UPDATE 6/27/13 1:00 PM: Here is an English translation of the below video message:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Ḥizb al-Islāmī al-Turkistānī [Turkistan Islamic Party] — “On the Occasion of the Military Operation in the Village of ‘Seriq Boya’ in the Prefecture of Kashgar” (En)
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Ṭāriq Abū Azim — “This Is My Path- Steadfast Message Behind Bars- Despite the Adversity, Resolve Is Our Choice”
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To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: [email protected]
UPDATE 6/25/13 8:04 AM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic statement:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: al-Qā’idah in the Islamic Maghrib — “Regarding the Case of French and European Hostages” (En)
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: al-Qā’idah in the Islamic Maghrib — “Regarding the Case of French and European Hostages”
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NOTE: Click here for the first part in this series.
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī — “Answer of the Question in the Questions of the Calamity #2”
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To inquire about a translation for this release for a fee email: [email protected]
Saturday June 15:
Democracy in Modern Islamic Thought – Nazek Jawad, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies: https://bit.ly/18K3HRl
Chechnya and Kashmir: The Jihadist Evolution of Nationalism to Jihad and Beyond – George Garner, Terrorism and Political Violence: https://bit.ly/18K48Le
Sunday June 16:
“Divine Victory” in Qusayr: Hizballah Promotes Their Success on the Web – Phillip Smyth, Jihadology: https://bit.ly/17QMJ2v
Monday June 17:
Why Drones Work: The Case for Washington’s Weapon of Choice – Dan Byman, Foreign Affairs: https://fam.ag/13V5Lis
Evil in a Haystack: How do you find a terrorist hidden in millions of gigabytes of metadata? – J.M. Berger, Foreign Policy: https://atfp.co/11kzqng
Tuesday June 18:
Convivenza, Convenienza and Conversion: Islam in Medieval Hungary (1000–1400 CE) – Katarína Štulrajterová, Journal of Islamic Studies: https://bit.ly/10tbZto
Thursday June 20:
Book Review of “Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts” – Mark Youngman, Jihadology: https://bit.ly/19kzjtv
The Next Decade of Jihadism in Pakistan – Tufail Ahmad, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology: https://bit.ly/14MCMQL
Hizballah Cavalcade: Liwa’a Zulfiqar: Birth of A New Shia Militia in Syria? – Phillip Smyth, Jihadology: https://bit.ly/13W48md
NOTE: An archive of the Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad column can now be found here.
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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Introduction
The past couple of weeks has seen Hamas’ tensions with Hezbollah come to the forefront despite past cooperation as the former has urged the latter to withdraw from the Syrian conflict immediately. At first sight, one may be tempted to accuse Hamas of hypocrisy on the basis of widespread rumors of the group’s involvement in Syria in aid of the rebels against the Assad regime. But how far, if at all, is Hamas really participating in the civil war?
Mainstream Media Reports
The main basis for claiming Hamas involvement in Syria lies in a few reports in media outlets. Thus in April the British newspaper The Times claimed Izz ad-Din al-Qassam fighters were training rebels in Damascus- citing anonymous Western diplomats. In the same month, the Kuwaiti paper ‘As-Sayaasah al-Kuwaitiya’ claimed that Hamas was preparing to send a thousand fighters from Lebanon into Syria to take on Hezbollah.
More recently, Rania Abouzeid wrote a piece for The New Yorker on arming rebels of Syria where she claimed in passing that rebels in Idlib had produced projectiles resembling the Qassam rocket, attributing the production to the provision of know-how from Hamas. Abouzeid offered no source for the conveying this information to her.
The problem with these claims is that they are all second-hand in nature, and they have all been denied vigorously by Hamas, whose leadership stresses an official policy of non-intervention in the Syrian conflict, even as Hamas officials abandoned Syria out of alienation from the Assad regime’s harsh repression against the mainly Sunni Arab uprising.
Hamas and the Social Media of Jihadis and other Rebels
Outside of the scanty media report testimony, claims of Hamas fighters’ presence in Syria primarily come from pro-regime media. For instance, one video was circulated recently of a Syrian soldier beside the bodies of several men, whom the soldier claimed were Hamas fighters and showed a photo of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin that one of the men purportedly had as proof.
In contrast, one can find extensive first-hand evidence of Hezbollah involvement even from before the Battle for Qusayr, most notably through pro-Hezbollah social media (Twitter, Facebook and chat forums) featuring photos of Hezbollah ‘martyrs’ killed in Syria. Far more reliable evidence by any measure than rebel media circles. By the same standard, the only real way to ascertain a Hamas presence in Syria is through acknowledgement in rebel media organs, jihadist organs, and so on.
Yet such acknowledgement is sorely lacking. There are of course many cases of Palestinian martyrs killed in Syria while fighting for rebel forces, but they are of a Salafist orientation in line with the rebel-battalion coalition known as the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), rather than the Muslim-Brotherhood-alignment of Hamas.
From Gaza itself, I have counted only two martyrs via forums and social media. One of them- called Mohammed Ahmad Quneiṭa– had gone to Syria some months before his death, participating in battles and training rebels. He is said to have been a commander in the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.
There are also conflicting reports as to whether he was acknowledged by Hamas in Gaza as one of its own: here is one report from the pro-regime site ‘Syria Now’ that claims so, pointing to the alleged acknowledgement of Quneiṭa as definite proof of Hamas involvement in Syria, besides giving citations from a ‘Syrian military source.’ Here is another Arabic news report that claims Hamas acknowledged the fighter.
However, the pro-regime site Zanobia denies that Hamas acknowledged him. Zanobia claims that Quneiṭa went on to become leader of a Jabhat al-Nusra contingent in the Idlib countryside near the Turkish border, but Hamas did not support his enterprise and apparently tried to dissuade him from doing so.
On balance, I am inclined to go with Zanobia’s account, for there is nothing in pro-Hamas social media to corroborate the claim of the group’s acknowledgment of him. It is merely on the basis of Quneiṭa’s apparent senior connections within Hamas that Zanobia takes as proof of Hamas involvement in Syria on the side of the rebels.
It is also of interest to note that the authoritative jihadi news agency- Dawaa al-Haq- claims that Quneiṭa was dismissed from the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades for going to Syria to fight jihad. The entire report is worth reading, with claimed citations of close friends of Quneiṭa that purportedly show that despite his membership in the Qassam Brigades, he was always more sympathetic to the Salafi circles at odds with Hamas, such that he had even been arrested a number of times.
The other Gazan martyr- Niḍal al-Ashi– was a Salafist fighter killed in the Aleppo area and was claimed by jihadi sources to have been subject to persecution by Hamas’ security services, including time served in Hamas prisons for firing rockets at Israel and involvement in a plot to assassinate the former head of the International Relief Agency in Gaza.
Salafis in Syria and Hamas
Indeed, the Hamas-Salafist rivalry in Gaza has not escaped the notice of the SIF or al-Qa’ida-aligned battalions like the Katiba al-Muhajireen, both of which have issued statements criticizing Hamas for alleged mistreatment of Salafist mujahideen in Gaza.
Neither acknowledges any Hamas contribution to aiding the uprising against Assad. The SIF in particular made its sentiment clear as its statement was released with a subheading ‘On Hamas’ betrayal of the Syrian revolution’. The SIF then accused Hamas of still being beholden to Iran, noting Hamas officials’ denial of involvement in Syria.
Summary Analysis
In short, we can say at most that to the extent that any Hamas fighters have been involved in Syria, they have been doing so without approval from the Hamas leadership, and either travel to the country from abroad out of their own accord- perhaps with Hamas in Gaza passively allowing this- or could be left-behinds from Hamas’ evacuation of Syria. This is quite far removed from the level of Hezbollah’s involvement in the civil war.
In any event, attempting to infer a Hamas presence from rebel tactics can be easily explained by the fact that many Palestinian fighters of Salafist orientation were once Hamas-aligned and then defected.
Conclusion: Hamas, Syria and the Wider Region
Examining Hamas’ stance vis-à-vis Syria is important for analyzing the group’s wider position in the region. While it is conventional to talk of Hamas’ shift to the ‘Sunni bloc’, the reality is that the group is very much in a state of limbo, with all sides harboring some form of reservation towards it.
Iran- angered by Hamas’ withdrawal from Syria and abandoning of Assad- has drastically cut financial support for the group. Salafist factions in Gaza and Syria accuse it of collaborating with Egyptian intelligence to suppress true jihad against Israel. One particularly egregious accusation came from an Egyptian Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen commander in the Sinai, who claimed some Hamas military leaders fund takfiri terrorists.
Egypt, which has now given a green light for citizens to fight in Syria, has not been any more relaxed about border controls with Gaza, preoccupied with economic troubles at home and concerned about security threats posed by militants in the Sinai with links to Gaza.
Finally, Gulf states like Qatar have not been all that forthcoming on aid promises to Gaza, such that the Hamas government there faces its own financial crisis.
While Hamas’ popularity may flare up every time there is a conflict with Israel, the fact is that the group is more isolated than ever, with few reliable friends in the region. If Hamas is going to get more involved in Syria, then the Egyptian and Qatari governments in particular will at the minimum have to demonstrate a greater willingness to aid the Hamas government in Gaza.
NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
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Liwa’a Zulfiqar: Birth of A New Shia Militia in Syria?
By Phillip Smyth ([email protected])
Click here for a PDF version of this post
On June 5, 2013, the same day Lebanese Hizballah declared victory at the Battle of Qusayr, a page for a new Damascus-based Shia militia group, Liwa’a Zulfiqar (LZ or the Zulfiqar Battalion), was created on Facebook. The group asserts it is, “Assigned to protect religious shines, especially the Saydah Zaynab [shrine]”. This claim is also held by Syria’s other main Shia militia, Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA). However, Liwa’a Zulfiqar is not competing with Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. In fact, most of its members and leadership appear to have been drawn from LAFA. Furthermore, Liwa’a Zulfiqar does not hide the fact that it was created out of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. Along with new photographs, the new group has repackaged older LAFA photographs and claimed them as representations of the new group.
LZ’s formation results in a number of questions: Is Liwa’a Zulfiqar a genuinely new organization? Could it be another front for LAFA? Was LZ’s formation representative of something else going on within the ranks of Shia fighters in Syria?
Based purely on social media data, it appears LZ is less of a new organization, and probably a LAFA front or part of LAFA. At best, the group could be a repackaging of LAFA fighters into a new group which serves the same functions and cooperates closely with LAFA and the Syrian army. At the same time, the group could be little more than a web-based propaganda vehicle. Since the creation of a new organization would generate the sense that larger numbers of capable Shia fighters are flooding into Syria, LZ’s propaganda function may also be aimed directly at rebel morale.
Using unnamed sources, Al-Hayat newspaper reported the majority of LZ’s fighters have come from Muqtada al-Sadr’s Liwa’a al-Yum al-Mawud (Promised Day Brigades), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata’ib Hizballah.[1] The latter two groups have suffered casualties in Syria and have also been integral pieces of LAFA. If LZ is an actual organized entity, it has already established itself as primarily Iraqi Shia staffed. It is unknown whether the Iraqi make-up of the group is a deliberate measure to create a separate purely Iraqi staffed organization. However, based on LAFA’s history of having a membership of mixed nationalities, it is unlikely the group has been formed to suit such a purpose.
Still, new evidence about LZ’s origins may have come to light via a June 19th Reuters report.[2] Liwa’a Zulfiqar may instead be the outgrowth of infighting pitting Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s Syrian commanders, Assad militias, and trained Iraqi fighters who comprise a large chunk of LAFA’s membership. Citing claims by Iraq-based Shia militants, Reuters reported, “Two Iraqi fighters and three Syrian Shabiha died” in a short battle pitting local Assad’s forces against Iraqi Shia fighters. As a result, “divisions fester and Iraqi combatants have formed a new brigade, refusing to fight under Syrian command”. It is possible Liwa’a Zulfiqar is the “new brigade” mentioned in the report.
If Liwa’a Zulfiqar was established due to the infighting, it is highly probable that the old LAFA command and military apparatus has been replicated and simply given a new name. This would explain the repackaging of LAFA photographs and the claims that LAFA leadership now comprises LZ’s leadership.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that LAFA and LZ would still be reliant on the cooperation of Assad’s forces. Heavy weapons provided to them by the Syrian army, including tank and artillery support, will still be necessary for LZ to mount any offensive or effective defensive operations. Furthermore, supplies for the group need to be funneled through the Assad regime, so a working relationship with Assad’s forces would be necessary.
Importantly, LAFA does not appear to have an interest in heightening any split. LAFA’s official Facebook page even announced the creation of LZ and posted some of their photographs. Also, LZ does not hide their support for the Assad regime. If a split resulting in the creation of LZ really did arise, it appears it was mitigated to the extent that the discord did not spill into public spheres, namely social media.
Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas & Liwa’a Zulfiqar’s Shared Members
Since the creation of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas and the creation of multiple social media (primarily Facebook) pages to market the group and its goals, very few of the group’s members have been photographed or named. However, LAFA’s leadership were often photographed (without their faces obscured) and claimed as group leaders. This has also been the case for LZ, which has publicized the leadership element of the organization.
Demonstrating its extremely close links to LAFA, LZ’s announced commanders were and may possibly still be LAFA leaders. This further points to the possibility LZ is little more than a subgrouping of fighters who operate under the main header of LAFA. Then again, it could also demonstrate the organization is a replication of LAFA with more Iraqi leadership.
LZ claims Abu Shahed and Abu Hajar as acting as a commanders (ranks were not given). Yet, these two commanders are already well-known to those following LAFA. In fact, the two have both been presented as LAFA leaders.
Figure 1: A banner featuring (shown wearing camouflage fatigues) Abu ‘Ajeeb (left), Abu Shahed (center), Abu Hajar (right) are pictured together as the leadership for LAFA. The photo of the banner was first posted on Facebook on June 6, 2013, 24 hours after the announcement of the creation of Liwa’a Zulfiqar.
Figure 2: Abu Hajar and Abu Shahed stand together in the Saydah Zaynab Shrine.
Figure 3: Abu Shahed, shown in an April, 2013 LAFA photograph. In the picture he is wearing a desert pattern MARPAT style uniform. The photo has been reposted on LZ’s Facebook.
Figure 4: Abu Jafar al-Assad takes aim with an M16A1 style rifle. Another LZ/LAFA militiaman also takes aim with an FN FAL. A Bashar al-Assad patch is fastened to Abu Jafar’s arm.
Symbolism
The creation of Liwa’a Zulfiqar and their symbol also coincided with the creation of a new symbol for Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. LAFA’s new logo was first adopted on the group‘s official Facebook page on May 31, 2013. Both logos include stylized images of crossed Zulfiqar-style swords. The dome of the Saydah Zaynab Shrine also features prominently.
It is important to note that both logos are quite similar in design. It can be assumed that this was not likely due to unoriginality, but instead was done to demonstrate common themes. The adoption of these new symbols is a clear example of the both organizations attempting to capitalize on the fate of the Saydah Zaynab Shrine and on placing clearly Shia symbols as centerpieces of their respective organizations.
Figure 5: Liwa’a Zulfiqar’s logo (Left).
Figure 6: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s new logo (Right).
What’s In A Name?
As with Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas, Liwa’a Zulfiqar’s name has deep roots within Shia Islam. According to Shia tradition, the Zulfiqar was a sword which originally belonged to the Islamic prophet Muhammad. According to Shia tradition, the legendary double tipped sword had immense strength and was passed on to Imam ‘Ali by Muhammed as he lay dying. For Shia, the handover of the sword connoted the passing of the mantle of Islam’s leadership to ‘Ali. The sword also formed a central facet for ‘Ali’s renowned status as a warrior.[3]
A popular traditional Shia saying, which invokes Imam Ali and the Zulfiqar says, “La fata illa ‘Ali, la saif illa zulfiqar” (“No victor like Ali, no sword except the Zulfiqar”).[4] Jennifer G. Wollock also notes the Zulfiqar’s near mystical qualities saying, “[Zulfiqar is] famous in its own right…[J]ust as King Arthur’s sword Excalibur or Roland’s Durandal…[I]n the West.”[5]
For Shia Muslims, the Zulfiqar and its significance did not simply disappear with the assassination of ‘Ali. It is believed the sword is the weapon to be wielded by the Mahdi, Shi’ism’s messianic figure who will usher in a time of justice and end oppression.[6] For Shia, particularly Twelver Shia, the Mahdi is the true ruler of earth—the final Imam—hidden by Allah and set to return. Contemporarily, the messianic theme of connecting the Zulfiqar to the Mahdi is also still popular with many Shia.[7]
Accordingly, the Zulfiqar’s powerful symbolism is being wielded by LZ to demonstrate power, commitment to the protection of Shi’ism, traditional Shia themes, messianic motifs, and as a military symbol.
The Fighters of Liwa’a Zulfiqar
Interestingly, LZ’s photographic posts for their fighters seem to include shots of them dressed in desert-pattern camouflage. LAFA members photos are more generally seen in woodland and urban themed MARPAT-style camouflage clothing. The emphasis on the desert pattern uniforms may be LZ’s attempt to posit a clear and visible difference from LAFA.
Figure 7: The fighter’s white turban and beard indicate he may hold the status
NOTE: An archive of the Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad column can now be found here.
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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
General Overview
While both Raqqah and Aleppo offer ample evidence for an Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) presence, there is nothing of the sort for Deraa. In fact, a search in Arabic on Twitter for ISIS and Deraa turns up one result: namely, a query I had sent to another user about whether he knew of any ISIS fighters operating in Deraa.
That question went unanswered. Youtube, Facebook and jihadi forums likewise turn up no results. Instead, one only finds evidence for fighters operating under the banner of Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN), which continues to play an important role in rebel offensives in Deraa.
Indeed, while the disagreement that arose in April between Sheikh al-Baghdadi and Sheikh al-Jowlani on the merging of JAN with Islamic State of Iraq remained unresolved by a verdict from Sheikh Aymenn al-Zawahiri, not only did numerous reports via rebel media outlets continue to appear of JAN activities in Deraa, but there also emerged a ‘Jabhat al-Nusra: Wilaya of Deraa’ council that put out statements for distribution in jihadi media circles.
Deraa itself is perhaps the best example of how, despite Jowlani’s pledge of allegiance to Zawahiri, other rebel battalions of different ideological inclinations have still been willing to cooperate with JAN in operations against Assad regime forces.
This was most apparent at the beginning of May when a video emerged of JAN’s takeover of the eastern front in Deraa, with the cooperation of other battalions like Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya.[i] Later that month, a video was posted explaining JAN’s seizing control of a sample area in Deraa with the cooperation of those identifying by the label of the ‘Free Army.’ Here was another video where ‘Free Army’ rebels acknowledged cooperation with JAN in Deraa, though it has since been removed from Youtube.
This testimony of cooperation between JAN and those calling themselves the ‘Free Army’ is corroborated by an earlier Omawi News interview with a Jabhat al-Nusra field commander in Deraa on operations conducted against the Syrian army with the cooperation of ‘our brothers in the Free Army’ (eastern region).
Towards the end of May and into the beginning of June, more overt evidence of JAN’s presence in the rebel offensives in Deraa emerged. For example, here is a collection of photos released at the start of June of JAN fighters in Buṣra ash-Sham[ii]. Note the distinctive flag and the use of a distinct ‘Deraa’ logo with a JAN flag as a media outlet for JAN in the area.
In a similar vein, here is a video of a JAN tank operating in Deraa. Here is another video of the JAN tank released via the channel al-Maysar. Further, here is a video of Jabhat al-Nusra, ‘with the participation of a number of battalions,’ in the battle for Wadi al-Yarmouk in west Deraa.
JAN’s Deraa Media Outlet and Military Council
The Deraa media channel for JAN bears further consideration. Here is a video released by the outlet at the end of May of a JAN training camps in Deraa, introduced by the nasheed ‘Madin Kas-Sayf’ by Abu Ali (see translation here). Deemed ‘camps of martyrs’, the fighters wear sophisticated military uniforms and the JAN flag features prominently throughout, with a banner at around 3:50 reading ‘An Ummah whose leader is Mohammed (sall Allahu alayhi wa salam) will not bow down [in submission]’.
Here likewise is a JAN Deraa video from the beginning of June denouncing Assad, Iran and Hezbollah, with admiration for figures like Osama bin Laden and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi also made clear.
In the meantime, some statements have been released on jihadi forums and elsewhere from the ‘Military Council in Jabhat al-Nusra (Province of Deraa).’ They were not put out in the name of JAN’s official media channel al-Manarah al-Bayḍā, suggesting a degree of autonomy for JAN in Deraa.
For example, corroborating the video and photographic evidence of JAN operations in Buṣra ash-Sham, the council released a statement at the end of May, indicating that it had undertaken operations in the ‘battle to liberate Buṣra ash-Sham’ in cooperation with ‘Liwa al-Haramain affiliated with Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya, Liwa al-Qādisiya al-Islami, Liwa al-Yarmouk, Liwa al-Fallujah, Liwa Mohammed bin Abdullah, Liwa Hāfiẓ Meqdad, Katiba Usud as-Sunnah, and Katiba Muṣ’ab bin Umair al-Islamiya.’
Apart from Liwa al-Haramain, which by virtue of its affiliation is part of the Salafist Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), and Liwa al-Qādisiya al-Islami with its espousal of global jihad, most of what can be ascertained about the other battalions is that they are what is considered ‘mainstream’ in the overall Syrian insurgency. That is, combining some sort of Islamic motif(s) with notions of the Free Syrian Army.
For instance, see this Facebook page of Liwa Mohammed bin Abdullah, which features the banner of jihad and the FSA flag, though the page has been inactive since being taken over by pro-Assad hackers. In a similar vein, here is the Facebook page of a detachment affiliated with Liwa Hāfiz Meqdad (also called Katība Shaheed Hāfiz Meqdad).
For further evidence, here is a video from the end of January in Buṣra ash-Sham of a dead Shabiha militant called Jawad Jafar, killed by Liwa Hāfiẓ Meqdad. Note the nasheed playing in the background but also the claimed affiliation with the ‘Free Army.’
All of these data only reinforce my earlier point about JAN’s ability to work with a variety of rebel battalions even after the pledge of allegiance to Zawahiri that many commentators characterized as a turning-point for the worse in JAN’s fortunes.
JAN and Minorities in Deraa
Another statement from the Deraa military council for JAN concerns its position vis-à-vis the Druze community. While some media reports conveyed the impression of a shift in allegiances among the Druze towards the rebels a few months back, the reality is that the majority of Druze have not taken up arms and among those that have done so, the tendency is to side with the regime.
In fact, in response to a video at the start of May that purportedly showed JAN fighters on the march to Deraa as reinforcements (NB just before the announcement of JAN’s takeover of the eastern rebel front in Deraa), some pro-Assad Druze from Suweida released a video purporting to show resolute Druze support for the regime.
The JAN Deraa council probably had that in mind, along with the Battle of Qusayr, when it released a statement warning the Druze in Suweida in particular and other communities that they would face the consequences at the hands of the mujahideen for any support lent to the Shabiha or Hezbollah, said by the council to be fighting in Buṣra ash-Sham. Key to this message is the notion of, ‘Leave us alone, and we will leave you alone’ (i.e. a defensive jihad), with citation of the example set by Christian villages and by villages inhabited by minority sects in Idlib.[iii]
The Latest Offensive
The council further released a statement on 6 June announcing the beginning of a new offensive to liberate the checkpoints of al-Banayyat and al-Khazan in Deraa, in cooperation with Liwa al-Haramain, Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islami and Harakat al-Mothana al-Islamiya.[iv] This statement is corroborated by the earlier videos of the JAN tank from June mentioned above, illustrating operations to take over al-Banayyat. See also this video from 10 June of a tank with the banner of Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū Salmān al-Ṣūmālī — “Advice and Congratulations to Our Brothers the Mujāhidīn in Muslim Somalia”
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To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: [email protected]
