Abū Muslim al-Jazā’irī — Declaration of the Legitimacy of Jihād in the Islāmic Maghreb
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UPDATE 1/30 7:54 AM: Here is an English translation of the below audio message:
‘Ustādh Aḥmad Fārūq — “Keep Belief in the Promises of Allah” (En)
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NOTE: ‘Ustādh Aḥmad Fārūq is considered al-Qā’idah’s official spokesman for its Pakistan branch.
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As-Saḥāb Media presents new audio message from ‘Ustādh Aḥmad Fārūq: “Keep Belief in the Promises of Allah”
NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to Global Jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.
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Apocalypse in Islam
Jean-Pierre Filiu, tr. MB DeBevoise
University of California Press (2011)
reviewed by Charles Cameron
Jean-Pierre Filiu’s book, Apocalypse in Islam (University of California Press, 2011) makes a crucially important contribution to our understanding of current events – it illuminates not just one but a cluster of closely-related blind-spots in our current thinking, and it does so with scholarship and verve.
Al-Qaida’s interest in acquiring nuclear weapons — and Iran’s – and the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear materiel – and the situation in Jerusalem – depending how you count ’em, there are a half dozen or so glaring world problems where one spark in the Mahdist underbrush might transform a critical situation. And yet as Ali Allawi put it in his talk to the Jamestown Foundation on Mahdism in Iraq a few years back, Mahdists ferments still tend to be “below our radar”.
Background:
People are always talking about unintended consequences: might I suggest that blind-spots are where unintended consequences come from – and offer some background on apocalyptic, before proceeding to discuss Filiu’s contribution?
We already have a tendency to dismiss religious drivers in considering current events, having concluded in many cases that religion is passé for the serious-minded types who populate diplomatic, military and governmental bureaucracies world-wide – and we are even more reluctant to focus on anyone who talks about the Last Days and Final Judgment, despite the presence of both in the faith statements and scriptures of both Islam and Christianity. We think vaguely of cartoons of bearded and bedraggled men with sandwich boards declaring The End is Nigh, and move along to something more easily understood, something conveniently quantitative like the number of centrifuges unaffected by Stuxnet in Iran, or purely hypothetical, like the association of Taliban and Al Qaida in Afghanistan.
And yet, as I’ve argued before, apocalyptic belief can be a potent force-multiplier – because as Timothy Furnish puts it bluntly in the opening paragraph of his book, Holiest Wars (Praeger, 2005):
Islamic messianic insurrections are qualitatively different from mere fundamentalist ones such as bedevil the world today, despite their surface similarities. In fact, Muslim messianic movements are to fundamentalist uprisings what nuclear weapons are to conventional ones: triggered by the same detonating agents, but far more powerful in scope and effect.
Even if that’s somewhat overstated, it should give us pause.
Stephen O’Leary, in Arguing the Apocalypse (OUP, 1994), noted that apocalyptic studies have generally been considered disreputable, and went on to say,
Apocalyptic arguments made by people of good and sincere faith have apparently succeeded in persuading millions; it is unfair and dangerous to dismiss these arguments as irrational and the audiences persuaded by them as ignorant fools. In a world where bright utopic visions compete with increasingly plausible scenarios of global catastrophe, it seems imperative to understand how our anticipations of the future may be both inspired and limited by the ancient logic of apocalypticism.
Indeed, Jessica Stern, was taken aback at first by the apocalyptic intensity of the terrorists she studied, writing in Terrorism in the Name of God (Harper/Collins, 2003):
I have come to see that apocalyptic violence intended to “cleanse” the world of “impurities” can create a transcendent state. All the terrorist groups examined in this book believe — or at least started out believing — that they are creating a more perfect world. From their perspective, they are purifying the world of injustice, cruelty, and all that is antihuman. When I began this project, I could not understand why the killers I met seemed spiritually intoxicated. Now, I think I understand. They seem that way because they are.
So the bottom line is that we have a very real perceptual problem: an inability to take religious drivers seriously in terms of the special passions they evoke, and an even greater blindness to the most intense form those passions can take – a form which even now powers some significant undercurrents in both Sunni and Shi’ite affairs.
And that, in a nutshell, is why Filiu’s book makes such an important contribution: he’s turning a spot-light on a major blind-spot.
An early warning
Filiu is nothing if not urbane – a European diplomat-scholar with a lively curiosity – so his eye is caught by the garish covers of apocalyptic tracts sprouting across the countries he travels in, much as Drezner’s eye is caught by the current crop of zombie movies, and he begins to collect them, even though – or perhaps because – they’re at the very antipodes of cosmopolitan urbanity.
They mushroom, they explode. And they are indeed eye-catching, grotesque.
Yet just as Hal Lindsey’s The Late Great Planet Earth (Zondervan, 1970) was the number one best-selling non-fiction book in the US in the 1970s, but somehow escaped mention in the Publisher’s Weekly listings, a plethora of pop Islamic apocalyptic titles only too easily escapes our notice.
And like an early jazz critic – or comic book, superhero, or video-game critic – catching on to the sense that something important is brewing, not just “beneath the radar” but frankly “outside the pale”, and intercepting it, interrogating it within the context of a wider literacy, Filiu intercepts Islamic millennialism, interrogating it, bringing it politely to our attention and interpreting it for us.
Angles and learnings
What can we learn from Filiu? What angles does he see that we might otherwise miss?
It may seem pretty basic, but the unit of thought in the Qur’an, equivalent to a Biblical verse, is an aya, a sign: Islam is a religion of reading the ayat, the signs – and prominent among them are the signs of the times, the apocalyptic signs of the end times, the coming of the Mahdi and Judgment day. Christianity has its “signs of the times” too – but Christianity isn’t a religion of “reading the signs” in the way that Islam is, and in Christianity signs don’t have the same force.
Filiu doesn’t emphasize this, but he does make it a departure point for his exploration of Islamic apocalyptic (p. 4), and follows it up by noting that in the first chapter of the Qur’an, God most merciful is spoken of as Master of the Day of Judgment.
But then that’s Islam -– and huge and diverse though Islam may be, it’s still a focus, and must be seen in context. So how’s this for context? Speaking of Iran’s Ahmadinejad and “the most farsighted of American neoconservatives” he notes their common conviction “that an implacable conflict is foretold in prophecy” and observes:
It is … less a clash of civilizations that is now beginning to take shape than a confrontation of millenarianisms.
— which doubles the poignancy of his comment in concluding his Prologue (pp. xix-xxi), just two paragraphs later:
The end of the world is a serious matter — especially for those who are busy preparing for it
And although Filiu’s topic is Apocalypse in Islam, this sense that Islamic apocalyptic finds its mirror image in its Christian analogue will run like a quiet thread through his book, appearing at odd moments, as when he points to Sheikh al-Hawali’s use of Christian apocalyptic materials in his polemic against Christian apocalyptic writers themselves (p. 109), and in the discussion of the parallelisms between Christian and Islamic apocalyptic and their divergences with which Filiu brings his book to a close (Epilogue, pp. 195-99).
The history
In the first half of his book, Filiu presents the history of Islamic apocalyptic…
David Cook has given us his scholarly account of the Sunni traditions in Studies in Islamic Apocalyptic (Darwin Press, 2002), and dealt with more recent developments in his Contemporary Muslim Apocalyptic Literature (Syracuse UP, 2005), though we have yet to see his corresponding work on the Shi’ite side, and Timothy Furnish has given us a treatment of a number of Mahdist movements, similarly weighted towards the Sunni. Filiu’s work covers both the historical and contemporary aspects, in both Sunni and Shi’a schools – and like Furnish, he writes with one eye on his scholarly audience and the other on the interested non-specialist reader.
For the history of Sunni apocalyptic thought, Filiu begins with beginnings – the clear presence of expectation of the Day of Judgment and absence of references to the Mahdi as such in the Qur’an, the paucity of strong Mahdist ahadith in the great hadith collections, and the gradual formation of a corpus of “signs” of impending apocalypse. His chapter “Grand Masters of the Medieval Apocalypse” then calls on Ibn Arabi, al-Qurtubi, Ibn Kathir, Ibn Khaldun and al-Suyuti.
The case of Ibn Arabi is instructive. In Filiu’s view, the great
In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious and the Most Merciful.
Today America is bankrupt. It can no longer finance and control the world. The richest country of the world is the most debt-ridden country of the world. The super power that once used to give loans to others is today drowned overhead with debts—about $ 14 trillion, which it can’t pay. What a good saying, “As you sow, so shall you reap.” America faced bankruptcy and deficiency because of its negligence and arrogance.
If we look at the past, we can see that when Bill Clinton was vacating office for George Bush in 2000, there was a surplus of $300 billion in the treasury. When Bush turned to spending astronomical amounts both at the military and financial fronts following the 9/11, the surplus became deficit. In the first two years, the surpluses of $300 billion were spent. In the following two years it rose to 600 billion dollars. In the next two years, the debt was $ 900 billion. In 2009, it went up to $1.2 trillion. Today it is nearly $ 1.7 trillion, being unprecedented in the history of America.
This has forced America to borrow more money and to revamp its debilitating economy. It did so, taking heavy debts from Japan, China, Saudi Arabia and other gulf countries. In the first term of Bush, the debt reached $7.6 trillion. But in his second reign, it rose to $ 10.6 trillion. Today it stands at $ 14.02 trillion. More than half of the present debts occurred in the past six years, when Iraq and Afghanistan wars were at their heights. If we spread the debts over the American population, every American has borrowed approximately $45,300.
Regional analysts say, America must spend $1.3 trillion more than its revenues in the current year. Because budget deficit is increasing by $400 billion per day, it brings America to the verge of sinking with the passage of each day.
It means America has to borrow 40 cents of every dollar that she spends. On January 15, the finance secretary said that this was unprecedented in the history of America. The irony is that the two major parties blame each other for the crisis. Congress is compelled to either remove the legal limitation on debt to give free hand to the government to borrow more money, or to bring great cut in expenditure. But whatever step they may take, it will not make any difference. In war times, debts usually increase but not to the extent that the former President Bush was responsible for. He bankrupted the state and left it to Obama in that dilapidated condition.
The trouble is that an interest of $6 trillion dollar is added to the debt of $14 trillion. The actual interest is$ 900 billion but for some reasons it rises to $600 trillion i.e.
A. Since the government can’t pay it back, therefore the interest multiplies.
B. The lenders (states, companies, banks, individuals etc.) raise interest rates.
C. The government has lost its credibility against the lenders and is imposing its self-made regulations.
D. The government keeps the military expenditure and budget both on its high level. Therefore both of the wars are supported by loan.
The Pentagon’s budget is $717 billion for 2011. An additional amount of $200 billion is allocated for war in Afghanistan and Iraq and the so called “War on Terror”.
The Soviet Union is dead now. The Warsaw Pact is buried. So why is she (America) destroying the world? Why did she waste her 6,000 soldiers in vain and $3 trillion over-spending? Why all this?
The war in Afghanistan and Iraq has left behind three main questions unsolved:
1. Would America have lost so much, if Bush had not been made the President?
2. Would America not be in debt to that extent, again if Bush had not been the president?
3. Would America not see the crisis so heavily if he had not been at the helms of affairs?
All the answers could be but only in the negative. Attacks over Afghanistan and Iraq affected the stocks market. Companies were damaged and bankrupted. In 2007-2008, a great regional crisis started. This ushered in financial and commercial deficit– the immediate affect being on the housing and mortgage sector. The economy melted down, growing debts followed. Dollars were printed without any support, dwindling its value and increasing the inflation and financial deficit. Large companies touched the peak of the crisis, compelling the government to save them from bankruptcy by giving them billions of dollars. It encircled America like a chain and is difficult for her to get rid of.
The former Soviet Union would not transcend to admit that the Afghan war was bringing them to knees. In the same way the America is not ready to accept this bitter reality that the main cause behind the crisis is the Afghan war.
How and when can America get rid of the current $14.02 trillion? The answer is ambiguous. We can say that it is a back- breaking and irreversible crisis, swallowing America day by day. Can’t we say that this hurricane is just like the strong waves of the Red sea, which engulfed the Pharaoh, putting him stayed in their embrace for ever?
NOTE: The Caucasus Emirate’s media mouthpiece the Kavkaz Center discussed the issue of the official language of the Caucasus Emirate back in November too.
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I want to stress again the importance of this issue. We should weigh all the pros and cons, and carefully examine the prospects of a solution, since this question is of strategic importance for the peoples of the Caucasus and our state.
There are advantages in the choice of Ottoman or Arabic language. The Arabic language is the language of the Holy Quran, the native language of Islam and its study is both necessity and obligation for the Muslims.
The Ottoman language is the language of the Ottoman Caliphate, which in 600 years of its existence had an enormous influence on the Caucasus, the Caucasian languages and the culture of our peoples.
For many centuries, the Ottoman Caliphate was the mainstay of the Islamic Ummah and Caucasian Muslims, and it left a deep mark on the consciousness of our peoples.
In our choice, we must take into account all the nuances of today’s situation, both in the Caucasus and the situation in the world which entered into a period of global instability and change.
Therefore, we must take into account not only cultural priorities, but also historical perspectives and political aspects in the light of rapidly changing political configurations in the geographic regions that are important for us.
I think that the discussion on the state language of the Caucasus Emirate should be expanded; suggestions, comments, and arguments must be systematically and carefully analyzed.
We have no doubt in our victory, and so today we must prepare for the arrangement of our state, as Allah commands. And Allah is sufficient for us as a protector, and He’s the best of the protectors!
I ask Allah, praise Him, the Most High, to forgive us our sins and mistakes that were made voluntary or involuntary, and ask Him to instruct us on the right path. He is One Knowledgeable and Experienced.
Allahu Akbar!
It is patently clear from the experiences of those who preceded us and firmly established from our own observations that the success of Islamic governments, as well as democratic and despotic governments, and the prosperity of religious; educational; governmental and other establishments lies in the superiority of its administrative regime in heeding its important elements (lofty aims, the abilities of its leader, having a righteous entourage around him,etc.). Complete victory in this field requires diligent efforts from those heading it to implement decisions issued; established regulations and fixed principles. Attention must also be paid to the impartiality of the administration through the good selection of personnel who are recruited to work there.
I do not intend to list the components of successful administration or to declare the characteristics of an Islamic Administration. What concerns me here is to shed light on the Islamic Emirate’s policy in the realm of administration and coordination despite the difficult circumstances surrounding it connected to its heavy involvement in the Holy Jihad and the bitter war against the Americans and their partners in their repulsive crimes. I also strive to place before you, as Allah enables me, simple information regarding the order of the Islamic Emirate – or the Taliban regime, as they say, so that perhaps it will benefit the readers of our heroic magazine “al-Somood” to”heal the breasts of the Believers” and “Nor is that for Allah any great matter”.
The loftiness of the desired objective and the sanctity of the anticipated goal – combined with the firm anchoring of this sanctity within those who belong to this administration after they are made fully aware of it – are together a strong factor in successfully achieving the declared and sought-after goal. It is also the secret behind reviving the spirit of altruism, dedication and sacrifice in the spirit of the staff (members). When they are convinced of the importance of their jobs they will compete in rushing to complete their assigned tasks and exert the utmost of their efforts for the sake of achieving the highest objective and sacred goal, because they will see the laudable results and great benefits behind their activities and above the ceiling of their own invaluable works. As Allah Almightysays in this regard:“They are those who, if We establish them in this land , establish regular prayer and give regular charity, enjoin the right and forbid wrong: with Allah rests the end (and decision) of all affairs.” (al-Hajj: 41).
Moreover, concern must be paid to attracting trustworthy and competent persons, and choosing specialized cadre; contingent upon piety and impartiality. Specialization without piety corrupts an administration and piety without competence weakens it. In the event of a contradiction, the pious one is given preference, because he is like the shepherd whose legs are tied and is unable to benefit the flock or serve the people. But the corrupt one is a ravenous wolf spoiling the earth and harming others. Preventing damage takes priority among wise men and in any event the selection of righteous people is a strong element of successful administration. This is in accordance with the words of the Almighty: “Allah doth command you to render back your Trusts to those to whom they are due”(al-Nisa: 58)and “Verily the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you.” (al-Hujurat: 13).
The capacity of the personality of the leader who directs the people religiously, politically and ideologically is no less important than any of the above. Indeed, it is considered one of the most important elements of successful administration. The leader is the axis around which matters pivot. He employs the community to achieve his goals and directs people to goodness and happiness. He warns them against evil and danger according to his lights. Among the duties of the leader – after trust in and reliance upon his Lord and Creator – is to make a diligent effort in directing the activities of all the employees and volunteers who assist him – in an atmosphere of cooperation – towards the fixed goal. He is also responsible for creating strong feelings among the people to move quiet hearts and slumbering eyes, and energize the human power for self-sacrifice for the sake of achieving high and lofty goals. It is notable that among the qualities of the successful leader are that he is free; male; of sound mind and emotion; with knowledge; vision; strength; courage; wisdom; organizational skills and other qualities mentioned in the books of fiqh and ‘aqidah. So seek it where you would expect to find it.
1. After this pleasant introduction, I take you to the subject of this study by saying: In its entire organization, the Islamic Emirate relies on the Book of Allah Almighty and upon the Sunnah of his Messenger (SAW), the Sunnah of the rightly guided Caliphs and the sayings of the Companions, may Allah be pleased with them all. It utilizes the fatwas of the followers and the opinions of mujtahid scholars, may Allah Almighty have mercy on them. The Emirate borrows from the history of bygone nations and its system consists of the components of a successful administration balanced with the sanctity of its goals, the vision of its leader, and the strength of its faith and the qualifications of its workers with regards to piety; devotion; trust; competence, etc.
2. Based on this, the Administrative System of the Islamic Emirate is based upon the principles of the Islamic Caliphate from the era of the rightly guided Caliphs, may Allah be pleased with them, in dividing the country into provinces, appointing pious and righteous governors, guiding workers to piety and justice, encouraging the establishment of a religious and worldly policy, tending to the needs of the people, instructing them in matters of religion and encouraging them to make the utmost effort in promoting virtue and preventing vice. Regulations have been drawn up for the guidance of the Mujahideen fi sabeel Allah. Messages are constantly sent for this purpose to guide them; direct their deeds; illuminate their thoughts and have them follow in the footsteps of the Companions, may Allah be pleased with them. Umar ibn al-Khattab, may Allah be pleased with him, spoke to the people thus, saying ”O people, by Allah I do not send you governors to flog you or take your wealth but I send them to teach you your Religion and the way you should follow (sunnah). If anything other than this is done to anyone, he should refer the matter to me. By Him in whose hand is Umar’s soul, I will provide justice for him.” (History of Islam/Dr. Hasan Ibrahim/part 1, page 455).
Uthman ibn Affan, may Allah be pleased with him, wrote to his governors in the provinces, saying: “Allah has decreed the imams to be shepherds, he did not ask them to be tax collectors. When this Ummah emerged, they were created as shepherds; they were not created as tax collectors. Your imams are on the verge of becoming tax collectors and not shepherds. If that happens, diffidence, fidelity and loyalty will be torn apart. The best course is to look to the affairs of Muslims and what is requested of them. Give to them what is their due and take from them what you ought”.(Previous reference/part 1/page 455).
3. The area of our Muslim country of Afghanistan is approximately 650,000 square kilometers with an estimated population of at least 33 million people. The country is divided into 34 administrative units, each named a province such as Qandahar, Helmand, Herat and Balkh province. Moreover, each province is divided into multiple directorates, big and small such as Marjah in Helmand province, Arghandab in Qandahar province, etc. Each directorate contains beautiful areas and numerous villages. There are a total of 400 provinces, while there are tens of thousands of villages.
4. In each village, there is a faithful leader (appointed) by the Emirate and who is responsible for civilian and military affairs. He has around him from 10 to 50 Mujahideen depending on the prevailing circumstances. A new leader is selected from among them if the previous leader is martyred or is unable to continue to lead for any reason. In case of a disagreement, the matter is elevated to the amirs above them. This battalion – called a front – is ready for combat and to fight against the enemy night and day. They are also recourse to which people
NOTE: This question came about as a result of the recent spate of self-immolations that have occurred throughout the Arab world following the original one from Muḥammad al-Bū’azīzī of Tunisia, which sparked the uprising that overthrew former Presiden Ben ‘Alī.
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Fatwā from Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shanqīṭī of Minbar at-Tawḥīd wa’l-Jihād- “Ruling on Suicide Bombers ‘Lighting Oneself on Fire'”
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UPDATE 2/8 8:46 AM: al-Qādisīyyah Media Productions released an Urdu and Hindi translation of the below audio message. For more background on the creation of the al-Qādisīyyah Media outlet see here.
Urdu:
Usāmah Bin Lāden — “From Usāmah Bin Lāden to the French People” (Urdu)
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Usāmah Bin Lāden — “From Usāmah Bin Lāden to the French People” (Hindi)
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UPDATE 1/26 7:52 AM: Here is a video with English subtitles:
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UPDATE 1/24 7:38 AM: Click here for an English translation of the below audio message.
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UPDATE 1/23 7:50 AM: Anṣār al-Mujāhidīn Arabic Forum posted a Russian translation of the below audio:
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UPDATE 1/23 7:42 AM: Click here for an Arabic transcript of the below audio message.
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NOTE: This was originally released through al-Jazeera Arabic TV yesterday. This statement is a follow up to AQIM’s statement this past November by their amīr Abū Muṣ’ab ‘Abd al-Wadūd (‘Abd al-Malik Drūkdīl) titled “Any Negotiations For French Hostages Must Be Conducted With Bin Lāden Himself.” Additionally, UBL’s last release was about the French hostages as well, which came out in late October titled “A Letter for the People of France.” Here are some key quotes from the below audio:
President Nicolas Sarkozy’s refusal to remove his forces from Afghanistan is nothing but a green light to kill the French hostages. But we will not do that at the time that he determines to try and finish off with the repercussions of his position, which will cost him dearly inside and outside of France.
We repeat the same message to you: The release of your prisoners in the hands of our brothers is linked to the withdrawal of your soldiers from our countries, its doubt and budget deficit does not need a new front.
As one can see, UBL provides AQIM with sanction to kill hostages if they would like at a time of their choosing. In the tape UBL also gives permission for attacks inside and outside France. As such, it would not be surprising to see more attempted plots and/or attacks against France in the near future.
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As-Saḥāb Media releases new audio message from Usāmah Bin Lāden: “From Usāmah Bin Lāden to the French People”
Audio:
Video:
NOTE: Jamā’at Sharī’at, is the largest jihādī groupin the Russian republic of Dagestan, North Caucasus. Jamā’at Sharī’at was established during the Second Chechen War. They were in favor of Dagestan’s independence as an Islamic state and are currently under the umbrella of the Caucasus Emirate, which is led by Dokku Umarov. The below statement is unedited in its original Russian version.
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English:
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| Front yard of the brothel “White Nights”, destroyed by the Mujahideen of the Khasavyurt Jamaat on January 14, 2011. |
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| The stock of alcohol of the “establishment”. |
3. Kommerstant as well as other russian medias reported that the owners allegedly refused to pay a tax to the Mujahideen.
Russian:
Владельцам злачных мест и их покровителям: танк для разрешения проблемы не понадобился
20.01.11 11:50
Хотим сообщить, что уничтожение развлекательного борделя “Белые ночи” несколько дней назад, а так же вчерашнее уничтожение супермаркета “Караван” является специальной военной акцией хасавюртовского джамаата ДФ.
Владельцы супермаркета “Караван” были неоднократно предупреждены, но они возгордились и высказывали смелые заявления. Как видите, танк для разрешения проблемы не понадобился.
Мы хотим предупредить простых жителей Хасавюрта – владельцев и посетителей таких злачных мест – подумайте о том, что любое место, где распространяют мерзость – вроде спиртного и проституток – является нашей законной целью – уничтожение которых вопрос только времени и рано или поздно они вкусят свое наказание прежде всего в этом мире, потом на том свете, иншааЛлах.
Мы так же напоминаем вас, что работа в таких заведениях является харамом и опасным для жизни и прежде чем пойти работать в такие злачные места подумайте семь раз, стоит ли оно того. А наш вам совет – не продавайте свою душу за копейки.
Один из хадисов гласит: «Вино – источник грехов. Тот, кто выпил вина, теряет разум. Он никого не уважает. Даже своих родных и близких, легко совершает дурные поступки. Дух веры и благочестия покидает его, дух мерзости и порочности вселяется в него. Его проклинает бог, ангелы, пророки и правоверные. Сорок дней его молитвы не будут услышаны. В день Страшного суда лицо его будет чёрным, язык – свисать изо рта, слюна – течь на грудь….».
Мы со всей ответственностью заявляем что работа будет продолжена и что мы руководствуемся Кораном и Сунной, а не по заказу каких-либо из людей – ваших конкурентов и попутчиков в огонь Ада.
Мы просим братьев не поддаваться слухам, которые распространяют наши недоброжелатели, что якобы мы берем деньги от врагов Аллаха – взамен на безопасность. Аллах не предлагает им безопасность и мы не можем им такое позволить ни за какие деньги.
Аллаху Акбар!
Хасавюртовский джамаат, ВД, ИК
ДШ
NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to Global Jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.
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By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
On January 19, Joshua Foust posted a rather interesting article at Jihadology questioning Anwar al-Aulaqi’s importance as a jihadi ideologue, and in so doing, also called into question the assumed linkage between Islamist ideology and behavior. Though Foust’s post raises interesting and valid questions, and introduces bodies of research that are often ignored in debates over terrorist radicalization, I find his conclusion problematic for three reasons. First, Foust seems to be arguing against a strawman on the question of how ideology can have an impact on behavior. Second, the applicability of his general observations about the connection between ideas and behavior is questionable in the context of Islamist ideology. And third, erecting the very high evidentiary standard with which Foust concludes his article is not at all helpful when it comes to a problem set like terrorist radicalization, which it is necessary to address now.
Strawman Opponent?
It is somewhat unclear what Foust is objecting to within the current literature on radicalization—which, in fairness, is reflected in his post’s title, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology.” But to the extent his article refutes a definable set of ideas, it seems to argue against monocausal explanations of behavior. Specifically, Foust writes:
The assumption behind the ideology discussion appears to be that behavior is a gun, and ideology is a trigger. That is, you have a person, they accept ideology, and then the output is behavior (in this case, violence). But that just isn’t how people work, and using some basic logic and self-knowledge can reveal that. We are not mono-causal creatures, even in relatively simple matters like choosing where to eat lunch.
The last point is undoubtedly correct: we are not monocausal creatures. But which authors, specifically, share this set of assumptions? A careful reading of Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens’s Foreign Policy article that is the hook for Foust’s piece reveals no such monocausal assumption, though Meleagrou-Hitchens clearly does conclude—contrary to Foust—that ideology is important. Nor does Foust point to other authors who write about ideology as though it is the sole cause of terrorist violence.
This framing of the discussion seems designed to bolster the importance of Foust’s refutation. But the contribution an author can make by refuting a clearly exaggerated interpretation of a subject is minimal when that exaggerated interpretation does not represent the conventional wisdom in a field. And in the academic discussion of terrorist ideology, it seems that the dominant opinion among prominent scholars—including Marc Sageman, Jessica Stern, Robert Pape, Jerrold Post, and now apparently Brian Michael Jenkins—is that religious ideology is relatively unimportant. (There are of course plenty of scholars on the other side of this debate, including Mary Habeck, Assaf Moghadam, and myself.)
So let’s define the debate in a more reasonable way. The question is not whether terrorists are automatons who read something on the Internet and then act in service of that idea. They aren’t, full stop. Rather, the question is whether religious/ideological factors seem to provide a robust explanation for both terrorist radicalization and also terrorist actions.
One Man’s Experiences
Before turning to the role of al-Aulaqi specifically, I’d like to address the role that Islamist ideology has on behavior. Foust writes: “The heart of my problem with discussing Islamist ideology is that I don’t understand how it affects behavior.” This is because behavior is complex, encompassing such causal factors as “constraints, signaling from peers, intent, and capability.” On the question of how Islamist ideology can impact behavior, I believe the answer is so obvious as to be virtually indisputable. Note that Foust frames the issue as Islamist and not jihadi ideology. I don’t know whether this framing was purposeful, but I’m glad that he put the question this way, because an examination of Islamist behavior is illuminating.
As I recently discussed on a Bloggingheads appearance with Matt Duss, and as a number of readers will know, before my entry into the counterterrorism field I worked for an Islamist charity, the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, that has now been named a specially designed global terrorist entity by the U.S. Treasury Department. I had converted to Islam in college, and worked for Al Haramain in 1998-1999 between college and law school. I entered as a relative Islamic novice, with a very moderate conception of the faith; during my time at Al Haramain, my behavior changed substantially and I ultimately adopted an interpretation that I now consider extreme. Though I wrote a book about this period in my life, until now I have not really introduced my experiences into my own academic work on radicalization due to my awareness that people often universalize their own experiences improperly. However, their applicability should be clear in this response to Foust; and then I will introduce my empirical work on the subject.
At its heart, Islamism holds that human instincts and inclinations do not provide a reliable guide for determining morality. The reason Islamists believe that society should be governed by sharia is because man-made laws are contingent, and subject to shifting views of morality. Only God’s guidance, as best exemplified in the Qur’an and sunna, provides a reliable and unquestionable framework for determining how a society should be run. But if we can only trust God—and, related to that, Muhammad’s example—for the making of laws, isn’t it just as true that only the sunna can provide a guide to how we should live our own lives?
Thus, within Islamism, one’s behavior is clearly and unequivocally controlled by ideology. I encountered an intricately legalistic system within Al Haramain, wherein the restrictions were virtually all-encompassing. Growing a beard was required for men; likewise it was necessary to eat only with the right hand and roll one’s pants legs up above the ankles. Petting a dog, listening to music, and shaking hands with a member of the opposite sex all clearly transgressed the bounds of morality. Quite clearly ideology played a role in these behavioral outcomes. Absent the prevalent ideology (which could be described either as Islamism or Islamic conservatism), there is simply no explanation for why a relatively large number of people would decide to grow their beards out in a similar way, see dogs as unclean, stop making physical contact with members of the opposite sex, et cetera. While Foust writes that behavioral changes occur “in an unpredictable way,” in this case the behavioral changes all comported with the dominant ideology.
Moving beyond my own experiences, one of the remarkable aspects of Islamism—giving lie to Foust’s claim that behavioral changes in this area are unpredictable—is the consistency of behavioral changes across a broad array of cases. To be clear, not all Islamist interpretations of the faith are alike, and there are variegations among known Islamists, but in case after case the behavioral changes mirror those I experienced during my time at Al Haramain. One example is the Duka brothers—Shain, Eljvir, and Dritan—who were arrested with three others in May 2007 for plotting to attack the military base in Fort Dix, New Jersey. As the brothers turned to Islamism, they alienated family members with the announcement that “[t]he playing of music—a centuries-old tradition at Albanian weddings—had been banned” at Eljvir Duka’s wedding. Similarly, they spent an extended conversation captured via covert surveillance exploring the legalistic rules of how their beards should be kept:
Dritan Duka: That’s not really the way it [the beard] should be kept, it should be kept trimmed.
Unidentified male: It’s supposed to be neat, not, right trimmed but not over your lip.
Dritan Duka: Not shaved off completely.
Shain Duka then told a story about how a man in a Popeyes Chicken restaurant, after staring at them for a short time, asked why young men like them had such large beards. Shain recounted that “then we explained to him listen all the prophets wore beards and were Muslim so we wear the beards because all prophets wore beards.” Similarly, Daniel Joseph Maldonado’s behavioral changes included “wearing traditional Arab clothing, including the galabeyah, an ankle-length gown with long sleeves that covered the tattoos on his arms.” Tattoos are considered haram (prohibited by Islamic law) within the dominant conservative interpretations of Islam. Maldonado also tried to grow a beard; when he failed, “he blamed his Puerto Rican heritage and began chastising fellow Muslims who could grow a full beard and chose not to.”
Both Adam Gadahn and John Walker Lindh stopped listening to music. Gadahn had previously been seriously obsessed with death metal, but gave away virtually his entire music collection. Explaining this to the recipient, Gadahn said: “Well, I turned
