

![]()
The clandestine nature of the various networks responsible for sending Sunni fighters into Syria makes it difficult to ascertain exactly how many foreigners have entered the war and from which countries. Yet social-media sources affiliated with jihadists often post death notices for slain fighters, providing a unique, though incomplete, picture of where they are being recruited and where in Syria they fought. Tracking and analyzing these notices can help broaden Washington’s understanding of foreign recruitment networks, the largest of which appear to operate in Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Tunisia.
Since the Syrian uprising turned into an armed rebellion, jihadists have announced the deaths of more than 1,100 fighters on their Twitter and Facebook accounts and, to a lesser extent, on password-protected forums. Although other foreigners have been killed in Syria, their deaths were reported by non-jihadist rebels, Western media, or Arabic media and are not included in this assessment. The figures below also exclude foreigners who have fought on the Assad regime’s side.
To be sure, the information gleaned from jihadist sources is self-reported, and some data might therefore be suppressed for political reasons, especially reports of Iraqi involvement. That said, it still offers a worthwhile snapshot of an otherwise murky world.
The most striking revelation in the latest data is the huge rise in overall death notices. Previously, jihadist sources had posted only 85 such notices as of February 2013, and only 280 as of June. In other words, the vast majority of the more than 1,100 notices have come in the past half year.
Click here to read the rest.

In a small town in Nabeul governorate, east of Tunis, on the last day of August 2013, I sat down with a Tunisian that fought in Syria for six months and has since returned home. It was clear that Khalid (not his real name) was uncomfortable talking about his experience. He looked at the ground during the entire conversation, playing with a wrapper in his hand, and he never made eye contact. He was also not interested in providing too many details, stating that it was because “I believe in God.” However, he did provide some interesting insights as a result of what he did and did not say, along with conversations with those who knew him in the town.
Khalid comes from a humble background. His parents run a stand on the side of the road selling candy, crackers, chips, gum and soft drinks. It is possible that one of the motivating factors for going to Syria was economic, as well as prestige for his family. When he returned home via Istanbul, he bought nice clothing for his parents, using money either from the coffers of the rebel group he fought with (likely Jabhat al-Nusra) or his patron, a Salafi businessman from the same town as Khalid who has business ties in Saudi Arabia, who helped pay for his passport and plane ticket to Turkey. Further, there are reports that fighters from Jabhat al-Nusra make $250-300 a month while fighting, which could also benefit his family.
There are also important religious and ideological pulls as well. Following the revolution in 2011, he became more religious. He first dabbled in support for Ennahda, but later ditched them and joined the Salafi camp. He began attending the local Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) mosque, which is run by an Egyptian imam who had previously lived in Saudi Arabia. Khalid first went to the AST mosque to pray, then befriended other mosque attendees, and over time adapted the Salafi lifestyle.
Click here to read the rest.

The public rise of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST) – the radical Islamist group recently listed as a terrorist organisation by the Tunisian government – first began two and a half years ago, and online.
On 27 April, 2011, a blog titled the al-Qayrawan Media Foundation (QMF) was created, and two days later a corresponding Facebook page was established. Then, on 15 May, another Facebook page under the name Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia was launched, coinciding with the announcement that a conference would be convened in Tunis on 21 May.
This is the public story of AST’s emergence, and since 2011, the group’s visibility has grown significantly; the group has courted controversy through its protests against blasphemy, been accused of involvement in political violence, and been banned by the state. Yet the organisation remains poorly understood, not least with regards to its real origins, the story of which stretches several years further back than 2011, runs much deeper into Tunisian politics than has otherwise been disclosed, and has up to now stayed largely concealed.
Click here to read the rest.
Tonight it was reported by Express FM that Shaykh al-Khatib al-Idrisi was arrested in Sidi Ali Ben Aoun (in the governorate of Sidi Bouzid), where there has been recent violence in the past couple of days. On Wednesday afternoon after an exchange of fire occurred between militants and national guardsmen, six national guard officers were killed and four were wounded. Contrary to the article from Express FM, al-Idrisi is not the founder of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST). In fact, he’s not even a member of the group at all. He is though one of, if not the most well-respected Salafi clerics within Tunisia as well as North Africa writ-large. More importantly, though, he is also viewed as a key unaffiliated spiritual guide for members of AST. His arrest will likely further galvanize those in AST and harden their belief that the state is at war with Islam and will never allow them to practice it as they see fit. It also could push AST away from its dawa-first approach and move into a more terrorism-first approach (something that Daveed Gartenstein-Ross has been hypothesizing would eventually happen), which would make it more like a classical jihadi organization.
Click here to read the rest.

Earlier this month, Tunisia’s main political parties signed an agreement on how to proceed in its transition to a consolidated democracy. While Tunisia’s process so far has been slow and steady, it has also been largely devoid of internal or external meddling like the coup d’état in Egypt or outside interference in Libya or Syria. These factors could actually lead to its ultimate success and should be applauded. When in Tunisia last month, many I spoke to just want things to be normal and to provide for their family, without all of the crises. There are major challenges that remain ahead though, notably on the economic and security fronts.
Click here to read the rest.
_______________
To inquire about a translation for this series of tweets for a fee email: [email protected]
Since the assault on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis on September 14, 2012, a collision course has been set between the Tunisian state and the salafi-jihadi organization Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST). It highlights the utter failure of the Ennahda-led government to fully appreciate or understand AST as a movement. Ennahda believed it could use a light touch approach and attempt to co-opt AST and bring them into the political system. This strategy was fraught with false assumptions; most notably that AST itself stated repeatedly it is against the democratic process since it contravenes Islam and places men on the same level as God. Today, Tunis designated AST as a terrorist organization. How the Tunisian government uses this new mandate against AST will likely provide more information on AST’s connections to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) and/or the extent to which it has a secret fighting apparatus.
AST’s Public Persona
Following the founding of AST in April 2011, it has promoted an image of an organization only interested in conducting da’wa (missionary activities). The leader of AST Sayf Allah bin Hussayn (better known as Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi) continually noted that Tunisia was not a land of jihad, but a land of da’wa and that his movement did not carry weapons. Abu Iyadh also emphasized that the media distorted AST and that one should “hear from them, not about them.” While it is true that the majority of AST’s activities have been related to da’wa like passing out religious literature, providing food and medical services to the needy, and putting on lectures, among other things, from the beginning there has been a more nefarious side of the group, too.
Click here to read the rest.
السلام عليكم،سمعنا تصريح رئيس حكومة الردة في تونس المدعو علي العريض وهو يصنف”أنصار الشريعة في تونس” في خانة الارهاب ويتهمها رسميا بجرائم قتلاتهمها بالضلوع في جرائم قتل معارضين سياسيين ملحدين وقتل افراد من الجيش اضافة الى حيازة اسلحة والسعي الى قلب النظام بالقوةوالتهمة الكبرى الملصقة بالإخوة هي علاقتهم بتنظيم قاعدة الجهاد في المغرب الإسلامي،طوبى للإخوة هذه التهم المشرفة،فليس هناك اي جديد يا علي عريضمحاربة الإرهاب وشن الحرب على الإخوة هو السلم العنكبوتي الذي يلهث وراءه هؤلاء الاسلاموقراطيون،خونة الإخوان،نهجهم واحد لقد تواصوا بهقولوا لهؤلاء الأغبياء:إنه سلم وهن،سراب لن تبلغوه،ستُحرقون بنار كيدكم ومكركم لأصحاب الحق،ولن ينفعكم من تتلمقون لهم وتبغون رضاهم من دون اللهامضوا حيث امركم ربكم ايها الإخوة في انصار الشريعة،في تونس واليمن ومصر وفي كل مكان،إن الله معكم ولن يتركم اعمالكم{ويخوفونك بالذين من دونه}حزب النهضة في تونس على شفا جرف هار وينتظرون نفس مصير الإخوان في مصر،ومن اجل تفادي المأساة يسارعون الى شن الحرب على الإخوة ولن ينفعهم ذلك
سيخسر اخوان النهضة كرسي الحكم كما سيخسرون محاربتهم لأصحاب الحق وهم انصار الشريعة،خزي ووبال في الدنيا والآخرة والله ناصر دينه وعباده الصالحين
____________
To inquire about a translation for these tweets for a fee email: [email protected]
Over the past few years there have rumblings about training camps in Libya that are run by jihadi entities such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib in southern Libya as well as ones by Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), the organization most likely responsible for the attack on the US Consulate in Benghazi last September. It has been difficult to confirm these camps due to the secretive nature of these groups and the lack of self reported evidence by these groups. For the first time, though, on August 6, 2013, credible sources within Libya have confirmed such camps exist.
On Facebook, Moaoya EL Wrffli, posted two videos of two separate Tunisians that had been detained by locals in the Darnah region and later interrogated. The two videos below provide fascinating insights into Ansar al-Sharia in Libya and its non-publicized activities as well as facilitation networks as it relates to the war in Syria. Based on the information given in the these videos, even though they were just posted online, it is likely that they are from late spring/early summer 2012. Highlighting that ASL was already at that point very active with training fighters for Syria as well as other likely nefarious activities in light of what we know would eventually happen in Benghazi on September 11, 2012.
Click here to read the rest.