed absent becoming radicalized. But on the other hand, ‘‘he also could have hooked up with the Crips or the Bloods.’’ Jegley noted, however, that Muhammad had every opportunity to not go down the wrong path, in that he was blessed with a father who had ‘‘pulled himself up by his bootstraps, worked hard, took chances, and was part of the American dream. His family members all wanted desperately for him to share in that.’’ Thus, Jegley said, ‘‘I’m not going to argue with anybody who says the radical Muslim stuff he was exposed to could have been an influence.’’
Though Muhammad had early brushes with the law, one particular 2004 incident, occurring in Knoxville, Tennessee, would indelibly change his life.
Around 9:00 p.m. on the evening of February 21, Knoxville police officer Michael Harper pulled over a blue Mazda. A man who had been in the car’s front seat fled, and the officer found Muhammad in the back. There were weapons in the car, including a SKS assault rifle and a single-shot shotgun, which Muhammad told the officer he had been trying to sell. A search accompanying the arrest turned up a bag of marijuana in Muhammad’s front left pants pocket, and he was charged with unlawful possession of a weapon and drug possession.
Muhammad could have faced up to fourteen years of imprisonment, which he said ‘‘spooked’’ him. The family hired a lawyer, who argued he was just a college student who was experimenting. The prosecutors gave Muhammad a plea deal that included a year’s probation, but one condition was that if he got into further criminal trouble, he would have to serve the full fourteen-year sentence.
The experience seemingly instilled in Muhammad the idea that he had to show he could do better. He became interested

al-Katāi’b Media presents a new statement from Ḥarakat al-Shabāb al-Mujāhidīn: “We Do Not Recognize the UN as a Legitimate Authority"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin


Mogadishu (09/12/2011) – The visit by the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon to Mogadishu at this critical time in Somalia’s political situation is a futile attempt aimed at boosting the drained morale of the African Union soldiers in Somalia as well as their Kenyan counterparts whose forces have recently been bled dry militarily as well as economically by the Mujahideen.
And with the Kenyan invasion staggering to achieve its objectives, a declining public support, at home as well here as in Somalia, and an acute shortage of finances to maintain the military operation have led the Kenya Defence Force to pursue an alternative course of action; a marriage of convenience under AMISOM flag.
The decision taken by the Kenyan forces to operate under the African Union in Somalia stands as a true testament to the failure of the so-called Operation Linda Nchi whose real aim was to invade Somalia.
Having failed to receive the promised military and financial support, the Kenyan government opted to join the AU after an endorsement by the parliament, revealing their willingness to pursue every available avenue in their invasion and proving that the operation was not embarked on in response to the kidnapping of aid workers and tourists from Kenyan territory, as alleged, but rather to subjugate the people of Somalia in the regional scramble for the East African Horn.
The United Nations has also confirmed its full commitment to supporting the Kenyan invasion of Somalia and by funding Kenyan operations now under AMISOM, the UN has clearly demonstrated its contentment with the continuous air raids that target innocent civilians in Somalia; the latest being Thursday’s bombardment of Baardheere, Gedo reigion.
Harakat Al Shabaab Al Mujahideen pledges to multiply its effort in order to counter the UN-sponsored terrorism that threatens the lives of millions of Somalis living in south and central Somalia and defend the sovereignty of our nation from the aggressive invasion of the allied foreign forces at all cost.
We hereby clarify that we do not recognize the United Nations, or any of its institutions and affiliates, as legitimate authorities to regulate or govern the affairs of our nation and we will not accept any compromise when it comes to our religion.
Press Office
Harakat Al-Shabaab Al Mujahideen
________

Articles of the Week – 11/27-12/3

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

Saturday November 27:
Concerning Bomb Makers – Mr. Orange’s War Tracker: https://bit.ly/gYr4Mf
Sunday November 28:
Dehumanize or Understand Your Enemy? Choose One – Mark Stout, On War and Words: https://bit.ly/e4NPVu
Misinterpreting the “Insurgency” in Tajikistan – Christian Bleuer, Ghosts of Alexander: https://bit.ly/fKbQhh
Monday November 29:
AQAP v Huthi: This time, its personal – Brian O’Neill, Always Judged Guilty: https://bit.ly/fR8I47
Yemeni Intellectual Saeed al-Jamhi Ideologically Attacks al-Qaida – Youssef Aboul-Enein & D Corley, Small Wars Journal: https://bit.ly/dF1h3C
Tuesday November 30:
Promoting Jihad Against China: The Turkistani Islamic Party in Arabic Jihadist Media – Kirk H. Sowell: https://bit.ly/gkcYee
The al-Awlaki Debate Continues – Gregory D. Johnsen, Waq al-Waq: https://bit.ly/e0pc84
Wikileaks Questions – Gregory D. Johnsen, Waq al-Waq: https://bit.ly/iicvzU
Majahden vs. Shmukh Country statistics for November 2010 – Aaron Weisburd, The Internet Haganah: https://bit.ly/hxeM89
Wednesday December 1:
Al-Qaeda’s relations with the Taliban: An unhappy marriage? – Noman Benotman and James Brandon, Quilliam Foundation: https://bit.ly/g7zIeS
Thursday December 2:
Trial of Would-Be Assassin Illustrates al-Awlaki’s Influence on the British Jihad – Raff Pantucci, Terrorism Monitor: https://bit.ly/dLtTVI
The Salafist Challenge to al-Qaeda’s Jihad – Michael W. S. Ryan, Terrorism Monitor: https://bit.ly/eCrvct
Friday December 3:
Bin Laden’s Lonely Crusade – Peter Bergen, Vanity Fair: https://bit.ly/hdp0Lc
New CTC Sentinel is released: https://bit.ly/ihV5qz

The Global Islamic Media Front releases an English translation of Shaykh Ibrāhīm bin Sulaymān al-Rubaysh's audio message: "Between Islamists and Liberals"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: Ibrāhīm bin Sulaymān al-Rubaysh is one of the senior leaders within al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula and is their chief ideologue.Prior to joining up with AQAP, al-Rubaysh was in Guantánamo Bay prison until December 2006. Following his release he entered into the Saudi rehabilitation program, which supposed to reform jihadists and transition them back into regular society. He went to Yemen, though, in 2008 and joined up with AQAP. The below English translation/transcription is unedited and came from al-Rubaysh’s Arabic audio message, which was released on September 18.
—

In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful Praise be to Allah, Lord of Creation, prayers and peace be upon the noblest of the prophets and messengers, our Prophet Muhammad, and his family and companions until the Day of Judgment. Thereafter:

I send this message to every sympathizer of the Ummah in the Land of the Haramain (the Two Sanctuaries: Makkah and Medinah). I send it to the scholars and the preachers, to the sermonizers on the pulpits and the imams of the mosques, to the teachers and instructors in the universities, to the caretakers in the homes and to the jealous fathers and guardians, to every Muslim man and woman who prefers the commandments of Allah over all other else, and are not among those who, if provided a salary,, pay no mind to what is occurring to the religion. To all those, I send this message asking them to take it into great consideration. I remind you of Allah who entrusted you with your Religion and granted you guardianship over what is under your hands. As the Honest and Trustworthy, prayers and peace be upon him, said
“If the shepherd to whom Allah granted guardianship dies having neglectedhis flock, Allah will ban him from Paradise.”
I remind the people of knowledge of the covenant by which Allah bound them:

{ وَإِذْ أَخَذَ اللَّه ُمِيثَاقَ الَّذِينَ أُوتُوا الْكِتَابَ لَتُبَيِّنُنَّه ُلِلنَّاسِ وَلَا تَكْتُمُونَه ُفَنَبَذُوهُ وَرَاءَ ظُهُورِهِمْ وَاشْتَرَوْا بِه ِثَمَنًا قَلِيلًاۖ فَبِئْسَمَا يَشْتَرُونَ }

“And remember Allah took a covenant from the people of the Book, to make it known and clear to mankind, and not to hide it; but they threw it away behind their backs, and purchased with it some miserable gain! And vile was the bargain they made!” (Aali Imran: 187)
If Allah had not made it a duty for us to give advice to Muslims, I would not have taken it upon myself to send this message.
To begin, I ask this question: Are you satisfied with the situation of society and its state of deterioration from which is apparent that it is heading towards an abyss? Each year brings more evil than the last.
Some will answer me by casting a hadith of the Messenger of Allah, prayers and peace be upon him and his household, in which he said:


“If a man says that people are damned, he is more damned than they.”

I will be characterized as a fear-mongerand conspiracy theorist but all this does not matter. He, who wishes to ascertain the truth, let him examine the situation without prejudice.
What will be apparent to those who study the situation is that the problems of sinfulness and corruption have increased and diversified to the point that the senses are inured to them. Inappropriate veiling of women has increased and no market is without it. Even the Masjid-ul-Haraamhas not been spared from it. Cases of impermissible seclusion and its consequences have increased manyfold, and those who sit with the Committee for the Prevention of Vice and Promotion of Virtue know of these calamities!
The calamity is that our society has delivered itself to its executioner through carelessness or feigning indifference. You see society toying with it without arousing the least resentment, resulting in the appearance of all kinds of legalized sinfulness and corruption, aimed at transforming and westernizing society and effacing all that bespeaks an Islamic identity in societal customs.
As a result, we see foreign exchange programs whereby women are sent out more than men, and they are provided more jobs than men. An identification card for women has been instituted and a serious effort made to gradually enforce this upon them. We hear of a female dean of a certain college who refused to allow female students to take a test without an ID card and the judge who suspended a case until a female client was issued an ID card. It is as if they can do what they want: they will stop marriage contracts, the distribution of inheritances, the purchase or sale of property until the women clients are issued ID cards.
Another form of sinfulness and corruption, of which there is inundation of reports, is the employment of women as actresses and their work as announcers and correspondents on official networks.
Part of the legalized sinfulness and corruption that we see is the mixing of sexes in the hospitals, even though the ability to segregate the sexes is easily available to any who wish to do so. And if they claim that there is a need for men to treat women in some cases, why are the male sections filled with female doctors and nurses?
Another kind of intermingling has come, contrived by the king’s genius. He has realized his dream for which he has been waiting 25 years through the universities where men and women, male and female students mix.
Their plan is to spread corruption and transform society, but gradually so that society will not reject it. As it is said, “Slowly but surely”. Although in fact recent years have witnessed an acceleration in their measures, this will perhaps expose them quicker. Perhaps their haste is due to the fact that they feel secure. Those who think they are safe from punishment will misbehave! They do not fear Allah, and all past experiences have proven that there is no reaction from the people to be feared.
One of their cunning plots to introduce sinfulness and corruption is through claiming journalistic freedom. The beginning was when the Minister of Justice issued a circular to the Shari’ah judges requiring adherence to article 37 of the press and publication laws, stipulating that issues of publication in the newspapers are the purview of the Ministry of Information and not the Shari’ah courts. When the wolf is entrusted with the flock, the field has been opened for people to write what they want with no accountability or supervision, but of course this privilege is not given to all. It is only for certain kinds of writers. They write what they want, in violation of the Shariah, and rejected by our societal customs. Then many voices which are raised in response are disregarded, and with the passage of time, society becomes numbed to this issue.
The closest example of this is the women’s ID card. The newspapers wrote much about this issue, and much has been said about it. When the people were prepared to receive the blow, it was instituted. When its institution was accepted, the time came to gradually enforce it. The turn is coming for women’s athletic clubs and women driving cars.
Their increased audacity is derived from the weakness of those in the forefront of the Islamist movement. You see that a vast majority of the newspapers will not publish an article by them. As for those who do write in the newspapers, they do not even think of discussing these topics, because they know they will not be published. Nothing remains for them but the internet, and one or two satellite channels. As for the other networks, they seldom host them unless they feel that their words will serve their (the network’s) own benefit. When they do appear, their weakness becomes apparent. They expose themselves to shame and melt away with these changes to a shocking degree. Their words they use and the concepts they hold are almost identical to those newspaper writers from other ideologies. They now speak of nationalism, dedication to it, and identification with it, rather than jealousy for Islam. They have begun to utter that such and such is “against the regime and the law”, when previously governance was for Allah alone. You will but seldom hear from their tongues (any talk) of enforcing Allah’s law.
This calamity is not limited to the fact that they will not reject forbidden acts unless the regime also forbids them. Indeed the situation has become worse with many of them, in that they have come to advise people not to condemn forbidden acts unless the regime itself has stipulated that they be banned. And whoever openly rejects forbidden acts, they proceed to admonish him more than the ones who actually committed the forbidden acts. As for he who rejects the forbidden act by deed, this to some of them is a kind of open sin that requires public rejection of the sinner.
Sometimes you see them having discussions with the liberalists in meetings or on TV. Then you will see the weakness of their rhetoric and their lack of audacity. You will see each of the two parties claiming to be the chosen one. Each claims that the rulers back them and what they say, that the regime favors them, and they want to serve the homeland and the interest of the people. Frequently their argument in responding to an opponent is “I do not know more than those in authority” or “the people in authority know where the benefit lies”!
Before, during and after this, they try to strikes the right note to please their rulers. This is done by condemning Jihad under the name of terror. With some of them, it is like salt on food, or purification for prayer. They are afraid that if they are silent their mouths will be muzzled or their Dawah efforts impeded. The situation has reached the point where some of them slander lies against the Mujahideen. And if they talk about the liberalists, they say “My brother liberals”. You see their rulers smile upon them, but give them nothing but more restrictions and spread of sinfulness and corruption.
You see them rejoice because Nayef Ibn Abdul Aziz criticized this newspaper