Click here for the first part in this video series.
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Source: RocketChat
To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
The Islamic State today looks different than it did five years ago and is far more integrated now as an organization amongst its global network than al-Qaeda ever was. It has been 10 years since the Islamic State announced itself as a caliphate and more than five years since it lost its last vestige of territory in Syria. However, with the Islamic State back in the news due to an increasing external operations capacity (with attacks in Iran, Turkey, and Russia this year as well as numerous broken up plots in Europe), there is a fundamental misunderstanding of how the group operates today. In many ways, it is either incorrectly viewed through the lens of how al-Qaeda operates (a decentralized branch network), since it had previously been a part of al-Qaeda’s global network, or based on how the Islamic State operated when it was at its prior zenith when it controlled territory in Iraq and Syria. It is also likely why some within the U.S. government may have misinterpreted signals intelligence by pushing the idea that the Islamic State leader targeted in Somalia at the end of May, Abd al Qadir Mumin, became the group’s caliph. These changes in the past five years are crucial for policymakers to understand because the way the threat presents itself today will look different from how policymakers dealt with the issue last decade when much of the focus was on the Islamic State’s territorial control in Iraq and Syria.
The most important body for understanding the Islamic State today is its General Directorate of Provinces, which has previously been based in Syria, but new information suggests that at least at the highest levels of it might now have centrality in Somalia. When one understands that structure, the Islamic State’s actions globally make more sense. It is also why we see far more interaction and connection between its various wilayat (provinces) today than in the past. In many ways, the key aspects that animate the Islamic State as an organization (governance, foreign fighter mobilization, and external operations) remain, they have just moved from primarily being based out of or controlled by its location of origin in Iraq and Syria to being spread across its global provincial network. Its aims remain the same, even if the organization has adapted to a changed environment. It is also why the challenge from the Islamic State today is different from the past and why it is in some ways also more resilient now to pressure than before.
This makes the challenge of the Islamic State more difficult from a security perspective than in the past when there was the ability to primarily zero-in on its efforts in Iraq and Syria. Today, only focusing on Iraq and Syria or any other province independent of understanding its connections to other parts of the group’s global network will lead to missing crucial details due to expediency. This is why, although it is understandable that the United States has shifted a lot of its manpower and budgeting to more existential and larger problem-sets such as China and Russia, it would be a mistake to neglect the Islamic State as a continuing, but evolving security challenge. Therefore, it is still useful to continue to have and add more funded government positions across different agencies and departments to focus on tracking this threat to better get ahead of the next surprise. Otherwise, mistakes of misinterpretation will be made as in the past.
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On March 21, 2023, The Washington Institute launched the Islamic State Select Worldwide Activity Map as a way to better track and understand the global jihadist organization’s status. The ongoing project includes data on IS propaganda, claims of responsibility, financial sanctions, arrests, and other factors, providing a more holistic view of the group than attack data alone.
A year later, the data collectively paints a sobering picture. Although the core IS “provinces” in Iraq and Syria remain degraded, the group has been able to diversify at the periphery, with the Khorasan province in Afghanistan (aka IS-K) spearheading external operations while various other provinces establish territorial control in Africa. IS supporters continue to plot major terrorist attacks as well, especially in Turkey, though most of these have been thwarted by law enforcement (with the notable exception of the January 2024 bombings in Kerman, Iran). Given these evolving threats, it is worthwhile to explore the findings of the IS Activity Map project in greater detail, since they can provide a clearer picture of where the organization stands today amid growing calls to dissolve the global coalition tasked with fighting IS.
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Nearly five years after losing territorial control in its core areas of Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State is once again racking up territorial gains around Africa. In Mali, IS forces seized portions of the rural eastern Menaka region and the Ansongo district in southern Gao last year, while foreign fighters reportedly became more interested in traveling to Wilayat Sahel, the group’s self-styled “Sahel Province.” Elsewhere, IS “provinces” in Somalia and Mozambique have taken over various towns in the Puntland and Cabo Delgado regions over the past two months, further destabilizing the area and in some cases jeopardizing important natural gas projects.
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Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for giving me the opportunity to testify today on terrorism threats emanating from parts of the African continent, in particular focusing on issues and recommendations related to the Sahel region, especially in Mali where insecurity is getting worse by the day. There are two main jihadist groups now operating there: the Islamic State’s Sahel Province and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).
This increased insecurity can be directly linked to the August 2022 withdrawal of French forces operating under the Operation Barkhane counterinsurgency mission. At the time of the French departure, the Mali insurgency had not been deterred or defeated, but it has undoubtedly worsened since. This suggests France at the very least was managing the situation in hopes that a future easing of the political tempest would facilitate a more sustainable resolution. The French withdrew at the request of the government of interim Malian president Assimi Goita, who seized power after a May 2021 coup and expressed his preference for the Russian-sponsored Wagner Group as a counterterrorism partner.
The latter point highlights the fact that Washington and its allies cannot bifurcate counterterrorism and great power competition. A position that casts counterterrorism and great power competition as an either/or challenge will only undermine the challenge of both. While this discussion is focused on Mali and the Sahel more generally, this dynamic first occurred in Syria since the 2011 uprising and is also playing out in Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal in mid-August 2021.
Click here to read the written testimony it in full.
In April, Islamic State fighters in Mali seized villages surrounding the city of Menaka, marking the group’s first territorial conquest since losing its final Syrian foothold in 2019. The human cost of these advances has been steep. By May, at least 150,000 individuals had reportedly been displaced, and civilians have been subjected to targeted killings, kidnappings, and looting. The offensive occurred amid a string of regional of security setbacks: namely, France’s August 2022 military withdrawal (which followed the Malian junta’s expressed preference for Russia’s Wagner Group), the April 2023 dissolution of the UN mission in Mali, and the junta’s decision earlier this month to form a tripartite alliance with Burkina Faso and Niger, thereby undermining the French-led G5 Sahel framework designed to thwart jihadist actors in the region.
In this amply illustrated Policy Note, Aaron Zelin and Sarah Cahn explain that while the United States may have limited room for maneuver in Mali today, it can promote regional stability and U.S. national interests by pursuing further sanctions against local Islamic State officials and exploring constructive arrangements with nearby African states.
Click here to read the paper in full.
There are two main reasons for this: 1. pledges are leader-specific rather than group-specific and thus need to be renewed with each succession and 2. it is a way to legitimize al-Qurashi’s rule and create a media event so that the group can promote itself as it transitions to a new phase.
The first reason is also something that IS pointed to when it began to overtly feud with al-Qaeda (AQ) in 2013, by saying that following Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s death, his successor Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir gave baya to the newly created Islamic State of Iraq’s leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and even after Abu ‘Umar was killed, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over in 2010 and then Usamah Bin Laden was killed in 2011, Abu Bakr never publicly gave baya to Ayman al-Zawahiri, even if al-Zawahiri claims he gave it to him privately. Therefore, from the perspective of IS this whole process is not trivial, but important for legitimacy of its leadership and to potentially weed out any insubordination before it manifests into something larger as it already did in the past vis-a-vis AQ.
This post will be updated with the latest official pledges.
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August 5, 2023:
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Krenoa Region
August 6, 2023:
Wilāyat al-Ṣūmāl
Wilāyat al-Yaman
August 7, 2023:
Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Tri-Border Area
Wilāyat Bākistān
August 8, 2023:
Wilāyat Wasaṭ Ifrīqīyah
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – al-Buhayrah Region
Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Anderamboukane
August 9, 2023:
Wilāyat Khurāsān
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Sambisa Region
Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Azawagh
August 10, 2023:
Wilāyat al-Shām
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – al-Faruq Region and Banki Region
August 11, 2023:
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq
August 12, 2023:
Wilāyat Sharq Asīā
August 14, 2023:
Wilāyat Mūzambīq
Wilāyat Bākistān
Wilāyat Sāḥil – Burkina Faso
August 16, 2023:
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq
Wilāyat al-Shām
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Source: RocketChat
To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]The title of this release is in reference to Qur’anic verse 22:40. Here it is in full: “[They are] those who have been evicted from their homes without right – only because they say, ‘Our Lord is God.’ And were it not that God checks the people, some by means of others, there would have been demolished monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques in which the name of God is much mentioned. And God will surely support those who support Him. Indeed, God is Powerful and Exalted in Might.”
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_____________
Source: RocketChat
To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
There are two main reasons for this: 1. pledges are leader-specific rather than group-specific and thus need to be renewed with each succession and 2. it is a way to legitimize al-Qurashi’s rule and create a media event so that the group can promote itself as it transitions to a new phase.
The first reason is also something that IS pointed to when it began to overtly feud with al-Qaeda (AQ) in 2013, by saying that following Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s death, his successor Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir gave baya to the newly created Islamic State of Iraq’s leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and even after Abu ‘Umar was killed, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over in 2010 and then Usamah Bin Laden was killed in 2011, Abu Bakr never publicly gave baya to Ayman al-Zawahiri, even if al-Zawahiri claims he gave it to him privately. Therefore, from the perspective of IS this whole process is not trivial, but important for legitimacy of its leadership and to potentially weed out any insubordination before it manifests into something larger as it already did in the past vis-a-vis AQ.
This post will be updated with the latest official pledges.
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December 1, 2022:
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Sambisa Region
Wilāyat Khurāsān
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – al-Buhayrah Region
December 2:
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – al-Faruq Region
Wilāyat al-Shām
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Banki Region
December 3:
Wilāyat al-Yaman
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Krenoa Region
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq
Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Azawagh, Tri-Border, and Burkina Faso Regions
December 4:
Wilāyat al-Ṣūmāl
Wilāyat Wasaṭ Ifrīqīyah
Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Anderamboukane Village
December 5:
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Central Nigeria
Wilāyat al-Shām
Wilāyat Bākistān
Wilāyat Mūzambīq
Wilāyat Wasaṭ Ifrīqīyah – Beni Region
December 7, 2022:
Tūnis
Wilāyat al-Hind – Kashmir
Wilāyat Mūzambīq – Nangade Region
December 8, 2022:
Lubnān
December 14, 2022:
Wilāyat Saynā’
December 17, 2022:
Wilāyat Sharq Asīā
December 19:
Wilāyat Lībīyā
