Hizballah Cavalcade: Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 3

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 3
By Phillip Smyth
Click here for a PDF version of this post
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Collecting information for profiles of Iraqi Shia killed fighting in Syria became more complicated following further acknowledgements by Hizballah’s leadership of their involvement in Syria.[1] Concurrently, Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA), the Damascus-based pro-Assad Shia militia which includes a large number of Iraqi Shia, also became more open with their recognition of Lebanese Hizballah members killed serving with the group. Thus, announcements-of-death for Iraqi LAFA members were often mixed with large numbers of Lebanese Hizballah martyrdom announcements.
Martyrdom declarations for Iraqi Shia have also continued to follow a format where the majority of dead individuals have only one or two photographs of themselves released. Often, the photographs of these dead fighters are found on an official martyrdom poster produced by the Iraqi group to which these fighters originally belonged. On rare occasions, killed Iraqi Shia will have many photographs of them or their funerals displayed online. One Facebook-hosted funeral photo album, released for Al-Sa’id Mutheneh ‘Abees Khafeef, numbered around 80 photographs.
It has become increasingly clear that the majority of Iraqi Shia killed fighting in Syria have belonged to the Iranian created and backed, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq has not announced the loss of any of their members via their website. Instead, the group has relied on quasi-official and pro-Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas Facebook pages to report its dead. At times, announcements for killed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq members have first emerged on Facebook pages and forums (including official forums) for Lebanese Hizballah. This likely demonstrates another deep link the group has with Lebanese Hizballah.[2]
Kata’ib Hizballah, another Iraqi organization created by the Iranians, had announced that it lost a number of members in Syria in mid-March-mid-April. However, this organization has not issued any new statements regarding further losses.[3]
This post only includes five dead from a period starting on May 18, 2013 and ending on May 31, 2013. One killed Iraqi Shia fighter reported dead on May 9th, was also confirmed.  Despite the lower number of Iraqi Shia declared as, “killed fighting in Syria”; there is a strong possibility reported numbers of Iraqi Shia killed in Syria may rise in the coming weeks.
Nine pro-Hizballah, pro-Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas, Iraqi Shia, and pro-Assad Facebook pages (all Shia oriented) were utilized in the collection of information for this list. Two pro-Hizballah forums—one official and one quasi-official—were also employed for confirmation purposes.
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Name: Al-Sa’id Mutheneh ‘Abees Khafeef
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 18, 2013 (via Facebook). The funeral was held on May 18, 2013 in Baghdad.
Notes:  Khafeef’s funeral had an entire photo album on Facebook devoted to it. Additionally a video of the funeral was also posted to YouTube.
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Name: Hamid Abu ‘Amran al-Bahadali (A.K.A. Abu ‘Amran/’Umran)
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas/Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
Death Announced: May 26, 2013 (two Facebook pages claimed his death was announced on May 25th)
Notes:  Bahadali was initially only claimed by Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas as a member. However, on May 28th it was announced on a prominent pro-Hizballah/pro-LAFA Facebook page that he also belonged to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. His funeral was reportedly held in Baghdad.
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Name: Dergham Hisham al-Sa’di al-Baya (A.K.A. Dergham al-Sa’di)
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 23, 2013. Funeral was held (in Iraq) on May 24, 2013.
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Name: Iyad Fadhl Matar al-Sarifawi
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
Death Announced: May 28, 2013, (reportedly killed on May 26, 2013)
Notes:  This is the first Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq martyrdom poster (for a member killed in Syria) to feature Iraq’s late Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr (left) and Iranian Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei (right) as bereaved over the loss of a fighter. Al-Sarifawi’s death could only be confirmed on two pro-Hizballah Facebook pages. Since all other Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq members killed in Syria have also fought under the banner of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas, it is probable that Sarifawi fought as a member of that organization. However, any affiliation with LAFA has not been publicized.
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Name: Haidar Jabari Salman al-Jazari
Affiliated With: Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 24, 2013 (via YouTube video posting). Funeral was held in Basra, Iraq on May 23, 2013.
Notes:  In the video for Jazari, it is claimed he was a “Commander” for the “Sacred defense” of the Zaynab Shrine in Damascus. Jazari’s claimed affiliation with Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (on his martyrdom poster) is another important facet of his background. The group was first mentioned in late-April during a funeral for an Iraqi Shia in Basra. Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada may be a new organization used to vector volunteer fighters to fight at the Zaynab Shrine. As with other Iraqi Shia killed in Syria, Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas also claimed Jazari as a member.
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Name: Maytham Khalaf al-‘Aqabi (A.K.A. Ghayth al-‘Asab)
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 9, 2013
Notes:  As with most other killed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq members, ‘Aqabi’s poster features Iraq’s late Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr (left) and Iranian Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei (right). His Iraqi roots were not hidden, with Iraq’s flag and the symbol for Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq pictured between the two ayatollahs.

Untitled186 [1] “Hezbollah leader Nasrallah vows victory in Syria”, BBC, May 25, 2013, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22669230. [2] See: “Analysis Of The History And Growth Of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, The League Of The Righteous, An Interview With Institute for the Study of War’s Sam Wyer”, Musings On Iraq Blog, January 7, 2013, https://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2013/01/analysis-of-history-and-growth-of-asaib.html [3] Note: As with Lebanese Hizballah, Iraq’s Kata’ib Hizballah has never officially announced its members were being killed in Syria.  Instead, the group claimed its fighters were killed while performing their, “Jihadist duties”.

New article from Shaykh Abū Basīr al-Ṭarṭūsī: "They Leave the People of Syria, the Soldiers of al-Shām, and They Join the Iraqi State"


Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū Basīr al-Ṭarṭūsī — “They Leave the People of Syria, the Soldiers of al-Shām, and They Join the Iraqi State”
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To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: [email protected]

Hizballah Cavalcade: Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 2

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here. Click here for part one of ‘Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria’.

By Phillip Smyth
Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 2
The latest installment of Iraqi Shia killed in Syria demonstrates a more publicly acknowledged level of Iranian involvement. Two bodies of Iraqi Shia fighters killed in Syria were returned to Iraq through the Iran-Iraq border. Family members of one of the dead Iraqis told the Associated Press that he had gone to Iran before heading to Syria.[1]
The make-up of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s (LAFA) — a Syrian-based Shia militant group—membership was also exposed. Demonstrating a slight departure from earlier martyrdom announcements, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) more broadly acknowledged that their fighters in Syria operate exclusively under LAFA’s moniker. Earlier announcements listed only one of AAH fighters as serving with LAFA.
Three of the Iraqis killed were reportedly not claimed as members by any Iraqi Shia parties (including pro-Iranian Iraq-based groups). This partially fits with LAFA’s narrative that they are staffed by volunteer fighters from throughout the Shia Islamic world. However, with the recent revelations, it becomes clearer that LAFA fighters are most likely vetted and trained by Iran before heading off to fight in Syria.
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Name: Ala’a Muhsen Shahib al-Tamimi
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 15, 2013. His death was first announced on Facebook.
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Name: Ali Abdul al-Wahid ‘Awlan
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 15, 2013. His death was first announced on Facebook on May 16, 2013.
Notes: Iran’s Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is pictured on the right and Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr is pictured on the left.
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Name:  Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki (A.K.A. Mohammed Aboud)
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 17, 2013. Funeral held on May 17, 2013.
Notes: According to Elaph.com, Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki was a 27 year old Iraqi from Basra. Elaph also said he was not claimed by any Iraqi organization as a member. It was also reported by the Associated Press that Aboud went to Iran before heading to fight in Syria. Maliki’s body and that of fellow fighter Hassan Ali Farhud were also transferred back to Iraq via Iran. Since it was announced he was killed fighting around Damascus’s Zaynab Shrine, it is possible he was fighting as a member of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. One released photo of Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki, which was posted on pro-Lebanese Hizballah and pro-Liwa’a Abu Fadl al Abbas Facebook pages, also claimed he belonged to Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas.
The released photo may also point to al-Maliki’s training influences. Holding the magazine of the rifle is a common fire-control technique used by Hizballah and is featured in a number of their propaganda videos.
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Name:  Hassan Ali Farhud
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas* (?)
Death Announced: May 17, 2013. Funeral held on May 17, 2013.
Notes: According to Al-Sumaria News, Farhud was a 32 year old from Basra, Iraq. His body, along with Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki (see above) were returned to Iraq via Iran. It is unknown whether he engaged in training in Iran or which group he served with. Since it was reported he was killed fighting around the Zaynab Shrine in Damascus, it can be assumed he was part of Liw’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. At the time this was written, no photos of Farhud were released.

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Name:  Diya Mutasher al-Issawi
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 5, 2013. Funeral held on May 6, 2013.
Notes: The Iraq-based Buratha News Agency reported the 30 year old was originally from Iraq’s Basra province. Issawi was not claimed by any Iraqi party as a member. Also, it is unknown whether Issawi was trained in Iran or elsewhere.

Untitled71 [1] “Bombings at Sunni mosque and funeral kill 47 in Iraq”, Associated Press, May 17, 2013,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqis-in-southern-city-mourn-2-shiite-fighters-killed-in-syria/2013/05/17/a53d1988-bece-11e2-b537-ab47f0325f7c_story.html.

Hizballah Cavalcade: Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 1

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

By Phillip Smyth
Reports of Iraqi Shia involvement in the Syrian Civil War surged from January-May, 2013.[1] In March, the first photos and bios of Iraqi Shia killed during the fighting were released. Many of these announcements, photos of those killed, and other information received much broader coverage after it was spread on forums and Facebook pages. Thus far, the only two Iraqi groups to have announced they have lost members have been Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous) and Kata’ib Hizballah (Hizballah Brigades).
It should be mentioned that Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq has not announced on its official webpage that it has had any “Martyrs” in recent months. Nevertheless, the group has set-up funeral processions for its dead in major Iraqi cities. In sharp contrast to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s lacking web announcements; Kata’ib Hizballah updates its webpage regularly and in a more detailed fashion, regarding the fate of its members who have been killed and their funerals. Both Kata’ib Hizballah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, like their Lebanese counterpart, Hizballah, do not mention where these fighters were killed. Regardless, on most forums and Facebook pages, those who post comments are generally aware that the two groups are actively involved in fighting in Syria.

Created during the height of Coalition operations during the Iraq War, together, Kata’ib Hizballah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq have received extensive assistance from Lebanese Hizballah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp.[2] Both Iraqi groups are also major supporters of Iranian Revolutionary Islamist ideology (Wilayat al-Faqih).[3] Thus, it is extremely likely both organizations are acting as proxy forces for Iran. —

Name: Sa’ad Abed al-Qadr Abu Shamia’
Affiliated With: Kata’ib Hizballah
Death Announced: March 17, 2013
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Name: Ahmed Mahdi al-Shuweili (A.K.A. Qassim Abu Mahdi)
Affiliated With: Kata’ib Hizballah
Death Announced: March 15, 2013
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Name: Arfad Muhsein Al-Hamidawi (A.K.A. Abu Karar)
Affiliated With: Kata’ib Hizballah
Death Announced: April 2, 2013
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Name: Karar Abed al-Amir Fatlawi Abu Assad (A.K.A. Karar Fatlawi and Karar Abed al-Amir Aziz Abu Assad)
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: Early April, 2013.
Facebook Page: https://ar-ar.facebook.com/pages/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF/472898662780073
Note: Karar has one of the best developed narratives of any of the Iraqis killed. His story comes complete with numerous photos, a Facebook page, and supposed videos of him engaged in fighting. It is also important to note that he is the only one to have significant acceptance from supporters that he was a part of both Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and the Syria-based (members mainly come from Iraq and Lebanon) Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas.
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Name: Ahmed Farhud Hashim al-Zerjawi (A.K.A. Ahmed Farhud Hashim)
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
Death Announced: May 2, 2013 (for funeral held in Najaf, Iraq)
Note: Iran’s Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is pictured on the left and Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr is pictured on the right.
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 Name: Yahiya Sarmad Muhammed al-Fayli (A.K.A. Yahiya al-Fayli and Asu)
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
Death Announced: Early May, 2013 (most forums list between May, 5-May,7)
Note: Iran’s Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is pictured on the right and Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr is pictured on the left.
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[1] One example: Mariam Karouny, “Shi’ite fighters rally to defend Damascus shrine”, Reuters, March 3, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/03/us-syria-crisis-shiites-idUSBRE92202X20130303. [2] Elizabeth O’Bagy and Stephen Wicken , “Fact Sheet: Ali Musa Daqduq”, Institute For the Study of War, May 14, 2012, https://www.understandingwar.org/reference/fact-sheet-ali-mussa-daqduq. See also: Thomas Strouse, “Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Intricate Web of Iranian Military Involvement in Iraq”, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 9, March 4, 2010, https://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36109. [3] [Absolute] Wilayat al-Faqih (also known by in Persian as “Velayat-e-Faqih) is an ideological concept first drawn up by Iran’s late Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini posited that only learned clerics could rule over society and make political decisions. This was an extremely radical departure from the more traditional schools of Shi’ism. As a result, those currently following this ideology are religiously bound to follow the rulings of the Wali al-Faqih, who is currently Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. See also: Sam Wyer, The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Institute for the Study of War, Middle East Security Report 7,December, 2012, https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ResurgenceofAAH.pdf.

Expanding the Scope of Jihadology: Intro to the Hizballah Cavalcade

Three years ago, in May 2010, Jihadology.net was established to provide easy access to primary source materials from Sunni global jihadi groups affiliated or sympathetic to al-Qaeda’s worldview. I never would have imagined how large this site would become and want to thank everyone for that support and I hope it has been a useful resource. That being said, one of the largest conflicts embroiling the greater Middle East is the current civil war in Syria. As a consequence of the sectarianization of the war, non-state Shia jihadi groups aligned with the Iranian regime and Hizballah have joined the fight on the side of the Assad regime. It is important to note, that while both AQ-sympathetic and Iranian/Hizballah-sympathetic are  ‘jihadi’ in nature, this site is not conflating these two separate movements and strands of thought. Due to the dearth of information on Shia jihadi organizations, Jihadology hopes to fill the same type of gap it did when covering the study of AQ-type groups. For more on this new project (which will take a slightly different approach to what I have done as it relates to Sunni global jihadis), see the introduction to it below from Phillip Smyth.

What is Hizballah Cavalcade?
The new and improved Hizballah Cavalcade has now moved to its new home and will present new information here at Jihadology. Beginning as a humble Twitter hashtag (#HizballahCavalcade) by Phillip Smyth, Hizballah Cavalcade initially sought to post photos of Lebanese Hizballah members killed in Syria and their funerals.
Hizballah Cavalcade will now also focus on (but is not limited to) organizations such as: Lebanon’s Hizballah and Harakat Amal (Amal Movement); Iraq’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s (League of the Righteous), Kata’ib Hizballah (Hizballah Brigades), and Liwa’a al-Yum al-Mawud (Promised Day Brigades); and Syria’s new Liwa’a Abu Fadhl al-Abbas (The Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade).
By utilizing data found on sympathetic Facebook pages, YouTube accounts, and on forums, the new Hizballah Cavalcade will attempt to display available photos of all funerals and martyrdom posters belonging to Shia groups which are fighting in Syria. In addition, funeral, combat, and even music videos belonging to these groups pertaining to the fighting in Syria will also be posted.
About the Author:
Phillip Smyth is currently a researcher focusing on Hizballah for University of Maryland’s Institute for Advanced Computer Studies’ Lab for Computational Cultural Dynamics.

New statement from the Syrian Islamic Front's Ḥarakat Aḥrār al-Shām al-Islāmīyyah: "Clarification on the Declaration of the 'Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām' and Its Implications for the Domestic and Regional Arena"

UPDATE 5/6/13 1:36 PM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic statement:
In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful.
Praise be to God and prayers and peace upon the messenger of God.
We were surprised, just as many were surprised, by what Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, released concerning the announcement the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. We were similarly surprised by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s response, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, in which he pledged allegiance (bay’ah) to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda.
Given that we are watching with interest the implications of the event – and what it means in terms of its large impact on the internal and regional arenas – we wish to record some important points that make our position clear on what has come out. We take the approach of offering advice (al-nush) and admonition (al-tazkir):
1: We in the Islamic Ahrar al-Sham Movement are keen on concentrating efforts and unifying them in the battle to topple the aggressive Assad enemy, as nothing except for faith (iman) is more required and nothing comes before it.
2: God has set forth the legitimate norms (sunan) and universal laws to establish rightly guided states. Whoever breaches the laws is deprived of their consequences(note: this line was unclear to me). Religious leadership (al-imamah) over Muslims must have ability and authority to secure its interests. This does not exist among any of the factions and brigades on the ground.
3: The “emirate” is a method – enunciated in God’s law – to unify the message and the ranks, but it is not an end in itself. What al-Baghdadi announced did not unify the scattered groups and it did not reconcile conflicting factions, and this is what is called “corruption of the situation” among religious scholars. This is when what resulted from a ruling is the opposite of what is originally intended.
4: No one in this country – no religious scholars or sincere Islamists and FSA brigades working on the ground – was consulted in the announcement of the state. This opens up the field for anyone to announce initiatives on their own according to how they see fit
5: As such, the two announcements will drag parties into the conflict that do not serve – as we see it – the people’s revolution and Jihad. The principle is to not expand the scope of the conflict and to concentrate on fighting the Assad regime, undermining its pillars of support, and stopping its aggression.
Our wounded people. When we saw Jabhat al-Nusra’s dedication and valor in battle, their charity and their good treatment of the people, it was thought that they would continue being altruistic and serving the interests of the nation.
Based on what has preceded, we ask both parties to get a sense of the magnitude of the event, the danger of regionalizing the conflict in this way, and bringing in other parties. This is not based on arbitrary distinctions between members of the Islamic nation, but an objective reading of the situation. It is a presentation of what we see as being in the best interests of Muslims and their Jihad against the tyrant of Syria.
Lastly, we in the Islamic Ahrar al-Sham Movement announce that the establishment of a rightly guided Islamic state that rules its subjects with justice is a goal that we strive to achieve through legitimate means. As such, we take care to heed the requirements of the situation and the state of the Islamic nation, which has concealed its religion for a half century. We ask God to guide us rightly in both thought and action and to grant our nation what is best. He is the protector and enabler, praise be to God, lord of the worlds.
Saturday 05/04/2013
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Ḥarakat Aḥrār al-Shām al-Islāmīyyah — “Clarification on the Declaration of the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām’ and Its Implications for the Domestic and Regional Arena”
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New article from Shaykh Ḥussayn bin Maḥmūd: "The Fitnah Episode"

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم فتنة الحلَقة

لعل رؤوس كثيرين من أنصار الجهاد دارت مع تلك الحلقة التي انتهت من حيث بدأت : تزكية الأمير الظواهري للأمير البغدادي ، ثم إعلان البغدادي ضم جبهتي الشام والعراق في “دولة العراق والشام” ، ثم إعلان الأمير الجولاني الإعتذار عن هذا الضم ، ثم مبايعة جبهة النصرة للأمير الظواهري !!
هذه الحلقة رُسمت في أيام معدودات ، وفي كلمات خاطفة ، لكنها أظهرت خللاً كبيراً في الفكر الذي يتبناه بعض أنصار المجاهدين هنا وهناك ، ثم أظهرت خللاً لا يقل عنه عند بعض العلماء والدعاة وطلبة العلم وخواص المناصرين لأهل الجهاد !!

لا بد من إعادة النظر في تأثير هذه الحلقة على كثير من الشباب الذين لم يعهدوا مثل هذه الإشكالات في العمل الإسلامي : فصُدم البعض ، وأخذ البعض موقفاً ، وتعصّب البعض ، وحصل تنافر وتشاحن وتشويش ، فتغيّرت الألفاظ ، وتباعدت القلوب ، ووقف البعض بعيداً يراقب الحال دون تدخّل في أمل أن تنجلي الغمة ، وهي كذلك ..

قد يكون الأمر كبيراً عند البعض ، وقد يكون عند البعض أصغر مما نتصوّر ، فهو عند المتفائلين : سوء تنسيق بين بعض القيادات ، وعند المتشائمين : أموراً ذكروها في كتاباتهم ومقالاتهم وتصريحاتهم .. سنحاول مناقشة بعض المفاهيم التي نعتقد أن بها غبش عند البعض ، وهي المشار إليها في العنوان بالفتنة ، لأنها كذلك ، فمنها :

أولاً : معنى قول الله تعالى {وَالَّذِينَ جَاهَدُوا فِينَا لَنَهْدِيَنَّهُمْ سُبُلَنَا …} (العنكبوت : 69) ، هذه الآية يظلمها البعض ، فالهداية هنا لا تعني العصمة بأي حال من الأحوال ، فالمجاهدون بشر ، وقادتهم بشر ، وهم يُخطؤون وليسوا بمعصومين ، وإنما معنى الآية أنهم أقرب إلى الهداية العامة من كثير من المسلمين لأنهم في موطن إخلاص وعمل جليل وفي عبادة مستمرة ، وقد فسّر بعض العلماء هذه الآية بأنها في أهل القتال ، وقال البعض بأنها في من يجاهد بأي نوع من أنواع الجهاد . فمن جاهد نفسه أو الشيطان أو العدو الداخلي أو الخارجي ولم يكن خاملاً متكاسلاً متقاعساً يدخل في هذه الآية عند بعض علماء التفسير ، وظاهر الآية أنها في أهل القتال لأن العلماء قالوا بأن كلمة الجهاد إذا أطلقت فإنها تعني القتال في سبيل الله ما لم يصرفها صارف عن ذلك ..

الشاهد أن الهداية هنا لا تعني العصمة ، فلا ينبغي أن نلطم بهذه الآية وجه كل من يناقش قراراً أو عملاً للمجاهدين بزعم أنهم هم المهتدون ، ومخالفوهم ضالون ، فخالد بن الوليد – رضي الله عنه – قتل بني جذيمة وتبرأ النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم من صنيعه ، ونزل الرماة من جبل أحدٍ وكانوا من الصحابة المجاهدين وتسببوا في هزيمة المسلمين ، والأمثلة كثيرة .. قد يكون رأي بعض المجاهدين أهدى من بعض ، وقد يكون رأي بعض القاعدين أصوب من رأي بعض المجاهدين ، فالأمر نسبي وليس على إطلاقه ..

ثانياً : سوء الظن بالمسلمين .. وهذا أمر عظيم أنزل الله فيه قرآناً يُتلى ، قال تعالى {يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اجْتَنِبُوا كَثِيرًا مِنَ الظَّنِّ إِنَّ بَعْضَ الظَّنِّ إِثْمٌ …} (الحجرات : 12) ، وقال تعالى {وَإِنَّ الظَّنَّ لاَ يُغْنِي مِنَ الْحَقِّ شَيْئًا ..} (النجم : 28) ولعلنا لا نجد كلمة الظن معرّفة في القرآن إلا في موضع ذم !! نحن نسأل هؤلاء : ما هو الأصل في المسلمين ؟ ولماذا سوء الظن ؟ وأين حمل كلام المسلم على أحسن محمل ؟ وماذا يفيد سوء الظن غير الخصومة والضغينة !!

ثالثاً : بالرجوع إلى كتاب الله تعالى نجد أن الله تعالى ذكر نهياً عظيماً قبل آية الظن في سورة الحجرات فقال سبحانه {يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لاَ يَسْخَرْ قَومٌ مِنْ قَوْمٍ عَسَى أَنْ يَكُونُوا خَيْرًا مِنْهُمْ وَلاَ نِسَاءٌ مِنْ نِسَاءٍ عَسَى أَنْ يَكُنَّ خَيْرًا مِنْهُنَّ وَلاَ تَلْمِزُوا أَنْفُسَكُمْ وَلاَ تَنَابَزُوا بِالأَلْقَابِ بِئْسَ الاسْمُ الْفُسُوقُ بَعْدَ الإِيمَانِ وَمَنْ لَمْ يَتُبْ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ} (الحجرات : 11) ، وقد رأينا كيف أن سوء الظن أدى إلى اللمز والتنابز والسخرية بين الإخوة !! ورأينا الطعن واللعن والبذاءة والفحش في القول !! فأين آداب الإسلام ؟ وهل نحن أنصار قضية إسلامية أم قضية سوقيّة !! وأين نحن من قول نبينا صلى الله عليه وسلم “ليس المؤمن بالطعّان ولا اللعّان ولا الفاحش ولا البذيء” (الترمذي ، وصححه الألباني) ، وهل يعتقد أحد بأن سبيل النصر هو انتفاء صفة الإيمان !!

رابعاً : عمِل البعض على تفريق المجاهدين وتمزيقهم من حيث لا يشعر ، فقد تعصّب البعض لرأي فلان ، وتعصّب آخرون لرأي فلان ، وأصبحت عندنا فرقتان ورأيان بعد أن كنا جبهة واحدة على قلب رجل واحد ، والله تعالى قد بيّن بياناً واضحاً جليّاً ليس فيه أي مجال لتأويل فقال سبحانه {وَأَطِيعُوا اللهَ وَرَسُولَهُ وَلاَ تَنَازَعُوا فَتَفْشَلُوا وَتَذْهَبَ رِيحُكُمْ وَاصْبِرُوا إِنَّ اللهَ مَعَ الصَّابِرِينَ} (الأنفال : 46) ، هذه حقيقة لا تقبل الجدال ، فالتنازع مآله الفشل وذهاب الريح ، وهو مناقض لطاعة الله ورسوله المذكورة في أوّل الآية ، فالواجب الصبر وتحمّل بعض الأمور في سبيل اجتماع الكلمة حتى تتحقق معيّة الله ويحصل النصر بفضله ، فمن تدبّر الآية جيداً علم هذا يقيناً .. كلنا يحفظ هذه الآية : {إِنَّ اللهَ يُحِبُّ الَّذِينَ يُقَاتِلُونَ فِي سَبِيلِهِ صَفًّا كَأَنَّهُمْ بُنْيَانٌ مَرْصُوصٌ} (الصفّ : 4) ، والسؤال هنا : إذا كان الله تعالى يحب هذا ، فهل يحب نقيضه !! وهل ننتصر بما لا يحبه الله تعالى !!

خامساً : هل يسعنا مخالفة رأي قادتنا !! هذه معضلة عند البعض ، ويتحرّج منها البعض ، فلا بد من بيان الأمر ووضوحه .. هناك فرق بين مخالفة رأي القادة ومخالفة أمرهم في غير معصية .. لا ينبغي للإنسان أن يلغي عقله أو يرهنه لغيره ، فالصحابة كانوا يراجعون النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم في بعض قراراته ويناقشونه ، ولم ينههم النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم بل كان يطلب مشورتهم وهو أغنى الناس عن ذلك ، فغيره من باب أولى .. قادة الجهاد ليسوا طغاة ، الطاغية هو من يرفض أن يخالف الناسُ رأيَه ، ولذلك تجد سجناء الرأي بالآلاف في البلاد الدكتاتورية ..

إذا أمر قادة الجهاد أمراً فعلى الجنود السمع والطاعة في غير معصية ، قد يكون الجندي غير محب للرأي أو غير مقتنع به ، ولكن عليه أن يسمع ويطيع ، ولا إثم عليه إن لم يعجبه الرأي ، ولكن قد يأثم إذا شغب على القادة وأبدى إعتراضه على الرأي في بعض المواقف التي لا تحتمل ذلك : كأن يعلن ذلك في معركة أو في موقف يحصل فيه انشقاق في صفوف المسلمين أو وهن ، عندها يكون السكوت هو الواجب ..
قد لا يعجبني أن يعلن البغدادي “دولة العراق والشام” ، أو لا يعجبني اعتذار الجولاني عن الإنضمام إلى هذه الدولة ، وأرى أن رأيي هو الصواب ، وهذا حقي الطبيعي والشرعي أحتفظ به كرأي