Category: Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia

السلام عليكم ورحمة الله.

هذه الكلمة لإخواني في أنصار الشريعة في تونس، أكتبها على وجل لأني قصرت في متابعة أحداث تونس ومناصرة إخواني فيها، منشغلا عن ذلك بشأن الشام.
وإني لأعلم أن لي بتونس إخوة لا تنقصهم البصيرة والحكمة والدراية بالواقع ما يغني عن إسهام مثلي، لكنه سهم نسهم به ومناصرة نسأل الله أن يبارك فيها.
أحبتي، يا من تهمون بالمشاركة في الملتقى رغم تهديد وتوعد الجهات الرسمية…إنا لنعلم أن خصومكم بلغوا الدرك الأسفل في خيانة الله والأمانة، والمتاجرة بدمائكم إرضاء لأسيادهم في النظام الدولي، والرفض الوقح للشريعة والنفور والتنفير عنها ومحاولة إخضاع البلاد والعباد لدين الديمقراطية التي تتسع للجميع إلا لدعاة الخير والصلاح من أبناء البلد…بما لا يدع مجالا لتأول لهم ولا لرجاء الخير منهم.
ونعلم أنكم صبرتم على ذلك صبرا حميدا باعثه الإخلاص والتجرد وتقديم مصلحة الدين نحسبكم والله حسيبكم.
ولا يستطيع مثلي أن ينصح بعقد الملتقى أو تعليقه وتحمل تبعات هذه النصيحة، لكني إن قررتم عقد الملتقى فإني أرى لزاما علي أن أذكر إخواني وأحبتي بأمور من واقع خبرة، ((فإن الذكرى تنفع المؤمنين)) وإني أحسبكم إن شاء الله منهم:

1) تجنب لغة التوعد والتهديد على صفحات الإنترنت وفي المقابلات والشعارات المرفوعة قبل المؤتمر وأثناءه، فإن خصمكم قليلَ الأمانة –إن لم يكن عديمها- سيستغل هذه العبارات ويبني عليها أكاذيبه.
حتى عبارات الانتصار، أدعوكم إلى أن تجعلوها “الانتصار للدعوة” حتى لا تبدو عبارات من تأهب للقتال بالسلاح. هذا مع تقديرنا لكون تخويف الخصم الذي لا يردعه دين ولا خلق مطلبا ليكفه عن الفجور في عدوانه، لكن هذه المصلحة قد لا تعدل المفسدة المترتبة على هذه العبارات عندما يلبس بها خصومكم على الناس.

2) الإعلان بوضوح عن متحدثين رسميين باسمكم لا تتحمل الجماعة مسؤولية تصريحات غيرهم. فلا يخفاكم يا حفظكم الله أنه يكثر الاندساس في مثل هذا الوقت.

3) تشكيل لجنة تمنع الناس من رفع شعارات أو النداء بهتافات لا تمثلكم ولا تمثل منهجكم.

4) الحذر من فتنة الميكروفونات ومحبةِ سماع الهتافات المؤيدة، فهذه تجعل المرء يقول أحيانا ما يجر عليه وعلى إخوانه ودعوته ما يحدث الندم بعد فوات الأوان.

5) ضرورة التغطية الإعلامية المكثفة لكل خطوة ونشرها حتى لا ينفرد الآخرون بروايتهم الملفقة.

6) تجنب عبارات الوصف بالكفر والردة. فهذه يفرح بها أهل الأهواء ليحْدثوا بها لدى عامة الناس حالة استغلاق، فتضيع القضية وتُحرمون من بيان الحق للناس ومخاطبة الخير الكامن في فطرهم.
ثم أيها الأحبة إن نجحتم في أن تعرضوا للناس دعوة هادئة نقية ثم رأوا من خصومكم محاربة وقمعا لهذه الدعوة فلسان حال خصومكم سيكون أنطق وأبلغ من ألسنة مقالكم. ولهذا أيضا ننصحكم بالنصيحة السادسة:

7) التركيز في فعالياتكم على عرض ما لديكم من حق دون الكلام عن باطل خصومكم.

ثم نصيحتان أخيرتان مهمتان:

8 ) أن تضعوا –يا بارك الله فيكم- في أذهانكم أننا في مرحلة الدعوة والصبر على تبعاتها. ليس هذا أوان المواجهة بالقوة إخواني. وتذكروا أن سيد الشرفاء الشجعان رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم والصحابة معه، أعز الناس نفسا وأكثرهم إباء للضيم، كانوا في مرحلة الدعوة يضربون ويعذبون ويُسخر منهم فيصبرون، لا عن دنية وحاشاهم، لكن لأن المواجهة في غير وقتها مهلكة للدعوة وتغبيش لصورتها في نفوس الناس.

9) كثرة التضرع والدعاء واللجوء إلى الله تعالى في الثلث الأخير من الليل وبعده أن يجعا عاقبة هذا الأمر خيرا وألا يجعل للظالمين عليكم سبيلا.
اللهم احفظ إخواننا في تونس. ربنا أعنهم ولا تعن عليهم وانصرهم ولا تنصر عليهم وامكر لهم ولا تمكر عليهم واهدهم ويسر الهدى لهم، وانصرهم على من بغى عليهم.

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To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]

Unfortunately, this article, which can be found here, is behind a pay wall. If one is interested in reading it, send me an email ([email protected]) and I’ll see what I can do.

On Friday, Magharebia came out with a report that has already garnered attention among those who follow jihadist militancy. The publication claims that Tunisia’s salafi jihadists have just announced their allegiance (bayat) to al-Qaeda:

Tunisian salafist jihadists announced their allegiance to al-Qaeda this week, accepting the group’s invitation to wage a holy war.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s call Sunday (March 17th) to fight Westerners, secularists, reformers and other so-called “enemies” was welcomed by Tunisian salafist jihadists, the movement’s leader Mohamed Anis Chaieb told Assabah.
This was the first time Tunisia’s salafist jihadist groups officially declared their allegiance to al-Qaeda. And the terror group’s call to arms could not have come at a more critical juncture for the still-fragile state.

This is an extraordinarily sloppily reported and misleading article that shouldn’t be taken at face value, although there is a relevant data point beneath the sensationalized presentation. The first, and most obvious, error is that Mohamed Anis Chaieb simply cannot be regarded as “the movement’s leader” in any way, shape, or form. The biggest salafi jihadist organization in Tunisia is Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia (AST), and Abu Iyad al-Tunisi is widelyrecognized as AST’s emir. Chaieb is an obscure enough figure that most analysts who follow Tunisia and the Maghreb closely have probably never heard of him. He is, in fact, affiliated with AST, as we will detail below. But it is not clear that the statement he made can be construed as speaking for AST as a whole.
Click here to read the rest.

I walk through a Tunisian market around midday, at the entrance to the fortress of Sousse, a town about 90 minutes southeast of the capital Tunis on the coast. A man is selling Salafi books and copies of the Quran from a maple wood table, 12 feet long, in front of a small masjid inside the old fortress walls, which were built in the ninth century by the Aghlabid caliph Ziyadat Allah I.
Two men are sitting nearby, at the edge of a dry, broken-down fountain, enjoying the sunny and mild weather. I approach them, along with three Tunisian friends, to ask for an interview. One dismisses me outright, gets up and leaves. He thinks I am in the American mukhabarat(intelligence). The other accepts. I sit next to him, shake his hand, and we both exchange salam alaykum pleasantries.
“Are You Muslim or a non-Muslim?” he asks.
This was the start of my conversation with Ramzi, a Salafi, who takes issue with the term since he sees himself as a Muslim. Based on the description of the activities he has been involved in, it is possible he is a member of Ansar al-Sharia in Sousse (AST), but he would not confirm. Ramzi has a traditional Salafi look, sporting a marine green thawb, black skullcap, and a fully-grown beard, but with a well-trimmed mustache. By his own account, he had spent six years in exile in Morocco before returning to Tunisia following the ouster of former President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali.
“Bidun sura aw fidiyo” are his conditions for an interview — no pictures or video. A couple of weeks prior, Ramzi had talked with the France 2 series Envoyé Spécial, which did an exposé titled “La Tunisie sous la menace salafiste” (“Tunisia, under Salafist Threat). He told them his name was Nasim. Ramzi promises only five minutes, though the conversation lasts 15.
Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia is an organization that believes in al Qaeda’s worldview, but primarily at this juncture only focuses on local recruitment and missionary activities. AST typically sets up lectures from prominent Tunisian Salafi clerics, passes out mainstream Salafi literature at weekly markets, provides food, medicine, and clothing in charitable convoys, and publishes about its activities on Facebook as well as highlights key news events and new releases relating to the global jihadi world.
Unlike al Qaeda and its like-minded groups around the greater Middle East and North Africa, on the whole, AST has been a non-violent organization — besides alleged involvement in the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis in September 2012. Its main focus has been on dawa (missionary work). This is an under studied aspect of many current jihadi organizations. Much of this has come about as a consequence of the excesses of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and al Qaeda in Iraq last decade.
Groups like AST largely follow the ideas of Sheikh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi who has attempted to steer the community toward a more “pure” jihad. Maqdisi emphasizes the importance of consolidating power through education and dawa rather than focusing on fighting to damage the enemy. The groups working to change the emphasis on their actions, fostering the possibility of gaining a constituency in the same manner that ideologically different Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Hezbollah have been doing for years. That being said, because AST believes in al Qaeda’s ideology, it could be susceptible to engaging in violence in addition to dawa activities in the future if it sees it fit. It is difficult to predict if and when this might happen, but it should not be ruled out.
Click here to read the rest.

Following the untimely assassination of Chokri Belaïd (Shukri Bilayd), a Tunisian lawyer, opposition leader with the left-secular Democratic Patriots’ Movement and one of the leader’s of the Popular Front to which his party had adhered when the coalition was formed, there was a sense that security within Tunisia could break down. Although it appears, for now, that the situation has calmed down and many are returning to their normal everyday activities, on February 7th, Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia (AST) for the first time activated its ‘Neighborhood Committees.’ The mobilization of these committees within a mere few hours illustrated the strength of AST’s organizing structures as well as its memberships obedience to orders coming from the top.
The ‘Neighborhood Committees,’ which were originally called ‘Security Committees,’ were announced and set up on October 6, 2012 as a preemptive precautionary measure in case there was a security vacuum within the country. In other words, aspirationally, the establishment of a de facto non-state controlled martial law force if need be (more on if they were successful in their first mobilization below). The original intent of these committees was to safeguard and protect individuals in case the country spiraled out of control on October 23, 2012, which was the one year anniversary of the Constituent Assembly Election. No security issue or vacuum developed and the date passed without the activation of AST’s committees.
This changed last week, though, in light of the assassination, as well as the tense environment on the streets of Tunisia. Some individuals attempted to take advantage of this and began to loot, but many have since been arrested for these crimes. As a consequence of the perceived lack of security, AST called on its followers to mobilize their ‘Neighborhood Committees,’ stating the goal was to protect individuals, their money and property, and ward off thieves and looters. AST also urged followers to remain vigilant and cautious in light of potential gangs and criminality. Within a few hours, AST was able to mobilize members in Sfax and Hammamet for the night of the 7th. The mobilization was even swifter on the 8th whereby committees in addition to the former two came to the streets in al-Zahra’, al-Wardiyyah, al-Qayrawan, Sousse, al-Qalibiyyah, Mahdia, Ariana, Sidi Bouzid, al-Tadhamin Neighborhood, Beni Khayr, Southern Suburbs (Tunis), al-Kef, Diwar Hishur, al-Dandan, al-Nur Neighborhood, Jendouba, the Western Suburbs (Tunis), Matar, the Braka Coast, al-Khadra’ Neighborhood, and Qarbah (excuse the literal transliterations from Arabic in some cases, I’m fully aware they are spelled differently in the French rendering). AST conducted some of their patrols with the League for the Protection of the Revolution (LPR), believed to be a hardline faction associated with Ennahda.
Click here to read the rest.