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To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
New video message from The Islamic State: "Marriage Contracts Office – Wilāyat Nīnawā"
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New statement from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s Mawlāwī Hībat Allah Akhūnd Zādah: “Congratulatory Message On the Arrival of the Auspicious ‘Īd al ‘Aḍḥā”
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To the Mujahid Nation of Afghanistan and to the Muslims Around the World
I wish you all a very happy Eid. May Allah accept your charity, pilgrimages, services and all good deeds in the path of Islam.
I hope you celebrate these days with happiness and perform Eid prayers, pilgrimage and all worships properly.
On this auspicious day, millions of Muslims from all over the world perform pilgrimage and it is a day of worship and brotherhood that invites Muslims to unite, sympathize and give charity in the path of Allah.
Our countrymen are celebrating Eid while the Islamic system exists and peace is ensured throughout the country, therefore, we should thank Allah Almighty to gain further rewards.
Under the rule of the Islamic Emirate, the Islamic system has been established, the Islamic Sharia law has been implemented, and concrete steps have been taken to strengthen the religious centers. Reforms are underway in law-making, governance, judiciary, economy, culture and other related fields. These are the goals and values for which we have fought and made great sacrifices.
At the national level, the independence of Afghanistan has been restored once again, brotherhood and national unity have been strengthened, all kinds of prejudices such as race, language and region have been eliminated, the territorial integrity of the country has been preserved and all borders are strictly defended and protected. Afghanistan’s national assets, such as customs and revenues, mines, state land, forests and other common assets have been taken from powerful individuals and now being protected as state assets.
Under the rule of the Islamic Emirate, concrete measures have been taken to save women from many traditional oppressions, including forced marriages and their Sharia rights have been protected. Moreover, necessary steps have been taken for the betterment of women as half of the society in order to provide them with a comfortable and prosperous life according to the Islamic Sharia. The negative aspects of the past 20-year occupation related to women’s Hijab and misguidance will end soon. By issuing the six-article decree on women’s rights, the status of women as a free and dignified human being has been restored and all institutions have been obliged to help women in securing marriage, inheritance and other rights.
With the functioning of the Sharia courts, the Holy Sharia has once again been put into practice. Religious and Sharia orders that were not possible to be implemented are now being enforced. In addition, the great duty of vice and virtue is being carried out. Necessary measures have been taken according to the Islamic principles, due to which the society is improving day by day and the evildoers are about to disappear.
In the economic sector, the prediction of the country’s economic collapse and crisis has been proven wrong. Economic collapse was prevented as a result of Islamic Emirate’s wise measures, sincerity and transparency. For the first time in recent history, Afghanistan has become economically self-sufficient, furthermore, concrete steps have been taken and are underway in rehabilitation, reconstruction, agriculture, mining and other related sectors.
The Islamic Emirate calls on national investors and businessmen to play a constructive role in the development of the country by investing in various fields in order to further develop the country’s economic sector and eliminate existing problems. IEA is committed to ensure their security and all government institutions are responsible for providing necessary facilities to investors in order to pave the ground for the country’s growth and economic development.
The war that lasted for decades in the country, left hundreds of thousands of orphans, widows and needy people, and the Islamic Emirate is committed to helping them secure their rights. Also, I call upon rich people and specially the relatives of the needy people to extend their support and pay full attention to their education and livelihood. After decades of war, now, Islamic system is enforced and peace has been ensured in the whole country, therefore, I call upon those who threaten peace to start a comfortable life in their country with their fellow citizens and help to further strengthen and stabilize peace.
Significant steps have been taken to divert beggars from begging and thousands of beggars who are in need are being given assistance by the Islamic Emirate. However, in order to prevent professional beggars, it is necessary for scholars, clerics and community elders to take an active role in educating people and encouraging them to work.
As a result of continues efforts of the Islamic Emirate, the cultivation of poppy has eradicated in the country, farmers are looking for alternatives and legal cultivation is expanding, meanwhile, ban has imposed on production, trafficking and use of all kinds of drugs and now, many citizens, specially the youth are saved from this harm.
Currently, many institutions of the Islamic Emirate are working to treat those who became addicted in the past 20-year and efforts are underway to bring them back to a normal life.
During the occupation period, many people were deprived of their rights and national assets were seized by powerful individuals, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has appointed a special commission for restitution of state grabbed land, so far, hundreds of thousands of acres of state land have been identified and freed from grabbers. Since, preventing oppression is a public duty, therefore, I call upon all the citizens to extend their cooperation with this commission.
The Islamic Emirate wants good political and economic relations with the world, especially with Islamic countries, and has fulfilled its responsibility in this regard. Just as we do not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, in the same way we do not allow others to interfere in our internal affairs.
My advice to the officials of the Islamic Emirate is to carry out the given responsibility seriously; providing services and wellbeing of the people should remain on top. Keep your doors open toward the people, do things efficiently and never treat people in a way that makes them feel less than you. This is the same nation who sacrificed their lives and properties during the past 20-year. I instruct the security officials to pay full attention to the well-being, service and safety of the citizens, especially during Eid. Consider all measures for the welfare and safety of the countrymen and extend your help and support to the families of martyrs, disabled and orphans.
Dear Countrymen!
It is our shared responsibility to protect and serve our Islamic system, the current system is the result of sacrifices of thousands of Mujahideen, let’s stand by each other, eliminate conspiracies, value security and prosperity and work together for its further enhancement.
It is with immense pleasure, that this year thousands of our countrymen went to attend and perform pilgrimage. All necessary facilities are provided and they are being served properly by the officials of the Islamic Emirate. I request all the pilgrims from around the world to pray for the prosperity of the entire Islamic Ummah and especially for the people of Afghanistan, so that Allah may grant them happiness in this world and the hereafter.
I strongly condemn Israel’s brutal act on Palestinian women, children and defenceless Muslims and ask other countries to do their duty in order to prevent this great human crime and cruel atrocities.
I request the people and government of Sudan to leave their differences and work together for unity and brotherhood, rather, the solution to the problems of the Islamic Ummah relies on their unity, considering the fact, every Muslim has an obligation to be fulfilled with sincerity, doing so will eliminate conspiracy and Muslims will enjoy the blessing of unity and Islamic brotherhood.
At the end, I once again wish you a happy Eid-ul Adha. May Allah grant us the opportunity to celebrate Eid under the shadow of the Islamic system.
Sheikh Al-Quran and Hadith Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Emirate
۷/۱۲/۱۴۴۴ هـ ق
۴/۴/۱۴۰۲هـ ش ــ 2023/6/25م
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GUEST POST: Intellectual Differences and the Future of the Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
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As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this websites administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy researchers to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
This is a unique post as it is authored by one of the founder of Jabhat al-Nusra, Saleh al-Hamawi, who has since left the group. Therefore, it is an interesting perspective from someone has previously been a part of the movement on these intellectual issues.
Click here to see an archive of all guest posts.
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Intellectual Differences and the Future of the Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS, the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham
By Saleh al-Hamawi
Ideology is the effective fuel and the main engine for jihadi groups. There was no comprehensive doctrinal approach adopted by these groups. Rather, it is a set of legal and doctrinal rulings. These groups added the specificity of their temporal and spatial circumstances to later form their intellectual system. ISIS and al-Qaeda emerged from the womb of jihadist salafism, which was not one of the integrated Islamic sects, but began to crystallize after adopting groups that were taking jihad as a path to rule by the Salafi doctrine in the mid-1970s, such as the Egyptian Islamic Group and the Jihad Movement, followed by a long list of organization — the most famous of which are al-Qaeda and ISIS.
As for the Taliban, it emerged from another niche that has no connection whatsoever with the Salafi movement, namely the Deoband school, which adopt the Maturidi creed and the Hanafi school, while jihad is rooted in the instinct of the Afghans and their hatred of the foreign invader that does not require a doctrinal approach to adopt it.
The Salafi-jihadi approach developed during three decades through the accumulation of jurisprudence begun by Salim al-Murjan (an Egyptian) in his book The Clarity in Problems of Infidelity and Belief.
Then the interpretations of the Jordanian Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi in his book Millat Ibrahim and Between Two Approaches to Abu Qatada al-Filistini in the early nineties. Then, there is the book The Collector of the Noble Knowledge, which is considered the most comprehensive reference to jihadi salafism by Sayyid Imam Sharif (an Egyptian), known as ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Abd al-‘Aziz. He later would retract this approach in 2008 in the so-called document Rationalizing Jihadist Action from inside Egyptian prison. This forced his former deputy in the jihad movement, Ayman al-Zawahiri, to respond to him in his book The Exoneration of the Nation of the Pen and the Sword From the Defeat of Cowardice and Weakness. Briefing the Salafi-jihadi approach with the following principles:
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- All Arab regimes are apostates because they rule by other than what God has revealed.
- The army, police, intelligence, and judicial institutions are apostates, and they are supporters of the tyrants.
- Parties that take democracy as a method to reach power are apostates.
As for the Taliban, they do not adopt any of that. Rather, they believe that everyone who bears witness that there is no god but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God is a Muslim. And this does not prevent fighting their opponents, but the cause of the fighting is oppression, not infidelity, as in their fight against Ahmad Shah Mas’ud between 1996 and 2001, as a transgressive group that emerged. In contrast, we find that al-Qaeda assassinated Mas’ud because of his apostasy from religion, as they accused him of being an agent of France and the West.
As for ISIS, it has become a more extreme version of al-Qaeda. Its founder, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, was not accepted by al-Qaeda in its camps in 1999 in Kandahar, due to his extremism, according to what al-Qaeda’s Secretary-General Fadil Harun reported in his book The War on Islam, so he chose the city of Herat, bordering Iran, to establish his camp there. Al-Zarqawi chose Abu ‘AbduAllah al-Muhajir al-Masri as a legitimate reference for him (the author of the book Issues in the Jurisprudence of Jihad), which laid down rules for all the actions of ISIS that we saw in 2013, such as burning and brutal methods of execution.
The most prominent differences between al-Qaeda and al-Zarqawi’s group (called Jama’at Tawhid wa-l-Jihad at the time) was the infidelity of all Shi’ites, scholars of regimes and Islamist parliamentarians, while al-Qaeda does not declare all Shi’ites to be infidels, only its senior scholars. Likewise, they strategically differed on the issue related to fighting the near enemy (Arab regimes) versus fight the distant enemy (the interests of America and Israel only).
Despite these differences, a political marriage took place in 2004 between al-Qaeda and Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad in Iraq. It took place because al-Qaeda needed a moral victory after many of its leaders were killed or arrested after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and al-Zarqawi needed access to al-Qaeda’s financial network. Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir (whose real name is ‘Abd al-Mu’naym al-Badawi, a former companion of al-Zawahiri) succeeded in bringing the two sides closer together, and the pledge of allegiance was made in 2004.
After the killing of al-Zarqawi and the announcement of Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir of the Islamic State of Iraq on October 13, 2006, the extremism of their soldiers increased and they began to fight all those who defected from them, did not pledge allegiance to them, considered themselves to be the group of Muslims (the Islamic State), not a small group of Muslims, and they declared apostasy on all those who oppose them from the Islamic groups and parties until they got to the version we saw in 2013.
Jabhat al-Nusrah:
It was a branch of the Islamic State of Iraq and adopted its entire approach until 2014, when it began to differentiate a little from it, not in the ideological approach, but in the field of legitimate politics, such as not declaring the infidelity of those who adopt democracy from the Islamic parties and scholars of Arab regimes. They also differed with it in the legitimate ruling of allegiance, for ISIS believes fighting whoever did not pledge allegiance to it, while al-Nusra believes that one is only a sinner. As a consequence, al-Nusra tried to curb its elements and prevent them from engaging in the issues of apostasy on others and educated them about the necessity of separating from al-Qaeda as the legitimate interest of the jihad in al-Sham, which eventually happened on July 28, 2016. Though the real reason for the split was al-Zawahiri’s decision to isolate Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, the original founder of al-Nusrah, and appoint Abu al-Khayr al-Masri the leader of al-Nusrah. Abu al-Khayr only entered Syria in 2015 after coming from Iran when he was released from its prisons in a deal between al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. Abu al-Khayr was eventually killed by the international coalition with a done raid on February 17, 2017 in Idlib City. Because of al-Zawahiri’s attempted maneuvers, al-Jawlani took a proactive step, disassociated himself from al-Qaeda and changed its name to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and then later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. HTS began with a series of openings and tactical changes in its curriculum due to local and regional conditions, such as Russia’s invasion of Syria and the spread of Turkish forces and the need for HTS to remove its classification from terrorism lists. However, more than 60% of its members still adopt the approach of Jabhat al-Nusrah.
Taliban and the Start of Change:
At the time Usamah Bin Ladin announced the Global Front to Fight the Jews and the Crusaders in 1998, he was under the command of the Taliban and pledged allegiance to them. Yet, under their protection, direct friction began between the Taliban and the men of al-Qaeda, where the organization committed all its elements to the obligation of jihad against Ahmad Shah Mas’ud’s Northern Alliance in obedience to the ruler, Mullah Muhammad ‘Umar. Al-Qaeda legislators began to engage in dialogues and debates with Taliban scholars on basic issues of beliefs such as ruling by other than what God has revealed, allying unbelievers against Muslims, supporters of tyrants, and martyrdom operations, which the Taliban considered suicide operations.
Al-Qaeda was not able to make a legitimate change in the Taliban until 2001, when the rule of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan fell after the American invasion, and the withdrawal of the Taliban to the mountains with the remnants of Al-Qaeda. Following al-Qaeda’s assassination Ahmad Shah Mas’ud, the Taliban saw the Northern Alliance’s dealings with the Americans, and it began to adopt their views on apostasy. They now accuse Muslims of infidelity, which was not the case in 1990s.
These intellectual changes continued until 2009, when the Taliban began to control some districts in Afghanistan. That is until there was an infiltration of an ideological current of some of its fighters from the second and third rank and some leaders of the first row represented by the Haqqani Network. They adopted the ideas of apostasy for those who practice democracy. The Taliban was unable to control this current. Part of this was because the intellectuals within its ranks were more preoccupied with fighting America. As a consequence, the snowball grew and became a large current of extremism embodied by an eventual split from within the movement and the pledge of allegiance by some to ISIS in 2013. All of them were Afghans, and this was confirmed by Zabihullah Mujahid, the official spokesman for the Taliban, in a statement to Anadolu Agency.
After the split to ISIS from the Taliban, a wing within the movement remained adopting a large part of the al-Qaeda’s
New statement from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s Dhabīḥ Allah Mujāhid: “Clarification Regarding Recent Enemy Fabrications and Propaganda”
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After the stooge enemy was exposed and suffered humiliating defeats across the country where thousands of soldiers defected and embraced the open arms of the Islamic Emirate, and nearly two hundred districts were cleansed from their malicious presence, the enemy has now reached for propaganda, fabrications and other futile tactics regarding which we clarify the following:
– Fake statements, documents, threats and other letters are recently being circulated on social media and even physically airdropped into some areas that impose restrictions on locals, threatens them, specifies gender laws, regulates lives, beards, movements and even contains baseless claims about marriage of daughters and other such issues.
– Similarly fake videos and footage of multi-year-old video scenes showing activities of Daesh militias are also passed off as recent actions committed by the Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate.
– Moreover, spurious claims and propaganda is being conjured and handed over to media by the enemy about horrendous dealings by the Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate with locals in the recently liberated districts.
– Unfounded reports about inflicting hundreds of casualties on the Mujahideen of Islamic Emirate or retaking recently liberated districts are also being published by the enemy.
The Islamic Emirate rejects all above material and does not allow anyone to transgress against people anywhere, or to impose laws and regulations by themselves, or to circumscribe lives, and neither has there been any ill-treatment of women and men, nor is anyone allowed to do so.
All this propaganda by the enemy is aimed at controlling their fear and anxiety, to distract common thinking and to cover up their compounding failures.
We want all media outlets, activists and the general public to not fall victim to such propaganda and to rest assured about their Mujahideen brothers. All our publications will be distributed through our official and other channels through which we have communicated with outlets over the past twenty years. Any material published by any additional and novel channels should be ignored.
Zabihullah Mujahid
Spokesman of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
02/12/1442 Hijri Lunar
21/04/1400 Hijri Solar 12/07/2021 Gregorian
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Articles of the Week – 6/12-6/18
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Monday June 14:
The Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Women and Children from Syria and Iraq: The Experiences of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – Bulan Institute for Peace Innovations: https://bit.ly/3xyz3YC
Wednesday June 16:
Confronting Islamist Insurgencies in Africa: The Case of the Islamic State in Mozambique – Jessica Trisko Darden and Emily Estelle, Orbis: https://bit.ly/35yuO35
Fragile States, Technological Capacity, and Increased Terrorist Activity – Ore Koren, Sumit Ganguly, and Aashna Khanna, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: https://bit.ly/3q5sDNO
Ivory Coast witnesses surge in jihadist activity – Caleb Weiss, Long War Journal: https://bit.ly/3cQMonc
Thursday June 17:
Affirmations of Support and Rituals of Jihadi Martyrdoms – Aaron Y. Zelin, GNET: https://bit.ly/3gHZXX4
Sahel 2021: Communal Wars, Broken Ceasefires, and Shifting Frontlines – Héni Nsaibia and Jules Duhamel, ACLED: https://bit.ly/3wGEnsF
Friday June 18:
Examining the Characteristics That Differentiate Jihadi-Associated Cyberattacks Using Routine Activities Theory – Thomas J. Holt, Noah D. Turner, Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven M. Chermak, Social Science Computer Review: https://bit.ly/3vUlfpN
Two Classes of “Marriage”: Race and Sexual Slavery in Al-Shabaab-Controlled Somalia – Lindsay J. Benstead and Daniel Van Lehman, The Journal of the Middle East and Africa: https://bit.ly/3A0wbp5
New statement from the Mujāhidīn of al-Yarmūk Refugee Camp: “And Do Not Forget Graciousness Between You: Support and Loyalty For Hay’at Taḥrīr al-Shām”
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The first half of the title of this release is in reference to Qur’anic verse 2:237. Here it is in full: “And if you divorce them before you have touched them and you have already specified for them an obligation, then [give] half of what you specified – unless they forego the right or the one in whose hand is the marriage contract foregoes it. And to forego it is nearer to righteousness. And do not forget graciousness between you. Indeed God, of whatever you do, is Seeing.”
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Mujāhidīn of al-Yarmūk Refugee Camp — And Do Not Forget Graciousness Between You- Support and Loyalty For Hay’at Taḥrīr al-Shām
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Source: Telegram
To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]
New release from Abū Mālik al-Shāmī: “And Do Not Forget Graciousness Between You”
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The title of this release is in reference to Qur’anic verse 2:237. Here it is in full: “And if you divorce them before you have touched them and you have already specified for them an obligation, then [give] half of what you specified – unless they forego the right or the one in whose hand is the marriage contract foregoes it. And to forego it is nearer to righteousness. And do not forget graciousness between you. Indeed God, of whatever you do, is Seeing.”
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Abū Mālik al-Shāmī — And Do Not Forget Graciousness Between You
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Source: Telegram
To inquire about a translation for this release issue for a fee email: [email protected]
The Archivist: Stories of the Mujahideen: Women of the Islamic State
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NOTE: For prior parts in The Archivist series you can view an archive of it all here. And for his older series see: Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad.
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Stories of the Mujahideen: Women of the Islamic State
By Aymenn al-Tamimi
The previous post in The Archivist series looked at the internally distributed series of documents entitled Qisas al-Mujahideen (‘Stories of the Mujahideen’), which tell stories of particular individuals in the Islamic State (IS). One of the figures covered in these series was Dr. Iman Mustafa al-Bagha, a Syrian female Islamic scholar who has worked in IS’ Diwan al-Iftaa’ wa al-Buhuth (‘Fatwa Issuing and Research Department’) and organization of women’s hisba (Islamic morality enforcement) teams in the various provinces of IS. Her activities were characterized as jihad, with the biography of her emphasizing that she was continuing in this jihad despite the loss of her son Abu al-Hassan al-Dimashqi.
This post looks further at the women covered in Qisas al-Mujahideen. These particular stories point to roles beyond hisba and Islamic jurisprudence. Indeed, IS even appears to allow for an actual military role for women, as mention is made of a female suicide bomber who targeted a Kurdish YPG base in the Kobani area (in IS discourse: Ayn al-Islam). Female suicide bombers are not publicised in IS’ official propaganda, where certain suicide bombing operations are publicised with the name of the suicide bomber in the form of a kunya and sometimes a photo of the bomber. Perhaps one reason female suicide bombers are not publicised is that it is not possible, by IS standards on women’s modesty, to show their faces in the propaganda.
In the context of military roles, a particular case of interest here is that of Umm Fatima al-Rusiya, who is said to have participated in an operation in Grozny after giving her allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The operation in question was actually claimed by the Caucasus Emirate. However, the operation also came at a time when North Caucasian jihadis and leaders began pledging allegiance to Baghdadi and going public with their pledges, thereby defecting from the Caucasus Emirate. Some, it seems, may have kept their pledges and/or IS sympathies private for a time in the hope that the Caucasus Emirate’s overall leader at the time, who was subsequently killed in April 2015, would declare allegiance to IS. Ultimately he did not do so.
Also of note in the internal documents here is the role women can play in providing food for fighters. Indeed, every IS brigade (liwa) is supposed to have a team of cooks and kitchen staff that constitute the matbakh (‘kitchen’) for the IS brigade. For a sample food schedule for an IS battalion (katiba, which on the basis of documentary evidence appears to be a subordinate part of a liwa), see Specimen 18U in my archives of IS documents.
Unsupported by the evidence, in contrast, is any notion of ‘sex jihad’ (jihad al-nikah). Some have attempted to draw attention to internal IS documents under the title of aqd nikahas proof of institutionalised ‘sex jihad’. In fact, these documents are no more than simple marriage contracts.
Below are the documents with translation, including parenthetical notes in square brackets for explanation of some terms.
Umm Khalid al-Wahjani (released under the series as part of Akhbar al-Khilafa)
Among the women who have been an example for the granddaughters of al-Khansa’: a mother of three martyrs- by God’s permission- from the girls and four martyrs from the boys.
Umm Khalid Khansa’ is from the Arab Maghreb, and migrated along with her family fleeing obedience to the taghut [idolatrous tyranny/tyrant] and the decay that Maghrebi society had attained at the hand of its tawagheet from the kings and heads of the Arab states, which have wiped out the identity of the Arab Muslims and made them forget their religion, noble language, and acts of worship and customs of their conquering ancestors.
Her first husband was killed in the battle of the conquest of Mennagh military airport north of Aleppo as he was in the first ranks, so we reckon him as a martyr with God and God is his reckoner.
As for her three daughters, two of them were killed in Crusader coalition bombing on the Aisha Umm al-Mu’mineen centre to teach the Qur’an in Wilayat al-Kheir. As for the third, she carried out a martyrdom operation in a base for the YPG party apostates in Ayn al-Islam.
Three of her sons were killed in blessed martyrdom operations, the first of whom was Abu Mu’adh who blew up a rigged vehicle in a gathering of the Rafidite [derogatory for Shi’i] Hashd Sha’abi in Baiji. Following him was his brother Abu Talha and with him a group of soldiers of the Dawla carrying out an inghimasi [commando] raid into the ranks of the Rafidites after the martyrdom operation, during which the mujahideen managed to kill dozens of the Rafidites.
As for their third brother Abu Muslim, he drove a truck rigged with explosives with which to strike the fortresses of the Nusayris at the gates of Deir az-Zor military airport in Wilayat al-Kheir.
And their fourth brother Abu A’isha led a group of the Dawla’s soldiers in the Mahin mountains in Wilayat Homs, launching an inghimasi raid into the ranks of the Nusayris, leaving dozens of them killed and wounded, and he blew up his belt in a base of the apostates of the Syrian regime army.
Umm Khalid married one of the mujahideen of the Dawla from the muhajireen, and she is one of the sisters who work in the women’s hisba apparatus in Raqqa, spending her time advising the daughters of the Muslims and applying God’s law in Wilayat al-Raqqa.
Umm Fatima al-Rusiya (released under the Diwan al-Da’wa wa al-Masajid)
She is the mother of three martyrs who died in battles against the Russian invasions of the land of the Muslims in all of Chechnya and Afghanistan. She says having lost all her sons:
‘By God I wish I had 30 sons, so I should have them go forth to the fields of jihad and every one of them should be killed in one of the lands of Islam defending the Ummah.’
Umm Fatima migrated to Afghanistan and remained there teaching women how to raise the Islamic generation that defends its religion, and she established Dar Umm Fatima to teach women the principles of true aqeeda [creed] and how to raise the Islamic generation.
Umm Fatima returned to Chechnya after five years of da’wa [proselytization] and after she lost her three sons. The Russian intelligence arrested her in Grozny, and she spent four years in Grozny prison. After being released, Umm Fatima began making preparations to fulfil the path of her children, and there was the Grozny operation in which she participated after pledging allegiance to the Caliph Ibrahim bin Awwad al-Badri, as she set out with a group of mujahideen to attack a base for the heretic Russian police in Grozny during the country’s preparation for a speech by the taghut Putin in front of the Russian parliament.
The operation led to the killing and wounding of dozens from the ranks of the Russian police that lived for months in recollections of the strikes of the mujahideen in the depth of their abode.
Umm Fatima died during the operation to join the convoy of soldiers of the Caliphate who died defending Islam and the structure of the Caliphate in all regions of the world.
Thus we reckon her and God is her reckoner.
Fatima al-Shami (released under the Diwan al-Da’wa wa al-Masajid)
The intifada of al-Sham arose with an instinctive spirit that tried to make its banner the banner of Islam, and its methodology that of the Prophetic methodology and the Caliphate. But the Satans of the West insisted on turning it to banners of ignorance [/blindness] and seeking help in the West and Crusaders.
Fatima al-Shami is a mother of a thirty year-old whose three children and husband were killed by the Nusayris in a massacre in the Damascus countryside.
She swore not to return to her life until the fall of the Nusayri regime, and she enlisted to fight the Nusayris with some of the battalions in Damascus countryside, but it did not take long before she left their ranks and in a question to her about the reason, she responded:
‘I did not enlist to serve these people: my enlistment was to fight the oppressors and criminals, and not to serve the offices of the leaders of the factions that have concluded truces with the Nusayris and abandoned fighting them. By God I see massacres afflicting our people and every day there is a mother like me losing her children, but they are silent and concluding truces with the criminal regime to fight the Dawla.’
Fatima joined the ranks of the Islamic State, and worked in its kitchens that prepare food for the mujahideen on the fighting fronts.
And she was transferred as they were the most difficult of places for the sisters to work in, from the Damascus countryside to Fallujah and after that to Wilayat al-Kheir.
She participated in the women’s hisba in Wilayat al-Kheir until she died in a Crusader coalition strike in the town’s countryside while she was commanding what is right and forbidding what is wrong, accompanied by her sisters.
And a pledge remains upon us oh Fatima, that we will not return to our abodes before bringing down the Nusayri regime and the rest of the systems of kufr, and that God’s law should rule among His servants.
Thus we reckon her and God is her reckoner.
The Archivist: 26 Unseen Islamic State Administrative Documents: Overview, Translation & Analysis
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NOTE: For prior parts in The Archivist series you can view an archive of it all here. And for his older series see: Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad.
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26 Unseen Islamic State Administrative Documents: Overview, Translation & Analysis
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Introduction
Of all jihadist groups, the Islamic State [IS] by far has presented the most comprehensive, ostensible bureaucratic structure as part of its claimed state project, embodied foremost in a system of diwans (government departments) since the declaration of the Caliphate in June 2014. The best means to analyse the nuances of this set-up is through looking at documents issued by these departments that have not been officially released in IS’ media outlets.
Here, numerous shades emerge that go beyond simple statements such as ‘IS provides services.’ For example, one pattern in the documents from the IS takeover of parts of Iraq is that the Diwan al-Khidamat (services department) in a given city is normally composed of the same staff, workers and offices of already existing government service offices in that city. It is simply that the personnel have been compelled to return to work under threat of confiscation of their homes. For a more in-depth survey, see my recent paper in the academic journal Perspectives on Terrorism primarily based on my current archive of IS documents and other collections of mine currently totalling over 200 specimens.
This post presents 26 further documents not previously in the public domain, obtained from a businessman from a town in northeast Aleppo province that is currently a stronghold of IS. For reasons that are self-evident, this person’s exact location and identity cannot be revealed, but it may be added that this person does business across IS territory, including regular trips to Mosul and Anbar. Though not necessarily a hardline, ideological supporter of IS, he nonetheless finds the security environment amenable to doing business: a common advantage perceived by Syrians who make investments and conduct transactions in IS territory.
Islamic State vs. Jabhat al-Nusra Administration
Before proceeding to the selection of documents, one question worth pondering- first suggested to me by Aaron Zelin- is comparing the IS administration with that of Jabhat al-Nusra, Syria’s al-Qa’ida affiliate. To put it briefly, Jabhat al-Nusra’s administrative structures lack the same sense of comprehensiveness and consistency. Jabhat al-Nusra does not have the same level of contiguous territory and urban strongholds, and the extent of its presence varies considerably from one place to another. Further, Jabhat al-Nusra is not claiming yet to be a state.
The main Jabhat al-Nusra administrative bodies that can be identified are the Dar al-Qada (Judicial Body), the Maktab al-Da’wa wa al-Irshad (Da’wa and Guidance Office) and al-Idarat al-Aama lil-Khidamat (Public Administration for Services). Broadly speaking, the Dar al-Qada corresponds to IS’ Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim and Diwan al-Hisba, dealing with legal matters such as real estate and enforcement of Shari’a justice (including harsher hudud punishments like stoning fornicators to death), while the Maktab al-Da’wa wa al-Irshad corresponds to IS’ Diwan al-Da’wa wa al-Masajid (Da’wa and Mosques department), and al-Idarat al-Aama lil-Khidamat to the Diwan al-Khidamat.
However, these bodies do not exist in every place where Jabhat al-Nusra has a presence, and sometimes functions are blurred. The Dar al-Qada can be clearly identified in Idlib towns controlled by Jabhat al-Nusra, such as Sarmada, Salqin and Darkush, but in at least one instance the Dar al-Qada seems to have assumed entered into the realm of provision of public services, with the undertaking of a project to reform the main road in Sarmada. Even so, evidence suggests that Jabhat al-Nusra continues to allow civilian local and service councils in Sarmada to operate and provide services such as fixing water pumping lines, contrasting with IS co-optation of such bodies in cities like Raqqa whereby they only have the Diwan al-Khidamat label now. More recently, as part of the Jaysh al-Fatah coalition that has driven the regime out of all major towns in Idlib province since the spring, Jabhat al-Nusra has agreed with the other factions in Jaysh al-Fatah on the formation of a judicial council that is supposed to be “independent in its decisions and rulings, with no right for any faction to intervene in it.” The council is also supposed to unify judiciary authority in all areas liberated at the hands of Jaysh al-Fatah. This development comes amid complaints from the Islamic Commission for the Administration of Liberated Areas (mainly linked to Ahrar al-Sham) that some members of Jabhat al-Nusra have attacked its branches in places like Kafr Nabl.
Moving toAleppo province, one will note the Dar al-Qada branch in Hureitan, which claims authority also over Kafr Hamra and Anadan. Here the Dar al-Qada is undoubtedly supported by the jihadi coalition Jabhat Ansar al-Din that has a presence in these towns (most notably the coalition’s main component Jaysh al-Muhajireen wa al-Ansar). Further up north in Azaz, the Jabhat al-Nusra presence has been limited to bases with control of one of the mosques in the town (the Mus’ab ibn Umair mosque), railing against the public school system in Azaz and offering alternative education for children.
Nevertheless, with talk of the establishment of a U.S.-Turkish safe zone stretching from Azaz to Jarabulus in the north Aleppo countryside, Jabhat al-Nusra has evacuated most of its bases in the Azaz area and is primarily operating as a small military force to provide limited reinforcements for the rebels fighting IS to the east of Azaz (these rebels being primarily the Levant Front and Ahrar al-Sham, with smaller contributions from mainly Levant Front break-offs like Thuwar al-Sham and Jaysh al-Mujahideen elements). These Jabhat al-Nusra members on the frontlines are mostly locals, while the remainder have already gone to Idlib province.
Thus it can be seen how much more complex the picture is with Jabhat al-Nusra administration. The bodies do not have a uniform presence and the group’s approach seems split between a more hardline approach embodied in the rise of the Dar al-Qada and the more traditional picture of Jabhat al-Nusra as a faction willing to work with others in administration. In 2013 what was then the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) indulged in the latter to a degree in the occasional issuing of joint statements for defensive projects and the like.
The Documents
Below, each document is translated and notes provided where applicable.
Specimen A: Activities of the services office, Manbij, Aleppo
Manbij
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
By order of the wali [provincial governor] of Aleppo, the services office in the town of Manbij has placed more than 600 flags on all the entrances to the town and its surrounding. The office has also made the Manbij-Jarabulus road passable for traffic, and has opened a maintenance workshop for the sewage system in the eastern quarter, has planted trees on al-Imaan street, and has done maintenance work on the Dar al-Qada in the town. And all the expenses have been referred to the Diwan al-Wilaya.
And glory belongs to God, His Messenger and the believers but the hypocrites don’t know it.
Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham
Abu [?] Al-Azadi
Wilayat Halab
Notes: Dating uncertain. The ‘Diwan al-Wilaya’ (Province Department) appears to be the same as the “General Administration” (al-Idarat al-Aama) for a given Islamic State province. A similar interchange of names can be observed in some documents regarding healthcare labelled ‘Diwan al-Siha’ (Health Department) and others labelled ‘al-Idarat al-Tibbiya’ (Medical Administration).
Specimen B: Prohibition on hoarding of goods, Yarmouk, Damascus
Islamic State
Wilayat Dimashq
Diwan al-Hisba
28 Rajab 1436 AH [17 May 2015]
In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful
On
The Clear Banner: From Paradise Now To Paradise Hereafter: Maldivian Fighters In Syria
Posted on
The Clear Banner sub-blog on Jihadology.net is primarily focused on Sunni foreign fighting. It does not have to just be related to the phenomenon in Syria. It can also cover any location that contains Sunni foreign fighters. If you are interested in writing on this subject please email me at azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
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From Paradise Now To Paradise Hereafter: Maldivian Fighters In Syria
By Dr. Azra Naseem
The young man was on his way to school when Ali Adam first saw him. He was a high achiever; among national Top Ten in the GCE O’Level examinations1. Every day after school the young man worked in a shop. That’s where Adam met him next. Slowly, Adam cultivated a relationship with him until he became a close friend. This is when Adam’s real work began.
Everyday the two friends met. They discussed religion. Adam always started the discussions with stories about the plight of Muslims living in countries like Palestine, Pakistan, Yemen and Syria. The stories were meant to arouse the young man’s sympathies. When they ended, the young man understood ‘Jihad is a duty.’ Half of Adam’s work was done.
About six months later, Adam began the second phase of his work: to take the young man as far as Pakistan. Adam first accompanied him to India. The young man’s parents cried, begged him not to go. Their pleas fell on deaf ears. The young man’s sister was a student in India; she, too, decided to go with him. He wanted to take another woman with him. Adam only agreed on condition the young man married her. About five people were gathered together and a wedding was quickly performed.
“When we got to Pakistan, a Lashkar–e–Taiba agent said the marriage was not valid. We were told to return home. I came to Male’. The young man’s sister went back to study in India. He stayed in Pakistan for about five years, doing odd jobs,’ Adam said, when asked what the most memorable events in his story were.
Adam says he is a recruiter who finds Maldivians to fight in Syria. About a year ago, he ‘saw the errors of his ways’ and stopped the work. He described his job, and that of his co-workers, as operating within ‘a major network’. It is an endless task, beginning with collecting funds and recruiting people in the Maldives.
[…]
The recruitment work is done in parallel with procuring finance. Adam described the recruitment process step by step: sermons that encourage ‘Jihad’ are given in mosques like Dharumavantha Mosque where people hold the Friday prayers in a separatist congregation [away from the mainstream mosques]. Some people travel to outer islands on the pretext of teaching Quran recitation and providing religious counselling. Envoys are also sent to Maldivian students in countries like Sudan, Egypt and Yemen to enlist their support. They look for people ‘who can be easily convinced’, and seek to ‘play with their minds’.
According to Hussein Rasheed, who was arrested at Male’ airport en route to Syria, Maldivian fighters travel to Syria via Sri Lanka, India or Thailand – all popular travel destinations with Maldivians. The would-be fighters stopover at these destinations [for varying lengths of time] before travelling to Turkey to cross the border into Syria. That’s when ‘Jihad’ begins. They don weapons, and carry out suicide attacks.
‘I know 15 to 20 Maldivians who are in Syria right now. This includes a woman, too. Some Maldivian students who had been studying in Egypt, Sudan and Yemen lead these fighters. One of them has a family in Syria, including a baby. All Maldivians are fighting with Al-Qaida affiliated Jabhat Al-Nusra’, Rasheed said.
What type of Maldivian goes to Syria? Do any of them want to return to Maldives? What happens to their families [in Syria] if one of them dies in battle? All questions.
‘I know that among the fighters are people who have been convicted and sentenced in relation to the Himandhoo case and in connection with the Sultan Park bombing. I don’t think anyone who went there has returned. I doubt any would. If one of them dies, someone else will marry his [the deceased man’s] widow. Expenses will also be looked after, and money given,’ Rasheed, who was arrested last year, said in answer to those questions.
[…]
The above text is a translation of an article in Maldivian daily newspaper, Haveeru, published on 4 June 2014, shortly after the first Maldivian died fighting in Syria2. It serves as an introduction to a growing problem confronted by Maldives – a steady increase in the number of people leaving for ‘Jihad’ in Syria.
Background
Officially, the Maldives is a ‘100% Muslim’ country. The state religion is Islam, and its constitution stipulates every citizen must be a Muslim. Only a Sunni Muslim can be President, or become a judge. Despite what the legal stipulations may suggest, for centuries Islam in Maldives has been fundamentally different from the strict, fundamentalist Islam practised in some ‘Islamic states’. Both the island culture and the centuries old pre-Islamic Buddhist history, as well as its remote geography and distance from the ‘Islamic world’ leant itself to the evolution of an Islam that, while adhering to the five basic tenets of the religion, reflected few of the common practises and jurisprudence followed by other ‘100% Muslim’ countries. This, however, changed drastically in the 21st Century, especially after the United States-led War on Terror began. With seemingly unlimited funding from Islamist societies and organisations—mostly Saudi Arabia—Islam that follows the teachings of ‘Revolutionary Islamism’3 has become predominant, side-lining the country’s Traditionalist Islamic practises with astounding success4.
Dying in Syria
Figure 1. Abu Turab (L) first Maldivian known to have died fighting in Syria
The first Maldivian fighter known to have died in Syria was a 44-year-old named as Abu Turab He was later identified as Ali Adam from the island of Feydhoo in Shaviyani Atoll5.
Two days later, another man, Abu Nuh, was reported killed in Syria. He was later identified as Hassan Shifaz from the capital island of Male’. Since then, around a dozen Maldivians are known to have died fighting in Syria.
Figure 2 Abu Nuh, second Maldivian to die in Syria
Authorities differ greatly on the number of Maldivians who have travelled to join the war in Syria. The most recent police estimate put the figure at 50, while the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) puts the figure at around 200. While it is hard to get an accurate figure, judging from the number of reported deaths and the increasing numbers reported as leaving for Syria, the police estimate is ultra-conservative and, not unintentionally, misleading. The Maldives Police Service and the government have been largely6 unable or unwilling to address the issue. This is not surprising, given the links said to exist between the government, Islamists and law enforcement authorities7. At the UN Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review in Geneva on 6 May 2015, Maldivian Foreign Minister Dunya Maumoon denied any Maldivian links to terrorism, and refrained from making any reference to the growing number of people leaving to Syria.
In contrast to the government’s reluctant admission to existence of limited extremism, the opposition has, for several years now, highlighted religious extremism as a major concern. Their figure of 200 fighters in Syria, however, appears inflated—at least for now. A more accurate figure would be somewhere in-between. From a population of just over 300,000 this is still a shockingly large number. There are more Maldivian fighters in Syria than there are from Afghanistan or many other countries in the Middle East8.
‘Hijra’ in large groups
In October 2014, Ahsan Ibrahim (23) left for Syria with his mother, wife and 11-year-old sister. They left their island Meedhoo, in Raa Atoll, on the pretext of seeking medical treatment in the capital Male’. Ali Ibrahim, father of Ahsan and the 11-year-old girl, only became aware of their plans a week later. In the five months since, Ali Ibrahim has only heard from his family once. ‘We are in Iraq’, Ahsan told his father in a phone call made on Viber. Ahsan told his father they have no intention of returning to the Maldives, which he described as ‘a land of sin’. They left it behind to be ‘on the right path’. With help from Maldivian authorities Ali Ibrahim confirmed his family has crossed the Turkish border into Syria, but he has no way of knowing whether his wife and children are dead or alive.9
Increasingly, Maldivians are leaving for Syria in large groups. This new trend can be spotted from early January 2015 onwards, when it was reported that a group of seven Maldivians had left together for Syria. It was also the first time connections emerged between dangerous criminal elements in society and those travelling to Syria. All seven members of the group belonged to a criminal gang. Among them was Azleef Rauf, a notorious gangster accused of involvement, among other violent crimes, in the murder of Dr Afrasheem Ali, an MP and a religious scholar known for relatively moderate views. The group entered Syria via the Turkish border. According to local media reports, Azleef planned to take his pregnant wife, one-year-old son and four-year-old daughter with him but was prevented by the wife’s family.10
Another group of six, en route to Syria to join with Azleef’s group, were stopped in Malaysia and returned to the Maldives on 12 January 2015. Their plans were reported to the police by a family member and four were stopped by a joint operation by Malaysian and Maldives police. Whereabouts of the other two are unknown, but they are believed to be in Indonesia11.
Another group of six Maldivians left for Syria on 29 January 2015. The group included the Imam of a mosque in capital Male’,