Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad: Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi

NOTE: An archive of the Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad column can be found here.

Interview with the leader of Iraq’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen: Abd al-Hakim al-Nuaimi

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

Jaysh al-Mujahideen- not to be confused with the Ikhwani Islamist/Salafist rebel coalition of the same name in Aleppo province- is one of Iraq’s older insurgent groups, now revived in the face of a renewed Sunni insurgency. The Iraqi Jaysh al-Mujahideen tends not to advertise itself openly on social media. However, like Syria’s Jaysh al-Mujahideen, this group stands out- together with Jamaat Ansar al-Islam- for its known tensions with the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS: I will translate the relevant statement from the group’s Shari’a Committee later). Yet unlike Jamaat Ansar al-Islam, Jaysh al-Mujahideen has kept a low social media profile.

Recently (8 March), in light of the revived activity, some questions were put to Jaysh al-Mujahideen’s media committee, which were then directed to the group’s leader, whose tribal name suggests origins in northern Iraq (my own maternal lineage- from Mosul- is also Banu Nuaim).
Interestingly, ISIS is not mentioned once in the interview, but rather the interview suggests tensions with the Islamic Army of Iraq, even as the ideological outlook here is not unlike that of the mainstream Sunni insurgency in Iraq, such as belief in an Iranian conspiracy- in alliance with the West and/or Jews- against the Sunnis, and expressing solidarity with the rebellion in Syria. In response to this interview, the Islamic Army of Iraq’s media committee put out a statement denouncing Nuaimi’s claims of no Islamic Army of Iraq presence: “The fact that he doesn’t know of their existence means that he is not present in the field.”
Below is my translation of the interview, with some explanatory footnotes.
Q: What is your assessment of the situation in Iraq and the battle with the Safavids?
A: The battle in Iraq is not confined to its borders, for it is part of the battle that the Ummah is waging in defence of its religion and land in the face of the Safavid Majus [derogatory term for Persians] project. The Safavids are allies of the Jews and Crusaders in the war on Islam, and they have exchanged roles and coordinated plans one way or another. Their aim has been to exterminate the Ahl al-Sunna- the people of Islam- by breaking their courage, humiliating them, rendering them subservient, and preventing them from being able to establish the form of rule they want- the Shari’a of God, Mighty and Glorified is He- and this is what we have seen above all in the lands in which its people [the Ahl al-Sunna] have been able to revolt against their oppression and rule at the hands of the corrupt.
Therefore we are in confrontation with a Safavid regime and whatever forces of the East and West inimical to Islam that are behind it.
Our people and our tribes are convinced that there is no choice for them that protects their dignity, recovers their rights and liberates them from servitude to the Majus than to fend off the attacker and confront arms with arms: indeed it is an important issue for which God- Exalted and Mighty is He- has given them His blessing after the suspicious projects and fitna of participation in the political process were thrown upon them with their shadow. Thus the equation in Iraq has changed greatly during the past two months, and since the escalation of the armed confrontation with Maliki’s forces two months ago the Ahl al-Sunna has been able to achieve a lot, for the ranks between the tribes and their sons waging jihad have held together, while previously the enemy was able to fracture them.
And the Ahl al-Sunna has been able to humiliate Maliki’s army and inflict disastrous losses on them. They [the Sunnis] have also been able to organize their ranks such that they have begun fighting in an organized and coordinated manner. They have been able to free wide areas from the Safavid occupation. They have been able to widen the battle in their provinces.
It is impossible to dissociate what is happening in Iraq from the wider region, especially in Syria and other areas that are witnessing Majus aggression. The uprising in Iraq has participated in coordination with the Ahl al-Sunna in other areas, so the widening of the front in Iraq against the Majus has made them totter in Iraq, which was previously a passageway for them, open for their militias that are fighting in Syria, and providing financial support for Assad and others besides him. From the military perspective, the Ahl al-Sunna today is in a far better state than one or two years ago.
Q: How far are you united with the Iraqi Sunni tribes in this war?
A: If God Almighty wills, we will only be pious and sincere sons for our people, striving to protect them and defending their abode, and today we are as close as we can be to the hearts of our people. Our ranks have been nourished- thanks to God Almighty- as our Lord likes (“in a row as though they are one structure joined firmly”- Qur’an 61:4). Indeed we have said on many previous occasions, when we were urging our people to stand as one rank with their sons waging jihad against the Majus project, bear arms, and defend their honour and themselves. We have said to them many times that we want to be swords in your hands, using us to strike the enemy of God and your enemy and using us to defend your honor and land. Today we are carrying our what we promised them: we ask God Almighty to give victory to our people through us.
Q: Where is your activity concentrated?
A: We are present in every place of the battle and its divisions but there is a difference in the extent of the presence from place to another. There is no reason to divulge further details.
Q: Do you support the current shift in the battle from holding land and defending it?
A: The situation differs from one place to another, and we see that in some of the regions where it has been possible to keep hold and expel the enemy from them, [doing so] is an excellent thing, but spreading this state of affairs to other areas where the balances of force differ is a mistake into which we hope not to fall; so the majority has not withdrawn from the areas in a state where it is difficult to retain control and we see that attack and flight in them and exhausting the enemy are the best way to manage the battle in such areas. I ask God to free Iraq- all of it- urgently and not to postpone.
In any case, we must not- on seizing control of a place and expelling the enemy from it- make leaving a place concerning the seizure or the enemy’s seizure of it again be the end of the battle or a standard for victory or defeat. This is what makes us affirm [a policy] of not holding assaulted areas where matters concerning the field are difficult before an improvement in relevant circumstances because the enemy’s seizure of it again will weaken the morale of some people and make them think that we have been defeated and the enemy is victorious.
Q: What is your position on widening the extent of the fronts and battle in the present time and is this within the capabilities of the Sunni civilian people?
A: Widening the extent of confrontation with the Majusi enemy is a matter of utmost importance to reduce the pressure from other areas. In this [approach], we can confuse the enemy and disrupt their efforts especially if we know that they are not fighting from a viable position now except by means of elite brigades and forces as they cannot rely on the capabilities of other forces in their army.
Q: Do you have reservations about working and coordinating with other groups and do you participate in operations in the field with the Islamic Army group?
A: The battle today requires the Ahl al-Sunna to be one hand against their Majusi enemy. The battle today is greater than group and party, greater than clan, tribal and regional interests, but it is also greater than the Iraqi Ahl al-Sunna themselves, for if- God Almighty forbid- their courage were broken, that would be the key for evil against our people not only in ash-Sham and the Gulf, but also in other states that think they are safe from the Majusi project. For what we see from Safavid expansion in the Gulf and Yemen after Iraq and Syria is only the beginning, as expansion does not stop there in the incubation period and without potential for opening military fronts, as is the situation in Egypt, Sudan, the Arab Maghreb and other areas.
So we see a need for coordination among all the Ahl al-Sunna in this war- tribes and groups- and for them to cleanse their ranks of those bartering in their cause from the failure of the politicians and others besides them.
As for the Islamic Army, it saddens us that we have not seen any presence on their part and we had been hoping that they might have corrected the mistakes into which they fell, return from the paths they drifted into, and return to their integrity, but we have not come across that in the field and we don’t know of a presence on their part. There are some groups that originally abandoned working with them years ago and finance themselves from here and there. Perhaps some of their members are among those who are working without disclosing their affiliation for what they know of the lack of their being accepted among the groups and tribes. As for what has been publicized concerning their participation with us in some operations, there is no truth to such claims.
Q: What is your position on the ruling for arms in the conflict among the mujahideen in ash-Sham? And do you have any

The Clairvoyant: The Guidelines: Measuring Zawahiri's Influence

NOTE: For prior posts in The Clairvoyant sub-blog you can view an archive of it all here.

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Over the past few years since the American operation against Usama bin Ladin in Pakistan, there has been much debate over the leadership capabilities and influence that Bin Ladin’s successor Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri still has over the global jihadi movement generally and al-Qaeda branches in particular. Endowing al-Qaeda franchise-status upon Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin in Somalia, slow response to the Arab uprisings, and inability to resolve the conflict in Syria between the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra highlight how many have become skeptical of Zawahiri’s importance or relevance. And while this is all certainly true, those within the movement that are still true believers in the cause and view Zawahiri and al-Qaeda’s general command (AQGC) in Pakistan/Yemen as the fountainhead of the jihad against the Zionists and Crusaders still heed Zawahiri’s advice.
One potential area of measuring this is the guidelines that Zawahiri released for the movement in September 2013. In some ways, it is a codification of issues and ideas that Zawahiri and Atiyatallah ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Libi argued for in letters to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi last decade when attempting to reign in his excesses during the Iraq jihad. Two recent examples highlight how those that are still loyal to Zawahiri and AQGC have internalized these guidelines. Recently, both al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzam Brigades (AAAB) apologized for killing civilians and non-combatants in their military operations (more on this below). While not seeming like much, it highlights how those that are tied to AQGC have become very sensitive to Muslim public opinion as well as the movement becoming more mature, even if it is still ideologically fringe and militarily radical overall.
Here are some examples from Zawahiri’s guidelines:

  • Avoid fighting the deviant sects such as Rawafidh, Ismailis, Qadianis, and deviant Sufis, except if they fight the Ahl as Sunnah.
  • Avoid meddling with Christian, Sikh and Hindu communities living in Muslim lands.
  • Refrain from killing and fighting against non-combatant women and children, and even if they are families of those who are fighting against us, refrain from targeting them as much as possible.
  • Refrain from harming Muslims by explosions, killing, kidnapping or destroying their wealth or property.
  • Refrain from targeting enemies in mosques, markets and gatherings where they mix with Muslims or with those who do not fight us.

While there is not definitive proof, it is likely that these guidelines helped inform the responses of AQAP and AAAB to acts committed that they then either regretted or realized could harm their public image and therefore apologized and then noted how it was outside the normal framework for how they interpret the shari’a and operate in the battlefield.
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On December 21, 2013, AQAP’s military commander Qasim al-Raymi released a video message titled “Comment on the Targeting of the Defense Ministry in Sana’a’” apologizing for members of his organization killing medics and patients in the military hospital as well as those in the prayer room within the ministry. Al-Raymi stated: “We do not fight in this manner, and this is not what we call people to do. This is not our manhaj (methodology) … We confess to this mistake and fault. We offer our apologies and condolences to the families and the victims.” He later offered blood money compensation and medical treatment to the individuals and families affected by the attack.
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More recently, on March 7, 2014, AAAB released a statement titled “On the Raid of the Iranian Chancellery in Beirut” claiming that there was faultiness in the second suicide bombers belt. It stated: “The two bombs were meant to be in a place where the explosion would not reach the main road and cause damage to passersby … The military operations of the ‘Abd Allah ‘Azzam Brigades do not target Shiites, or other sects.” Rather the attack was aimed at Hizb Allah, which while Shi’a is actively militarily fighting Sunnis in Syria. Illustrating how AAAB wanted to show that they were attempting to be discriminant in targeting and only defensively responding to attacks upon them and their fellow Sunni Muslim brethren.
Both of these examples highlight that the groups that still maintains allegiance to AQGC have become more astute and smarter in how they massage public opinion. That does not mean though they are now all of a sudden moderate actors. To the contrary, this past week for example, AQAP crucified a man for allegedly spying on them to help with drones strikes, while AAAB’s allies in Syria Jabhat al-Nusra still are actively beheading individuals on the battlefield that fight for the Assad regime (see both graphic photos below).
AQAP-Ansar al-Sharia has crucified a man (accused of being American spy) in Hadhramaut #YemenJabhat an Nusra from Al Numr checkpoint with a beheaded Rafidi
That being said, it appears that in some areas jihadi groups aligned with Zawahiri and AQGC are indeed listening to his advice and actively attempting to be more mature and pragmatic actors in some aspects. This is in contradistinction with the now rival global jihadi faction ISIS, which appears to have no rules of engagement and does as it pleases no matter what the consequences. How these guidelines continue to play out and what impact they may have with the AQGC-aligned groups remains to be seen, but it appears that as of now it has made slight differences in their on the battlefield methodologies, albeit imperfectly.

Fursān al-Balāgh Media presents a new book from Abū Nusaybah al-Maqdisī: "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām: Project of the Promised Caliphate"

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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Abū Nusaybah al-Maqdisī — “Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām- Project of the Promised Caliphate”
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To inquire about a translation for this book for a fee email: [email protected]

al-Furqān Media presents a new audio message from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām's Shaykh Abū Muḥammad al 'Adnānī al-Shāmī: "Then We Pray For God's Curse to Be On the Liars"

UPDATE 5/15/14 8:42 PM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic audio message and transcription:
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū Muḥammad al ‘Adnānī al-Shāmī — “Then We Pray For God’s Curse to Be On the Liars” (En)
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UPDATE 3/29/14 5:19 PM: Here is an Arabic transcription of the below audio message:
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū Muḥammad al ‘Adnānī al-Shāmī — “Then We Pray For God’s Curse to Be On the Liars” (Ar)
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Shaykh Abū Muḥammad al ‘Adnānī al-Shāmī- “Then We Pray For God’s Curse to Be On the Liars”

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To inquire about a translation for this audio message for a fee email: [email protected]

New statement from the Kavkaz Center: "Clarifying Position In Connection With Ongoing Discord In Syria"

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In the name of Allah, Most Gracious, Most Merciful!
Recently, the Kavkaz Center received many letters in connection with its information policy regarding the continuing discord in Syria.
In addition, some sites and forums, as well as social networks, periodically discuss KC’s position on the issue. At the same time, in letters and discussions, the opinions of the authors are diametrically opposed.
In general, these views could be divided into three groups:
1. The group, which accuses the KC that it “does not like the ISIL”, “is from the outset opposed to the ISIL and against an Islamic state”, “conveys false reports”. And that KC does not expose the “apostasy of Islamic Front”, and other “apostate groups”.
2. The group, which accuses the Kavkaz-Center that it does not expose “all crimes committed by the ISIL properly”, that the KC ignores the truth about “the cruelty of ISIL” and thus “contributes to discord” because “many young Mujahideen have been deceived by the slogans of the ISIL and they are used against Muslims”.
3. The group which supports and shares the information policy of the Kavkaz Center.
In this regard, the editorial staff of the KC felt it necessary to clarify its position and to answer some of the charges.
First, the Kavkaz Center is an Islamic political information site covering events in the Ummah, the Caucasus, as well as in the world and Russia. We consider it important to inform Muslims about these events, evaluate them, interpret and explain their motives, so that Muslims adequately evaluate the processes and can properly respond to them.
The importance of this work can be estimated at least by the fact that many Muslims, and even some among Mujahideen, still express incomprehension why the KC pays “so much attention to events in infidel countries”.
Secondly, we DO NOT hate the ISIL. We believe that the very idea of the Islamic State is right! However, in our opinion, the methods of its implementation, the ideology of takfirism, leaving the battle against infidels and starting the battle against Muslims, violence and mass executions, undermine on the vine this idea and provoke hostility and hatred from the population of Levant, which not only promotes the idea of the ISIL, but on the contrary – leads to a collapse.
We believe that the policy (or rather – the lack of policy as such) and methodology of implementation of the idea of an Islamic State in Levant is extremely flawed and plays into the hands of the enemies. Although, once again, the very idea of an Islamic State is correct in our opinion and we support it.
We supported the Islamic state long before those who now consider ourselves the only conductors of this idea, and are not going to turn away from this path.
Third, with respect to the discord in Levant, we share the views of the Command of the Army of Emigrants and Supporters, expressed in the latest speech of Emir Salahuddin al-Chechen.
We believe that the way out would be a recognition the single Sharia Court for all groups of Mujahideen with mandatory subordination of its decision, a union, a rejection of personal ambition and arrogance, and aiming weapons against infidels and not against each other.
However, even a semi-literate person understands that the disengagement between Mujahideen and rebels (nationalists, democrats, Saudi-sponsored groups and associations, groups financed by the west, etc.) is inevitable. This can be seen today, but as soon as the forces of infidels (Shiites, Assadites, Alawites, etc.) are weakened or defeated, this disengagement may acquire the character of a war. Clashes that occur today are only the first signs as compared to what might occur “after the victory over Assad”.
That is why even now, we must become a uniting power for all the Muslims (all Islamic Mujahideen groups), rather than one group trying to impose with force its views, ideas and rule for the others. First and foremost, this concerns the ISIL and the Nusrah Front. The presence of a strong united force among Mujahideen could prevent an internal war after the elimination of the Assad regime.
Fourth, for the most part, we deliberately do not publish materials in any way to affect the ongoing issue of discord, including the materials related to the ISIL.
However, we sometimes, albeit rarely, publish separate statements and addresses of the main leaders of Mujahideen groups such as the Nusrah Front (al-Joulani), the ISIL (Abu Bakr Baghdadi), the AES (Salahuddin al-Chechen), and we deliberately do not publish materials from other emirs/leaders, including information from their websites.
In the future, we will probably publish statements and appeals of lower-level emirs and other groups, but it will depend on the content of the texts. If we see it fit, then we will publish it – if not, then we will not.
We also publish appeals and statements of some scholars, whose opinions and positions we share. And we do not publish the views of those scholars whose position we do not share.
In general, we publish materials that we see fit and do not publish material that we believe are unnecessary and harmful, including those coming from websites that support one or another group.
Speaking about discord/infighting, we mean primarily the confrontation between Islamic groups. As for secularist groups and groups supported by the Saudis and the west, the opposition to them is a natural manifestation of ideological hostility. But the fact that these clashes occur in a situation and time, disadvantageous for the Mujahideen, is a result of failures in the policy of the ISIL leaders, if it is unaccompanied by other motives.
Fifth, we deliberately do not engage in polemics and do not respond to attacks on the KC, because we believe it is flawed and would only lead to increased hostility and hatred. We try to avoid it, even though we have what to answer, to show, and to blame with specific evidences.
We also do not accept insults of some emirs and their websites that they accuse us of not publishing them (allegedly, due to dislike or enmity), and we address to them and say – you are mistaken.
We call on Allah to witness and declare love for the sake of Allah for every sincere Mujahid on the path of the Jihad. We remind every Muslim, every Mujahid, reading these lines – We have one faith, one qibla, one Prophet (pbuh).
Sixth, a few words to those who accuse us of “working for the west”. We treat these charges without emotion. Especially, because it is not only us who are accused. For example, many believe that the ISIL is an Iranian Shiite project, aimed at undermining the Jihad in Syria.
So it does not surprise us, since we hear all kinds of accusations since the start of the KC 15 years ago.
We were accused of working for al-Qaeda and the Mossad, for the FSB and the CIA. Remember, that all these accusers were and are professional propagandists and liars, political opponents and enemies, as well as amateurs in “kitchen conspiracies”.
If someone does not know, we say that in working for the west (America and so on) we are now accused, along with Russian invaders, by Shiites and Raafidis of Iran (for example, here).
So have a look in what company you are yourselves in first, before throwing mud at us.
Seventh, we do not intend to debate on this explanation. We made our position clear. Whoever accepts it, accepts. Whoever rejects, rejects.
And in conclusion:
Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds!
Kavkaz Center
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The Clairvoyant: The Return of Foreign Fighters in the Iraq Jihad

NOTE: ‘The Clairvoyant” will be a new sub-blog of Jihadology.net. It will be written by me the founder of this website for quick hit blog posts or interesting things I come across that might be too short, in the weeds, or random for more mainstream publication.

The Return of Foreign Fighters in the Iraq Jihad
By Aaron Y. Zelin
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Earlier today, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham’s (ISIS) official Twitter account for the Wilayah of Northern Baghdad released a series of photos of foreigners who had been killed fighting the ‘safawis’ (a derogatory term for Iran/Shi’a) and the ‘dajal’ (the false messiah in Islamic end times prophecies). While much attention has been given to foreign fighters in Syria due to the unprecedented mobilization over the past two years or so, once again, Iraq also seems to be attracting foreign fighters. While it is likely that it never truly stopped, following the sahwa and surge, there was a lot less enthusiasm for it since the Islamic State of Iraq (prior name to ISIS) appeared in decline. The American withdrawal along with the outbreak of the Syrian war and more recent prison breaks have helped revive ISIS to once again be a spoiler within the Iraqi context.
Although ISIS in the Iraqi arena has gained more of a local flavor from Iraqi recruits over the years, since its inception when it was originally called Jama’at al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad (and all of its later name iterations), foreigners have played an important role as previously documented by Evan Kohlmann as well as recovered from the US Military’s Sinjar Record cache in the organization. Prior to the release of this data on killed foreign members of ISIS fighting in Iraq, between April 2013-March 2014 I personally recorded 15 cases. It is possible that there is overlap. Here is the information from my set:

Tunisia 5
Libya 4
Egypt 3
Syria 1
Kuwait 1
Saudi Arabia 1

The information that ISIS released today was about 29 of its members killed between September 2013-March 2014 in northern Baghdad. Some of this data has unknown nationalities such as al-Shami, which could denote anyone in the Levant, or al-Muhajir, just meaning the emigrant, among other non-nation descriptive noms de guerre. Here’s the breakdown:

Tunisia 7
Morocco 6
Unknown 6
Egypt 4
Saudi Arabia 3
Denmark 1
Syria 1
Uzbekistan 1

It is likely this trend will continue and more information will be released in the coming months as ISIS expands its fight in Iraq once more. Whether they make the same mistakes as last decade in Iraq or more recently in Syria remains to be seen (though is likely), but for now, due to the infighting in Syria there has been a lot of discussion within jihadi social media that some foreigners have escaped the internecine fighting and decided (besides returning home or going to other fields of jihad like Egypt or Libya) to move their fight to the Iraq war zone.

al-Furqān Media presents a new video message from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām: “Testimony of the Commander Abū al-Jihād al-Shishānī About the Plot Against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām #3"

UPDATE 3/29/14 5:27 PM: Here is Arabic transcription of the below video message:
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām — “Testimony of the Commander Abū al-Jihād al-Shishānī About the Plot Against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām #3″
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NOTE: For previous parts in this testimony see: #2 and  #1.

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To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]

al-Baṣīrah Foundation for Media Production presents a audio video message from Jabhat al-Nuṣrah's Shaykh Abū 'Abd Allah al-Shāmī: "You Must Make It Clear To the People and Not Conceal It"

NOTE: The title of this release is in reference to Qur’anic verse 3:187.

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Shaykh Abū ‘Abd Allah al-Shāmī — “You Must Make It Clear To the People and Not Conceal It”

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To inquire about a translation for this audio message for a fee email: [email protected]

'Ā'ishah Media Center presents a new article from Abū Mu'ādh al-Shara'ī: "In Response to al-Muḥaysinī: Declaration of Bearing Down Upon the Bellows of the Blower in the Call With the Invalidity of the Bay'a of the Amīr"

al-I’tiṣām Media presents a new video message from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām: “A Window Upon the Land of Epic Battles #50"

NOTE: For prior parts in this series see: #49#48#47#46#45#44#43#42#41#40#39#38#37#36#35#34#33#32#31#30#29#28#27#26#25#24#23#22#21#20#19#18#17#16#15#14#13#12#11#10#9#7#6#5#4#3#2, and #1.

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To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]