Hizballah Cavalcade: Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada: Another Supplier of Iraqi Shia Fighters in Syria

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada: Another Supplier of Iraqi Shia Fighters in Syria
By Phillip Smyth
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Figure 1: Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada’s symbol.
Following funerals for some of its members killed fighting in Syria, The Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (The Battalion of the Sayyid’s Martyrs or KSS) has quietly established itself as an Iraqi Shia militia force contributing combatants to the battlefront in southern Damascus. At present, the KSS’s main raison d’être appears to be as a source for Iraqi Shia fighters who can be used to “Defend the Zaynab Shrine”, a major Shia Islamic site in Syria.
The first reports of KSS’s existence occurred on April 14, 2013. In one press report, it was stated that KSS initially went by the names of Kata’ib Karbala (the Karbala Battalions) and later as Kata’ib Abu Fadl al-Abbas.[1] Interestingly, a group which had targeted American and Coalition forces in Iraq was and Iranian-backed “Special group” called Kata’ib Abu Fadl al-Abbas.[2] Adding further significance to the KSS’s earlier names and its links to Syria; KSS sends its fighters to Syria where they act as an intrinsic part of the Syrian-based Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA).
It was reported that the KSS was formed due to splits within the Iranian-created and backed Kata’ib Hizballah.[3] These contentions were initially based on nameless sources and were reported by a small number of Iraqi Arabic-language publications.  It was also claimed that Abu Mustafa Sheibani (Hamid al-Sheibani), a pro-Iranian militia leader, who had been involved with the creation of many so-called “Special Groups” (including Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Hizballah) was KSS’s leader.[4] According to a Washington Institute for Near East Policy report, Sheibani “holds both Iranian and Iraqi citizenship” and when operating in Iraq, concentrated on the, “distribution of explosively formed penetrator (EFP) roadside bombs”.[5]
Based on the KSS’s few public appearances and its activity in Syria, it is likely the organization has a steady source of funding. Said funding allows the group to hold attention grabbing funerals and to put on airs of professionalism and organization. Nevertheless, based on Iraqi media, forums, and other social media sources, the size of the group’s membership, leadership, recruitment activities, and amounts of money it may receive remain unknown or unconfirmed.
Mirroring the activities of other Lebanese and Iraqi pro-Iranian groups, such as Kata’ib Hizballah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and Hizballah, the KSS sent a number of fighters to serve in the ranks of the Damascus-based Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. When these fighters were killed, LAFA was often the initial or only group which would claim them as members. Only when Iraqi family members of dead fighters were interviewed, was it revealed their deceased relatives were also members of KSS.[6]
Pointing to direct Iranian support for KSS, the bodies of fighters who belonged to the organization have, on all occasions involving a funeral, been returned to Iraq via Iran. On May 6, 2013, the funeral for Diya Issawi included claims he belonged to KSS and that his body was returned to Iraq from Iran, through Basra.[7] Later that month, on May 17, 2013, two more funerals were held for Iraqis killed in Syria. The first, for Hassan Ali Farhud, was held in Sadr City, a Shia section of Baghdad.[8] The second funeral, for Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki, was held in Basra. Paralleling the return of Issawi’s body, Farhud and Maliki’s bodies were delivered through Iran. (Note: Partial profiles for Farhud, Issawi, and Maliki, were provided on Hizballah Cavalcade’s “Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 2”).
During funerals for its members, the KSS has fielded guards dressed in matching camouflage fatigues and a full color guard holding a mixture of KSS and Iraqi flags. Coffins for the dead are usually covered with Iraqi national (often painted onto the casket) and KSS flags. In most cases, the funeral processions resemble other funerals held for members belonging to Kata’ib Hizballah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.
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Figure 2: KSS statement released on May 8, 2013.
Following the funeral for Issawi, KSS declared its goals in a press statement issued by its media office. The group stated its aims included the protection of “shrines across the globe”, the preservation of “Iraqi unity”, and an end to sectarian conflict. It was claimed by KSS that its enemies were “Sowing [Islamic sectarian] discord” due to their “suspicious motives”. The group also mentioned that Israel is “Cancerous”, the U.S. occupation of Iraq was a symbol of “Arrogance”, and called for Jerusalem to be liberated.[9] For all intents and purposes, KSS repeated many of the main talking points presented by Lebanese Hizballah and Iran, albeit with an Iraqi spin.[10]
Despite the group’s statement claiming it was against sectarianism, some Iraqi forums reported the group had threatened to kidnap Iraqi Sunni Muslims.[11] Nevertheless, the KSS’s military activities appear to be limited to engagements in Syria.
WARNING: GRAPHIC IMAGES


Videos featuring KSS members have also been a relative rarity. Save for the posting of funeral videos made for fallen KSS members, only one video—posted on May 28, 2013—claims to be a KSS-specific combat video.  Released on YouTube, the film purports to show KSS members (likely attached to LAFA) operating in Syria and displaying the dead bodies of what the video refers to as, “Wahhabi Free Syrian Army mercenaries”. Further linking KSS to LAFA, the film was set to an Iraqi-made pro-Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas song, which first appeared online in early-2013. KSS members present in the film can also be seen wearing fatigues which are commonly worn by LAFA members.
When compared to LAFA and Lebanese Hizballah, social media and forum presence for Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada has been sparse. What appeared to be a main Facebook “page” was created for the group on April 19, 2013.[12] However, the page conveyed little information and most posted material came on the day it was created or on April 26, 2013. The majority of the postings were of edited photos (mainly of the Zaynab Shrine) which could also be found on most pro-LAFA and pro-Hizballah websites. It is unknown whether the page was sanctioned by the group’s leadership. Membership for the page stands at fewer than 200. Additionally, a preponderance of those who “liked” the page lived in Baghdad, Iraq.
Facebook “Groups” have also been created for Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada. Most of these groups have less than 300 members and tend to contain more information about the organization. Photos made specifically for KSS are present on these devoted KSS group pages. However, they tend to utilize imagery which has been used previously by LAFA. In general, KSS’s images are at times more amateurish than with other Shia militias operating in Syria.
The KSS’s dead maintain positions of prominence in KSS Facebook groups. On rare occasions, photos of live KSS members serving with LAFA have their faces blurred. One KSS group page even featured photos of what were presumably KSS fighters arriving by bus to the frontlines in Syria. Based on the captions provided for these and other photographs, it appears that KSS fighters may primarily originate from Basra, Iraq. Incidentally, the many mentions of Basra would also coincide with two of the three funerals for killed KSS members, since they also occurred in Basra.
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Figure 3: A KSS member is seen posing with a poster for Lebanese Hizballah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah.
Underpinning the KSS’s Zaynab Shrine-centric role, their official symbol has a number of key images which emphasize Shi’ism, the Zaynab Shrine, and militarism. First, a stylized and green-colored image of Damascus’s Zaynab Shrine’s dome stands in the center with a red banner flying from the top. The raising of the red banner—symbolizing martyrdom and sacrifice—on top of the Zaynab Shrine has been used to great propagandistic effect by Shia groups such as Lebanese Hizballah and LAFA. The dome is flanked on two sides with images of AK-47 rifles. Around the dome on a roundel is a laurel wreath. At the bottom of the roundel are stylized blood drops. The blood drops may serve as a

Hizballah Cavalcade: Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 3

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 3
By Phillip Smyth
Click here for a PDF version of this post
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Collecting information for profiles of Iraqi Shia killed fighting in Syria became more complicated following further acknowledgements by Hizballah’s leadership of their involvement in Syria.[1] Concurrently, Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA), the Damascus-based pro-Assad Shia militia which includes a large number of Iraqi Shia, also became more open with their recognition of Lebanese Hizballah members killed serving with the group. Thus, announcements-of-death for Iraqi LAFA members were often mixed with large numbers of Lebanese Hizballah martyrdom announcements.
Martyrdom declarations for Iraqi Shia have also continued to follow a format where the majority of dead individuals have only one or two photographs of themselves released. Often, the photographs of these dead fighters are found on an official martyrdom poster produced by the Iraqi group to which these fighters originally belonged. On rare occasions, killed Iraqi Shia will have many photographs of them or their funerals displayed online. One Facebook-hosted funeral photo album, released for Al-Sa’id Mutheneh ‘Abees Khafeef, numbered around 80 photographs.
It has become increasingly clear that the majority of Iraqi Shia killed fighting in Syria have belonged to the Iranian created and backed, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq has not announced the loss of any of their members via their website. Instead, the group has relied on quasi-official and pro-Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas Facebook pages to report its dead. At times, announcements for killed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq members have first emerged on Facebook pages and forums (including official forums) for Lebanese Hizballah. This likely demonstrates another deep link the group has with Lebanese Hizballah.[2]
Kata’ib Hizballah, another Iraqi organization created by the Iranians, had announced that it lost a number of members in Syria in mid-March-mid-April. However, this organization has not issued any new statements regarding further losses.[3]
This post only includes five dead from a period starting on May 18, 2013 and ending on May 31, 2013. One killed Iraqi Shia fighter reported dead on May 9th, was also confirmed.  Despite the lower number of Iraqi Shia declared as, “killed fighting in Syria”; there is a strong possibility reported numbers of Iraqi Shia killed in Syria may rise in the coming weeks.
Nine pro-Hizballah, pro-Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas, Iraqi Shia, and pro-Assad Facebook pages (all Shia oriented) were utilized in the collection of information for this list. Two pro-Hizballah forums—one official and one quasi-official—were also employed for confirmation purposes.
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Name: Al-Sa’id Mutheneh ‘Abees Khafeef
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 18, 2013 (via Facebook). The funeral was held on May 18, 2013 in Baghdad.
Notes:  Khafeef’s funeral had an entire photo album on Facebook devoted to it. Additionally a video of the funeral was also posted to YouTube.
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Name: Hamid Abu ‘Amran al-Bahadali (A.K.A. Abu ‘Amran/’Umran)
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas/Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
Death Announced: May 26, 2013 (two Facebook pages claimed his death was announced on May 25th)
Notes:  Bahadali was initially only claimed by Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas as a member. However, on May 28th it was announced on a prominent pro-Hizballah/pro-LAFA Facebook page that he also belonged to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. His funeral was reportedly held in Baghdad.
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Name: Dergham Hisham al-Sa’di al-Baya (A.K.A. Dergham al-Sa’di)
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 23, 2013. Funeral was held (in Iraq) on May 24, 2013.
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Name: Iyad Fadhl Matar al-Sarifawi
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
Death Announced: May 28, 2013, (reportedly killed on May 26, 2013)
Notes:  This is the first Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq martyrdom poster (for a member killed in Syria) to feature Iraq’s late Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr (left) and Iranian Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei (right) as bereaved over the loss of a fighter. Al-Sarifawi’s death could only be confirmed on two pro-Hizballah Facebook pages. Since all other Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq members killed in Syria have also fought under the banner of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas, it is probable that Sarifawi fought as a member of that organization. However, any affiliation with LAFA has not been publicized.
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Name: Haidar Jabari Salman al-Jazari
Affiliated With: Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 24, 2013 (via YouTube video posting). Funeral was held in Basra, Iraq on May 23, 2013.
Notes:  In the video for Jazari, it is claimed he was a “Commander” for the “Sacred defense” of the Zaynab Shrine in Damascus. Jazari’s claimed affiliation with Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (on his martyrdom poster) is another important facet of his background. The group was first mentioned in late-April during a funeral for an Iraqi Shia in Basra. Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada may be a new organization used to vector volunteer fighters to fight at the Zaynab Shrine. As with other Iraqi Shia killed in Syria, Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas also claimed Jazari as a member.
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Name: Maytham Khalaf al-‘Aqabi (A.K.A. Ghayth al-‘Asab)
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 9, 2013
Notes:  As with most other killed Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq members, ‘Aqabi’s poster features Iraq’s late Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr (left) and Iranian Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Khamenei (right). His Iraqi roots were not hidden, with Iraq’s flag and the symbol for Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq pictured between the two ayatollahs.

Untitled186 [1] “Hezbollah leader Nasrallah vows victory in Syria”, BBC, May 25, 2013, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22669230. [2] See: “Analysis Of The History And Growth Of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, The League Of The Righteous, An Interview With Institute for the Study of War’s Sam Wyer”, Musings On Iraq Blog, January 7, 2013, https://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2013/01/analysis-of-history-and-growth-of-asaib.html [3] Note: As with Lebanese Hizballah, Iraq’s Kata’ib Hizballah has never officially announced its members were being killed in Syria.  Instead, the group claimed its fighters were killed while performing their, “Jihadist duties”.

Minbar at-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād presents a new Fatwā from Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī: "Is It Permissible For Me To Enforce Martyrdom Operations Upon the Communities of Ḥizb Allah al-Rāfiḍī?"


Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī — “Is It Permissible To Me To Enforce Martyrdom Operations Upon the Communities of Ḥizb Allah al-Rāfiḍī?”
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To inquire about a translation for this fatwā for a fee email: [email protected]

Hizballah Cavalcade: The Qusayr Meat Grinder: Hizballah’s Dead From May 20-May 25, 2013

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

The Qusayr Meat Grinder: Hizballah’s Dead From May 20-May 25, 2013
By Phillip Smyth
Click here for a PDF version of this post
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Figure 1: Four Hizballah dead are buried in the Bekka Valley city of Ba’albek on May 21, 2013.
The five day period from May 20-25th saw a massive rise in the number of Hizballah funerals which occurred across Lebanon. There were also group funerals. One occurred in the Bekka city of Ba’albek and is shown below.
An undeniable trend, which has also become much more widespread, is the insistence that every dead Hizballah member was a “Defender” of Damascus’s Sayda Zaynab Shrine. During earlier announcements and funerals, the Zaynab Shrine and it’s protection were invoked quite regularly, but this shift demonstrates a more full acceptance of the narrative that all Hizballah members who are dying in Syria are “Protecting the Lady Zaynab”. On Facebook, albums holding the pictures of Hizballah’s dead from Syria have been entitled, “The Campaign to Defend Saydah Zaynab’s Shrine” to “Zaynab’s Defenders”. The narrative disregards whether these fighters were serving in the countryside near Qusayr, Damascus, or elsewhere within Syria. Instead, the main theme is that all actions executed in Syria are done to protect the Zaynab Shrine. Of course, this promotes more sectarian aspects of the war in Syria and with Hizballah’s involvement.
The listed Hizballah members were all confirmed by checking close to 30 pro-Hizballah and official Hizballah forums, Facebook pages, and websites.
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Name: Muhammed Yasir Sabalani
Death Announced: May 21, 2013
Notes: Sabalani was buried in a group funeral which included three other Hizballah members.
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Name: Muhammed Qataya.
Death Announced: May 21, 2013. Funeral was also held on May 21, 2013.
Notes: Qataya’s was part of a group funeral, which included three other dead Hizballah members.
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Name: Muhammed Mahdi Ahmed Murtada
Death Announced: May 21, 2013. Funeral was also held on May 21, 2013.
Notes: Murtada was part of a group funeral, which included four other dead Hizballah members.
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Name: Al-Haj Ahmed Wael Ra’ad
Death Announced: May 21, 2013. Funeral was held on May 21, 2013
Notes: Ra’adwas part of a group funeral, which included four other dead Hizballah members.
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Photos of the Ba’albek Group Funeral
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Name: Ali ‘Abbas Daheni (Abu Ghaleb)
Death Announced: May 20, 2013.
Notes: Daheni’s death was first announced on three pro-Hizballah Facebook pages.
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Name: Husayn Ahmed Abu al-Hassan (Al-Sayyid Abu Zaynab)
Death Announced: May 20, 2013. Funeral was held on May 21, 2013.
Notes: First announcement of Hassan’s death came via Facebook and then BintJbeil.org.
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Name: Muhammed Hassan al-Shahadi
Death Announced: May 20, 2013. Funeral was held on May 23, 2013.
Notes: Yasour.org and BintJbeil.org reported that Shahadi was killed “Defending the holy shrines in Syria” and that those attending his funeral chanted “Labayka ya Zaynab” (“We are here for you, O Zaynab”). The first photo of al-Shahadi which was uploaded showed him with a beard. His martyrdom poster showed him clean-shaven.
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Figure 2: Trucks with mounted speakers are often used to shout Hizballah slogans during funerals.
Name: Al-Sayyid ‘Abd al-Talib Husayn al-Musawi
Death Announced: May 21, 2013. Funeral was held on May 21, 2013.
Notes: The funeral was held in the central Bekka Valley town of Nabi Chit. The day before, the town buried another fighter, Hassan Faysel Shaker (also spelled Shukor).[1]
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Name: Muhammed Jihad Yusuf
Death Announced: May 21, 2013. Funeral was held on May 23, 2013.
Notes: Yusuf was from the southern Lebanese city of Tyre.
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Name: Muhammed Ghassan Bedayr (A.K.A. Muhammed Husayn Ghassan)
Death Announced: May 21, 2013. Funeral was held on May 23, 2013. Funeral was also listed (with photos posted on two Hizballah run webpages) on May 24, 2013.
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Name: Ali Ahmed Mazloum
Death Announced: May 21, 2013.
Notes: At the time of this writing, no other photographs were available. Mazloum’s death was announced via Facebook. It is important to see that the two religious clerics at the top of the photograph are Hizballah’s leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah (left) and Iran’s Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
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Name: Talib Habib Fadhl (A.K.A. Abu ‘Ali al-Hur)
Death Announced: May 24, 2013.
Notes: At the time of this writing, only one photo of Fadhl was released. In this photo Hizballah’s flag waves (left corner) and Damascus’s Sayda Zaynab Shrine shines in the sun (right corner).
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Name: Abbas Ahmed Halal (A.K.A. Abbas or Abu al-Fadhl)
Death Announced: May 24, 2013
Notes: On most Facebook and Hizballah-run webpages, Hilal is usually only referred to as, “Holy Warrior Martyr Abbas”. His middle and last names are not mentioned (except for one photo shown below). He was buried in Haboush, Lebanon.
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Name: Muhammed Diab ‘Ali Sayyid Ahmad (A.K.A. ‘Ali al-Ridha)
Death Announced: May 24, 2013
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Name: Jusoor Muhammed Isma’il (A.K.A. Tareb)
Death Announced: May 24, 2013
Notes: In the photo it is possible to make out a tattoo of Abbas Ibn Ali (Abu Fadhl al-Abbas), a major figure in Shia Islam, who represents bravery, loyalty, and strength on the battlefield.
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Name: ‘Ali Muhammed Sa’id ‘Aql (A.K.A. Abbas or ‘Ali Muhammed Aql)
Death Announced: May 24, 2013
Notes: One photograph of ‘Aql has been issued in the 24-hour period since his death was announced. His poster combines a photo of Hizballah leader, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah and the gold dome of the Zaynab Shrine.
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Name: Abbas ‘Ali Rashid Meqdad (A.K.A. Abu al-Fadhl)
Death Announced: May 24, 2013
Notes: Meqdad was claimed as a “Commander” on one Facebook page.
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Name: Salah al-Sabagh
Death Announced: May 22, 2013
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Name: Muhammed Hamadeh (A.K.A. Haj Bashar)
Death Announced: May 24, 2013
Notes: On Facebook, Hamadeh was claimed to be a Hizballah commander. His older age may indicate this claim as true. The announcement for Hamadeh was only found on 2 pro-Hizballah Facebook pages.
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Name: Isma’il ‘Ali Za’ytar (A.K.A. Abu Mahdi Nasrallah)
Death Announced: May 25, 2013
Notes: Youkal.net claims Za’ytar was killed in Qusayr.
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Name: Husayn Abdallah Tashuni
Death Announced: May 25, 2013
Notes: Youkal.net claimed Tashuni was killed in Qusayr.
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Name: Muhammed Husayn Salami (A.K.A. Bura al-Zuhra)
Death Announced: May 23, 2013. Burial took place on May 24, 2013.
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[1] See also: Anne Barnard, “Hezbollah’s Role in Syria War Shakes the Lebanese”, The New York Times, May 20, 2013 https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/world/middleeast/syria-developments.html.

Hizballah Cavalcade: Hizballah’s Multiplying Qusayr Martyrs

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

By Phillip Smyth
Hizballah Cavalcade: Hizballah’s Multiplying Qusayr Martyrs
 
Click here for a PDF version of this post
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Figure 1: Hizballah fighters pose under a road sign pointing to the Syrian city of Qusayr. (Source: Facebook).
On April 30, 2013, Hizballah leader Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah finally made an official announcement signifying Hizballah would become more greatly involved in the Syrian Civil War. Coinciding with his speech were a number of Facebook, pro-Hizballah forum, and other online webpage posts (often with photographs) showing funerals of Hizballah members. These posts had also occurred for well over a month prior to the Nasrallah speech. While Hizballah had been more publicly involved in the conflict in Syria since the summer of 2012 (with the announcement of the first Hizballah members killed in Syria), the speech appeared to be the first truly publicized acknowledgement of what was originally covert Hizballah activity inside Syria.
The weekend spanning May 18-20, 2013 was one filled with martyrdom announcements from Lebanese Hizballah. These announcements coincided with some of the heaviest fighting witnessed since the start of an over-a-month-long, combined pro-Bashar Assad, and Hizballah offensive. This offensive targeted the strategic area of Qusayr. Qusayr serves as a communications link between Syria’s hilly coastal ‘Alawi heartland, Lebanon’s Hizballah-dominated Bekka Valley, and Syria’s capital, Damascus.[1]
Hizballah often obscures the activities of its fighters in Syria. When a Hizballah member is killed, the phrase, “Killed while performing jihad duties” is regularly utilized by the organization as a description for how and why the member died.
As the Qusayr offensive picked-up steam, the numbers of Hizballah dead multiplied greatly. On May 19, 2013, Hizballah officially released a list of 12 Hizballah members killed.[2] On the other hand, Pro-rebel sources claimed anywhere from 20-120 Hizballah members were killed. Hizballah Facebook pages posted different numbers, ranging from 8-15 killed. Additionally, not all of the newly killed Hizballah members had photographs of themselves posted online.
Pro-Hizballah Facebook groups have taken the brunt of responsibility in spreading the news of new Hizballah dead. These pages are often the first to post photographs of Hizballah’s fallen. In turn, pro-Hizballah Facebook pages demonstrate a high level of online organization. Posts announcing newly killed Hizballah members on different pro-Hizballah Facebook pages often occur within minutes of each other. Honing Hizballah’s message further, these pages also share similar photographs. Such activity underlines how information is vetted and then conveyed to the public about those killed. This fact may also demonstrate official Hizballah involvement in announcements of their dead on Facebook.
There are other dead Hizballah members who were killed in Qusayr before the turbulent weekend. However, the posted list includes individuals who were announced by Hizballah as “Martyred” during the fighting from May 18-20, 2013. Currently (May 20, 2013, 12:00PM EST), that number stands at 20 (though, it may be updated with more information). Additionally, only names which could be cross-referenced using a variety of Hizballah sources were incorporated. These sources included pro-Hizballah Facebook pages, Iranian websites, pro-Hizballah forums, official, and semi-official websites.
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Name: Hassan Faysal Shaker
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: Shaker’s place of death was not listed on Facebook, forum, or official web posts. Shaker was originally listed as killed-in-action in an official Hizballah announcement. The announcement reported a group of 12 Hizballah fighters were killed while fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”. This photo was the only one released and could only be found on pro-Hizballah Facebook pages and on pro-Hizballah forums.
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Name: (Al-Haj) Muhammed Salman al-Khalil
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: Khalil’s place of death was not listed on Facebook, forum, or official web posts.
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Name: Muhammed Ali Assad Bakri
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: Bakri’s place of death was not listed on Facebook, forum, or official web posts.
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Name: Abbas Muhammed Uthman
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: Uthman’s place of death was not listed on Facebook, forum, or official web posts. He was one of 12 dead, who were named in the official Hizballah notice.
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Name: Fadi Muhammed al-Jazar
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: One pro-Hizballah Facebook page reported Jazar was killed fighting in Qusayr. This was one of the first announcements of a Hizballah fighter being killed in that area. The Times of Israel reported Jazar was a Hizballah “Field commander” at Qusayr and from 1991-2004 he was jailed by Israeli authorities after attacking Israeli positions on the Israel-Lebanon border. Jazar was part of a prisoner exchange in 2004.
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Name: Muhammed Fouad Raba’
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: Raba’’s photo shows him holding a modified M4 carbine and posing in front of the 23mm quad-cannon toting ZSU-23 anti-aircraft gun. Raba’ was part of an official Hizballah announcement that a group of Hizballah fighters were killed fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”. This photo was the only one released and could only be found on pro-Hizballah Facebook pages.
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Name: Ibrahim Husayn (A.K.A. Abu Ali or Hatem Husayn)
Death Announced: May 18, 2013
Notes: Husayn’s death was announced as part of an official Hizballah announcement that a group of Hizballah fighters were killed while fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”. On two pro-Hizballah Facebook pages, it was claimed that Husayn’s death occurred while “Defending the Zaynab Shrine”. This is a common narrative used to describe Hizballah members who have been killed in Syria. However, it is possible that Husayn could have been serving in Damascus with Hizballah-staffed front groups like Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. Other dead Hizballah members from the weekend of May 18-19 did not repeat the claims of that note with their Facebook martyrdom announcement posts. The official website for the town of Bint Jbeil (which is Hizballah controlled) did not report that Husayn was killed defending the Zaynab Shrine. On May 20, an official Iranian website for the Young Journalists Club, reported Husayn was a Hizballah commander.
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Name: Hassan Ali al-Shahrour
Death Announced: May 18, 2013. Funeral held on May 18, 2013.
Notes: According to YaHala.org, a pro-Hizballah website, Shahrour’s funeral was attended by many senior Shia religious leaders. Al-Ahed, one of Hizballah’s official news organs, reported that Hizballah MP Muhammed Ra’ad attended the funeral. This was the likely due to the fact that Ra’ad represents Nabatiyeh in Lebanon’s parliament. Photos were posted on Facebook pages, YaHala.org, and BintJbeil.org.
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Figure 2: Shahrour’s funeral was led by members of the Mahdi Scouts (Hizballah’s official scouting program). To the right of Shahrour’s posters, Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini is pictured on another poster.
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Name: (al-Haj) Ahmed Wael Ra’ad
Death Announced: May 19, 2013.
Notes: No photo was posted. Ra’ad was part of an official Hizballah announcement stating a group of Hizballah fighters were killed fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”.
Name: (al-Haj) Radhwan al-‘Attar
Death Announced: May 19, 2013.
Notes: No photo was posted. ‘Attar was part of an official Hizballah announcement stating a group of Hizballah fighters were killed fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”.
Name: Hassan Hariri
Death Announced: May 19, 2013.
Notes: No photo was posted. Hariri was part of an official Hizballah announcement stating a group of Hizballah fighters were killed fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”.
Name: Radhi al-Sha’er
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: No photo was posted. Hariri was part of an official Hizballah announcement stating a group of Hizballah fighters were killed while fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”.
Name: Hussein ‘Amar Yaghi
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: No photo was posted. Yaghi was part of an official Hizballah announcement stating a group of 12 Hizballah fighters were killed while fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”.
Name: Abu Saman Qasas
Death Announced: May 19, 2013
Notes: No photo was posted. Qasas was part of an official Hizballah announcement stating a group of 12 Hizballah fighters were killed while fulfilling their, “Jihad duties”.
Name: Muhammed

Hizballah Cavalcade: Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 2

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here. Click here for part one of ‘Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria’.

By Phillip Smyth
Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 2
The latest installment of Iraqi Shia killed in Syria demonstrates a more publicly acknowledged level of Iranian involvement. Two bodies of Iraqi Shia fighters killed in Syria were returned to Iraq through the Iran-Iraq border. Family members of one of the dead Iraqis told the Associated Press that he had gone to Iran before heading to Syria.[1]
The make-up of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s (LAFA) — a Syrian-based Shia militant group—membership was also exposed. Demonstrating a slight departure from earlier martyrdom announcements, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) more broadly acknowledged that their fighters in Syria operate exclusively under LAFA’s moniker. Earlier announcements listed only one of AAH fighters as serving with LAFA.
Three of the Iraqis killed were reportedly not claimed as members by any Iraqi Shia parties (including pro-Iranian Iraq-based groups). This partially fits with LAFA’s narrative that they are staffed by volunteer fighters from throughout the Shia Islamic world. However, with the recent revelations, it becomes clearer that LAFA fighters are most likely vetted and trained by Iran before heading off to fight in Syria.
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Name: Ala’a Muhsen Shahib al-Tamimi
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 15, 2013. His death was first announced on Facebook.
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Name: Ali Abdul al-Wahid ‘Awlan
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq/Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 15, 2013. His death was first announced on Facebook on May 16, 2013.
Notes: Iran’s Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is pictured on the right and Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr is pictured on the left.
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Name:  Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki (A.K.A. Mohammed Aboud)
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 17, 2013. Funeral held on May 17, 2013.
Notes: According to Elaph.com, Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki was a 27 year old Iraqi from Basra. Elaph also said he was not claimed by any Iraqi organization as a member. It was also reported by the Associated Press that Aboud went to Iran before heading to fight in Syria. Maliki’s body and that of fellow fighter Hassan Ali Farhud were also transferred back to Iraq via Iran. Since it was announced he was killed fighting around Damascus’s Zaynab Shrine, it is possible he was fighting as a member of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. One released photo of Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki, which was posted on pro-Lebanese Hizballah and pro-Liwa’a Abu Fadl al Abbas Facebook pages, also claimed he belonged to Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas.
The released photo may also point to al-Maliki’s training influences. Holding the magazine of the rifle is a common fire-control technique used by Hizballah and is featured in a number of their propaganda videos.
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Name:  Hassan Ali Farhud
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas* (?)
Death Announced: May 17, 2013. Funeral held on May 17, 2013.
Notes: According to Al-Sumaria News, Farhud was a 32 year old from Basra, Iraq. His body, along with Muhammed Aboud al-Maliki (see above) were returned to Iraq via Iran. It is unknown whether he engaged in training in Iran or which group he served with. Since it was reported he was killed fighting around the Zaynab Shrine in Damascus, it can be assumed he was part of Liw’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas. At the time this was written, no photos of Farhud were released.

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Name:  Diya Mutasher al-Issawi
Affiliated With: Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: May 5, 2013. Funeral held on May 6, 2013.
Notes: The Iraq-based Buratha News Agency reported the 30 year old was originally from Iraq’s Basra province. Issawi was not claimed by any Iraqi party as a member. Also, it is unknown whether Issawi was trained in Iran or elsewhere.

Untitled71 [1] “Bombings at Sunni mosque and funeral kill 47 in Iraq”, Associated Press, May 17, 2013,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqis-in-southern-city-mourn-2-shiite-fighters-killed-in-syria/2013/05/17/a53d1988-bece-11e2-b537-ab47f0325f7c_story.html.

Hizballah Cavalcade: What is the Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA)?: Assessing Syria’s Shia “International Brigade” Through Their Social Media Presence

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

What is the Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA)?: Assessing Syria’s Shia “International Brigade” Through Their Social Media Presence
By Phillip Smyth
Click here for a PDF version of this post
Making its first appearances in the fall of 2012, Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas (Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigades or LAFA) represents a new addition to the Syrian battlefield and serves as another example of increased sectarianism in the Syrian Civil War. The organization claims its role is to defend the Sayida Zaynab Shrine and surrounding Shia populated neighborhoods located in southern Damascus.[1] The group is made-up of a mixture of a small number of native Syrian Shia with a majority of foreign Shia Muslim fighters.
LAFA has also maintained an outward appearance which mirrors the same type of spirit once found with the volunteer International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War. Despite the presented narrative, this does not necessitate the group is an ad hoc collection of individual Shia Muslims. The group heavily utilizes fighters originating from Iranian-backed organizations (such as Iraq’s Kata’ib Hizballah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq), has uniformed personnel, new weapons, a recognizable leadership structure, and openly identifies with Lebanese Hizballah. These factors point to an extremely organized fighting group and deeper levels of Iranian involvement in the organization.
Unlike larger and more established militant Shia Islamist groups such as Lebanon’s Hizballah or Iraq’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, LAFA has no official website or official online forums. The group finds most of its internet representation through a mixture of quasi-official Facebook pages and YouTube stations. In fact, for the Western and Arabic-language press, LAFA’s existence only came to light when a YouTube music video featuring the group’s fighters was made public.[2] Thus, fifteen pro-LAFA Facebook pages, five Facebook pages associated with Lebanese Hizballah, one Hizballah forum, three pro-Muqtada al-Sadr forums, and five pro-LAFA/pro-Hizballah YouTube stations were reviewed for this study.
 “Labayka Ya Zaynab!”: Abu Fadl al-Abbas’s Messaging Campaign & Narrative



Designating itself firmly as a Shia militant organization, LAFA utilizes Shia Islamic imagery, slogans, and other symbols to push its case to Shia Muslims. As stated by the group and its supporters, the Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade’s main purpose is to “Defend the Saydah Zaynab Shrine”. Their specified raison d’etre, immediately projects an image of “Protectors” simply reacting to a foe bent on the destruction of Shi’ism.
A common chant heard and written by LAFA members and supporters is “Labayka Ya Zaynab!” (“We are here for you Zaynab”). The slogan directly refers to the defense of the Zaynab Shrine and has also become a rallying cry for Shia Islamist groups fighting in Syria. At funerals held for Lebanese Hizballah members killed in Syria, the same slogan regularly chanted. LAFA militants regularly say the phrase as they engage Syrian rebel forces. The cry reinforces the line that the group’s sole function is the protection of the Zaynab Shrine and that they are worthy of praise for their sacrifice for the entirety of Shi’ism.
The Shia Symbolism behind LAFA’s name originates with the story of Abu Fadl al-Abbas (A.K.A. Abbas Ibn Ali). Abu Fadl al-Abbas was a trusted and brave warrior who fought for his father, Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib.[3] Serving with Imam Husayn’s forces during the religiously important and historic Battle of Karbala, Abu Fadl al-Abbas had both of his arms cut off attempting to collect water for his besieged compatriots. Symbolizing his willingness to sacrifice and loyalty, until he was killed, Abbas continued to carry water back to his forces using his mouth.[4]
LAFA has attempted to utilize this story in their propaganda material. The image of a severed arm was actually featured in a number of pro-LAFA videos.[5] Additionally, the green flag on LAFA’s logo represents the flag Abu Fadl al-Abbas carried when he acted as flag bearer for Imam Husayn during the Battle of Karbala.
The story taps into the very roots of the Sunni-Shia split. For Shia, the Battle of Karbala symbolizes their rejection of oppressive Sunni rule. Combined with what appears to be a clear Sunni Islamist drive to dislodge Shia presence in Syria, for many Shia the story resonates in the contemporary sense. Since the shrine and neighborhoods LAFA claims to protect are surrounded by pockets of Syrian rebels, the field of battle is also reminiscent of the Battle of Karbala. With these prevailing themes, LAFA taps into the culturally important concept of Shia self-sacrifice. These themes were used extensively by Iran’s current leadership and has been refered to by some scholars as the, “Karbala narrative”.[6]
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Figure 1: Another example of LAFA pushing the “Israel/Jewish-Sunni Gulf Arab” or “Israel/Jewish-Takfiri” conspiracy narrative. A LAFA member steps on a paper reading “Al-Saudia/Qatar/Al-Khaleej” (“Saudi, Qatar, the Gulf”) which are positioned under a Star of David. (Source: Facebook).
While LAFA describes its enemy as “Takfiris” or as “Gulf and Israeli” supported enemies, it neither specifically targets Sunni Muslims as a whole, nor marks the entire sect as apostates. Instead, the group brands its Syrian rebel enemies (no matter their political orientation, tactics utilized, or how secular) as “Wahhabists”, “Terrorists” and/or “Extremists”. Moreover, a number of online LAFA supporters refer to all Syrian rebels as “Kafirun” (“infidels”).
A major propaganda event for LAFA occurred when one of its members raised a red banner over the Zaynab Shrine’s golden dome. The message portrayal appeared to be one of valiantly opposing their Syrian rebel enemy and of embodying the flag-bearing role of Abu Fadl al-Abbas. The raising of the red banner signified willingness to become a martyr since it is the symbolic color for martyrdom in Shi’ism.[7] At the time of this writing, the film of the LAFA militant raising the red flag has been re-edited into eight YouTube films.
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Figure 2: LAFA members and supporters raise a red banner reading “Ya Zaynab” (“O Zaynab”) over the shrine. (Source: Facebook).
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Figure 3: A photo of a LAFA member raises the red flag reading, “Ya Zaynab” (“O Zaynab”). (Source: Facebook).
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Figure 4: An example of the Zaynab Shrine in LAFA propaganda. “Liwa’a Abu Fadl Al-Abbas” is written in Arabic calligraphy. Wrapped around the shrine’s minaret is a flag reading, “Ya Zaynab” (“O Zaynab”). (Source: Facebook).
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Figure 5: 7.62×39 rounds (the round used in the AK-47) have been arranged to spell, “Ya Ali” (O, Ali). The Ali reference refers to Imam Ali Ibn Abi Talib. For the Shia, he is considered the first Imam, his family. The ammunition also forms the Zulfiqar, Ali’s double pointed sword, which represents divinely guided power. (Source: Facebook).
Iranian-Backed Groups & Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
The foreign fighter element of Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas has caught the attention of many analyzing the group. A key factor for new militia is that the majority of fighters killed come from both Iraq and Lebanon. The original parties they were aligned with were either beholden to Iranian radical ideology or created with Iranian aid. This factor points to a more direct Iranian involvement with the organization’s creation.
There has been a preponderance of reports citing large number of Iraqi Shia who have joined the group. Pro-LAFA social media is rife with many individuals praising Iraqi Shia efforts with the group. However, there have also been numerous Lebanese Shia—mainly Hizballah members—who fight or have fought with the group.
Journalist Nicholas Blanford identified that Hizballah involvement with the militia could be determined due to their utilization of semi-automatic fire, “a technique taught to Hezbollah combatants to improve accuracy and save ammunition”.[8] The clothing worn by LAFA members also points to another Hizballah-LAFA connection.[9] However, the links between the two organizations are far deeper than similar weapons techniques and uniforms.
As far back as August, 2012, there was unconfirmed evidence that Hizballah had positioned itself around the Zaynab shrine. At that time, Hassan Selim Meqdad, a Lebanese Shia was captured by Syrian rebels and was accused of being a Hizballah operative fighting in Syria. His family and Hizballah both denied the claims.[10]  When Meqdad was filmed, he told his captors he was one

Hizballah Cavalcade: Roundup of Iraqis Killed in Syria, Part 1

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

By Phillip Smyth
Reports of Iraqi Shia involvement in the Syrian Civil War surged from January-May, 2013.[1] In March, the first photos and bios of Iraqi Shia killed during the fighting were released. Many of these announcements, photos of those killed, and other information received much broader coverage after it was spread on forums and Facebook pages. Thus far, the only two Iraqi groups to have announced they have lost members have been Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (League of the Righteous) and Kata’ib Hizballah (Hizballah Brigades).
It should be mentioned that Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq has not announced on its official webpage that it has had any “Martyrs” in recent months. Nevertheless, the group has set-up funeral processions for its dead in major Iraqi cities. In sharp contrast to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s lacking web announcements; Kata’ib Hizballah updates its webpage regularly and in a more detailed fashion, regarding the fate of its members who have been killed and their funerals. Both Kata’ib Hizballah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, like their Lebanese counterpart, Hizballah, do not mention where these fighters were killed. Regardless, on most forums and Facebook pages, those who post comments are generally aware that the two groups are actively involved in fighting in Syria.

Created during the height of Coalition operations during the Iraq War, together, Kata’ib Hizballah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq have received extensive assistance from Lebanese Hizballah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp.[2] Both Iraqi groups are also major supporters of Iranian Revolutionary Islamist ideology (Wilayat al-Faqih).[3] Thus, it is extremely likely both organizations are acting as proxy forces for Iran. —

Name: Sa’ad Abed al-Qadr Abu Shamia’
Affiliated With: Kata’ib Hizballah
Death Announced: March 17, 2013
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Name: Ahmed Mahdi al-Shuweili (A.K.A. Qassim Abu Mahdi)
Affiliated With: Kata’ib Hizballah
Death Announced: March 15, 2013
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Name: Arfad Muhsein Al-Hamidawi (A.K.A. Abu Karar)
Affiliated With: Kata’ib Hizballah
Death Announced: April 2, 2013
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Name: Karar Abed al-Amir Fatlawi Abu Assad (A.K.A. Karar Fatlawi and Karar Abed al-Amir Aziz Abu Assad)
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas
Death Announced: Early April, 2013.
Facebook Page: https://ar-ar.facebook.com/pages/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%AF-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%AC%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-%D9%83%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%B9%D8%A8%D8%AF-%D8%A3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D8%A8%D9%88-%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF/472898662780073
Note: Karar has one of the best developed narratives of any of the Iraqis killed. His story comes complete with numerous photos, a Facebook page, and supposed videos of him engaged in fighting. It is also important to note that he is the only one to have significant acceptance from supporters that he was a part of both Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and the Syria-based (members mainly come from Iraq and Lebanon) Liwa’a Abu Fadl al-Abbas.
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Name: Ahmed Farhud Hashim al-Zerjawi (A.K.A. Ahmed Farhud Hashim)
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
Death Announced: May 2, 2013 (for funeral held in Najaf, Iraq)
Note: Iran’s Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is pictured on the left and Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr is pictured on the right.
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 Name: Yahiya Sarmad Muhammed al-Fayli (A.K.A. Yahiya al-Fayli and Asu)
Affiliated With: Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq
Death Announced: Early May, 2013 (most forums list between May, 5-May,7)
Note: Iran’s Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is pictured on the right and Iraqi cleric Grand Ayatollah Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr is pictured on the left.
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[1] One example: Mariam Karouny, “Shi’ite fighters rally to defend Damascus shrine”, Reuters, March 3, 2013, https://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/03/us-syria-crisis-shiites-idUSBRE92202X20130303. [2] Elizabeth O’Bagy and Stephen Wicken , “Fact Sheet: Ali Musa Daqduq”, Institute For the Study of War, May 14, 2012, https://www.understandingwar.org/reference/fact-sheet-ali-mussa-daqduq. See also: Thomas Strouse, “Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Intricate Web of Iranian Military Involvement in Iraq”, Jamestown Foundation, Terrorism Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 9, March 4, 2010, https://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36109. [3] [Absolute] Wilayat al-Faqih (also known by in Persian as “Velayat-e-Faqih) is an ideological concept first drawn up by Iran’s late Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini posited that only learned clerics could rule over society and make political decisions. This was an extremely radical departure from the more traditional schools of Shi’ism. As a result, those currently following this ideology are religiously bound to follow the rulings of the Wali al-Faqih, who is currently Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. See also: Sam Wyer, The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, Institute for the Study of War, Middle East Security Report 7,December, 2012, https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ResurgenceofAAH.pdf.

Expanding the Scope of Jihadology: Intro to the Hizballah Cavalcade

Three years ago, in May 2010, Jihadology.net was established to provide easy access to primary source materials from Sunni global jihadi groups affiliated or sympathetic to al-Qaeda’s worldview. I never would have imagined how large this site would become and want to thank everyone for that support and I hope it has been a useful resource. That being said, one of the largest conflicts embroiling the greater Middle East is the current civil war in Syria. As a consequence of the sectarianization of the war, non-state Shia jihadi groups aligned with the Iranian regime and Hizballah have joined the fight on the side of the Assad regime. It is important to note, that while both AQ-sympathetic and Iranian/Hizballah-sympathetic are  ‘jihadi’ in nature, this site is not conflating these two separate movements and strands of thought. Due to the dearth of information on Shia jihadi organizations, Jihadology hopes to fill the same type of gap it did when covering the study of AQ-type groups. For more on this new project (which will take a slightly different approach to what I have done as it relates to Sunni global jihadis), see the introduction to it below from Phillip Smyth.

What is Hizballah Cavalcade?
The new and improved Hizballah Cavalcade has now moved to its new home and will present new information here at Jihadology. Beginning as a humble Twitter hashtag (#HizballahCavalcade) by Phillip Smyth, Hizballah Cavalcade initially sought to post photos of Lebanese Hizballah members killed in Syria and their funerals.
Hizballah Cavalcade will now also focus on (but is not limited to) organizations such as: Lebanon’s Hizballah and Harakat Amal (Amal Movement); Iraq’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s (League of the Righteous), Kata’ib Hizballah (Hizballah Brigades), and Liwa’a al-Yum al-Mawud (Promised Day Brigades); and Syria’s new Liwa’a Abu Fadhl al-Abbas (The Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade).
By utilizing data found on sympathetic Facebook pages, YouTube accounts, and on forums, the new Hizballah Cavalcade will attempt to display available photos of all funerals and martyrdom posters belonging to Shia groups which are fighting in Syria. In addition, funeral, combat, and even music videos belonging to these groups pertaining to the fighting in Syria will also be posted.
About the Author:
Phillip Smyth is currently a researcher focusing on Hizballah for University of Maryland’s Institute for Advanced Computer Studies’ Lab for Computational Cultural Dynamics.