Tunisia – Page 15

Minbar at-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād presents three new Fatāwā from Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī

Posted on February 27, 2013May 1, 2019 by Aaron Y. Zelin

Click the following links for safe PDF copies:
Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī — Is It First Jihād in Syria or Da’wah in the Land of Tunisia?
Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī — Are We Allowed To Kill Any Christian In Our Town Because One Of Them Killed A Muslim?
Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī — Our Amīr Commanded Us In the Field of Jihād To Leave Crosses In Churches .. Should We Obey Him?
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To inquire about a translation for these fatāwā for a fee email: [email protected]

Check out my new Foreign Policy piece co-authored with Daveed Gartenstein-Ross: "Uncharitable Organizations"

Posted on February 26, 2013 by Aaron Y. Zelin

In 1997, employees of the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHIF), a Saudi-based charity, were mulling how best to strike a blow against the United States in East Africa. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, one employee indicated that the plan they hatched “would be a suicide bombing carried out by crashing a vehicle into the gate at the Embassy.” A wealthy foundation official from outside the region agreed to fund the operation.
The employees’ plans would go through several iterations, but AHIF would eventually play a role in the ultimate attack. In 1998, simultaneous explosions ripped through the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya — attacks eventually traced back to al Qaeda operatives. Prior to the bombings, a former director of AHIF’s Tanzanian branch made preparations for the advance party that planned the bombings, and the Comoros Islands branch of the charity was used, according to the Treasury Department, “as a staging area and exfiltration route for the perpetrators.” The ultimate result was deadly: 224 people killed and more than 4,000 wounded.
This was, of course, before the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent crackdown on wealthy Islamist charity organizations such as AHIF, which provided a large portion of the funding that made international terrorism possible. As a monograph produced for the 9/11 Commission noted, prior to 9/11, “al Qaeda was funded, to the tune of approximately $30 million per year, by diversions of money from Islamic charities and the use of well-placed financial facilitators who gathered money from both witting and unwitting donors.”
But despite all the efforts made to shut down such groups, Islamist-leaning international charities and other NGOs are now reemerging as sponsors of jihadi activity. In countries like Tunisia and Syria, they are providing the infusion of funds that have allowed extremist groups to undertake the hard work of providing food, social services, and medical care. Jihadists, meanwhile, have discovered that they can bolster their standing within local communities, thereby increasing support for their violent activities. And governments are struggling to keep up.
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Minbar at-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād presents a new Fatwā Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī: "What is the Ruling on Burning Shrines of Righteous People in Tunisia?"

Posted on February 21, 2013 by Aaron Y. Zelin

Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī — %22What is the Ruling on Burning Shrines of Righteous People in Tunisia?%22
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To inquire about a translation for this fatwā for a fee email: [email protected]

Check out my new al-Wasat post: "The Night’s Watch: Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia’s ‘Neighborhood Committees’"

Posted on February 11, 2013 by Aaron Y. Zelin

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Following the untimely assassination of Chokri Belaïd (Shukri Bilayd), a Tunisian lawyer, opposition leader with the left-secular Democratic Patriots’ Movement and one of the leader’s of the Popular Front to which his party had adhered when the coalition was formed, there was a sense that security within Tunisia could break down. Although it appears, for now, that the situation has calmed down and many are returning to their normal everyday activities, on February 7th, Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia (AST) for the first time activated its ‘Neighborhood Committees.’ The mobilization of these committees within a mere few hours illustrated the strength of AST’s organizing structures as well as its memberships obedience to orders coming from the top.
The ‘Neighborhood Committees,’ which were originally called ‘Security Committees,’ were announced and set up on October 6, 2012 as a preemptive precautionary measure in case there was a security vacuum within the country. In other words, aspirationally, the establishment of a de facto non-state controlled martial law force if need be (more on if they were successful in their first mobilization below). The original intent of these committees was to safeguard and protect individuals in case the country spiraled out of control on October 23, 2012, which was the one year anniversary of the Constituent Assembly Election. No security issue or vacuum developed and the date passed without the activation of AST’s committees.
This changed last week, though, in light of the assassination, as well as the tense environment on the streets of Tunisia. Some individuals attempted to take advantage of this and began to loot, but many have since been arrested for these crimes. As a consequence of the perceived lack of security, AST called on its followers to mobilize their ‘Neighborhood Committees,’ stating the goal was to protect individuals, their money and property, and ward off thieves and looters. AST also urged followers to remain vigilant and cautious in light of potential gangs and criminality. Within a few hours, AST was able to mobilize members in Sfax and Hammamet for the night of the 7th. The mobilization was even swifter on the 8th whereby committees in addition to the former two came to the streets in al-Zahra’, al-Wardiyyah, al-Qayrawan, Sousse, al-Qalibiyyah, Mahdia, Ariana, Sidi Bouzid, al-Tadhamin Neighborhood, Beni Khayr, Southern Suburbs (Tunis), al-Kef, Diwar Hishur, al-Dandan, al-Nur Neighborhood, Jendouba, the Western Suburbs (Tunis), Matar, the Braka Coast, al-Khadra’ Neighborhood, and Qarbah (excuse the literal transliterations from Arabic in some cases, I’m fully aware they are spelled differently in the French rendering). AST conducted some of their patrols with the League for the Protection of the Revolution (LPR), believed to be a hardline faction associated with Ennahda.
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Mirkaz al-Maqrīzī al-Dirāsāt al-Tārīhkīyyah presents a new article from Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī: "The Crimes of an-Nahḍah in Tunisia … Till When?"

Posted on January 3, 2013 by Aaron Y. Zelin

Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī — “The Crimes of an-Nahḍah in Tunisia … Till When?”
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To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: [email protected]

al-Ḍarāghim Media Foundation presents a new audio message from Abū Faḍl 'Umar al-Ḥadūshī: "The Roar of Thunder in Defending Bakhtī and Bashīr"

Posted on November 18, 2012 by Aaron Y. Zelin

UPDATE 11/21/12 10:46 PM: Here is an Arabic transcription of the below audio message:

Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Abū Faḍl ‘Umar al-Ḥadūshī — “The Roar of Thunder in Defending Bakhtī and Bashīr” (Ar)

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Abū Faḍl ‘Umar al-Ḥadūshī — “The Roar of Thunder in Defending Bakhtī and Bashīr”

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To inquire about a translation for this audio message for a fee email: [email protected]

New statement from Hānī al-Sibā’ī: "Death of the Tunisian Detainee Who Was On a Hunger Strike"

Posted on November 15, 2012 by Aaron Y. Zelin

Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Hānī al-Sibā’ī — “Death of the Tunisian Detainee Who Was On a Hunger Strike”
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To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]

Check out my new article for Foreign Policy's Middle East Channel: "Maqdisi’s disciples in Libya and Tunisia"

Posted on November 14, 2012 by Aaron Y. Zelin

Ever since the attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi and U.S. Embassy in Tunis in September, there has been a large spotlight on the Islamist groups viewed as the main culprits — Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi (ASB) and Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST). While much of the understandable focus has been on the violent actions of individuals in these organizations, much of the scope of their activities lies outside violence. A large-portion of the activities of these groups is local social service provision under their particular dawa (missionary) offices. This broader picture is crucial to better understanding emerging trends in societies transitioning from authoritarian to democratic rule.
ASB and AST can broadly be considered jihadi organizations based on their ideological outlook. However, these jihadis are different than past incarnations. Jihadis have a good track record in fighting and less so in governing or providing social services. The only example of jihadi governance has occurred when the Somali-based Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin and Yemeni-based al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) held actual territory. What sets ASB and AST apart is that they are providing aid to local communities in a non-state actor capacity, which has been unheard of previously.
While many analysts view jihadism only through the prism of al Qaeda, it misses the influence of independent jihadi religious scholars. Since the excesses of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and al Qaeda in Iraq last decade, Minbar al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (the Pulpit of Monotheism and Jihad), a library of jihadi primary source material founded by Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi who is currently imprisoned in Jordan, has attempted to steer the jihadi community to a more “pure” jihad. To do this, Maqdisi established a sharia committee of like-minded scholars in 2009 for Minbar that provide fatwas answering questions along a range of topics from the mundane to political to jihad. This has been well documented by Dutch scholar Joas Wagemakers.
One of the main critiques Maqdisi presents, and hopes to create a course correction within the jihadi movement, is his differentiation between the idea of qital al-nikayya (fighting to hurt or damage the enemy) and qital al-tamkin (fighting to consolidate ones power), which he expounds upon in his book Waqafat ma’ Thamrat al-Jihad (Stances on the Fruit of Jihad) in 2004. Maqdisi argues the former provides only short-term tactical victories that in many cases do not amount to much in the long-term whereas the latter provides a framework for consolidating an Islamic state. In this way, Maqdisi highlights the importance of planning, organization, education, as well as dawa(calling individuals to Islam) activities. As Wagemakers has noted, the creation of the Minbar sharia committee was to forward these views to “protect” the jihad and to better advance the pursuit of a true Islamic state based on the sanctity of the tawhid (monotheism) of God.
The formation of Ansar al-Sharia groups in Benghazi and Tunisia are likely a logical conclusion and implementation of Maqdisi’s ideas, changing emphasis on the groups’ actions. One of the main avenues for advancing ASB’s and AST’s ideas has been through their social services programs. This provides an outlet for advancing the consolidation of a future Islamic state that cultivates followers in a broader fashion than the more vanguard-oriented organizations that have been involved in jihadism in a local, regional, or global capacity over the past 30 years.
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