Usāmah Bin Lāden is Dead: Forum Reactions

NOTE: Older quotes are first. Newest quotes toward the bottom of this post. This post was last updated 5/2/11 9:10PM US Central time.

“How sound is the news of the martyrdom of Sheikh Osama bin Laden?”
“O Allah, make this news not true”
“Allah protect us in our loss”
“God willing, news is not true. Catastrophic if it is authentic.”
“O Lord for your kindness”
“May Allah increase you rank in Jannah o Sheikh Usamah!”
“Ameen AMEEN AMEEN! May Allah give you a place next to our beloved Prophet (saws), ameen ameen”
“Please everyone calm and pray”
“We ask God to be the news is not true Lord of the Worlds”
“God damn you, Obama”
“Shut up and delete this thread”
“I think the Americans are doing this to make a good excuse for leaving Afg this year.”
“I hope with tears in my eyes that it is false. But if it is the will of Allah(swt) then may Allah(swt) grant the Sheikh ul Mujahideen, the status of a Shaheed and a place in Jannat ul Firdaus..”
“Inna li Allahi wa inna ilaihi raaji’oon. May Allah forgive his sins and raise him to the ranks of greatest Shuhada in the modern history of Islam.Ameen”
“Jihad will not stop because of Sheikh’s death, it will continue until we gain victory.”
“Kullna osama bin laden kullna osama bin laden kullna osama bin laden”
“I’m with Osama either in winning a victory or earning status as a martyr”
“May Allah accept his martyrdom and enter him into al-Firdaws with the Ambiya, Shuhada and the Saliheen.This day is the greatest day of shame in the history of Pakistan and what dignity had been left in calling oneself a Pakistani has now gone. Wallahi if the people of Pakistan keep on tolerating the kufr and riddah of that filthy kafir Zardari after this day, then may Allah deal with them as He sees fit.However, not all is so bad. Events like this are sent by Allah to remove the munafiqeen from the ranks of the Muslims. In the aftermath of this, we’ll see many munafiqeen, including ‘scholars’, come out in happiness and support for the Americans.Good news for Osama inshallah and good results for this Ummah inshallah.”
“This has not been confirmed by the Mujahideen what ever the out come Usamah bin Laden is the most influencial man of our times and May Allah accept all his sacrifices ameen”
“If it is true then we must thank Allah that America was not able to capture him alive. Else they would be humiliating him like Saddam Hussain. At last he may have find his greatest desire of Shahada.”
“Think not of those killed in the way of Allah dead, but alive with the Lord. We consider him a martyr. O Allah, accept the martyrs. And join us by the Lord of the Worlds”
“Brothers and sisters the order to attack the shaykh didn’t come from Obama, it came from Allah SWT and we should be aware that Allah SWT has the power to obliterate the White House in no time. So have yaqeen in Allah SWT because today the kufaar celebrate but tomorrow the ash of their fitna will block out their joy.”
“It seems obama has secured his seat in the white for the next term. This week only, he proved the world he was born in america by releasing his birth certificate and now he killed america’s worst enemy.”
“The celebrations are amusing. Cheer all you want kuffar, you only have a limited amount of time in this dunya in which to do it. And then you will see the reality of this life.”
“I hope Allah sends them [an] earthquake that will choke them further”
“And if its true it would be the most shameful moment for the pakistani people who could not protect 1 muslim hero…its a black day and a day when we should keep our voices and gazes lowi personally feel the lowest i have ever felt, we couldnt protect our beloved Sheikh”
“Mashallah the whole nation is celebrating the death of one man. Shaykh osama was a true lion.”
“We renew our pledge of allegiance with the Covenant and the first with the Lord to continue our path until the end. We will continue .. We will continue .. We will continue ..”
“Coming Oh America; Coming Oh Jews, Coming Oh rejectionists (Shi’a); Coming Oh Kufar, secularists, and apostates. Arrivals are coming and they are bringing the coffins with merciless devices”
“May Allah bring thousands osama to give nusra to his deen”
“Ya ikhwati wa akhawati, hold your horses. No conclusion should be derived until we get word from Muslims who are affiliated with him and who can confirm so. No words should be taken from the enemies of Islam and Muslims. They faked so many videos in the past of him, so why can this not be one of them? Just look at those beer-drinking, hog-eating, incestuous, red-necks, uncle sams, house negros, vatos locos, all celebrating outside the White House. It’s like a holiday for them. Really a sad bunch of people. I’m just waiting for the Chocolaty Muslims, Talafies, and those borderline murtad/moderates to join the ugly bandwagon of cheering this so-called victory.”
“I dont get it. How come Shaykh was living next to militray area and he was not seen before. Seems like a plot of america to wage war on pk. Anyways, it will be good to see pk fighting america ….actually Excellent!”
“please let them celebrate, they are celebrating their own end.
osama is in the heart of every muslim, even those who dont admit publicly.
in sha Allah its the start of something. this is the day muslims will remember Allah alot and seek the destruction of this pharoanic nation of our time.
oh Allah destroy this nation for their hatred and enmity toward your deen
oh Allah seal their hearts with disbelief they shall never taste faith untill they taste your severe punishment.
oh Allah send them endless tornados to destroy their homes and earthquakes to crash them.”
“Why can’t people admit he was killed? he is a human being, not a prophet. another man will replace his shoes, its easy.”
“The kuffar can show only symbolic success. Militarily, the beaten, like the Russians in Chechnya. Whenever the Russians have claimed that Doku Umarov has fallen and he reported back again and again.”
“Death of the commander of the Mujahideen Sheikh Osama bin Laden – as he had wished – a new victory for the approach of the Islamic Jihad”
Anjem Choudary’s reaction to the death of Bin Laden. He’s the leader of UK jihadi group al-Muhajirun: https://bit.ly/jHyzTZ
“I think America knows that Sheikh Osama already passed away in recent years. Now they have planned to take advantage of his confirmed death. And they are taking advantage as US people have greatly appreciated the news. Also this news have pressurize the Pakistani intelligence that Osama was declared to be found in a sensitive settled area.”
“We should not forget that these illitarete idiots in the past have killed sheikh ayman zawahiri many times sheikh osama and cmdr ilyas kashmiri in their dream. Let the kuffar and murtadeen keep dreaming.”
“Yes, the Covenant continues until the establishment of the law of God in the land”
“We are all Osama bin Laden, God willing; We are all Osama bin Laden, God willing; We are all Osama bin Laden, God willing; We are all Osama bin Laden, God willing”
New statement from Hānī al-Sibā’ī: “Congratulations Osama .. Woe Obama .. And Woe to the Traitors of Pakistan”
“Si la nouvel est vrai ,mon coeur sera plus que jamais brisé par cette nouvel , mais j’ai moi aussi le sentiment que cela est vrai , car il ont annoncer qu’il détenait le corps du Cheikh ( Allahou A’lem ) et ces derniers temps , je ne sais pas si ça explique cet nouvel , mais je faisait un rêve quasiment toujours le même ou je perdais mes dents et ou j’avais une barbe encore plus grosse que d’habitude , j’ai fait des recherches on m’a dit que cela signifiais la mort la mienne ou celle d’un proche , je sais que cheikh Oussama n’est pas un proche au sens propre mais je l’aime pour Allah énormément comme s’il faisait partie de ma propre famille voir plus.”
“En tout cas s’il était vraiment vivant et que les amerloques l’ont vraiment tué, je pense que hervé ghesquière et stéphane taponier ont du soucis à se faire…”
“If Osama is martyred then we are all Osama. And the march of struggle will inevitably continue.”
“I’ll cut the head of everyone who says Sheikh Osama is dead”
New Elegy from Ḥāmid Bin ‘Abdullah al ‘Alī: “To the Lion Shaykh Usāmah Bin Lāden, God Have Mercy”
“After the news of the killing of the Sheikh a sharp drop in oil prices

As-Saḥāb Media presents a new video from Usāmah Bin Lāden: "A Letter for the People of France"

UPDATE 4: Here is a German translation:

Von Osama bin Laden an das französische Volk:
Frieden sei mit denen, die den Rechtleitung folgen.
Das Thema meiner Rede ist über die Gründe für die Bedrohung eurer Sicherheit und die Entführung eurer Söhne.
Die Entführung von euer Experten in Niger, während eure Offiziere sie bewacht haben, ist eine Reaktion auf das Unrecht, das ihr den islamischen Nation zufügt.
Ist es fair, dass sie in dem Besatzung unseren Landes teilgenommen haben und neben den Amerikanern stehen wenn sie Kinder und Frauen töten, und danach wollen sie in Frieden und Sicherheit leben?
Wie könnt ihr euch vorstellen, dass ihr euch in den Sachen der Muslimen einmischt, besonders in Nord- und Westafrika, ihre Offiziere gegen uns unterstützt, und viel aus unseren Reichtum nimmt in verdächtigen Geschäften, während unser Volk unter Armut und Elend leidet?
Wenn ihr zu Unrecht denkt, dass es euer Recht ist, freien muslimischen Frauen das Tragen des Gesichtsschleiers zu verbieten, ist es dann nicht auch unser Recht, eure eindringenden Männer rauszuwerfen und ihnen die Kehle durchzuschneiden? Natürlich tun wir das.
Die Gleichung ist einfach: Wenn ihr tötet, werdet auch ihr getötet werden; wenn ihr Geiseln nimmt, werdet ihr selbst als Geisel genommen, wenn ihr unsere Sicherheit bedroht, werden wir eure Sicherheit zerstören; die Schuld lastet auf den, der anfingt.
Das einzige Mittel, eure Sicherheit zu bewahren, ist all das Unrecht und seine Wirkungen auf unseren Volk zu stoppen und am wichtigsten, eure Kräfte aus den bösen Krieg von Bush in Afghanistan zurückzuziehen. Es ist Zeit, dass die sogenannte direkte und indirekte Kolonisation beendet wird.
Ihr solltet Konsekvenzen daraus ziehen, wie tief Amerika gefallen ist wegen diesen unrechten Krieg, es ist am Rande der Kollaps an allen wichtigen Fronten und wird bald an die andere Seite der Atlantik zurückfallen, wenn Allah es so will.
Glücklich ist, wer von den Fehler von anderen lernt, und Frieden sei mit denen, die den Rechtleitung folgen.


UPDATE 3: Check out Andrew Lebovich’s thoughts on why UBL was targeting France.

UPDATE 2: Here is the English translation:
English translation of audio message from Usāmah Bin Lāden- “A Letter for the People of France”

UPDATE: Check out Leah Farrall’s take on the UBL audio.

NOTE: The main highlights of this video include Usāmah Bin Lāden discussing France’s ḥijāb ban that he states should be cancelled. In addition, the hostage taking by al-Qā’idah in the Islamic Maghreb in Niger is a justifiable act due to France’s transgressions and support for the American-led Afghan war, which he says they should withdraw from. Most importantly, Bin Lāden affirms, France should stop interfering in Muslim-related issues or affairs.
Nothing of significance here, just typical rhetoric. Previously, Dr. Ayman aẓ-Ẓawāhirī also discussed the issue of the ḥijāb on July 27, 2010 in a video statement eulogizing the death of Shaykh Muṣṭafā Abū al-Yazīd who was killed in a U.S. drone strike on May 21, 2010. He stated:

What France is waging … must push us to tightly hold onto our truthful faith to counter their deviational doctrines. We must call our daughters and sisters and mothers to wear ḥijāb and to support them and defend them. As every ḥijāb-wearing and niqāb-wearing female Muslim, who defends her ḥijāb, is a mujahid who defends the rulings of Sharia against the Crusade, secular, Western invasion.

Other than that, the only thing one can take away from this video is that As-Saḥāb Media is in a fairly safe area and has not been disrupted by the droning campaign since As-Saḥāb has released many videos in the past month.

As-Saḥāb released a new video of Abū Yaḥyā al-Lībī mourning the death of the Islamic State of Iraq's former senior leaders: "Blood of our Commanders, Fuel of our Battle"

NOTE: As-Saḥāb (“The Clouds”) Foundation for Islamic Media Publication released a new video of Abū Yaḥyā al-Lībī mourning the death of the Islamic State of Iraq’s former senior leaders: “Blood of our Commanders, Fuel of our Battle.” Abū Yaḥyā al-Lībī is considered one of the top leaders within the al-Qā’idah organization (AQSL). He has also been touted as a possible replacement to ‘Usāmah Bin Lāden. Al-Lībī started to gain notoriety and respect within thejihādī community after he broke out of the Bagram Airbase prison facility in 2005. It was also reported this past December that a drone killed al-Lībī, but it ended up being Ṣāleḥ al-Ṣūmālī instead.


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GUEST POST: Fringe Fluidity: How Prior Extremist Involvement Serves as a Distinct Radicalization Pathway

As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this websites administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy researchers to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.

Click here to see an archive of all guest posts.

Fringe Fluidity: How Prior Extremist Involvement Serves as a Distinct Radicalization Pathway

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Madeleine Blackman

In January, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Madeleine Blackman published an article in the peer-reviewed journal Studies in Conflict & Terrorism entitled “Fluidity of the Fringes.” The authors argued for the recognition of a distinct individual-level pathway for radicalization to violent extremism, “fringe fluidity,” that involves a person transitioning from adherence to one set of extremist beliefs to another. They contended that the validity of this theory can be seen in an observable pathway between neo-Nazism and militant Islamism. Gartenstein-Ross and Blackman have adapted their article for Jihadology’s readers.

This article argues for recognition of fringe fluidity as a distinct radicalization pathway in the terrorism studies literature. Most studies about individual-level radicalization examine how relatively normal people come to accept, and act in service of, extremist beliefs that counsel violence. As one prominent study said, most individuals it examined were unremarkable before they became terrorists, in that “they had ‘unremarkable’ jobs, had lived ‘unremarkable’ lives and had little, if any criminal history.” But some individuals who come to accept and act in service of a violent extremist ideology do not begin their journey as unremarkable. In some cases, individuals transition from adherence to one form of violent extremism to another—and understanding their prior extremist involvement is essential. This phenomenon can be observed frequently enough that fringe fluidity should be understood as an independent radicalization pathway.

This article demonstrates the existence of fringe fluidity by detailing the pathway between neo-Nazism and militant Islamism. In recent years, over half a dozen case studies are readily identifiable in open-source literature of individuals who either made the transition from neo-Nazi beliefs to militant Islamism, or worked to advance both causes simultaneously. As this article shows, these individuals’ trajectories cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of the totality of their extremist involvement.

It may seem counterintuitive or surprising that there would be a pathway between these two ideologies. After all, Islamist militants tend to view infidels writ large as adversaries, while committed Nazis view many Muslims as racially suspect. Indeed, today members of the European far right generally view Muslims as their top enemy. Yet there is a clear pipeline between the two—not necessarily a pipeline with an enormous quantitative output, but one that exists nonetheless. This pipeline has some ideological basis, including the fact that both ideologies share a common set of enemies in the Jewish people and the West (as currently constructed) more broadly. Further, the pipeline has some historical precedent.

To concretize what we mean by fringe fluidity, it is not just a process of inter-cultural borrowing and sharing of animosities that facilitate a congruence of extremist perspectives between neo-Nazi and extremist Islamist elements. Rather, fringe fluidity should be regarded as its own individual-level pathway into Islamist militancy. (We emphasize Islamist militancy as the end point because, as our case studies show, this is the direction in which fringe fluidity typically flows for these two ideologies: Rather than Islamist militants developing an interest in neo-Nazism, people with neo-Nazi sympathies far more frequently come to embrace militant Islamism.) The scholarly literature has elucidated such individual-level pathways by which Islamist militants are radicalized as personal grievance, social networks, ideology, and status-seeking. Similarly, there is an identifiable individual-level pathway by which individuals who have already embraced the belief system of neo-Nazism become acculturated into militant Islamism.

Though this article focuses on neo-Nazism and militant Islamism, we believe fringe fluidity is likely more widely applicable. Various extremist causes can likely serve as starting points for an individual’s movement into other forms of extremism. We hope that future research will test whether fringe fluidity is in fact more widely applicable. It is not clear that all three of the factors enumerated above—recent cases of convergence, some ideological overlap, and historical precedent—are necessary for fluidity to exist between two fringe ideologies. Future research can examine which factors are necessary for fluidity between two extremist ideologies, but the relationship between neo-Nazism and militant Islamism is sufficient to illuminate the existence of this radicalization pathway.

This article makes two contributions to the radicalization literature. First, it explicates a new individual-level pathway. Previous scholarship has outlined the convergence of some elements of militant Islam and the extreme right based on a sense of shared enemies, but without exploring how there might be a radicalization pathway between the two. Other academic work has viewed militant Islam and the extreme right as phenomena harboring significant mutual animosity, with little overlap, but that produce “reciprocal radicalization” in the course of their competition. Thus, there have been valuable scholarly explorations of neo-Nazism and militant Islam, but this radicalization pathway has not been identified in the scholarly literature. Second, the article raises—though does not answer—the question of whether individuals who have radicalized through fringe fluidity pose a greater danger of violence than do other extremists. People who have come to embrace more than one extremist ideology may have greater impulsiveness, or a lower threshold for action.

Our article first turns to the relevant literature on radicalization. It then examines the three factors that in our opinion demonstrate the pathway between neo-Nazism and militant Islam. We begin by explaining the ideological factors that, in the view of people who made the journey between the two extremist currents, bind them together. The article then delves into the history connecting these outlooks, before turning to contemporary case studies. The article concludes by discussing the utility of recognizing fringe fluidity, and proposing a future research agenda related to the concept.

Current Conceptions of Radicalization

There is no consensus definition of radicalization, nor is there a consensus model describing how it occurs. This section describes the conceptual frameworks that scholars have advanced, and argues that fringe fluidity has explanatory power regardless of which conception of radicalization a scholar adopts.

The lack of a consensus definition of radicalization is unsurprising, and does not call into question the concept’s validity. There is similarly no consensus definition of terrorism, nor is there a consensus definition of such critical and universally recognized concepts as war, civil war, or insurgency. As Peter Neumann has noted, most definitions of radicalization can be distinguished through their emphasis on either the progression to extremist views, or else to extremist behaviors. Fringe fluidity is relevant to the adoption of both extremist views and behaviors.

The fundamental insight of fringe fluidity is that prior extremist involvement provides a pathway by which an individual may come to engage in a new violent extremist ideology cognitively or behaviorally, at least if sufficient points of convergence exist between the prior and more newly-adopted form of extremism. These points of convergence—such as the ideological overlap and shared history that can be found in the case of neo-Nazism and militant Islamism—may allow an individual to transition between even two seemingly discordant movements. With respect to radical beliefs, an individual who has already embraced some form of extremism may find it easier to accept another extremist outlook that is also deeply counter-normative.

Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins have made the important observation that, despite sometimes heated debates in the field of radicalization studies, there is “some consensus on the key variables that produce radicalization and violent extremism.” They highlight grievances, networks, ideologies, and enabling environments and support structures as variables about which there is agreement. But Hafez and Mullins note that despite this agreement on variables that may drive extremism, the field is far from a consensus on the models tracing an individual’s transformation. In many ways, radicalization models can be seen as metaphors for how the adoption of violent extremist views or behaviors comes about.

One influential metaphor has been that of a process. Some scholarship has criticized

Check out my new piece at the Washington Post’s ‘Monkey Cage': "The Islamic State’s Model"

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The Islamic State announced several months ago that it was “annexing” territory in Algeria (Wilayat al-Jazair), Libya (Wilayat al-Barqah, Wilayat al-Tarabulus and Wilayat al-Fizan), Sinai (Wilayat Sinai), Saudi Arabia (Wilayat al-Haramayn) and Yemen (Wilayat al-Yaman). It is likely that the Islamic State plans to pursue a similar approach in Afghanistan and Pakistan following its announcement of accepting pledges of allegiance from former members of the Afghan and Pakistan Taliban to also try and “annex” territory there under the framework of a new wilayah called “Wilayat Khorasan.” On its face, this bold declaration of an expanding number of wilayat (provinces) resembles the announcements by al-Qaeda of creating numerous franchises in the mid-2000s. The Islamic State’s “wilayat” strategy differs in significant ways from al-Qaeda’s “franchise” strategy, however.
The academic literature has shed great light on the al-Qaeda franchising strategy. In a recent article Daniel Byman highlights a number of key factors within the al-Qaeda network regarding motivations for affiliation and franchising. Typically, affiliates joined up with al-Qaeda as a result of failure. Affiliation helped with financial support; offered a potential haven that could be exploited, along with access to new training, recruiting, publicity and military expertise; gave branding and publicity; and opened up personal networks from past foreign fighter mobilizations. It in turn helps al-Qaeda with mission fulfillment, remaining relevant, providing access to new logistics networks, and building a new group of hardened fighters.
But, Byman argues, those franchises often became as much a burden as an asset as local interests and views diverged with those of the parent organization. Leah Farrall argues that al-Qaeda increasingly came to view franchising “warily” in part due to its inability to always control its new partners such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as because of backlash from unsuccessful cooptation of organizations such as the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group or Egyptian Islamic Jihad. This is one of the reasons why, prior to Osama bin Laden’s death, the Somali jihadi group Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahideen was not given franchise status. Bin Laden had apprehensions about the group’s utility due to past clan infighting and lack of unity. Following the death of bin Laden though, his replacement, Ayman al-Zawahiri, brought Shabab into the fold, but the results have been quite disastrous; Shabab has declined and also was in an internal feud between its foreign and local members. Will the Islamic State’s wilayat pose a similar burden?
There is one key difference between al-Qaeda’s and the Islamic State’s model for expansion. Al-Qaeda wanted to use its new franchises in service of its main priority: attacking Western countries to force them to stop supporting “apostate” Arab regimes, which without the support of Western countries would then be ripe for the taking. This has only truly worked out with its Yemeni branch, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). On the other hand, while the Islamic State does not have an issue with its supporters or grassroots activists attacking Western countries, its main priority is building out its caliphate, which is evident in its famous slogan baqiya wa tatamaddad (remaining and expanding). As a result, it has had a relatively clear agenda and model: fighting locally, instituting limited governance and conducting outreach. This differs from al-Qaeda’s more muddled approach – it hoped a local franchise would conduct external operations, but many times franchises would instead focus on local battles or attempts at governance without a clear plan, as bin Laden had warned. Moreover, the Islamic State has had a simple media strategy for telegraphing what it is doing on the ground to show its supporters, potential recruits and enemies that it is in fact doing something. This accomplishes more, even if it appears that the Islamic State is doing more than it actually is, in comparison with al-Qaeda’s practice of waiting for a successful external operation to succeed and then claiming responsibility after the fact.
How is this strategy working? So far, Libya and the Sinai appear to be the locations with the most promise, though the Islamic State’s presence in these areas should not be overstated. It certainly does not command the amount of territorial control as its base in Mesopotamia. That said, the Islamic State’s wilayat in Libya and the Sinai are following the same methodology on the ground and in the media as the Islamic State’s wilayat have in Iraq and Syria.
By contrast, its wilayat in Algeria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen have yet to show any signs of activity. It is certainly possible that the Islamic State is playing a long game and preparing its soldiers and bureaucrats for future jihad, governance and dawa (propagation of Islam), but there are reasons to be skeptical as well. Following Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s announcement of the expansion of the Islamic State in mid-November, its media apparatus took over the media departments of all the local wilayat outside of Mesopotamia. This highlights that, at least on the media level, the Islamic State is in full command and control.
Click here to read the rest.

The Clear Banner: Turkish Foreign Fighters and the Ogaden

The Clear Banner sub-blog on Jihadology.net is primarily focused on Sunni foreign fighting. It does not have to just be related to the phenomenon in Syria. It can also cover any location that contains Sunni foreign fighters. If you are interested in writing on this subject please email me at azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.

Turkish Foreign Fighters and the Ogaden
By OSMahmood and North Caucasus Caucus
In recent months, there has been a major increase in international media coverage of Turkish citizens fighting alongside The Islamic State (IS). Much of the commentary has focused on the notion that this is abnormal behavior for citizens of the secular state. While this is partially true (the percentage of Turks in IS is even lower than some European countries by comparisons of percentage of total population), it should be recognized that at least for certain communities in Turkey, participating in jihadist conflicts is not abnormal, and those who participate are often honored. To provide a vivid example of this trend, this article will focus on a very specific case from 1996 of 14 Turkish foreign fighters who were killed in one of the lesser-known jihadi conflicts.
Turkish Foreign Fighters and the Ogaden
Conflict in the Ogaden
The year 1996 must have been a confusing time to be an aspiring jihadi. With the Dayton Accords ending the war in Bosnia the previous year, and the Khasavyurt Agreement temporarily halting hostilities in Chechnya, two of the premiere jihadist conflicts enticing foreign fighters came to an end. Given this context, some jihadis, including a group of young Turkish citizens, looked further afield to participate in one of the more obscure Islamist conflicts – the battle between ethnic Muslim Somalis and Ethiopian government forces in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.
The Ogaden – A Basic Background
The Ogaden, consisting of the mainly ethnic Somali-inhabited eastern region of Ethiopia, has long had a contentious history. By the early 20th century, the region slowly came under the domain of the Christian empire based in the highlands of central Ethiopia, though control shifted to the British after the Second World War. The British returned the Ogaden to Ethiopia in 1948, along with the Haud in 1954 (the north-eastern section used as a grazing land by nomadic Somali herders), effectively signaling the demise of a ‘Greater Somalia’ that united all Somali-inhabited lands, much to the chagrin of many Somali nationalists.
The reincorporation of the Ogaden into Ethiopia sparked a host of resistance movements and a devastating Cold War-infused proxy battle with Somalia in 1977-78. Following the collapse of the Mengistu government in Ethiopia in 1991, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) assumed control of the region under Ethiopia’s federal structure. The harmonious relationship between the ONLF and the new Ethiopian government, however, did not last – by 1994 the ONLF had divided, with a wing renouncing its political position in favor of armed resistance.
The Rise and Fall of Islamist Interest in the Ogaden
During this time, the struggle for the Ogaden caught the eye of Islamist actors in Somalia. While the ONLF operated as a secular, nationalist party within Ethiopia, often accused of narrowly representing the Ogaden clan, al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI) in Somalia developed a branch focused on the Ogaden that infused Somali irredentism with Islamist rhetoric, adding a new, albeit somewhat peripheral dimension to the struggle. The conflict was often portrayed in terms of Somali Muslims rising up against a Christian entity. Based in Luuq along the Ethiopian-Somali border, AIAI’s Ogaden wing also established training camps within the Ogaden itself, and even conducted a series of attacks in Ethiopia’s two largest cities in 1995-6.
Osama bin Laden also developed an interest in the Ogaden during his stay in Sudan from 1992-96, so much so that during his August 1996 declaration of jihad against the United States, the al Qa’ida (AQ) leader referenced the region amongst a host of other global hotspots where Muslims have suffered at the hands of a “Judeo-Christian alliance.” Representatives from al Qa’ida traveled to the Ogaden in the early 1990s and aided in the establishment of training camps, with bin Laden himself reportedly investing $3 million to bring foreign fighters to the region, cementing the Ogaden on AQ’s early 1990s horizon [Note: The vast majority of open-source information regarding AQ activities in the Ogaden during this time period comes from declassified documents in the Harmony Database, obtained by the Combating Terrorism Center and analyzed in its 2007 report Al-Qaida’s (Mis)Adventures in the Horn of Africa].
Ethiopia, however, responded forcefully to the 1995-6 attacks, bombing camps in Luuq on 9 August 1996 and again in January 1997, effectively routing AIAI. Combined with Osama bin Laden’s move to Afghanistan and AQ’s struggles in Somalia, the Ogaden likely fell off AQ’s map. With AIAI decimated, resistance to Ethiopian rule returned to the realm of the secular, clan-based ONLF, a stiutation that largely persists to the present day.
Turkish Involvement in the Ogaden
Much of the information for this article was drawn from Turkish language sites dedicated to Turkish Islamist martyrs killed in conflicts outside Turkey (as well as those killed fighting Kurdish separatists), such as sehidlerimiz.com and menzil.org. These websites purport to reproduce contemporary reporting from the time of the fighters’ deaths and often provide images of the news articles, primarily from local newspapers. Due to the age and second hand nature of much of this material, some caveats apply, especially as data on Turkish fighters who may have gone to fight but ultimately survived is not available.
As in Syria, looking into the backgrounds of fighters reveals connections to other jihadist conflicts and/or friends and family serving as pulling factors. Below we will describe the experience of a number of the Turkish fighters – who likely joined with the Islamist AIAI’s Ogaden wing, and were all reportedly killed along the Ethiopian-Somali border on two different days between August and December 1996.
Turkish Foreign Fighters and the Ogaden2
Backgrounds and Parental Involvement
From the available information, the majority of the 14 Turkish fighters killed in Ogaden had similar backgrounds – early 20s, often college students or professionals, and idealistic. One fighter, Nureddin Cingöz from Kozan, Adana, had graduated from a theological imam-hatip high school, where he allegedly won first place in a hadith knowledge competition. However, when he left with his friend, Bayram Ali Düz, for the Ogaden, both were students at Konya’s Selcuk University.
Duz
In some cases, fighters seemed to travel without support from their families. For example, Gökhan Süfürler graduated from a vocational high school in Istanbul before taking a job as an accountant working at a company in Kartal. After he left his job, Süfürler’s father wanted him to work at a different job before completing his military service, but Süfürler “claimed to have higher ideals,” according to his father. According to a letter he sent home, Süfürler wrote that he felt guilty living a good life in Turkey while injustice and deprivation occurred elsewhere. In an interview with Selam Gazetesi, Sufurler’s father explained that while he was born in Istanbul, his family was originally from Salonica, Greece and was quite secular. However, his father and other family members started praying more regularly after his son’s death.
In other cases, families appear to have been supportive. In an interview after his death in the Ogaden, Ismail Ozturk’s father stated that his son’s death should not be treated as a tragedy, but as martyrdom. Ozturk’s father went on to say that when his sons were young he brought back Islamic books from Libya where he was working, and that he tried to pass on his religious convictions. Ismail took his upbringing to heart and went to Bosnia, but the war ended two or three weeks after his arrival. He returned to Turkey changed and even more committed to jihad. He later tried to join the conflict in Chechnya, but was turned back by Russian preventative measures. After these failures, Ozturk decided try his luck in the Ogaden. This time, however, his father allegedly tried to convince him to stay and get married, demonstrating the at times shifting nature of familial support for such activities.
The Bosnian Connection
The conflict in Bosnia appears to have served as a central bridge to the Ogaden, with many fighters meeting there and deciding their next destination. One figure who seems to be especially important as a link between Bosnia and the Ogaden is Atilla Saltan. A young man from Agri in eastern Turkey, Atilla eventually got a job in advertising in Istanbul. While there, he became engaged in the study of the Quran and other religious activites, eventually leaving his job. He moved to Germany, staying with family and decorating a local mosque. His apparent motivation was to make his way to Bosnia to fight, arriving there in November 1995. When the ceasefire came into effect on 14 December 1995, however,

GUEST POST: Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.
Past Guest Posts:
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi
“The popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain have not only shaken the foundation of the authoritarian order in the Middle East, but they have also hammered a deadly nail in the coffin of a terrorism narrative which has painted al Qaeda as the West’s greatest threat,” Fawaz Gerges of the London School of Economics opined in definitive tones in January 2012. Peter Bergen, the bestselling author and CNN terrorism analyst, shares that sentiment, describing Osama bin Laden’s death and the events popularly known as the “Arab Spring” as “the final bookends” of the Global War on Terror. “It’s hard to think of anything that’s more seismic in terms of undercutting al Qaeda’s ideology,” he said, than the combination of these two developments. Other Western commentators believe the Arab Spring has helped the forces of jihadism. Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA unit that pursued bin Laden, said at a book festival in Edinburgh, Scotland, that the Arab Spring “delighted al Qaeda,” and has been “an intelligence disaster” for the United States.
Gerges and Bergen are representative of one side of a debate raging in the West over the impact of the Arab Spring on the threat of al Qaeda–inspired terrorism; Scheuer represents another side, with many gradations between their polarized outlooks. Yet, although informed observers’ perspectives on the impact that the Arab Spring will have on al Qaeda and other salafi jihadi groups differ, they are seemingly unanimous in believing that the effect of these uprisings will be profound. Unfortunately, one important voice has been marginalized from this debate: that of salafi jihadis themselves.
A review of prominent articles and analyses on the topic, some of them quite worthwhile, makes the marginalization of the jihadis’ perspective clear. Analysis of the Arab Spring’s impact on al Qaeda is often structural in nature, as is the case with Seth Jones’s observation in Foreign Policy that the revolutions may produce weak states, which social science literature suggests are more likely to become “fertile ground for terrorist groups.” Although Jones quotes from al Qaeda emir Ayman al Zawahiri, that quotation is intended to show that al Qaeda has designs for the Arab Spring rather than to comprehensively illuminate the group’s perspective and strategic thought. Eugenio Lilli’s structural analysis in the Journal of Terrorism Research reaches a more optimistic conclusion, that democracy is “still one of the best weapons to fight the threat of Islamic terrorism.” Lilli quotes Hosni Mubarak and Muammar Qaddafi’s warnings that their fall could bolster extremist forces, but he neither quotes nor cites the views of a single jihadi figure since the revolutions began.
Some analyses focus on internal dynamics within the jihadi movement. For example, William McCants’s informative Foreign Affairs piece “Al Qaeda’s Challenge” discusses, among other things, the manner in which Islamists who vote and Islamist parliamentarians pose problems for al Qaeda’s outlook. McCants hones in on a few discrete aspects of al Qaeda’s thought that are challenged by the new Islamist embrace of electoral politics, rather than assessing the group’s current perceptions of the Arab Spring. Still other contributions describe on-the-ground developments spurred by the Arab Spring that may strengthen or undermine al Qaeda. Such pieces may contribute when they offer rich descriptions, but they are less concerned with how jihadis see developments, and jihadi thinkers are rarely quoted in this genre.
Jihadi perceptions of the Arab Spring are important not because we can take their viewpoint as the definitive reading of these events, but rather because the U.S. has often encountered problems over the past decade when it has failed to understand the adversary. It could likewise be a grave error to declare what the events of the Arab Spring mean for the future of jihadi activities without understanding how the other side in this conflict perceives them.
This article addresses this gap in the literature through an analysis of 101 documents produced by salafi jihadi thinkers within a year following the movement’s first statement on the uprising in Tunisia (a January 13, 2011 statement from Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud). These documents include statements released by spokesmen, interviews with the movement’s intellectual leaders, and discussions on Web forums. Of course, there is no unified jihadi movement with something resembling a collective conscience. There are conflicting and competing groups; nor do they possess a unified view of the Arab Spring. But within the first year of public statements, there was more agreement than disagreement. Jihadi observers had a largely optimistic outlook on the revolts, seeing the Arab Spring as “a tsunami” capable of sweeping away regimes throughout the region and beyond. These observers believed that they were presented with new opportunities, and have begun to outline a methodology for taking advantage of these opportunities.
A Pan-Islamic Uprising
Jihadi observers see the events in the Arab world as a pan-Islamic uprising, one that may quickly extend beyond Arabic-speaking countries. This was apparent even in the first statement that a jihadi group released on the events of the Arab Spring, the aforementioned document from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud. “Your battle you fight today,” Wadoud told the Tunisians, “isn’t alienated from the general battle the Muslim umma is engaged in against its external and domestic enemies.”
Jihadi observers were ahead of the curve in predicting that Egypt would be next. On January 21, four days before the demonstrations that would topple Hosni Mubarak began, Kuwait-based commentator Hamid bin Abdallah al Ali wrote that the Egyptian regime “has an appointment with a coming and imminent pain.” He stated that the coming demonstration would “transfer the pains which afflicted the Arab peoples onto the tyrants, and transfer the authority back to the people, just as Tunisia did.” Ali’s assessment proved to be more accurate than that offered by U.S. officials, including the American secretary of state.
Jihadi observers generally agree with the assessment of Jordanian Islamist Akram Hijazi, who said on January 26 that “the Arab people are

Jihadology's Top Posts and Most Video Plays in 2011

This may interest some people:
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Usāmah Bin Lāden is Dead: Forum Reactions
al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s al-Malāḥim Media’s Inspire Magazine Issue #5
Statement from al-Qā’idah: “You Lived Benevolent and Died a Martyr: Statement on the Death of Usāmah Bin Lāden”
al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula’s al-Malāḥim Media’s Inspire Magazine Issue #4
al-Emarah presents a video message from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: “Unity and Uprising”
Video from the Teḥrīk-ī-Ṭālibān Pākistān: “Killing of Colonel Imām” [Graphic]
Statement from the Islamic Emirate Of Afghanistan Regarding The Anniversary Of The 9/11 Event
As-Saḥāb Media Production releases the second edition of Dr. Ayman aẓ-Ẓawāhirī’s “Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner”
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Anṣār al-Sharī’ah in Yemen — “Eye on the Event #1”
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al-Emarah presents a video message from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: “Unity and Uprising”
Omar Hammami [Abū Manṣūr al-Amrīkī] on Usāmah Bin Lāden’s Martyrdom
Video from the Teḥrīk-ī-Ṭālibān Pākistān: “Killing of Colonel Imām” [Graphic]
at-Taḥadī al-Islāmīyyah Forum presents a video nashīd from Abū Muṣ’ab al-Gharīb
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New article from a member of the Anṣār al-Mujāhidīn English Forum: "For The Muslims In The West: 'Huge Difference Between The Common People And Those Who Have Sold Their Lives To Their Lord'"

Salaam Alaykom wa rahmatollah wa barakatuh,
in the name of Allah,most gracious,most merciful.
Praise be to Allah, Lord of Creation; Lord and Supporter of the oppressed monotheists; Breaker and Vanquisher of unjust tyrants. Peace and blessings be upon the Seal of the Prophets, and their master; Imam and exemplar of the Mujahideen; and upon his household and his companions and those guided by his guidance; revive his Sunnah until the Day of Judgment.
** Huge difference between the common people and those who have
sold their lives to their lord ** ** They took a smiling at death, while swords gazed at them frowningly ** ** They turned their chests into shields for the cause of islam ** Sheikh Osama Bin Laden (May Allah have mercy on him)
My dear brothers and sisters,
We have experienced many historical events in the last 10 years. First we witnessed the wonderful raids on the source of infidelity and corruption. The raids on Manhattan, Washington and Pennsylvania healed the chest of the Islamic Ummah. The moment the 2 airplanes hit the World trade center we felt honour and glory. Some of us were too young to understand what was happening but we were celebrating because our family members were celebrating. The false god America was attacked by the grandsons of the Companions (May Allah be pleased with them). 19 brave men attacked America and not 19 armies.
Allah says in the Glorious Quran: Remember ye implored the assistance of your Lord, and He answered you: “I will assist you with a thousand of the angels, ranks on ranks. Allah made it but a message of hope, and an assurance to your hearts: (in any case) there is no help except from Allah. and Allah is Exalted in Power, Wise. (Anfal 8: 9-10)
On October 7, 2001, the forces of infidelity and corruption invaded Afghanistan. With their huge armies in cooperation with the traitors, they killed and slaughtered thousands of Muslims. The 4 weeks of happiness turned into sadness. On the news we saw the horrific bombardments on the poor people of Afghanistan. The forces of infidelity and corruption didn’t differentiate between civilians and gunmen. Every Muslim with a beard and a turban was considered a possible threat.
Allah says in the Quran: When they are told, “Do not spread corruption on earth,” they answer, “We are but improving things!” (2:11 Baqara)
Two years After the invasion of Afghanistan, The US government in agreement with the Arab traitors invaded Iraq. The crusader army and the filthy puppet rejectionist killed and imprisoned thousands of Muslims. With all the false rumours we heard from the American government, we expected some resistance from the Iraqi army. The Army of Saddam Hussein was eliminated without any difficulties. What did we expect from an army which is built upon the deviant ideas of Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Bitar?!
Those who believe do battle for the cause of Allah and those who disbelieve do battle for the cause of idols. So fight the friends of Shaytaan. Surely, Shaytaans strategy is always weak. (Nisaa 4:76)
The crusader governments were acting like raging bulls. They thought that no Muslim would dare to fight against them. They forgot that the Islamic Ummah is a nation which gives birth to people like Salahuddin Ayyubi, Tariq ibn Ziyad, Ahmad ibn Taymiyyah and other righteous servants may Allah be pleased with them.
In the land of the two rivers we heard the name Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi R.A. What about Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi?! We heard a voice which was filled with love for the believers and hatred towards the unbelievers. We heard a voice filled with the blessing of Allah. We heard the voice of Al-Qa’qaa’ Ibn ‘Amr At-Tameemi R.A.
Abu Bakr, may Allaah be pleased with him said: “The mere voice of Al-Qa’qaa’ in the army is better than a thousand fighters
May Allah accept our beloved Sheikh Abu Mus’ab in the highest Paradise.
In the land of the Students we witnessed the true meaning of patience and steadfastness. The students and the muhajireen showed the whole world that victory comes only from Allah. Mullah Muhammad Umar Mujahid – may Allah protect him – said: “Allah has promised us victory, and Bush promised us defeat, and we will see which promise is true.”
Victory cometh only from Allah, the Mighty, the Wise (Imran 3:126)
My dear brothers and sisters,
I want to ask you a question, what are the sons of Washington, Ottowa, Brussels, Copenhagen, Paris, Berlin, Rome, Amsterdam, Warsaw and London doing in the other side of the world?
Many of you will answer “kill Muslims and spread corruption” Right?
So my next question is, what are millions of Muslims doing in the above mentioned cities?
I think you all know the answer!
This reminds me of a story during the Muslim conquest of Andalusia. The crusader forces used to send spies for special operations. One spy came back from his journey and said to the leader of the polytheists that the time has not come to recapture Spain. The leader asked him why?
The spy answered “When I arrived at the gates of the Islamic state I saw a young boy crying”
Conversation between the spy and a young Muslim boy:
SPY: Why are you crying?
YOUNG BOY: I missed 1 of 10 targets at arrow shooting.
SPY: There is no reason to cry. I can’t even hit 5 targets.
YOUNG BOY: It makes me sad if I kill 9 crusaders instead of 10 crusaders!
The spy was shocked and said to the young boy that he is in a hurry.
The crusader leader couldn’t believe what the spy was telling him and asked the other spies if this is true. The other spies confirmed to the leader that the spy is speaking the truth. After many years the crusader leader ordered his spies to travel to the Islamic state. The same spies traveled to Andalusia. When they arrived at the gates of the Islamic state they saw a crying teenager.
Conversation between the spy and a Muslim teenager:
SPY: Why are you crying? TEENAGER: My girlfriend dumped me! SPY: Don’t cry you will probably find another girlfriend TEENAGER: Crying his eyes out…. SPY: I need to go! The spy travelled back and said to his leader with a loud voice “NOW THE TIME HAS COME TO RECAPTURE SPAIN FROM THE MUSLIMS” What I’m trying to say with this example is that, we have become weak like the crying teenager. We should be like the young boy. By Allah! If we had the same motivation as the young boy we would have recaptured all Islamic countries including Spain (With the permission of Allah). My dear brothers and sisters, Allah (SWT) says in the Quran: Then fight in the cause of Allah, you are not tasked (held responsible) except for yourself, and incite the believers to fight along with you. (An-Nisa 4:84) ”Imam Ahmad recorded Sulayman bin Dawud saying that Abu Bakr bin `Ayyash said that Abu Ishaq said, “I asked Al-Bara’, `If a man attacks the lines of the idolators, would he be throwing himself to destruction’ He said, `No because Allah has sent His Messenger and commanded him,
Then fight in the cause of Allah, you are not tasked (And incite the believersto fight, by encouraging them and strengthening their resolve in this regard. For instance, the Prophet said to the believers at the battle of Badr, while organizing their lines, (Stand up and march forth to a Paradise, as wide as the heavens and Earth.)  There are many Hadiths that encourage Jihad. Al-Bukhari recorded that Abu Hurayrah said that the Messenger of Allah said, (Whoever believes in Allah and His Messenger, offers prayer, pays the Zakah and fasts the month of Ramadan, will rightfully be granted Paradise by Allah, no matter whether he migrates in Allah’s cause or remains in the land where he is born.) The people said, `O Allah’s Messenger! Shall we acquaint the people with this good news’ He said,
(Paradise has one hundred grades which Allah has reserved for the Mujahidin who fight in His cause, the distance between each two grades is like the distance between the heaven and the Earth. So, when you ask Allah, ask for Al-Firdaws, which is the best and highest part of Paradise, above it is the Throne of the Most Beneficent (Allah) and from it originate the rivers of Paradise.) The biggest wish of a Mujahid in AfghanistanIraqYemenSomalia and other fields of Jihad, is to travel to the lands of kufr and let them feel what the Muslims feel…….. WHAT ARE YOU WAITING FOR?! O Allah, grant victory to the Mujahedeen over their enemy… Don’t make them reliant on their sayings and doings, and be merciful upon them and be for them and not against them… O Allah, make them from the believers who remember You and fear You and rely on You truly, and make them, O Allah, from the repenting worshippers who fear and obey You… O Allah, make them from those who are the victors before You, those who are deserving of Your victory.. O Allah, reveal upon them your victory, O Lord of the worlds… O Allah, reveal upon them your victory and make them steadfast and shake the earth from below the feet of their enemies, O Victory granter O Helper! And Allah knows best… and peace and blessings of Allah on our Prophet Muhammad and on his family and companions altogether… Was salaam Alaykom, The poor and weak servant of Allah ANSAR ________

Articles of the Week – 5/7-5/13

Saturday May 7:
New Osama bin Laden Videos: More Questions Than Answers – J.M. Berger, IntelWire: https://bit.ly/khkO5l
The Forgotten History of the U.S. and Bin Ladin – Paul Pillar, The National Interest: https://bit.ly/k3j2In
Monday May 9:
Towards Global Jihadism: Al-Qaeda’s Strategic, Ideological and Structural Adaptations since 9/11 – Bill Braniff and Assaf Moghadam, Perspectives on Terrorism: https://bit.ly/lzW0Si
Bin Laden’s Death: Why the Arab World Shrugs – Max Rodenbeck, New York Review of Books: https://bit.ly/kn9jXf
Bin Laden Was Dead Already – Gilles Kepel, New York Times: https://nyti.ms/m19O4t
Tuesday May 10:
The coming struggle within al-Qaeda – Noman Benotman and James Brandon, Quilliam Foundation: https://bit.ly/jVkwhV
Wednesday May 11:
Al Qaeda Without Bin Laden: How Terrorists Cope With Their Leaders Death – Brynjar Lia, Foreign Affairs: https://fam.ag/khGIux
Checkbook Jihad: The raid that killed Osama bin Laden may finally shed light on the financial network behind al Qaeda – Matthew Levitt, Foreign Policy: https://bit.ly/jBZMJY
Thursday May 12:
New Special CTC Sentinel issue on the death of Bin Laden: https://bit.ly/iq0bNW
Zawahiri’s Big Challenge: Can Bin Laden’s longtime No. 2 hold al-Qaida together? – Daniel Byman, Slate: https://slate.me/lxwacK