UPDATE 6/17/13 4:58 PM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic statement:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzām Brigades — “On the Aggression of the Party of Iran” (En)
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzām Brigades — “On the Aggression of the Party of Iran”
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NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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Iran’s Losses In the “35th Province” (Syria), Part 1
By Phillip Smyth
Click here for a PDF version of this post
“Syria is…[Iran’s] 35th province and a strategic province for us. If the enemy attacks us and wants to take either Syria or Khuzestan, the priority for us is to keep Syria…If we keep Syria, we can get Khuzestan back too, but if we lose Syria, we cannot keep Tehran.” –Mehdi Taeb, a high-level Iranian cleric speaking to to Iran’s Basij (paramilitary group attached to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps), February, 2013.[1]
Iran’s (Iraqi and Lebanese) Shia proxies are not the only groups losing members due to their involvement in combat in Syria. Iran is actively contributing infantry personnel to bolster regime of Bashar al-Assad. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force (IRGC-QF); Iran’s long-arm used to create, command, bolster Tehran’s proxies, and execute attacks overseas, has been rather active in Syria.[2] Their movements have not simply been limited to acting as behind-the-scenes guides for proxy or Assad’s forces. In fact, the IRGC-QF has engaged in combat and taken a number of casualties and their losses are becoming increasingly more public.
Back in August, 2012, 48 Iranian “Pilgrims” were kidnapped by Syrian rebels, when they were heading to the Saydah Zaynab Shrine.[3] Rebel forces accused these men of all being IRGC fighters.[4] It was later reported by the Iranians that the group included “Retired” IRGC members.[5] Rebels have also accused the IRGC of acting as commanders for Lebanese Hizballah’s May, 2013 offensive in Qusayr.[6]
Following Lebanese Hizballah’s official May recognition of their full-involvement in Syria, it would appear that Iran is not only becoming more open about their involvement, but also utilizing many of the same narrative points first honed by its regional Shia proxies.
February, 2013, witnessed the loss and public funeral of a senior IRGC-QF commander in Syria. It was claimed by Tehran he was simply working on “Reconstruction projects” in war torn Aleppo. Even with such a high-profile death, little additional information was offered by Iran regarding their activities in Syria.
However, In June, three IRGC members were claimed by Iranian sources to have been killed while operating around Damascus’s Saydah Zaynab Shrine. Proclaiming IRGC members have been killed defending the shrine recycles the exact narrative Lebanese Hizballah and other Iraqi Shia groups have been utilizing for many months. This line also demonstrates that Tehran has become more comfortable with using sectarian-based messaging to convey why it is willing to lose men in the Syrian war.
Based on the released data regarding killed IRGC-QF members, it is likely that Summer-Fall 2013 may witness several more announcements and public funerals.
As opposed to previous Hizballah Cavalcade posts, this post did not rely on the monitoring of social media, forums, or other sources. Instead, announcements of death and photographs were taken from official and officially approved Iranian sources.
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Name: General Hassan Shateri (A.K.A. Hossam Khoshnevis)
Death Announced: February 13, 2013. It was claimed by Iranian media that Shateri was killed in Syria on February 12, 2013. His funeral was held on February 15, 2013.
Notes: Shateri was a high-level IRGC-QF leader and the highest ranking Iranian killed in Syria. His work with Lebanese Hizballah (and possibly other Iranian-backed organizations in Iraq) was of great importance to the Iranians.[7] This connection was displayed openly at his funeral with funeral-goers waving Lebanese Hizballah flags and placing a Lebanese Hizballah flag on his casket.
Iran’s English-language PressTV reported that Shateri was killed, “by unknown gunmen as he was traveling by road from Syria to Lebanon.” Iran also blamed “Suspected Israeli agents” for Shateri’s death.[8]
Mashregh News posted a number of photos showing Shateri going about his duties in Lebanon (one is reposted here).[9] In Iranian media, the narrative used to explain Shateri’s tasks in Lebanon and Syria was that he was an overseer for the reconstruction of south Lebanon (from damage suffered during the 2006 Hizballah-Israel War). Additionally, Iranian-government-backed Fars News Agency described Shateri’s presence in Syria as the result of, “Reconstruction and development projects” he was working on in Aleppo.[10]
Name: Lt. Colonel Amir Reza Alizadeh
Death Announced: May 4, 2013 (It was announced Alizadeh was killed in Syria on May 1, 2013).
Notes: Iranian reports claimed Alizadeh was killed by an explosion which occurred outside of the Iranian embassy in Damascus. The bombing, according to Iranian state media, was orchestrated by, “Wahhabi terrorists”.[11] Alizadeh’s funeral was held in Rudsar, Iran.[12]
Name: Mehdi Khorasani
Death Announced: June 10, 2013
Notes: Since Shanaei and Khorasani had a shared funeral service, photos for both are located after the entry for Shanaei. Iran’s Damghan News published a full album of funeral photographs. However, the link did not work two days after the photos were posted. Shanaei and Khorashani were pictured together holding AK-47 type rifles in front of the Saydah Zaynab Shrine. Their funeral was the first group funeral (for two or more killed) held in Iran for personnel killed in Syria.
Name: Ali Asqar Shanaei
Death Announced: June 10, 2013
Notes: Shanaei and Khorashani were pictured together holding AK-47 type rifles in front of the Saydah Zaynab Shrine. Their funeral was the first group funeral (for two or more killed) held in Iran for personnel killed in Syria.
Name: Muhammed Husayn Atareh
Death Announced: June 10, 2013
Notes: Atareh’s casket included numerous IRGC symbols. It was also claimed that Atareh was killed in fighting around the Saydah Zaynab Shrine.
Name: Amir Kazem Zaydeh
Death Announced: June 9, 2013
Notes: Iran’s Mashregh News claimed Zaydeh was killed by a bomb during “Clashes with terrorists”.[13]
[1] See: https://iranpulse.al-monitor.com/index.php/2013/02/1346/head-of-ammar-strategic-base-syria-is-irans-35th-province-if-we-lose-syria-we-cannot-keep-tehran/
[2] See: https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr854/text
[3] See: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/9451858/Syria-48-Iranian-pilgrims-kidnapped-from-bus-travelling-to-Damascus-airport.html
[4] See: https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Tehran-warns-Syrian-rebels-to-free-captive-Iranians
[5] See: https://www.voanews.com/content/retired-iranian-revolutionay-guards-among-those-kidnapped-in-syria/1475622.html
[6] See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C03FDXqkOkI. Reportedly, this is an intercepted radio transmission.
[7] See: https://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9107144510
[8] See: https://www.presstv.com/detail/2013/02/14/288857/irgc-commander-assassinated-in-lebanon/
[9] See: https://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/193817/%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D9%88%DB%8C%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%AE%D8%AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B5%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B3%D8%B1%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B3%D9%86-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%B1%DB%8C
[10] See: https://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&Id=391473
[11] See: https://www.ido.ir/n.aspx?n=13920222001.
[12] See: https://www.mehrnews.com/detail/News/2046534.
[13] See: https://www.mashreghnews.ir/fa/news/222075/%D9%BE%D9%8A%DA%A9%D8%B1-%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%DA%A9%D8%A7%D8%B8%D9%85%E2%80%8C%D8%B2%D8%A7%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%A8%D9%87-%D8%AE%D8%A7%DA%A9-%D8%B3%D9%BE%D8%B1%D8%AF%D9%87-%D8%B4%D8%AF-%D8%B9%DA%A9%D8%B3
The Islamic Emirate confirms reports published by Fars news agency regarding visit by a delegation of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
A delegation headed by the chief of political office of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan went on a three day visit to the capital of Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran, a while ago where issues of mutual interests were discussed by both sides after which the delegation returned.
Similarly, high ranking officials of Islamic Emirate also made another visit in the recent past to the Islamic Republic of Iran after a formal invitation by the said country where the delegation of Islamic Emirate participated in an international Islamic conference which was convened in the capital Tehran.
The delegation delivered a speech in which it furnished all the participants with general information about the legitimate demands of Islamic Emirate and made clear its policy concerning key Afghan and international issues.
In this visit, which took place due to a formal invitation by the government of Iran, the delegation of Islamic Emirate made heard the voices and demands of its people and Mujahideen to the emissaries of various countries, gave information about the current ongoing situation and also held positive talks with high ranking officials of Islamic Republic of Iran about multiple issues especially about the subject of Afghan refugees who are living inside Iran. They asked the Iranian government to give special consideration to solving the problems faced by these refugees and to prevent sour incidents from occurring.
The Islamic Emirate has also previously made heard its policy to the world by participating in conferences in Japan and France, the outcomes of which have been positive.
We should mention that the Islamic Emirate has always strived to keep relations with the neighboring countries and countries of the world based upon mutual respect and it shall continue doing so.
Spokesman of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
Qari Muhammad Yousuf Ahmadi
24/07/1434
13/03/1392 03/06/2013
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NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here. Click here for part one of ‘Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria’.
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By Phillip Smyth
Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 2
The latest installment of Iraqi Shia killed in Syria demonstrates a more publicly acknowledged level of Iranian involvement. Two bodies of Iraqi Shia fighters killed in Syria were returned to Iraq through the Iran-Iraq border. Family members of one of the dead Iraqis told the Associated Press that he had gone to Iran before heading to Syria.[1]
The make-up of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s (LAFA) — a Syrian-based Shia militant group—membership was also exposed. Demonstrating a slight departure from earlier martyrdom announcements, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) more broadly acknowledged that their fighters in Syria operate exclusively under LAFA’s moniker. Earlier announcements listed only one of AAH fighters as serving with LAFA.
Three of the Iraqis killed were reportedly not claimed as members by any Iraqi Shia parties (including pro-Iranian Iraq-based groups). This partially fits with LAFA’s narrative that they are staffed by volunteer fighters from throughout the Shia Islamic world. However, with the recent revelations, it becomes clearer that LAFA fighters are most likely vetted and trained by Iran before heading off to fight in Syria.
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Name: Ala’a Muhsen Shahib al-Tamimi
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 15, 2013. His death was first announced on Facebook.
Name: Ali Abdul al-Wahid ‘Awlan
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 15, 2013. His death was first announced on Facebook on May 16, 2013.
Notes: Iran’s Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is pictured on the right and Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr is pictured on the left.
Name: Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki (A.K.A. Mohammed Aboud)
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 17, 2013. Funeral held on May 17, 2013.
Notes: According to Elaph.com, Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki was a 27 year old Iraqi from Basra. Elaph also said he was not claimed by any Iraqi organization as a member. It was also reported by the Associated Press that Aboud went to Iran before heading to fight in Syria. Maliki’s body and that of fellow fighter Hassan Ali Farhud were also transferred back to Iraq via Iran. Since it was announced he was killed fighting around Damascus’s Zaynab Shrine, it is possible he was fighting as a member of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. One released photo of Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki, which was posted on pro-Lebanese Hizballah and pro-Liwa’a Abu Fadl al Abbas Facebook pages, also claimed he belonged to Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas.
The released photo may also point to al-Maliki’s training influences. Holding the magazine of the rifle is a common fire-control technique used by Hizballah and is featured in a number of their propaganda videos.
Name: Hassan Ali Farhud
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas* (?)
Death Announced: May 17, 2013. Funeral held on May 17, 2013.
Notes: According to Al-Sumaria News, Farhud was a 32 year old from Basra, Iraq. His body, along with Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki (see above) were returned to Iraq via Iran. It is unknown whether he engaged in training in Iran or which group he served with. Since it was reported he was killed fighting around the Zaynab Shrine in Damascus, it can be assumed he was part of Liw’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. At the time this was written, no photos of Farhud were released.
Name: Diya Mutasher al-Issawi
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 5, 2013. Funeral held on May 6, 2013.
Notes: The Iraq-based Buratha News Agency reported the 30 year old was originally from Iraq’s Basra province. Issawi was not claimed by any Iraqi party as a member. Also, it is unknown whether Issawi was trained in Iran or elsewhere.
[1] “Bombings at Sunni mosque and funeral kill 47 in Iraq”, Associated Press, May 17, 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqis-in-southern-city-mourn-2-shiite-fighters-killed-in-syria/2013/05/17/a53d1988-bece-11e2-b537-ab47f0325f7c_story.html.
وردني سؤال عن جدوى تنفيذ عمليات عسكرية داخل الأراضي الإيرانية وفيما يلي جواب مختصر عن ذلك
نقل المعركة لأرض العدو مطلب مهم في أي حرب حتى تتوازن كفة الرعب ويذوق الذي تذوقه ولكن يختلف تأثير ذلك من بلد لآخر فالدول الغربية تتأثر كثيرا بالعمليات الداخلية اقتصاديا وأمنيا وسياسيا وبكل النواحي وحادثة محاولة تفجيرالطائرة في “ديترويت” في أمريكا خير دليل على ذلك فمع ان العملية لم تنجح إلا انها تسببت في انفاق 40 مليار دولار على تشديد اجراءات السلامة في المطارات !
أما الدول الشرقية فهي غالبا لا تتأثر بالعمليات الداخلية لأن الأنظمة الشمولية والمافيوية كالصين وروسيا لا تقييم وزنا كبيرا للعامل البشري على عكس الدول الغربية التي قد تسقط حكوماتها بسبب التهاون في سلامة مواطنيها ! ولعل حادثة مسرح موسكو وميدان “تيانامن” ففي الأولى فتح الروس الغازات السامة داخل المسرح لانهاء عملية احتجاز الرهائن التي أخذت بعدا اعلاميا عالميا وأعادت تسليط الضوء على الحرب في الشيشان وتداعياتها التي جعلت مجموعة القائد عربي باراييف تقوم بمثل هذه المهمة فقامت القوات الخاصة الروسية بفتح الغاز وتسببت بموت 200 رهينة روسي لتنهي المسألة بدون أن تتأثر بموتهم لطبيعة النظام الذي لا يقيم وزنا لهم أساسا وكذلك الحال في المظاهرات الطلابية في ميدان تيانامن في الصين والتي قام الجيش بادخال الدبابات لسحق جثت الطلبة المعتصمين دون أي رحمة ! فمثل هذه التعديات لا يمكن أن تحدث إلا في مثل هذه الأنظمة الشرقية أما الأهداف الذي تتأثر بضربها كثيرا هذه الأنظمة فهي الأهداف الإقتصادية وخير مثال على ذلك ما حدث في الغزو السوفيتي لأفغانستان فعندما كان يقتل الآلاف من الجنود الروس لم تبدي موسكو تأثرا ولكن عندما طالت الحرب واستنزف الاقتصاد وبدأت المتاعب لم تمضي سنوات إلا وتفكك الإتحاد السوفيتي كسبب غير مباشر للإنفاق على حرب أفغانستان !
وإيران تصنف من القسم الثاني الذي لا يقيم وزنا كبيرا للعنصر البشري بالمقارنة مع الاقتصاد وما حدث في الحرب العراقية الإيرانية في الثمانينات يؤكد ذلك فقد قاد خوميني الحرب باسلوب الأمواج البشرية كي يقتحم التحصينات العراقية فكان الهجوم يبدأ ب 20 ألف مقاتل على شكل سلاسل وأمواج متلاحقة ليربك الجيش العراقي ومع أنه اسلوب بدائي إلا أنه حقق بعض النتائج ويكفي تخيل هذه المعارك لندرك مدى رخص مواطني إيران عند ملاليهم
ولذا اعتقد ان دعم الجهاد في سوريا سيكون له بالغ الأثر على إيران أكثر من أي عمليات داخل الأراضي الإيرانية – إلا ان استهدفت هذه العمليات أهداف اقتصادية – لأن سوريا الآن هي مسرح استنزاف اقتصادي مستمر لإيران فهي من تنفق على الحرب وعلى بقاء النظام وإن كانت تغطي ذلك من حليفها المالكي بالعراق إلا أنها خسارة لها في النهاية فهذه المليارات التي تنفقها إيران من خزينة النفط العراقي على الحرب في سوريا وعلى كسب ولاء مصر واغراء الأردن كان من الممكن ان تصب في خزينتها أو أن تقاوم بها العقوبات الاقتصادية المفروضة عليها بدرجة أكبر ! ولذا يمكن ان نقول أن قتالنا ضد إيران في سوريا هو كقتالنا ضد السوفيت في أفغانستان فكما أن الجهاد الأفغاني قد تسبب في تفكك الإتحاد السوفيتي فإن الجهاد الشامي سيؤدي بإذن الله إلى تفكك الهلال الشيعي وانكماشه ومن ثم تفكك إيران نفسها باستقلال البلوش والأحواز والأذريين كما حدث في انهيار المعسكر الشيوعي بعد حرب أفغانستان وتحرر أوربا الشرقية ومن ثم تفكك الإتحاد السوفيتي وانكماشه في روسيا الإتحادية والله أعلم
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To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: [email protected]
NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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By Phillip Smyth
Reports of Iraqi Shia involvement in the Syrian Civil War surged from January-May, 2013.[1] In March, the first photos and bios of Iraqi Shia killed during the fighting were released. Many of these announcements, photos of those killed, and other information received much broader coverage after it was spread on forums and Facebook pages. Thus far, the only two Iraqi groups to have announced they have lost members have been Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous) and Kata’ib Hizballah (Hizballah Brigades).
It should be mentioned that Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq has not announced on its official webpage that it has had any “Martyrs” in recent months. Nevertheless, the group has set-up funeral processions for its dead in major Iraqi cities. In sharp contrast to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s lacking web announcements; Kata’ib Hizballah updates its webpage regularly and in a more detailed fashion, regarding the fate of its members who have been killed and their funerals. Both Kata’ib Hizballah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, like their Lebanese counterpart, Hizballah, do not mention where these fighters were killed. Regardless, on most forums and Facebook pages, those who post comments are generally aware that the two groups are actively involved in fighting in Syria.
Name: Sa’ad Abed al-Qadr Abu Shamia’
Affiliated With: Kata’ib Hizballah
Death Announced: March 17, 2013
Name: Ahmed Mahdi al-Shuweili (A.K.A. Qassim Abu Mahdi)
Affiliated With: Kata’ib Hizballah
Death Announced: March 15, 2013
Name: Arfad Muhsein Al-Hamidawi (A.K.A. Abu Karar)
Affiliated With: Kata’ib Hizballah
Death Announced: April 2, 2013
Name: Karar Abed al-Amir Fatlawi Abu Assad (A.K.A. Karar Fatlawi and Karar Abed al-Amir Aziz Abu Assad)
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: Early April, 2013.
Facebook Page: https://ar-ar.facebook.com/pages/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF/472898662780073
Note: Karar has one of the best developed narratives of any of the Iraqis killed. His story comes complete with numerous photos, a Facebook page, and supposed videos of him engaged in fighting. It is also important to note that he is the only one to have significant acceptance from supporters that he was a part of both Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and the Syria-based (members mainly come from Iraq and Lebanon) Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas.
[1] One example: Mariam Karouny, “Shi’ite fighters rally to defend Damascus shrine”, Reuters, March 3, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/03/us-syria-crisis-shiites-idUSBRE92202X20130303.
[2] Elizabeth O’Bagy and Stephen Wicken , “Fact Sheet: Ali Musa Daqduq”, Institute For the Study of War, May 14, 2012, https://www.understandingwar.org/reference/fact-sheet-ali-mussa-daqduq. See also: Thomas Strouse, “Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Intricate Web of Iranian Military Involvement in Iraq”, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 9, March 4, 2010, https://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36109.
[3] [Absolute] Wilayat al-Faqih (also known by in Persian as “Velayat-e-Faqih) is an ideological concept first drawn up by Iran’s late Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini posited that only learned clerics could rule over society and make political decisions. This was an extremely radical departure from the more traditional schools of Shi’ism. As a result, those currently following this ideology are religiously bound to follow the rulings of the Wali al-Faqih, who is currently Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. See also: Sam Wyer, The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Institute for the Study of War, Middle East Security Report 7,December, 2012, https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ResurgenceofAAH.pdf.
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Ḥāmid Bin ‘Abdullah al ‘Alī — “On the Aḥwāzī Issue on the Occasion of a Conference in Support for the Occupied Spaces Held in Cairo on January 10, 2013”
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To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū Basīr al-Ṭarṭūsī — “The Rawāfiḍ Shīʿah- An Apostate Idolatrous Sect”
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To inquire about a translation for this book for a fee email: [email protected]
