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Source: RocketChat
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Source: RocketChat
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Source: RocketChat
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Since the beginning of the year, counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts have zeroed in on the Islamic State’s Khorasan “province” (ISKP). This is unsurprising given that governments have connected ISKP to recent large-scale attacks and plots in Iran, Turkey, Russia, and Europe. Yet other provinces in the IS global network have also been involved in external operations planning—albeit unsuccessfully until the July 15 mass shooting against Shia worshippers in Oman, the first jihadist attack in that country’s history. For this reason, it is more important than ever to understand that IS today has a multipronged strategy to target its enemies, and this strategy is coordinated via its General Directorate of Provinces—individual “provinces” do not have independent strategies.
In the first half of 2024, there have been eight IS external plots and attacks unrelated to ISKP and seventeen related to ISKP. Regarding the successful attacks in Iran, Turkey, and Russia, governments disclosed the ISKP connection, but IS itself did not claim any of them for ISKP. The Turkish incident was designated as a Turkey “province” attack. Of the plots not related to ISKP, three have been connected to the IS province in Iraq (two in Germany, one in Kuwait), two were connected to the Syria province (in Israel and France), and the others were connected to the Somalia and Pakistan provinces (in Sweden and India, respectively). Given the frequency of such plots since January, more can be expected by year’s end.
With the Oman attack, it is still too early to know how it unfolded or what planning was behind it. Most likely, however, it was connected to IS-Yemen. From 2017 to 2019, IS leaders in Iraq and Syria asked the Yemen province to plan attacks in Oman targeting the embassies of countries that participated in the global coalition fighting the organization in Iraq and Syria. Hopefully, the Omani government will be transparent in its investigation and enable a better understanding of the network behind the incident, with Washington providing any necessary assistance based on its strong signals intelligence capabilities. Either way, the foiled plots not related to ISKP can help shed light on the Islamic State’s global plans.
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The Islamic State today looks different than it did five years ago and is far more integrated now as an organization amongst its global network than al-Qaeda ever was. It has been 10 years since the Islamic State announced itself as a caliphate and more than five years since it lost its last vestige of territory in Syria. However, with the Islamic State back in the news due to an increasing external operations capacity (with attacks in Iran, Turkey, and Russia this year as well as numerous broken up plots in Europe), there is a fundamental misunderstanding of how the group operates today. In many ways, it is either incorrectly viewed through the lens of how al-Qaeda operates (a decentralized branch network), since it had previously been a part of al-Qaeda’s global network, or based on how the Islamic State operated when it was at its prior zenith when it controlled territory in Iraq and Syria. It is also likely why some within the U.S. government may have misinterpreted signals intelligence by pushing the idea that the Islamic State leader targeted in Somalia at the end of May, Abd al Qadir Mumin, became the group’s caliph. These changes in the past five years are crucial for policymakers to understand because the way the threat presents itself today will look different from how policymakers dealt with the issue last decade when much of the focus was on the Islamic State’s territorial control in Iraq and Syria.
The most important body for understanding the Islamic State today is its General Directorate of Provinces, which has previously been based in Syria, but new information suggests that at least at the highest levels of it might now have centrality in Somalia. When one understands that structure, the Islamic State’s actions globally make more sense. It is also why we see far more interaction and connection between its various wilayat (provinces) today than in the past. In many ways, the key aspects that animate the Islamic State as an organization (governance, foreign fighter mobilization, and external operations) remain, they have just moved from primarily being based out of or controlled by its location of origin in Iraq and Syria to being spread across its global provincial network. Its aims remain the same, even if the organization has adapted to a changed environment. It is also why the challenge from the Islamic State today is different from the past and why it is in some ways also more resilient now to pressure than before.
This makes the challenge of the Islamic State more difficult from a security perspective than in the past when there was the ability to primarily zero-in on its efforts in Iraq and Syria. Today, only focusing on Iraq and Syria or any other province independent of understanding its connections to other parts of the group’s global network will lead to missing crucial details due to expediency. This is why, although it is understandable that the United States has shifted a lot of its manpower and budgeting to more existential and larger problem-sets such as China and Russia, it would be a mistake to neglect the Islamic State as a continuing, but evolving security challenge. Therefore, it is still useful to continue to have and add more funded government positions across different agencies and departments to focus on tracking this threat to better get ahead of the next surprise. Otherwise, mistakes of misinterpretation will be made as in the past.
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic State’s Wilāyat Khurāsān — The Fear and Terror of the Attack In Moscow
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Source: RocketChat
In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the beneficent
حامدا ومصلیا وبعد
First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude to the governments of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan for hosting this meeting and inviting us on behalf of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to take part in order to discuss and talk in-depth about the most recent political, security, and economic developments in our country.
Dear attendees,
Two years ago, on October 16, 2021, a delegation of the IEA participated in the Moscow format meeting at a time when the American and NATO occupation in Afghanistan and the administration dependent on them was toppled, and the new government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan had just begun working. At that time, there were deep concerns and serious questions regarding the future governance, the revival of government institutions, especially the reactivation of the security sector ministries, the security situation and drugs.
We believed in the special help of Allah, the support of the people, and our firm determination that as soon as the occupation ends, we will lay the foundation stone of an independent, peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan. All praise belongs to Allah almighty as this task begun and efforts underway to strengthened it.
For the past two years, in this format and other formats, We gave satisfaction and promised that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, as a responsible government, will not allow any threat to the world, the region and especially to its neighbouring countries from the territory of Afghanistan, and this promise has been well implemented.
In the past two years, while rebuilding the political, security and economic foundations of our government, we have accelerated the fight against the insurgent groups trained in the shadow of the invaders and were able to destroy the hideouts of Daesh throughout the country in a very professional manner and thus we foiled the last attempt of a big conspiracy against the security of the entire region including Afghanistan.
Dear attendees,
In the past half a century, Afghanistan was faced with many political, security, economic, social and especially domestic legitimacy crisis, which caused many challenges; Scientific and practical experience showed that the main root of the crisis was the application of foreign versions, models and orders regarding the domestic problem, which ignored our geography, history, culture, religious and social values.
A valid example of our claim is the last two years of government, where we ended the war without any help or support, we centralized the government, we made the budget independent, we did not threaten anyone from the country. We have effectively fought against drugs, we have expanded job opportunities in the government and private sector, access to justice has been extended to every district and village, we have created facilities for trade, transit and investment, in different parts of the country. We have started a rehabilitation project and ensured transparency in the delivery of services to the deprived sections of the people.
In the last 20 years, the so-called all-inclusive regime did not achieve this despite hundreds of thousands of foreign and domestic soldiers, advanced weapons, extensive financial support and political support from the region and western countries, which is the main reason for the collapse. As a result of accepting the orders, a crisis of legitimacy was created for the people and the people were opposed to it.
Based on this, we have established a government that enjoys religious and national legitimacy along with good governance, taking into account the religion, history, culture and especially the immediate political realities of our people. I hope that the countries of the region and the world also put their stamp of approval on this fact, but in the last 45 years, no foreign version like undefined inclusiveness has solved the problems of Afghanistan.
We hope from all countries, especially our neighbors and the countries of the region, as we do not convoy direction to others regarding the form of governance, they should also instead of presenting prescriptions regarding the form of governance of Afghanistan start official work with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in every field so that the hands of the evil directions can be cut off as well as take part as per their resources and capacity to use this historic opportunity for the benefit of the stability and prosperity the Euro-Asia region, which forms nearly seventy percent of the world’s population, most of the wealth and a third of the energy.
Dear attendees,
In the end, I would like to reference a few important issues.
First: Now as the occupation of Afghanistan has ended, security has been restored and there is a strong political will, it is time to implement the regional connectivity project cantered on Afghanistan. Based on our economic oriented foreign policy, we are ready to provide all necessary facilities for regional connectivity be it in the form of transport or in the form of energy transfer.
After the new political developments, now more than ever the conditions are suitable for the implementation of the “North-South Trade Corridor”. We support the statements of the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Mr. Mikhail Mishustin, who said that “Russia is ready to focus on the development of trade routes in the Euro-Asia region, including Afghanistan and South Asia.” It should also be important for the countries of the region to know how to protect their interests and take advantage of opportunities.
Second: Afghanistan has a strong potential for economic cooperation, trade and investment, and we have no discrimination in infrastructure projects, energy, mining, agriculture, communication lines, and especially the railway that connects the entire region through Afghanistan, we are ready to provide the necessary facilities.
Third: We are reiterating our preparations in the field of border cooperation with neighboring countries to prevent the movement of smugglers and other destructive elements. Countering these threats requires collective cooperation. We have made effective efforts in this area and we have fought to reduce drug cultivation and trafficking to zero; But in the field of smuggling, which requires bilateral cooperation, we need the cooperation of the respective countries.
Fourth: During the last two years, Afghanistan witnessed the beginning of extensive political and diplomatic interactions with many countries, especially with the countries of the region. In this regard, the countries of the region were very forward, thank you!
We call this a new chapter of diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and the region and the world. For example, the People’s Republic of China introduced an ambassador to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan according to diplomatic formalities. We hope that this action of China will become a good example for other countries and our ambassadors will also accept it in order to provide effective engagement in view of mutual benefits.
Fifth: Tourists, diplomats, aid workers, journalists and researchers from different countries of the world come to Afghanistan with confidence and roam freely throughout the country.
Therefore, we once again announce that anyone who is worried about security or drugs from Afghanistan should go to Afghanistan instead of listening to the propaganda of selfish people and reacting to this selfish propaganda. They should come, sent delegations and see everything with their own eyes so that their worries are relieved and they are satisfied.
In the end, besides thanking the Russian Federation for this initiative, I once again call on the neighbors and the countries of the region that Afghanistan is ready to interact positively with all of them based on common legitimate interests, and we hope that all countries taking into account their national interests will use this opportunity.
Thank you for your attention and have a great time.
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Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for giving me the opportunity to testify today on terrorism threats emanating from parts of the African continent, in particular focusing on issues and recommendations related to the Sahel region, especially in Mali where insecurity is getting worse by the day. There are two main jihadist groups now operating there: the Islamic State’s Sahel Province and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).
This increased insecurity can be directly linked to the August 2022 withdrawal of French forces operating under the Operation Barkhane counterinsurgency mission. At the time of the French departure, the Mali insurgency had not been deterred or defeated, but it has undoubtedly worsened since. This suggests France at the very least was managing the situation in hopes that a future easing of the political tempest would facilitate a more sustainable resolution. The French withdrew at the request of the government of interim Malian president Assimi Goita, who seized power after a May 2021 coup and expressed his preference for the Russian-sponsored Wagner Group as a counterterrorism partner.
The latter point highlights the fact that Washington and its allies cannot bifurcate counterterrorism and great power competition. A position that casts counterterrorism and great power competition as an either/or challenge will only undermine the challenge of both. While this discussion is focused on Mali and the Sahel more generally, this dynamic first occurred in Syria since the 2011 uprising and is also playing out in Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal in mid-August 2021.
Click here to read the written testimony it in full.
In April, Islamic State fighters in Mali seized villages surrounding the city of Menaka, marking the group’s first territorial conquest since losing its final Syrian foothold in 2019. The human cost of these advances has been steep. By May, at least 150,000 individuals had reportedly been displaced, and civilians have been subjected to targeted killings, kidnappings, and looting. The offensive occurred amid a string of regional of security setbacks: namely, France’s August 2022 military withdrawal (which followed the Malian junta’s expressed preference for Russia’s Wagner Group), the April 2023 dissolution of the UN mission in Mali, and the junta’s decision earlier this month to form a tripartite alliance with Burkina Faso and Niger, thereby undermining the French-led G5 Sahel framework designed to thwart jihadist actors in the region.
In this amply illustrated Policy Note, Aaron Zelin and Sarah Cahn explain that while the United States may have limited room for maneuver in Mali today, it can promote regional stability and U.S. national interests by pursuing further sanctions against local Islamic State officials and exploring constructive arrangements with nearby African states.
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Teḥrīk-ī-Ṭālibān Pākistān — Welcoming the Russian President’s Statement on Blasphemy!
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Source: Telegram
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