UPDATE 5/13/13 10:44 AM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic article:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Ibrāhīm bin Sulaymān al-Rubaysh — “Letter To Our Shaykh Sulaymān bin Nāṣir al ‘Alwan” (En)
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Ibrāhīm bin Sulaymān al-Rubaysh — “Letter To Our Shaykh Sulaymān bin Nāṣir al ‘Alwan”
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Month: February 2013
Minbar at-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād presents three new Fatāwā from Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī
Click the following links for safe PDF copies:
Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī — What is the Truth About the Dispute Between the Mujāhidīn in Algeria? Is it Permissible to Target Ambassadors of Algeria?
Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī — Is it Permissible For Me to Stop Da’wah Work Until the Demise of the Surveillance of Me By the Enemies of God?
Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī — What is the Ruling on Joining the Chief of Staff in Libya Under the Pretext of Taking Money
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New statement from Jund ash-Shām: "Announcement on the Establishment of Sada ash-Shām Foundation"
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الحمد لله ولي الصالحين، والعاقبة لمن أطاعه واتقاه في كل حين، ولا عدوان إلا على الظالمين، والصلاة والسلام على إمام المتقين وسيد المجاهدين وعلى آله وصحبه ناشري لواء الدين، وعلى من تبعهم من سلف هذه الأمة وخلفها ممن قاتل و جاهد و رابط ونافح في كل وقت وحين، و بذل في سبيل إعلاء كلمة الله النفس والنفيس حتى أتاه اليقين.
أما بعد:
فإننا في جماعة جند الشام في بلاد الشام في ريف حمص بقيادة الأمير المجاهد أبو سليمان المهاجر -حفظه الله- نزف إليكم بشرى إنشاء (مؤسسة صدى الشام)، ونعلن أن المؤسسة هي الناطق الرسمي بإسم الجماعة منها تصدر بياناتها وإصداراتها، وسنقوم عبرها بنشر برنامج دوري إن شاء الله تعالى بخصوص الأوضاع والأحداث في بلاد الشام عموما وحمص الأبية خصوصا بهدف إلى التوعية والإرشاد.
وبهذا يعلن إخوانكم عن شعار (مؤسسة صدى الشام) المعتمد والذي سيظهر على كل إصدارات المؤسسة إن شاء الله، و بالتالي فإن أي إنتاج يتحدث باسم جماعة جند الشام في بلاد الشام ولا يصدر من مؤسسة صدى الشام ستكون الجماعة بريئة منه وهذا منذ تاريخ الأربعاء 25 ربيع الأول 1434 هـ – 6 فبراير 2013م.
لا تنسونا وإخوانكم المجاهدين من دعائكم.
{ وَاللّهُ غَالِبٌ عَلَى أَمْرِهِ وَلَكِنَّ أَكْثَرَ النَّاسِ لاَ يَعْلَمُونَ }
مؤسسة صدى الشام
جماعة جند الشام في بلاد الشام
الأربعاء 25 ربيع الأول 1434 هـ – 6 فبراير2013 م
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New video message from Majlis Shūrā al-Mujāhidīn Fī Aknāf Bayt al-Maqdis: "The Journey of Martyrdom #1"
UPDATE 2/10/13 8:42 PM: Here is an Arabic transcription of the below video message:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Majlis Shūrā al-Mujāhidīn Fī Aknāf Bayt al-Maqdis — “The Journey of Martyrdom #1” (Ar)
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New article from Shamūkh al-Islām Forum: "Biographies of the Martyrs #1: Badr 'Āshūrī Abū Maysarah al-Maghribī"
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shamūkh al-Islām Forum — “Biographies of the Martyrs #1- Badr ‘Āshūrī Abū Maysarah al-Maghribī”
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Check out my new article for Foreign Policy's AfPak Channel: "#Jihad's social media trend"
From December 5, 2012 to January 29, 2013, al-Qaeda’s top-tier forum Shamukh al-Islam was down (with a brief return for a few days after December 17). The suppression of the forum is likely the work of an intelligence agency, but no claim of responsibility has been announced. It has also accelerated an already growing trend: the migration of jihadi propaganda from web forums to social media.
In response to the blackout, many jihadi groups, media outlets, and individuals created new accounts on Twitter (and to a lesser extent Facebook). Others have likely migrated to popular second-tier forums like Ansar al-Mujahidin Arabic Forum (AMAF), which occurred the last time the al-Qaeda approved forums went down in late March/early April 2012. During that period, I was in the middle of collecting and analyzing data (from February 1, 2012 to April 31, 2012) on a number of jihadi forums spanning multiple languages and Twitter accounts for a New American Foundation paper, which showed empirically for the first time that lower-tier forums did indeed fill the vacuum created by the main forum’s absence.
Both of these forum takedowns — in March and April, as well as in December and January — exposed the limits of al-Qaeda’s official online media procedures, which are headed by its distribution network al-Fajr Media. Al-Fajr is responsible for coordinating between al-Qaeda Central (AQC), its affiliates’ media outlets (As-Sahab Media for AQC, al-Malahim for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Furqan for al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and al-Andalus for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)), and the forum administrators. In both takedown cases, al-Fajr could not deliver content from the al-Qaeda affiliates, at least in an official capacity, to the online masses.
Media outlets, groups, and ideologues that, while not expressly affiliated, are inspired by al-Qaeda’s worldview have not been hindered by this process, and therefore have not evolved mechanisms for releasing their content. Previously, popular online jihadi essayists like Abu Sa’d al-Amili wrote articles when the forums when down, encouraging readers to be patient and to understand that the forums would persist and would not be defeated. On December 23, 2012, however, Abdullah Muhammad Mahmud, a writer for the jihadi news agency Dawa al-Haqq Foundation for Studies and Research, which is disseminated via a WordPress blog, provided guidance to online jihadi activists. Mahmud told his comrades that going forward, it was legitimate to use Twitter and Facebook as sources of information for jihadi-related issues. This advice was in a sense revolutionary, as jihadis had previously emphazized the importance of the forums as a method for authenticating materials, to prevent forgeries of official group content. At the same time, though, many grassroots activists had already been active on online social media platforms for a few years on an individual basis.
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Eight new statements from Jabhat al-Nuṣrah
Click the following links for safe PDF copies:
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — In a Joint Operation- Liberating the Political Security Branch in the City of Dayr al-Zūr
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — Battle of the Military Housing in Idlib
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — Some of the Military Operations in Dara’ā
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — Damaging a Tank of the Army on the Road (Damascus – Dara’ā)
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — Targeting the Security Branch of the Ba’ath Party in al-Saḥāri – Dara’ā
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — Killed Five Officers While Targeting Their Vehicles in Dara’ā the Village
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — The Battle of Reinforcing of the Armaments in al-Lajāt – Dara’ā
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — The Battle of Ṭayyībah al-Imām in the Governorate of Ḥamāh
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Masāma' al-Khayr l-l-Inshād presents a new Nashīd from Abū Hājr al-Ḥaḍramī: "Our Kings Are of This World for Centuries"
Abū Hājr al-Ḥaḍramī — “Our Kings Are of This World for Centuries”
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Check out my new piece for the Washington Institute’s Policy Watch: "The Syrian Islamic Front: A New Salafi Force"
The second half of 2012 saw increased radicalization of the Syrian armed opposition, particularly in the north and east. What began as a mainly secular force with the creation of the umbrella Free Syrian Army has slowly fragmented into Islamist splinter factions, including Suqur al-Sham, Kataib Ahrar al-Sham (KAS), and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN). Designated a terrorist organization by Washington in early December, JN has received the most attention, but little has been said about KAS, another popular Salafi-jihadist group whose strength and support continue to grow in Aleppo, Idlib, and elsewhere. On December 21, KAS announced the creation of a new umbrella fighting force called the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF). Given this group’s increasing prowess on the battlefield and ideological similarity to JN, Washington must develop a better understanding of its capabilities and reach.
WHO THEY ARE
In the statement and video proclaiming the SIF’s creation, spokesman Abu Abdul Rahman al-Souri declared that the group followed extremist Salafi doctrines and planned to topple the Assad regime and its allies, after which it would institute its interpretation of sharia (Islamic law). According to him, this would mean establishing institutions focusing on political matters, dawa (Islamic advocacy), cultural education, and humanitarian relief.
The SIF is made up of eleven brigades, including KAS (which operates throughout Syria), Harakat al-Fajr al-Islamiyah (which operates in and around Aleppo), Kataib Ansar al-Sham (in and around Latakia), Liwa al-Haqq (in Homs), Jaish al-Tawhid (in Deir al-Zour), Jamaat al-Taliah al-Islamiyah (in rural parts of Idlib), Katibat Musab bin Umayr (in rural parts of Aleppo), and the Damascus-area groups Katibat Suqur al-Islam, Kataib al-Iman al-Muqatilah, Saraya al-Maham al-Khasa, and Katibat al-Hamzah bin Abdul Mutalib. The latter five brigades have little to no battle record posted online, which suggests they are not real players on the ground.
At the end of its December statement, the SIF emphasizes that it is open to other Islamist organizations joining its cause, and the accompanying video shows the front’s fighters in action in Damascus, Homs, Hama, Idlib, Aleppo, and Deir al-Zour, among other places. Since then, the SIF and JN have been at the forefront of several key battles, including the recent liberation of Taftanaz airport, a jailbreak in Idlib, and efforts to take Jisr al-Shughour.
The video also shows the SIF’s humanitarian relief efforts, such as paving new roads and clearing old ones, baking bread for the increasing number of needy Syrians, and supplying foodstuffs. Other soft-power efforts include Quranic recitation contests for children. In addition, the video highlights two of the main actors financing these efforts: the Humanitarian Relief Fund (IHH), a government-linked Turkish NGO with ties to Hamas, and Qatar Charity, another government-linked NGO.
Click here to read the rest.
Fursān al-Balāgh Media presents a new issue of The Islamic World Magazine #6
NOTE: For previous issues see: #5, #4, #3, #2, and #1.
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic World Magazine #6
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