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GUEST POST: Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin: Between Israel and Hamas

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.

Past Guest Posts:

Hazim Fouad, “Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj),” April 30, 2013.

Shami Witness, “On the Jabhat al Nusrah vs. Kataeb Farouq Fitna,” March 27, 2013.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Famous Anasheed: ‘Madin Kas-Sayf’ by Abu Ali,” March 3, 2013.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.

Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.

Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.

Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.

Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.

Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.

Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.

Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.

Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

In recent weeks and months there has been a cacophony of Salafi protest that has swept Gaza against the ruling Hamas government related to treatment of prisoners, corruption, and ability to practice Islam as they see fit. One of the groups speaking out has been Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin fi Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis, a jihadi organization that is sympathetic to al-Qaeda’s worldview. By glomming onto a mainstream Salafi cause, MSM is attempting to co-opt individuals to gain a stronger footing within Gaza to challenge Hamas (albeit only at the political and not military level yet), whom they view as an enemy similar, though, on a lesser level than Israel.

Background
Following a cross-border attack on Israel carried out by one Egyptian and one Saudi fighter, the organization’s formation was first declared on 19 June 2012, which was announced in a video released from the Sinai Peninsula, featuring seven fighters. The two attackers read their martyrdom wills in the video as well.

In the first part of the video, the speaker in the center reads out a statement and begins by invoking Qur’an 61:4, ‘Verily does God love those who fight in his path in a row as though they were a firm edifice,’ followed by references to standard global jihadist themes such as the necessity of implementing the Shari’a on Earth and reviving the glory of the Ummah.

The Majlis also appeals to fellow Muslims in countries like Lebanon, Jordan, as well as the ‘Syrian Muslim people- the mujahid [people] brutalized under the control of the idolatrous, criminal Nusayri [derogatory term for ‘Alawite’] regime.’

The flag used is identical to the one pioneered by al-Qa’ida’s Iraqi branch known as the Islamic State of Iraq, and the group praises ‘Sheikh Osama Bin Laden’ in its founding statement.  Yet, while the al-Qa’ida affiliation thus illustrated is not in doubt, the group’s primary focus to attack Israel has been evident from the beginning.

This is apparent in the reference to the obligation of ‘the people of Tawhid [monotheism]’ to heed the ‘screams of al-Aqsa and the moans of prisoners under the grip of the enemy Jewish cowards.’ The founding statement includes in its conclusion a call for God to defeat ‘the Jews and the kuffar.’

In a video from October of last year, the Majlis likewise vowed to fight the Jews as enemies of God. In the wake of an April 2013 rocket attack on Eilat, the group released a video, part of which featured scenes of Jews praying at the Western Wall, denounced by the Majlis as the ‘Judaization of al-Aqsa.’ The video then continues with the recurring theme of treatment of Muslim prisoners by Israel.

MSM and Hamas
The focus on Israel is also made clear by the fact that the organization maintains a presence among Salafist jihadists located in the Gaza Strip. In light of Hamas’ detention and torture of jihadist individuals, the Majlis has on more than one occasion raised the issue of Hamas’ conduct towards Salafist militants.

For example, a senior Salafist in Gaza affiliated with the Majlis recently affirmed: ‘We will continue the jihad regardless of the stance of Egypt or Hamas,’ adding that the Majlis has ‘precise knowledge on the complete cooperation between Egypt and Hamas in the war against the Salafists.’

In a similar vein, the Majlis recently released a statement calling for the release of all Salafist detainees held prisoner by the Hamas government: ‘Everyone who has a free voice and noble pen, and everyone who has a living conscience and faith should raise his voice to pressure the dismissed government to put a stop to its pursuit against the rights of its mujahideen.’

Criticism of Hamas has been a recurring theme in Salafist discourse. A very noteworthy example is a Salafist-Jihadist video (NB not from an al-Qa’ida affiliate) from about a year ago that purports to document evidence on numerous counts of Hamas’ perpetrating- in the words of the video title- ‘massacres…in Gaza against the Salafist mujahideen.

For example, at 17:40 onwards, the video offers a purportedly intercepted radio transmission from the leadership of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades giving orders to destroy houses and a mosque frequented by Salafists with missiles.

Like the affirmation to continue jihad despite perceived Egypt-Hamas cooperation against Salafist militants, the latest call by the Majlis for Hamas to release Salafist detainees comes following the killing by Israel of a Majlis militant called Haitham Ziyad al-Meshaal, now commemorated as a ‘martyr’ in a video released by the organization.

The day before Haitham was assassinated, relatives of imprisoned Salafist militants in Gaza held a demonstration calling on Hamas’ security forces to release their detained kinsfolk. The al-Qa’ida flag’s presence may indicate that some of the imprisoned fighters in question are members of the Majlis.

It turns out that Haitham, who was targeted as a suspect behind the rocket attacks on Eilat, had once been a member of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades but according to the Majlis, left out of disillusionment with Hamas’ participation in ‘the game of democracy’ (a reference to the 2006 legislative elections that were judged to be free) and its ‘removal of the divine Shari’a.’

One should compare this sentiment with a statement from the group that condemned Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and some Salafist parties (e.g. Egypt’s an-Nour) for entering into the ‘mud of democracy.’ Here is a photo of Haitham from his funeral in Gaza- his coffin wrapped in the al-Qa’ida flag. His dislike of the concept of democracy is corroborated by his testimony in the video celebrating his martyrdom.

Unsurprisingly, Hamas condemned Israel’s targeting of Haitham, but many in jihadist circles did not fail to notice Hamas’ double standard behind the condemnation.

For instance, the jihadist outlet Ibn Taymiyyah Media released a statement noting that the Salafist jihadists in Gaza have been caught between the ‘hammer of Jewish aircraft and the anvil of Hamas and its security apparatus,’ noting the ongoing imprisonment and disappearances of Salafist militants.

In the meantime, however, Hamas, which has a vested interest in portraying itself as the true spearhead of ‘resistance’ against Israel, remains undeterred from cracking down on Salafists it perceives as its rivals, having just announced the arrest of several ‘extremist’ Salafist militants in Gaza on charges of stealing missiles.

The accusation of stealing weaponry- a familiar charge on Hamas’ part- is strongly denied by the Salafists, including those affiliated with the Majlis, which in October of last year released a video to refute the allegation. The video purportedly shows how they themselves manufacture projectiles to fire against Israel.

The global jihadist ideology of the Majlis and its animosity towards Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood notwithstanding, it should not be thought that the group is planning on armed confrontation with Hamas or the Egyptian government anytime soon.

On the contrary, when there was an attack last year on Egyptian border guards at the Rafah crossing into Gaza, the Majlis was quick to issue a denial of responsibility, while condemning the Egyptian army’s stance against jihadist fighters.

Conclusion
In short, the group will continue to attempt to carry out attacks on Israel, while avoiding an open fight against Egypt or Hamas. Even so, Salafist resentment about treatment under Hamas’ hands could lead to a more general shift in the Salafist trend in Gaza towards the open al-Qa’ida affiliation of the Majlis. Indeed, the banners on display at that demonstration in Gaza on Monday by the relatives of imprisoned Salafists may be a strong indication that such a turn is already underway.

To an extent, it would seem Hamas heeds internal Salafist pressure to enforce Islamic law more rigidly, as illustrated by the recent initiative for gender segregation in schools. Yet in the eyes of the Salafist militants, these Islamization moves are merely cosmetic and do not compensate for imprisoning and torturing Salafist brethren and so ultimately cannot off-put attempts by the Majlis to co-opt Salafist opinion in Gaza towards its orientation.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University. His website is http://www.aymennjawad.org

GUEST POST: “On the Jabhat al Nusrah vs. Kataeb Farouq Fitna”

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, “Famous Anasheed: ‘Madin Kas-Sayf’ by Abu Ali,” March 3, 2013.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.

Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.

Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.

Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.

Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.

Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.

Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.

Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.

Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.

By Shami Witness

Kataeb Farouq, one of the largest, GCC-leaning opposition battalions in Syria is in the news again. Since last week, they have been busy battling jihadists from the Jabhat al Nusrah in Tal Abayadd, a town of Raqqah governorate, near the Turkish border. The details of the why and how are murky, but clashes continued at least till 24 March, 2013, when Jabhat al Nusrah was seen gaining ground near the Ali bin-Abi taleb Masjid in the city. A report from Rania Abouzeid (@Raniaab) of TIME mentions only the Farouq side of the story, which of course, doesn’t give a complete picture of what happened.

But from the facts that cannot be denied is this: Turkish intelligence maintains a strong influence over Farouq leaders, specially over the Northern Farouq ones. Back in July 2012, a coalition of rebel brigades captured Bab al Hawa border crossing. Among the coalition were jihadists from the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC), which though not part of Jabhat al Nusrah (JN),is under “Jabhat al Nusrah’s umbrella organizationally” (to borrow a phrase used by JN to highlight relations between them and MSC).

The Turkish intelligence panicked as soon as they realized the jihadists’ presence. They would rather have another brigade involved in freeing Bab al Hawa, a local chapter of the Farouq Brigade,than jihadists at their borders. It is not clear what happened, and again we only have Farouq’s side of the story (courtesy @Raniaab again),but hostilities between the MSC leader in Bab al Hawa, Firas al Absi, and the local Farouq deputy leader, Thaer al Waqqas, increased to a point where Absi was kidnapped, tortured, and executed by Thaer’s men. Though this caused a lot of anger among other rebels, most saw it wise to not create further intra-rebel strife. Even Jabhat al Nusrah kept their mouth shut, instead of coming forward to defend a group under umbrella, fearing broader backlash. Waqqas and his now Tal Abaydd based Farouq commander even went on to boast about this killing to media outlets, painting it in the more media-friendly narrative of moderate rebels dislodging fanatical jihadists. But revenge was coming.

By early January 2013, Waqqas was shot dead, allegedly by a Tunisian jihadi, in Sarmada. Absi’s brother, who was a commander in Homs, had pledged vengeance for his brother. And so he delivered. The blood debt was paid. Neither Farouq high command (always had tenuous control of Northern Farouq) nor MSC, nor their jihadist allies, escalated the strife. JN issued a denial of involvement, and called for peaceful redressal of differences.

If you see how Farouq presents the story to English language media, it would seem it’s a plain black and white case of local, moderate fighters clashing with rabid, fanatical global jihadists, purely because Farouq wants a moderate Syria. All fine and dandy, but the truth, as always, is much more complex.

You see, Farouq Brigades, “are a bunch of thieves,” as one of my sources described. Northern Farouq is notorious for its extensive smuggling businesses of diesel, cement, and even hashish. They carry out extortion on their checkpoints. They charge exorbitant taxes for goods passing through their checkpoints, and this greed is shared by their Homs-based colleagues, who, in the last week of December 2012, were busy taxing weapons to other rebels, instead of co-operating with them to fight the regime forces, and the result was Assad forces carried out the Deir el Balbeh massacre on Dec 29,2012. Death toll was above 100, though exact figures are disputed.

Not ashamed by this massacre, in March 2013 itself, some rebels managed to cut off Assad forces’ pipelines to Homs from the North. Farouq leaders actually tried to convince these rebels to not cause problems to these pipelines! Apparently they get some kickbacks from Assad forces for keeping the lines running.

Locals in Bab al Hawa and surrounding don’t like Northern Farouq control of Bab al Hawa. These Farouq leaders are considered outsiders, but local civilians and rebels in Bab al Hawa as well as Tal Abaydd keep their mouth shut (for now) because they don’t want Farouq’s wrath. Farouq has almost zero public outreach, no humanitarian programmes or aid efforts; there is almost zero contact with the the civilian Syrian population, in stark contrast to jihadists from JN or the much larger Syrian Islamic Front (SIF).

Northern Farouq has also been blamed for looting of private and public property in the liberated zones, like some other rag-tag FSA factions. This was one of the crucial reasons for the jihadists now controlling Raqqah city to not allow FSA factions inside the city,the ones that played no role in freeing it.

It is still not clear who started the fight first in Tal Abayyd recently, whether JN or Farouq. But this needs to be seen in recent JN efforts of influencing small, but locally-influential battalions under its umbrella, across Syria. Recently, around 15 battalions involved in the seize of Kweires Aiport pledged to support Jabhat al Nusrah against “US threats.” This is what JN is trying to do. This is their second ring of defense, local allies across Syria who are much deeply rooted than big names like Ahrar Sham, Kataeb Farouq, Liwa Tawheed, etc. By attacking Farouq, they are signalling to local FSA battlions that they would no longer have to live under the mafia-like extortion of Farouq, if they team up with Nusrah instead. Also watch how quickly, even after capturing territory, Nusrah backtracked and called for peaceful redressal of disputes.

Given Nusrah’s success in actually injuring the Farouq commander in Tal Abaydd, and ability to seize Farouq territory, this little battle should be seen as a presentation from Nusrah to locals: see how effective we are. They most probably had no intention to totally kill off Farouq influence, but this 2-step forward, 1-step back approach is very convenient for Nusrah.

Farouq is up against some seasoned minds who have survived, and are now recovering from the Sahwa debacle in Iraq. If Farouq wants lesser public wrath, they would have to change their ways. Or else, local battalions always have an option.

Originally posted here and reproduced with the permission of the author.

GUEST POST: Famous Anasheed: ‘Madin Kas-Sayf’ by Abu Ali

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.

Past Guest Posts:

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.

Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.

Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.

Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.

Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.

Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.

Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.

Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.

Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

When it comes to media articles on jihadism, one of the least explored aspects is the phenomenon of anasheed (‘songs’ [sing. ‘nasheed’]- distinguished in this context by lack of use of musical instruments as per a widely held Islamic view that instruments are haram). Of the munshid artists who produce songs of this type, one of the most prominent is Abu Ali, of Saudi origin.

While Aaron Zelin regularly provides links to more recent anasheed, I decided to translate the lyrics of one of Abu Ali’s most well-known songs: ‘Madin kas-sayf’ (‘Sharp Like The Sword’): famous at least in jihadist circles. The tune is in fact identical to another nasheed he composed, entitled ‘It blew like the wind’- a song that does not refer to jihad but rather calls for the revival of the Ummah’s glory and encourages believers to seek knowledge and help each other out (in the Youtube video linked to for ‘It blew like the wind’, the user has misidentified it as ‘Sharp like the Sword’).

Given the glorification of suicide bombing that becomes very clear towards the end, the reference to ‘the occupier’ and al-Aqsa, one might expect that this nasheed was composed around the time of the Second Intifada, which saw numerous instances of suicide bombings. Yet the earliest instance I know of its use is in a 48-minute video released by the Somali al-Qa’ida affiliate Harakat ash-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, entitled ‘Labbayka ya Osama’ (‘I am at your service, oh Osama’) in 2009 (H/T: Phillip Smyth).

Here is a translation:

‘Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.

Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel that tear through his wall with fright.

He has rejected humiliation and has arisen, weaving his pride with might.
Like a weary fugitive has his day concealed him and passed by in concealment.
Like the roaming star, his orbit falls on the path of glory.
He was once not satisfied with the world at all, and injustice is his oppressor.

Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the night, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.

Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut  of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel that tear through his wall with fright.

He hearkened unto glory when Al-Aqsa summoned its revolutionaries.
He chanted, filled with longing for death, and proceeded to play his lute.
The occupier set up his trickery, and his broker was seduced by it.
He molded the words as promises, he embroidered his dialogue with deception.

Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.

Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel tears through his wall with fright.

They cultivated his path in fright, they imposed his blockade with starvation.
So he advanced; cunning did not divert him, even as it summoned its false steps.
How preposterous! He makes a truce until he should wipe away his shame with might.
A volcano of faith; this Talmud is his frenzy.

Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the wave in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the billows, sparkling.

Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel that tear through his wall with fright.

So he [the occupier] built his strongholds in fear, he raised his walls in them.
So he [the mujahid] blew himself up among them in anger; he fixed his nails in them.
You see him as splinters of fire; a commando makes his raid.
He did not slow down his pace until he carried out his decision in death

Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.

Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.

Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel that tear through his wall with fright.’

Explanatory Notes:

Taghut- An Islamic term used to describe idolatry and error. It is one of a group of words that occur in the Qur’an with the –ut termination (cf. ملكوت- ‘kingdom’, especially as in the ‘Kingdom of God’). In the 19th century, Geiger contended that the word is of Rabbinical Hebrew origin, since, he said, ‘no pure Arabic word’ ends with the –ut termination. In any event, the etymology is a matter of much dispute; for an attempt to connect the term with Ethiopic, see this discussion by Gabriel Said Reynolds.

Ababeel- Mentioned in Qur’an 105:3 (in the chapter known as ‘The Elephant’). These are apparently birds sent by God against an Aksumite force that tried to conquer Mecca in the 6th century, driving off the invaders with stones.

How preposterous! He makes a truce until he should wipe away his shame with might- Appears to be a reference to how some Islamist militants interpret the concept of hudna (Arabic for ‘ceasefire’). The idea is to sign a truce with your enemy and then wait until you think you have the upper hand, at which point you should resume hostilities.

Translation of Arabic lyrics by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, who is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University. His website is http://www.aymennjawad.org

EXCLUSIVE GUEST POST: The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI)

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.

The below guest post is from the Australian Jack Roche who is a former member of Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah. Roche was trained in an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan and was arrested in November 2002 for a plot against the Israeli Embassy in Canberra, Australia. Roche later said that he did not intend to carry out the plot.  After his arrest Roche helped provide vital information and intelligence on al-Qaeda and Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah. Roche was convicted to four and a half years in prison, and was released in May 2007 after serving his time. Below he explains Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s constitution based on his perspective and background. He also has provided an English translation of the entire constitution, which you can read here.

Past Guest Posts:

Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.

Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.

Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.

Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.

Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.

Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.

Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.

PUPJI: Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jamaah Islamiyah (General Guidelines for the Struggle of (an/the) Islāmic Group)

By Jack Roche

PUPJI was a document produced by the Indonesian based group JI, that is, Jamaah Islamiyah – the Islāmic Group. Once produced, production was merely the photo-copying, scanning or retyping of an extant original. It was only available to high-ranking members within the group (as attested to by Nasir Abas [a former high ranking member of JI] in his book)…‘the Amir of Al Jamaah al Islāmiyah, daily executive Amir (a person who has authority like the Amir), members of the Markaziy (Majlis Qiyādah Markazīyah) – Central Command Administration, and regional leaders as well as staff members (Majlis Qiyādah Wakālah – Proxy Command Administration)’.[1] [2]

In order to partially answer why it was that PUPJI was not made available to rank and file members, it is perhaps prudent to refer to a statement given by Nasir Abas:

‘…knowledge of PUPJI is restricted to the level of leader and above alone. Other members are guided and given instructions without the knowledge that those guidelines and instructions originate from the book of guidelines for the daʿwah of Al Jamaah al Islāmiyah, namely PUPJI, and without in fact having any knowledge of PUPJI. Likewise also, not all members of the Al Jamaah al Islāmiyah organization have ever physically seen the book of PUPJI but there are those who have knowledge of its existence or have heard of it but never actually seen it.’[3]

Whilst this does not completely answer the question of why the restricted availability of PUPJI, it does signpost guidance and instruction within JI being given by those personnel that have been made privy to PUPJI. Were it to be the case that copies of PUPJI were made available to each and every member of JI, then without correct supervision all manner of individual interpretations would abound. Such a system would be no system at all other than a form of anarchy. The distribution of PUPJI is therefore a managerial strategy, one that aligns itself with Islāmic methodology (namely that command comes from above) and ‘those personnel that have been made privy’, that is those individuals who possess a reasonably high degree of Islāmic knowledge and/or knowledge of the mechanisms and objectives of JI as a whole as well as leadership skills, are tasked with disseminating the precepts contained within PUPJI towards those members of JI tasked under their care.

PUPJI describes itself as,…‘a general objective that is able to provide a systematic overview for the motivational steps of a jamāʿah that integrates careful, objective standardized principles and operational measures’. This clause of PUPJI gels with the description given by Nasir Abas, that it was ‘…conferral of a systematic illustration of the Jamaah’s steps which are cohesive between the principal values (Islām) and the undertaking of actions that are prudent, guided, and regulated’.[4] It is within this context that it acts as a ‘guide-book’ or ‘book of guidelines’ for the workings of a/the jamā‘ah – that is a group that functions within and along Islāmic principles. For these reasons one often hears it described as JI’s constitution.

JI was officially formed around January of 1993 when some members of NII (Negara Islām Indonesia – Islāmic State of Indonesia) group broke away from its leadership. The breakaway members were ‘lead’ by ‘Abdullāh Sungkar and Abū Bakar Ba’asyir. Many of the members of NII had undergone training in Afghanistan under the auspices of such individuals as Shaikh ‘Abdur-Rabb rasul Sayyaf. Whilst the members of JI were now detached from NII, they were still able to make use of whatever facilities were available for training in Afghanistan.

As a group/organization, NII possessed ‘state statutes’.[5]  This is something that is often overlooked when examining the genealogy of JI, that is it is seldom made mention of. These ‘state statutes’ had been drawn up by, amongst others, S. M. Kartosoewirjo when he proclaimed the Islāmic Nation of Indonesia (NII) in a regional area in West Java on the 7th of August 1949. According to Nasir Abas, they were in book form and known as ‘Pedoman Dharma Bhakti’ (Negara Islam Indonesia) – ‘Manual of Devotional Obligations’ (Islāmic State of Indonesia) and ‘Qanun Asasi’ (sometimes referred to as Qanun Azasi) – ‘Founding Principles’ or ‘Statutes’, ‘Constitution’).[6]

In fact, ‘Pedoman Dharma Bhakti’ was a conglomeration of a number of smaller publications. These included, ‘Qanun Azasi’, ‘UU Hukum Pidana’ (Criminal Laws), ‘Maklumat Imam’ (Edicts of the Leader), ‘Maklumat Militer’ (Military Edicts), ‘Maklumat Komandemen Tertinggi’ (High Command Edicts), ‘Statement Pemerintah’ (Government Statement), and ‘Manifesto Politik’ (Political Manifesto). It is reasonable to determine that PUPJI was in fact a revised version of those publications.

Whilst ‘Pedoman Dharma Bhakti’ was written in Indonesian, PUPJI was written in both Indonesian and Arabic, wherein the main text is Indonesian and ‘references’ being in Arabic. ‘References’ within the document are quotations from Al Qur‘ān and the aḥādīth (‘sayings’) or Sunnah (sayings, non-sayings, actions or non-actions of the Prophet Muḥammad).

I was taught in 1996/97 that the principles upheld by JI towards the individuals within the group, and as such inculcated and practiced, were in accordance with those adhered to and upheld as belonging to the ‘aqīdah (belief) of the Ahlus Sunnah wa’l Jamā‘ah minhajus-Salafuṣ-Ṣāli. The beliefs of the Ahlus Sunnah wa’l Jamā‘ah is the belief and method of that which the Messenger of Allāh came with, and how his Ṣaḥābat understood this belief and their application of this method.

Ahlus Sunnah wa’l Jamāfiah minhajus-Salafuṣ-Ṣāli is explainable as:

Those who adhere to the Sunnah [of the Prophet Muḥammad] and who are assembled together in a group and who follow the methodology and practices of the Pious Predecessors. The ‘Pious Predecessors’ are the 1st three generations of Muslims, namely:

  1. The Prophet Muḥammad and his Ṣaḥābat (companions who followed the Prophet Muḥammad in his application of the Deen (religion) of Islām);
  2. The Tābi‘īn (followers of the Ṣaḥābat);
  3. The Tābi‘at-Tābi‘īn (followers of the followers of the Ṣaḥābat)].

The basis of Ahlus Sunnah wa’l Jamā‘ah is upon such aḥādīth as:

It was narrated from ‘Awf bin Mālik that the Messenger of Allāh said: “The Jews split into seventy-one sects, one of which will be in Paradise and seventy in Hell. The Christians split into seventy-two sects, seventy-one of which will be in Hell and one in Paradise. I swear by the One in Whose Hand is the soul of Muḥammad, my nation will split into seventy-three sects, one of which will be in Paradise and seventy-two in Hell.” It was said: “O Messenger of Allāh who are they?” He said: “Al Jamā‘ah – The main body.” (Sunan Ibnu Mājah 3992).

And:

“…adhere to my sunnah and the sunnah of the rightly guided caliphs…” (Sunan At-Tirmidhī 2685).

The general principles espoused within PUPJI are influenced by the likes of such people as Muḥammad bin ‘Abdul-Wahhāb, Abū’l A‘lā Maudūdī, and Sayyid Qutb. This would also have been the case for many of the precepts contained within the ‘state statutes’ of NII. However, since PUPJI was drawn up in 1996, its precepts were also influenced by the likes of ‘Abdullāh fiAzzam, Ayman Aẓ-Ẓawāhirī, and Usāmah bin Lādin, amongst others. This influence is in no small part due to the presence of NII members under training in Afghanistan in the 80’s and 90’s wherein the ideals espoused by those latter mentioned individuals were commonplace. In effect, the creation of JI in 1993 and hence the ‘constitution’ of PUPJI in 1996 was in large part to some of the ideologues espoused by those latter mentioned individuals.

This is hinted at by Nasir Abas when he mentions that his exposure to the ideals contained within ‘Pedoman Dharma Bhakti’ was sometime around 1992 when Abū Bakar Ba’asyir visited the camp he was at ‘Camp Towrkham’ in Pakistan on the border with Afghanistan. I personally recall hearing of ‘Abdullāh Sungkar attending a meeting in Afghanistan in the mid 90’s. This meeting was called for by Usāmah bin Lādin and those who attended were leaders of various Islāmic groups throughout the world. The essence of the meeting was the creation of a global network of like-minded groups in order to counter those non-Muslim forces/powers deemed to applying aggression towards Islām. Thus, both Abū Bakar Ba’asyir and ‘Abdullāh Sungkar moved in the same circles as ‘Abdullāh fiAzzam, Ayman Aẓ-Ẓawāhirī, and Usāmah bin Lādin, for a number of years so much so, that ties of mutual cooperation existed between both JI and Al Qaidah. (In fact, this relationship of mutual cooperation between the two groups is mentioned in a personal communication between myself and Abdur-Rahim the son of Abū Bakar Ba’asyir).

All of the people named as having influenced the general principles espoused within PUPJI are generally considered within the realm of Western thought to be radical and extremist in their ideologies. Thus, as a rule, it has been concluded that since the source of the Islāmic principles inherent within PUPJI is from the aforementioned people, then the content of PUPJI is itself radical and extremist.

The generally held assessment of PUPJI therefore is that it is held to be radical and thus, in the parlance of Western thought, extreme (Unfortunately both of these terms, radical and extreme, are interchangeable within today’s English language even though the one does not necessarily equate to the other). However, be that as it may, there is no doubting the professionalism and depth inherent within PUPJI as a document. It is unfortunate that prior to this translation of PUPJI the only ‘available’ references in English (and for that matter in Indonesian) to PUPJI were that of a synopsis of PUPJI’s contents and a far from complete translation. My use of the word ‘available’ is because the original is actually nowhere to be found except in a very few hands throughout the world. Basically it is kept under wraps.

In my opinion, this is a sad state of affairs since there is actually nothing within its contents that is unheard of throughout any search within any internet browser, which is not already readily ‘available’. My main reason for ‘putting it out there’ is to remove whatever mystery appears to cloud PUPJI as a document.


[2] The copy that has been translated here is dated May 1996, which coincides with the time that I perchance saw a copy belonging to Abdur-Rahim Ayub, the Amir of JI in Australia, laying on his photo-copying machine in his Sydney apartment around 1996/97.

[4] Ibid., p. 82.

[5] Nasir Abas, Uncovering Jamafiah Islamiyah, p. 67.

[6] Ibid.

GUEST POST: The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not represent at all his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East.

Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to Global Jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.

Past Guest Posts:

Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.

Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.

Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.

Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.

Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.

Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.

By Kévin Jackson

Defining al Qa’ida’s membership has always represented a divise issue among analysts. I’ll approach this topic by focusing on a fundamental practice commonly used by jihadi organizations, namely vowing an oath of allegiance or bay’a.

In a nutshell, the bay’a procedure constitutes the cornerstone defining one’s membership. A longstanding ritual featuring in the early Islamic tradition, giving bay’a (individually or collectively) consists in recognizing the legitimacy of a group/state leader authority. The covenant between the amir (leader) and the one who gives the bay’a lies in listening and obeying, in hard and easy times, as long as the amirship follows the right path. Rendering allegiance to the amir of al Qa’ida, for example, would thus imply not to dispute his and/or al Qa’ida’s commanders’ directives and to fully support the organization’s agenda.

The Bay’a has been institutionalized within the jihadi milieu for the doctrinal foundations it acts upon stress the mandatory aspect of such a practice. Given that joining a jama’ah (group) of mujahidin is seen as an obligation (wajib) upon every Muslim and cannot be done except with a pledge of allegiance, the bay’a is thus considered as such too. From an organizational perspective, these doctrinal regulations secure the loyalty and cohesion within the ranks, while preventing core attrition by tightly  binding new recruits through a formal covenant.

It is worthwhile underlining the contractual aspect of this longstanding ritual drawing lines of demarcation between jihadi organizations. If the one giving the oath promises to listen and obey whatever the hardships, the one receiving it is also entitled to fulfill his obligations as the amir. This counterpart from the leader amounts to a continuous commitment to respect the covenant provisos and serve the interests of Islam and Muslims through the policy he implements. The amirship also requires certain characteristics, which, for al Qa’ida, revolve around knowledge, experience, ethical qualities, etc.

On the other hand, a bay’a has to be accepted before one can be considered as a sworn member/organization. This decision falls upon the amir‘s goodwill and depends on the extent to which would-be comers meet the required criteria prescribed by the organization leadership. As a result, groups rendering their allegiance to Ayman al Zawahiri cannot be labeled al Qa’ida in the absence of an official recognition from the Pakistan-based leadership. This explains why assertions dubbing some al Qa’ida’s affiliates/franchises on the only basis that an oath has been sworn should be met with skepticism at the very least.

For example, while Harakat al Shabab al Mujahidin had pledged their loyalty to Usama bin Ladin in September 2009, the Somali group couldn’t be portrayed as being part of al Qa’ida without any further confirmation by the mothership in the Pakistan’s tribal areas. This changed only after February 2012, following a joint statement of Ayman al Zawahiri (amir of al Qa’ida)  and Mukhtar Abu’l Zubayr (amir of al Shabab), where the Egyptian officially accepted al Shabab under al Qa’ida’s direction. This is the type of acknoweldgement which should be looked at to draw accurate distinctions between jihadi factions.

A cherished autonomy

Well-understood by jihadis, the binding burden of the oath can be sensed through the lens of  militants’ own trajectory. The life story of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad (KSM) is a case in point. Even after having moved to Kandahar to work directly with al Qa’ida’s leadership in the late 1990′s, the 9/11 mastermind was still reluctant to formally join. Translation: while he had decided to play on al Qa’ida’s team via close work relationships, he was still refusing to swear allegiance to bin Ladin so as to maintain his operational room for manoeuvre. KSM became a core member only after 9/11 attacks were carried out, following pressures from his peers arguing that the persistent refusal of someone with his pedigree would establish a worrisome precedent for others.

Given how the pledge of allegiance undermines one’s autonomy, it should not come as a surprise that others have shared KSM’ sentiments by postponing the bay’a as long as they could or simply rejected it.

Before bin Ladin formally declared Mulla Muhammad Umar as his direct leader, the Saudi and his entourage made their best to avoid this option to ensure a complete freedom to their global jihad. Notwithstanding external pressures and an increased tense context, the late amir of al Qa’ida still kept using pretexts to shelve a proposal put forward by Abu’l Walid al Misri, a respected senior Egyptian mujahid, designed to improve his relationship with the Afghan Taliban leader. Bin Ladin eventually resigned himself to perform the bay’a in late November 1998 but (and this is a big one) only through Abu’l Walid acting as his proxy. The indirect oath would enable bin Ladin to play it both ways according to the circumstances and as a result, despite being virtually tied by his pledge, still retain his independence. And indeed, the following years, bin Ladin continued to by-pass Mulla Umar’s instructions, namely stopping his media campaign and external operations against the US.

Also instructive is Abu Jandal’ story, which outlines another way of keeping one’s room for manoeuvre. The Yemeni, along with some of the group of combatants he came with, vowed allegiance to bin Ladin after a three-day meeting with the al Qa’ida’s leader in Jalalabad in 1997. Except that it was not an integral but a conditional one. Hence, while Abu Jandal had accepted bin Ladin as his leader in Afghanistan, the deal was that he will not take his orders from the Saudi should he be in another battlefield. Later in 1998, the then bin Ladin’s bodyguard decided that the time has come and eventually pledged an unconditional oath, thereby making him a core member of al Qa’ida.

Muhammad al Owhali’s interrogation provides a further insightful glimpse into the meaning of the bay’a in terms of command and control, as well as the wariness it provokes among some. The 1998 East Africa bombing operative told his FBI interrogators that his refusal to formally join al Qa’ida, despite having been urged to do so, was linked to his fear that, once a core member, he might end up working in non-military activities while having a strong desire in armed jihad. His non-membership would thus enable him to accept or refuse a mission assigned to him by al Qa’ida’s leaders/ commanders according to his own will. As put it in his interrogation: « Once you take the bayat you no longer have a choice in what your missions would be. »

Theses various episodes clearly outline the concrete implications of pledging an oath of allegiance  and also explain jihadis’ lack of promptness in giving it. Not everyone is so inclined to reduce his freewill to a vestige…

A resilient structural demarcation

While cooperating at various levels on the ground, al Qa’ida and other Pakistan-based militant groups cannot be lumped altogether. Demarcations between these various organizations may be blurred when their public statements stress on unity within their community or when their propaganda material feature joint actions on the ground. But at the end of the day, that doesn’t mean there is no distinction to draw.

There is acutally a red line not to cross lying in command and control issues. In this regard, al Qa’ida gets quite cranky when others try to lure its core member into their fold. Obviously, these internal issues will not come out publicly. Regarding the al Qa’ida/Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) nexus, there is no dispute about the reality of their close links in the Waziristan’s mountains. In the meantime, that doesn’t translate into common membership and organizational command.

In a letter addressed to the amir of the TTP Hakimullah Mahsud in early December 2010, high-ranking al Qa’ida’s figures Abu Yahya al Libi and Atiyyatullah strongly warn the Pakistani leader to stay away from Badr Mansur, a Pakistani al Qa’ida’s commander, arguing that Mansur  is « one of the soldiers of the Qa’idat al-Jihad Organization who swore allegiance to Shaykh Usamah ». The two Libyans actually urge Hakimullah not to try this with any of al Qa’ida’s member, stating that if that might happen, it would be with the specific blessing of his leadership. In a nutshell: do not by-pass us when trying to tap one fellow of our ranks. One and the same you said?

As an aside, reading this warning was kind of ironic to me. In French we say « L’hôpital qui se fout de la charité » (translation: « The pot calling the kettle black »). The reason behind my brief digression here is to remind that this is the exact same kind of approach espoused by al Qa’ida.

Throughout its history, the organization has been keen to use and contract out external figures and groups which could serve its interests. As well-put it by former FBI agent Ali Soufan in his book The Back Banners: « At the same time, bin Laden still tried to use non–al-Qaeda groups to further his aims. (…) While bin Laden understood why other groups, wary of al-Qaeda poaching their members, distanced themselves from him, he still wanted to have a connection with them. » Leah Farrall, a former Counter Terrorism Intelligence Analyst with the Australian Federal Police, labels this proclivity to push relentlessly others to join under its umbrella, a « predatory approach ».

For instance, Ahmad al Almani, the suicide-bomber of the 1998 Dar-es-Salaam bombing, didn’t come from al Qa’ida’s core ranks but from al Gama’a al Islamiyyah’s, an Egyptian armed group. Bin Ladin’s aides then tapped the Egyptian explosives specialist for its first major external operation against US interests, in spite of al Gama’a's stance on how al Almani should be used for the forthcoming attack.

Back to the demarcation issue, I would add that the same as in Pakistan’s tribal areas does apply to whatever areas core operatives are involved in. For example, most of the al Qa’ida’s team operating in and around Somalia colluded with al Shabab movement while retaining their organizational independence. In his book Al Harb ala al Islam (War against Islam), Fadil Harun, a top figure of the African team, puts a strong emphasis on his loyalty to al Qa’ida’s core direction, meaning that cooperation with Somali fighters didn’t equal obeying its amirship. The embedding with local insurgents in a distant location would thus not prevent core members to keep seeking guidance and orders from the leadership. This is the reason why even after having being charged with the security matters for al Shabab, Harun made very clear that his new responsibilities should not be taken as a new membership.

Leaving al Qa’ida

Given how binding the bay’a is, leaving the group as a sworn member proves to be more difficult than for a random trainee. Many volunteers schooled at al Qa’ida’s camps in Afghanistan left and did not return after because they were simply not bound to follow the organisation’s orders. This is a whole different story for those who were trained and performed a vow of allegiance. Having done so, leaving would only be allowed if a legitimate reason is given. If not, they would then be considered as sinners, which is a pretty good way of reinforcing stability within the ranks.

Mustafa Abu’l Yazid evoked this point in his 2009 al Jazira interview, in which the late al Qa’ida’s leader for Afghanistan stated that his organization views itself as « a group from the groups of jihad. We are not caliphate group which claim that those who leave us leave fold of islam. » Given the absence of takfir (excommunication) on those wanting to leave, which doesn’t imply the absence of pressures to stay, I’m highly suspicious of allegations about al Qa’ida killing would-be quitters.

Abu Jandal’s account could be once again used as an illustration of al Qa’ida’s attitude towards core attrition. The Yemeni bodyguard returned to Yemen in 2000 after having faced a myriad of issues and disillusions related to his life with al Qa’ida in Afghanistan. Obviously, the organization  leadership did not welcome the departure of one of their own and tried to prevent it, notably through Abu Muhammad al Misri who told him: « If you think by leaving Afghanistan they [the Americans] will leave you alone, you are wrong. This is a war. Either we will win or die. There is no place for turning back. » (The Black Banners)

Al Qa’ida dissuasions did not stopped Abu Jandal, who left because of personal considerations (family matters, etc) but also because of some decisions made by his leaders. Among other things, he bemoaned bin Ladin’s bay’a to Mulla Umar which he (inaccurately) viewed as the end of al Qa’ida’s original goals and grew tired of disputes involving the Egyptian entourage of bin Ladin. Abu Jandal eventually felt disappointed by the turn of events with his superiors and decided to get away from al Qa’ida’s path by returning to his home land.

By the way, if one wants a real harsh way of dealing with quitters, Abu’l Walid al Misri’s account on  the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan provides a good one. In his book Salib fi sama’ Qandahar (Cross over the sky of Kandahar), the Egyptian notices that under Tahir Yuldashev’s (Muhammad Tahir Faruq) leadership, Central Asia volunteers were specifically told that once the oath has been made, marking the formal rallying to the group, leaving was not an option and would translate into a death sentence. « Everyone should take a step back before making his decision », Abu’l Walid writes, evoking how this strict rule has been met with harsh criticism from Arab groups, especially al Qa’ida, which used quite nasty words to depict it. This further supports my skepticism about stories dealing with al Qa’ida allegedly killing its members on the brink of quitting.

Conclusion

It goes without saying that the great variety of issues surrounding the bay’a as conceptualized in al Qa’ida/jihadi literature cannot be examined extensively through a single blogpost. My point here was simply to highlight how this procedure represents the tool used by al Qa’ida (and others) to gain formal control over recruits/groups and hence defines the essence of al Qa’ida’s (and others)  membership.

Kévin Jackson is a student at Sciences Po in France. His main research interests deal with global jihadism and al-Qa’ida.

GUEST POST: A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not represent at all his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East.

Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to Global Jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.

Past Guest Posts:

Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.

Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.

Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.

Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.

Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.

By Behnam Said

At the moment, I am working on my PhD-project on “Militant hymns (anasheed jihadiya) as a part of the Jihadist culture”. This culture I consider to be more effective in terms of propaganda and social cohesion than any ideology alone could be. Young radicals all over the world are listening to the nasheeds extensively – a fact, authorities are getting more and more aware of, as court papers and other sources show. Some of the most interesting findings (which are actually a lot) I will outline in an article to be published in November for Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Until then Aaron gave me the opportunity to share at least some facts with the readers of “Jihadology” in advance.

Background

Nasheeds, as you all are aware of, are an integral part of almost every Jihadist video production. For example, we see al-Qaeda members in action on the battlefield accompanied by the soundtrack of a smooth a cappella song. On relevant internet forums and websites you will find a bulk of these nasheeds as mp3-files, sometimes even complete collections. There are also plenty of videos with these songs on YouTube. It appears as if no Jihadist can establish his YouTube channel without posting at least a few militant hymns. On Facebook there are also groups publishing militant nasheeds that obtain more than 10,000 “likes”.

Not all of the songs which are popular in the Jihadist scene are new. Many of them are based on songs which were included in the songbooks of the 1980s and in poems of the so called shu´ara ad-da´wa, a branch of poetry which began in the 1950s and ended approximately in the 1980s. For example one of the most popular songs at the moment is “Bi-Jihadina”, which is actually a song by Abu Mazin, a popular Syrian munasheed, who recorded it either in the late 70s or the early 80s. There is also one example of a song used in videos of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) based on a poem by Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938), the famous Pakistani poet, that has been translated to Arabic. Some other nasheeds, like the Somali ash-Shabab song “Rayatu t-Tauhid” or some AQAP songs, are contemporary.

The fascination of these songs is described by Samir Khan, the former editor of Inspire, in an article for Inspire:

I remember when I traveled from San´a, for what seemed like years, in a car to one of the bases of the mujahidin, the driver played this one nashīd repeatedly. It was “Sir ya bin Ladin”. I already knew of this nashīd from before, but something had struck me at that moment. The nashīd repeated lines pertaining to fighting the tyrants of the world for the purpose of giving victory to the Islamic nation. But it also reminded the listener that Shaykh Usama bin Ladin is the leader of this global fight. I looked out of the window at the tall mud houses below the beautiful sky and closed my eyes as the wind blew through my hair.”

This personal experience by Khan finds its equivalent in many theoretical descriptions of the desired effects of nasheeds on young people. The oldest sources in this context I found in some nasheed collections from the 1980s. Here it is clearly said, that nasheeds are an instrument to awaken the wish for martyrdom and self sacrifice in the hearts of young Muslims and to give them strength for da´wa and Jihad.

You can categorize nasheeds in accordance with the topics they cover. Often you will find that the poems fit into categories of classical poetry, for example:

  • Mourning songs
  • Praising songs

Other categories are more modern:

  • Prisoners songs
  • Songs regarding ongoing political processes (for example the battle for Syria)
  • Palestine songs

But most of the songs I analyzed can be described as “battle songs”. Focusing on war and ones fighting group, which is described as heroic and brave in antipode to the tyrannical and oppressive enemy (taghut). Here I am not sure if such hymns can be described as classical by category, because the language of such songs are very Jihadist.

Legality and Influence

It is also interesting to have a look at the different legal stances towards nasheeds, especially from Salafi and Wahhabi scholars. I was surprised to find most of them skeptical towards nasheeds. They consider them allowed (mubah), but only under strict conditions regarding form (a cappella only) and content (purely Islamic and Jihad-supportive). So I tried to figure out why the Jihadists are making use of nasheeds so extensively even though Salafi and even more Wahhabi scholars underline the importance of limiting listening to nasheeds. The answer, I think, lies in the history of the nasheeds, which I mentioned above. Modern nasheeds have their origin with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its radical branches in the Levant and in Egypt. From here they made their way to the Arabian Peninsula where nasheeds were known at least from the 70s on, but became more popular in the early 90s during the sahwa-period as sources underline. The stance of MB ideologues was always more positive towards music than that of the Wahhabis and Salafis. Nasir ad-Din al-Albani for example criticized articles from the 50s published in the MB magazine which called for “Islamic music”, which he called as absurd as “Islamic Communism”. So the addiction of Jihadis to nasheeds reflects the influence of the MB on the militant movement. The only clear influence on nasheeds by the Salafis/Wahhabis is the Jihadist adoption of the strict prohibition of any music instruments, except the use of hand drums in some cases.

The Jihadist culture thus is – like the movement itself – a merging of MB and Salafi/Wahhabi ideology. But in this case the MB influence is absolutely overwhelming and it shows that the culture of the MB and its militant branches is more crucial for the Jihadis than some might assume.

I hope that I hereby provided you some input for discussions about the history of Jihadism and its culture as well as about the relevance of this culture.

Behnam Said has studied Islamic Science, Political Science, and History in Hamburg, Germany. His main fields of interest are the relation of Sunna and Shia, history and culture of modern Afghanistan, and political and militant Islamism.  Beside his current job as an intelligence analyst he is doing his PhD at the University of Jena on the topic of militant nasheeds. A more in depth version of this post will be published in a forthcoming issue of the academic journal “Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.”

GUEST POST: Gaidi Mtaani

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest authors and they do not represent the views of this websites administrator.

Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to Global Jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.

Past Guest Posts:

By Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn

Al-Shabbab introduced the world’s first Swahili jihadi magazine on April 5, 2012 called Gaidi Mtaani, meaning “On Terrorism Street.” In “On Terrorism Street” al-Shabbab subtly mocks the Kenyan army’s Operation Linda Nchi (“Defend the Nation”) by naming its own operation, Operation Linda Uislam (“Defend Islam”). The online magazine’s colourful style and well-edited and formatted articles places it among the elite of online Jihadist publications, similar to al-Qaeda’s now inactive Inspire and the Turkistan Islamic Party’s (TIP) Islamic Turkistan.

As always, the language of choice for this publication, Swahili, matters. Evidently, al-Shabbab wants to appeal to the Kenyan street. Al-Shabbab’s own constituency in Somalia would only understand Somali and, to a lesser extent, Arabic. Kenyan elites would be more attracted to an English publication than Swahili given that English is the language of education and the upper class in Kenya. Al-Shabbab may be trying to win over lesser-educated Muslims in Northern Kenya to al-Shabbab’s cause or to convince Kenyans of all stripes that the propaganda they see on television about the Kenyan army’s success in Somalia is untrue.

Alternatively, the publication may be a way for al-Shabbab to tell jihadis that al-Shabbab considers Kenya another one of its enemies, as evidence by the use of Swahili—not English, Somali or Arabic. On the Somali online jihadi forum, al-Qimmah, al-Shabbab has released other warnings to the Kenyan government, but the “Gaidi Mtaani” publication in Swahili, which was released on the Shamukh al-Islam forum, will reach a more diverse audience than statements on al-Qimmah.

Below is a summary translation of some of the main points included in the publication:

Operation Linda Uislam (Operation protect Islam)

Many Muslims believe that any attack on them (such as the incursion of Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) into Somalia) is instigated from the West. The basis that Kenya used to start the attack was not sufficient to justify its attack on al-Shabbab, but was part of the wider scheme of the influence of the unbelievers (kafir) of the Western world. The reason was a mere fabrication to validate their attack on Islam.

It is clear that the Western media has been successful in shading Muslim believers in a bad light. It has created an impression that the believers of God, who are fighting according to God’s will are followers and sympathizers of terrorism. The Western journalists are experts of deceit who have even managed to deceive some Muslims to believe their slander!

The fact is that they are trying to misrepresent the mujahidin by spreading false information and magnifying their small mistakes to look like big crimes. They are sowing a seed of hatred amongst them, their leaders and followers. On the other hand, they seem to praise the West and justify their wickedness. Therefore, Muslims are urged not to rely on such news sources until they are validated by true Islamic sources. However, some news such as that of weather can be relied on.

Protecting the Mujahidin

The prophet of God (Mohammad) says, “Whoever shall protect the reputation and name of his brother, God shall deliver his face from the furnace of jehannam (hell) at the day of judgement (from Al Tirmithi).” He continues saying that, “anybody who shall betray a fellow Muslim, his reputation shall be destroyed and God will forsake him at the time of need…” therefore Muslims are urged to defend their Muslim brothers all the time.

The British Betrayal of Muslims

History is very clear about how the British related with Muslims in the East African coast in the colonial period. The massacre, persecution and other inhumane acts that they did to Muslims are evidence of how they hate humanity. Their image today of being in the front line in defending human rights is superficial because underneath lies the crimes against humanity they perpetrated especially on Muslims. The British activities of fighting Islam are well known and are not a new thing. For example they took Palestine’s land and gave it to Jews. This is a proof that they can take land that duly belongs to Muslims and give it to their enemies.

In the case of East Africa; in 1895, the British government was given a coastal strip of 10 miles by the Sultans of Zanzibar. These Zanzibar leaders entered into a treaty which had one of its articles state that “Britain will not apply any Christian law on any party of the coast UNLESS Kenya attained independence or they consent to change the religion of the coast six months in advance.” These unwise poor sultans of Zanzibar made religion a commodity for transaction with the British authorities.

In the Lancaster meeting of 1962-63 which was to write the Kenya constitution, it was agreed that that coastal strip shall remain under the jurisdiction of the independent Kenyan government. We are not trying to mean or imply that the coastal Kenya should secede from the mainland Kenya. Not at all! We are trying to make the reader to understand how the Islamic religion was joked about.

Britain was a key player in dislodging Palestinians in favour of the Jews and selling the Muslim land in the Kenyan coast to the Kenyan government. Today the same thing is happening in Somalia where they are assisting to cast down Islam that is defended by al-Shabbab. They have been envying the Islamic growth in Somalia for the past 20 years, thus they now support the AMISOM, Ethiopian troops and now the KDF incursion into Somalia to disrupt the Islamic systems. But their efforts will not prevail over God.

The recent London Conference on Somalia was sponsored by Britain. The inner motive was to topple the Islamic systems by collaborating with Kenya together with other African countries and the world. If you carefully look at what is going on in Kenya and Somalia then you will vividly understand the real intention.

Just a few days before the conference, Kenya had given a contract to Total to start exploring oil on the coast. Later we saw British and American companies sign a contract to mine oil in Puntland. Moreover, just the other day we saw the Kenyan president, Ethiopian PM and the South Sudan president converge in Lamu to launch the construction of the Port of Lamu. It is sad that other nations are using the Somalia situation to advance their economic development instead of helping Somalia back to peace by strengthening Islam because Somalia was peaceful when it was under Islamic rule.

If Kenya is going to be the Israel of Africa and Somalia the Palestine of Africa then we must not allow that. Every Muslim wherever you are ask yourself whether you are defending Islam from attack by the unbelievers (kafir) or you are supporting the attack.

10 ways of recognizing an undercover spy

  1. He will disguise himself and start establishing friendship with the one he is interested in investigating just as a normal person.
  2. A few elements of lies will start surfacing. You will note this when he will use long explanations to defend himself whenever he contradicts himself. For example he may claim to be a college student and you may see him in a cyber cafe or the mosque during class hours.
  3. The spy might claim that he is one of the mujahidin or he is a shaykh or that he has contacts with other mujahidin or shaykhs. You have got to be careful.
  4. The spy will always claim to be busy with either studies or a job. This is to make him not to be involved in jihad. However, do not rely on this characteristic alone for even normal Muslims have it, but cross-examine with other characteristics discussed here.
  5. The spies will always direct a talk to what they are interested in. They can, for example, ask if you would like to participate in a jihad and what kind of weapons you would prefer to use.
  6. Usually a spy will never rebuke you when you are wrong! For instance, if you smoke or listen to secular music or put up images/pictures on the wall of your house.
  7. He will always show trust to you. He might claim that he saw you in the mosque once. He can even insinuate that he would like to participate in a jihad or a hijra (emigration).
  8. Ask yourself why they want to be with you and not others. Ask yourself questions why they don’t want to do an operation alone but with you.
  9. Once you ascertain that that person is indeed a spy, stop any further engagement with him. It may be even necessary to change your contact details. If possible, give him a reason for disassociating yourself.
  10.  All has been said but the most important thing is depending on God for all.

A message from a KDF captive in Somalia

When the KDF invaded Somalia, they thought things would be smooth for them. They have however faced real resistance. Major Chirichiri and Col. Cyrus Oguna are simply lying to Kenyans that KDF is doing pretty well on the battlefield. The fact is they have not been able to advance past Qoqani.

According to the video released by Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin showing one of the Kenya captives by the name Mulle, Yesse Edward (a former Distict Officer of Burdei) pleading with the Kenyan government to withdraw its army from Somalia, Kenya seems to be losing. 

Islamic Law on war captives 

When we talk about law on captives we do not imply the ‘Geneva convention.’ Islam has particular laws that guide them when dealing with war captives. Islam does not distinguish a trained soldier and a civilian. Both have a duty to take part in a jihad. You are either fighting to defend Islam or against Islam. That is the distinguishing factor. Period!

When Kenya decided to invade Somalia, it got herself into the list of the countries that are fighting Islam. It is therefore imperative for Kenya to be aware of where they have plunged themselves. Therefore, every Kenyan should know that he/she doesn’t have any difference from the KDF members in Somalia and the fate will be the same.

The case of Mulle and other captives, Al-Shabaab may set them free unconditionally, kill them or set them free on conditions just the way they have said that they will release him and others on condition that the Kenyan government withdraws the KDF.

GUEST POST: Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator.

Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to Global Jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.

See here for previous posts in this exchange:

By Joshua Foust

On January 21, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross wrote a detailed argument for why the study of “jihadi ideology” is important. He raised some really interesting points that inspired a great deal of thinking on my part, and I’m grateful he took the time to respond. I have to confess, however, that I am left more confused than ever about why we should focus so much on ideology, and not other things instead. It remains unclear to me how ideology affects behavior, or how its study can help us understand or predict the decisions and choices of would-be terrorists.

For example, Daveed is absolutely correct that I erred in describing ideology as a sole cause of behavior. I admit I was a bit confused when he later called ideology, “a robust explanation for both terrorist radicalization and also terrorist actions,” as that seemed to imply a sole-cause argument, but I did not intend to argue the point so I withdraw it.

However, I found myself lost in trying to figure out the other aspects of studying the concept of ideology as an analytic construct. For example, even if ideology is only a partial cause or inspiration for behavior, we should still be able to describe how ideology causes or inspires behavior. But I have never, in the many papers I’ve since read on Jihadi ideology, read of a mechanism by which ideology inspires or causes behavior—only a lot of stories, and plenty of people who did something that they claimed was inspired by ideology.  This begs the question: if we don’t know how ideology influences behavior, then how can I analyze it or declare it important for studying jihadism? And while Daveed’s post has a great deal of information, I don’t see in it, or in the study he wrote, a description of this causal mechanism.

I think, too, that any discussion of ideology—especially when dealing with a celebrity like Anwar al-Aulaqi, as my original post tried to do—must deal with the question of false positives and false negatives. If ideology is even a partial cause of behavior, then there should be a lot of people who espouse a certain ideology that engage in a certain behavior, along with relatively few people who espouse the ideology who DO NOT engage in the behavior, and also relatively few people who DO NOT espouse the ideology who DO engage in the behavior. Otherwise we’re seeing our cause without our effect and our effect without our cause as often as we’re seeing our cause with our effect, which would suggest we’re on the wrong track.  We do see a lot of false positives and false negatives in Islamist-ideology explanations of extremism. The vast, vast majority of people who espouse “salafist jihadist Islamist ideology” do not engage in terrorism. So how can we assign ideology as the reason why the tiny minority of people do things?

Which is another problem with this discussion of ideology and jihadism: begging the question. Given the fact that many people espouse radical ideologies but do not become violent extremists, it would seem that at most ideology is a necessary, but not sufficient to cause the behavior in question. If that’s the case, then what makes it sufficient? Does that thing lead to the behavior even if the ideology is absent? If it does, then there’s no reason to take ideology as an influence on behavior. It’s like saying “X causes Y only when Z is present” and “Z causes Y even if X is absent.” If both those statements are true, then you don’t need X—ideology—in either. You just need Z to predict Y.

I’m not really comfortable discussing Daveed’s personal experiences with radical Islam. His current research, however, does warrant discussion. For example, the percentages on radicalization that he provides at best fail to support his argument. At worst, they actually undermine it. About 40% of those studied became religious and then became political. About 10% became political and then became religious. And there is apparently no data on the other 50%. Since this wasn’t a random sample, we can’t assume that the 40% and 10% are representative of the larger population. That means it is entirely possible that it’s somewhere between a 60-40 and a 40-60 split, in which case the presence of religious influences would basically amount to a coin toss.  The figures he provides make it entirely plausible that the presence of religion is a random factor, and therefore not so causal.

Similarly, I don’t understand why he relied on behavior to explain ideology. Daveed’s study took people who already exhibit a behavior, and then measures the extent to which they exhibit other behaviors he assumes are evidence of a specific ideology. There is no control group.  This gets at the heart of the problem with false positives and false negatives: by not including people in the study who did not engage in the behavior, there is no way to assess actual behaviors. It is a significant sampling bias. Moreover, I simply don’t see how any of his examples are necessarily indicative of ideology. He argues, “Absent the prevalent ideology… there is simply no explanation for why a relatively large number of people would decide to grow their beards out in a similar way, see dogs as unclean, stop making physical contact with members of the opposite sex, et cetera.” But that doesn’t follow at all. If it were the case, then all behavior is ideological. Most people tend to behave similarly to the people they interact with – they eat similar foods, they wear similar clothes, they have similar hair styles, many people believe in the same things as their neighbors – is everything the any number of people hold in common to be automatically declared ideological? Common practices just aren’t a persuasive argument that ideology explains behavior.

I’m glad to see he didn’t rely on people’s stated beliefs—an unfortunate mistake many other researchers on ideology and jihadism commit. However, that still doesn’t avoid the false positives and negatives, begging the question, the lack of mechanisms, or the possibility that everything he found is the same as what we would expect from chance. I’m afraid I just can’t find a reason to believe it, especially when he leaps from saying ideology is important to saying who espouses the ideology is important. Even if we accepted ideology as an explanation, there’s no reason to assume ideology is tightly tied to specific people. If ideology matters, then why is it not just as reasonable to ask what the major influential components of it are, no matter who disseminates it? Why is it not just as reasonable to ask in what situations it matters, no matter what its components are and no matter who disseminates it? Or, why not be really nit-picky, and ask IF there are any disseminators, components, or situations that matter more than any others – allowing for the possibility that perhaps all options matter equally?

Viewed this way, the case for Aulaqi’s importance just doesn’t make sense. I have yet to see an explanation for why alternate hypotheses don’t apply. For example: which proponents of Islamist rhetoric were more available and accessible to western radicals than al-Aulaqi? Forensics on confiscated computers often turn up a whole host of jihadi ideologues—an ecosystem of personalities arguing for jihad. Aulaqi’s material is common, but it’s not the only thing out there. But even that is immaterial: if his speeches, by design in the English language, are just more available and accessible, then their use is more plausibly an effect or a co-occurrence, not a cause, of those people’s radicalization, just as his presence on computers similarly fails to explain lots of other people’s non-radicalization.

In a more general sense, the rejection of alternative explanations should be worrying to anyone seeking a systematic, rigorous explanation of how people radicalize and why they choose to engage in behaviors. This is the problem I have with calling Aulaqi the worst-anything, or most-anything. We just don’t know, especially because we just don’t know how the ideas he spreads affect people. All we have are correlates—not correlations—just things happening kind of at the same time for some people. While that is certainly important, and definitely deserving of detailed, rigorous research, I remain utterly confused at the certainty with which we can declare jihadi ideologues the global threat they’re portrayed to be.

GUEST POST: Why Jihadi Ideology Matters

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator.

Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to Global Jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross

On January 19, Joshua Foust posted a rather interesting article at Jihadology questioning Anwar al-Aulaqi’s importance as a jihadi ideologue, and in so doing, also called into question the assumed linkage between Islamist ideology and behavior. Though Foust’s post raises interesting and valid questions, and introduces bodies of research that are often ignored in debates over terrorist radicalization, I find his conclusion problematic for three reasons. First, Foust seems to be arguing against a strawman on the question of how ideology can have an impact on behavior. Second, the applicability of his general observations about the connection between ideas and behavior is questionable in the context of Islamist ideology. And third, erecting the very high evidentiary standard with which Foust concludes his article is not at all helpful when it comes to a problem set like terrorist radicalization, which it is necessary to address now.

Strawman Opponent?

It is somewhat unclear what Foust is objecting to within the current literature on radicalization—which, in fairness, is reflected in his post’s title, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology.” But to the extent his article refutes a definable set of ideas, it seems to argue against monocausal explanations of behavior. Specifically, Foust writes:

The assumption behind the ideology discussion appears to be that behavior is a gun, and ideology is a trigger. That is, you have a person, they accept ideology, and then the output is behavior (in this case, violence). But that just isn’t how people work, and using some basic logic and self-knowledge can reveal that. We are not mono-causal creatures, even in relatively simple matters like choosing where to eat lunch.

The last point is undoubtedly correct: we are not monocausal creatures. But which authors, specifically, share this set of assumptions? A careful reading of Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens’s Foreign Policy article that is the hook for Foust’s piece reveals no such monocausal assumption, though Meleagrou-Hitchens clearly does conclude—contrary to Foust—that ideology is important. Nor does Foust point to other authors who write about ideology as though it is the sole cause of terrorist violence.

This framing of the discussion seems designed to bolster the importance of Foust’s refutation. But the contribution an author can make by refuting a clearly exaggerated interpretation of a subject is minimal when that exaggerated interpretation does not represent the conventional wisdom in a field. And in the academic discussion of terrorist ideology, it seems that the dominant opinion among prominent scholars—including Marc Sageman, Jessica Stern, Robert Pape, Jerrold Post, and now apparently Brian Michael Jenkins—is that religious ideology is relatively unimportant. (There are of course plenty of scholars on the other side of this debate, including Mary Habeck, Assaf Moghadam, and myself.)

So let’s define the debate in a more reasonable way. The question is not whether terrorists are automatons who read something on the Internet and then act in service of that idea. They aren’t, full stop. Rather, the question is whether religious/ideological factors seem to provide a robust explanation for both terrorist radicalization and also terrorist actions.

One Man’s Experiences

Before turning to the role of al-Aulaqi specifically, I’d like to address the role that Islamist ideology has on behavior. Foust writes: “The heart of my problem with discussing Islamist ideology is that I don’t understand how it affects behavior.” This is because behavior is complex, encompassing such causal factors as “constraints, signaling from peers, intent, and capability.” On the question of how Islamist ideology can impact behavior, I believe the answer is so obvious as to be virtually indisputable. Note that Foust frames the issue as Islamist and not jihadi ideology. I don’t know whether this framing was purposeful, but I’m glad that he put the question this way, because an examination of Islamist behavior is illuminating.

As I recently discussed on a Bloggingheads appearance with Matt Duss, and as a number of readers will know, before my entry into the counterterrorism field I worked for an Islamist charity, the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, that has now been named a specially designed global terrorist entity by the U.S. Treasury Department. I had converted to Islam in college, and worked for Al Haramain in 1998-1999 between college and law school. I entered as a relative Islamic novice, with a very moderate conception of the faith; during my time at Al Haramain, my behavior changed substantially and I ultimately adopted an interpretation that I now consider extreme. Though I wrote a book about this period in my life, until now I have not really introduced my experiences into my own academic work on radicalization due to my awareness that people often universalize their own experiences improperly. However, their applicability should be clear in this response to Foust; and then I will introduce my empirical work on the subject.

At its heart, Islamism holds that human instincts and inclinations do not provide a reliable guide for determining morality. The reason Islamists believe that society should be governed by sharia is because man-made laws are contingent, and subject to shifting views of morality. Only God’s guidance, as best exemplified in the Qur’an and sunna, provides a reliable and unquestionable framework for determining how a society should be run. But if we can only trust God—and, related to that, Muhammad’s example—for the making of laws, isn’t it just as true that only the sunna can provide a guide to how we should live our own lives?

Thus, within Islamism, one’s behavior is clearly and unequivocally controlled by ideology. I encountered an intricately legalistic system within Al Haramain, wherein the restrictions were virtually all-encompassing. Growing a beard was required for men; likewise it was necessary to eat only with the right hand and roll one’s pants legs up above the ankles. Petting a dog, listening to music, and shaking hands with a member of the opposite sex all clearly transgressed the bounds of morality. Quite clearly ideology played a role in these behavioral outcomes. Absent the prevalent ideology (which could be described either as Islamism or Islamic conservatism), there is simply no explanation for why a relatively large number of people would decide to grow their beards out in a similar way, see dogs as unclean, stop making physical contact with members of the opposite sex, et cetera. While Foust writes that behavioral changes occur “in an unpredictable way,” in this case the behavioral changes all comported with the dominant ideology.

Moving beyond my own experiences, one of the remarkable aspects of Islamism—giving lie to Foust’s claim that behavioral changes in this area are unpredictable—is the consistency of behavioral changes across a broad array of cases. To be clear, not all Islamist interpretations of the faith are alike, and there are variegations among known Islamists, but in case after case the behavioral changes mirror those I experienced during my time at Al Haramain. One example is the Duka brothers—Shain, Eljvir, and Dritan—who were arrested with three others in May 2007 for plotting to attack the military base in Fort Dix, New Jersey. As the brothers turned to Islamism, they alienated family members with the announcement that “[t]he playing of music—a centuries-old tradition at Albanian weddings—had been banned” at Eljvir Duka’s wedding. Similarly, they spent an extended conversation captured via covert surveillance exploring the legalistic rules of how their beards should be kept:

Dritan Duka: That’s not really the way it [the beard] should be kept, it should be kept trimmed.

Unidentified male: It’s supposed to be neat, not, right trimmed but not over your lip.

Dritan Duka: Not shaved off completely.

Shain Duka then told a story about how a man in a Popeyes Chicken restaurant, after staring at them for a short time, asked why young men like them had such large beards. Shain recounted that “then we explained to him listen all the prophets wore beards and were Muslim so we wear the beards because all prophets wore beards.” Similarly, Daniel Joseph Maldonado’s behavioral changes included “wearing traditional Arab clothing, including the galabeyah, an ankle-length gown with long sleeves that covered the tattoos on his arms.” Tattoos are considered haram (prohibited by Islamic law) within the dominant conservative interpretations of Islam. Maldonado also tried to grow a beard; when he failed, “he blamed his Puerto Rican heritage and began chastising fellow Muslims who could grow a full beard and chose not to.”

Both Adam Gadahn and John Walker Lindh stopped listening to music. Gadahn had previously been seriously obsessed with death metal, but gave away virtually his entire music collection. Explaining this to the recipient, Gadahn said: “Well, I turned Muslim.” Lindh’s obsession had been not death metal, but rather hip hop. He even posed as a black rapper online, declaring himself “Hip Hop’s Christ” in one Internet forum. After he converted, he took the strictures of his new faith seriously. In July 1996, he asked in the alt.religion.islam discussion forum if musical instruments were actually haram. By July 1997, he had offered to sell his entire music collection.

There are many, many examples beyond this. Rather than being unpredictable, the behavioral changes associated with Islamist practice are in fact remarkably consistent. Without yet turning to jihadist ideology, it is very easy to glimpse the connection between Islamist ideology and behavioral change.

An Empirical Examination of Jihadism

Turning from Islamism to jihadism, the evidence also suggests links between ideology and behavior. While I am not equating religious conservatism with extremism or violence, one obvious connection should be stated: if you are not allowed the moral agency to determine what hand to eat with, or how far up your pants legs should be rolled, how can you have the moral agency to determine matters of war and peace?

This natural connection can be seen in the radicalization of Adam Gadahn. Soon after his conversion, he fell in with a small group of men at the Islamic Society of Orange County who, as the Washington Post puts it, “wore turbans, long robes and long beards, and … spent a lot of time criticizing other members of the mosque.” Zena Zeitoun, a convert to Islam, told the New Yorker that “[e]verything was haram to them in the United States.” She said, “If they saw a girl walking down the street in a short skirt, that’s haram. If they saw you with a beer bottle in your hand, that’s haram. If they saw a man and a woman holding each other, that’s haram.”

Gadahn began to adopt this legalistic outlook early on, as he grew out his beard and started wearing Saudi-style robes. He became close to Hisham Diab and Khalil Deek—two discussion group members with extremist views and connections to international militancy. To Saraah Olson, Diab’s ex-wife, Gadahn’s blind obedience stood out. “He took everything they said as the Holy Grail,” she recalled. After Diab and Deek told Gadahn to stop wearing jeans, he complied. Olson provided another example: “At first, [Gadahn] would come into the house, and if I would be making tea he would say, ‘Thank you, sister,’ very loudly into the kitchen. But he never, ever said anything again to me after Hisham told him, ‘You never thank them. That’s their duty.’”

The legalistic interpretation of Islam that Gadahn had accepted blended into his political radicalization, as his companions lectured to him just as naturally about global politics as they would about the need to stop wearing jeans. Olson and her son Ryan described a cult-like atmosphere in which Gadahn was not even allowed to speak with his own family, and was told that “if you’re a good believer, you’ll kill them.” He reportedly joined “heartily” in discussions focusing on the evils of the West and Israel.

While the connection between ideology and jihadism is intuitive in this way, I believe—as Foust does—in empirical evidence. Thus, in a 2009 report that I co-authored, I sought to measure relevant factors that indicated the role of religious ideology in terrorist radicalization. The relevant sample for this study was 117 homegrown jihadi terrorists from the U.S. and Britain. Five factors that I examined are indicative of ideology’s influence on the subjects: adopting a legalistic interpretation of Islam, trusting only select (i.e. salafi jihadi) religious authorities, perceiving the West and Islam as irreconcilable for theological reasons, displaying extreme intolerance for perceived theological deviance, and attempting to impose one’s religious beliefs on others. These factors showed up frequently throughout the sample. While one can ask a number of questions about causation, a couple of important findings emerge from this study. One is that the ideological factors I identify can be measured across a broad range of homegrown jihadi terrorists. The second finding concerns the adoption of religious ideology prior to political radicalization. For the homegrown terrorists who exhibited signs of political radicalization, the study found that religious awakening preceded political awakening 40.7% of the time. In contrast, I found that political radicalization preceded any kind of religiosity only 11.6% of the time. (In the other 47.7% of cases, it is unclear whether political or religious ideology came first.)

While Foust is correct that “we are especially bad at explaining our beliefs and behavior,” my study overcomes this problem because it does not depend on the terrorists’ post hoc justifications for their actions. Instead, it measures ideological variables as they were radicalizing. Thus, I believe my study makes a powerful case that a nuanced look at the role of religious ideology in homegrown terrorists’ radicalization suggests that religion likely plays a fairly important role.

Conclusion

As I have said, questions of causation can—and should—be asked about my study’s findings. But what I succeeded in doing is taking a much more granular look at the relationship between ideology and jihadism than other studies that deny the link without measuring any ideological factors.

And this brings us to Foust’s specific objection concerning al-Aulaqi. He contends that it is impossible to say that al-Aulaqi is “the most persuasive supporter of jihad for Muslims in the West.” Much of this conclusion rests on his skepticism about whether ideology maters at all. But, in my view, the evidence I outline above suggesting that ideology is important to terrorist radicalization (though not the sole factor) is more persuasive than evidence suggesting it is not. If one agrees with my argument so far, the next question is: who are the major influencers?

It is here that evidence suggesting al-Aulaqi’s importance is more compelling than Foust’s skepticism. As the Telegraph has put it, his “lectures have been found in possession of almost every radical Islamist who has executed, or attempted to execute, attacks on Western targets.” And we do not have to simply accept terrorists’ post hoc explanations of al-Aulaqi’s influence. For example, the would-be Fort Dix attackers spoke of his persuasiveness in covert recordings during the course of their plot. Nidal Hassan sought al-Aulaqi’s sanction prior to carrying out his attack at Fort Hood, as did Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab before his attempted Christmas Day 2009 attack on Northwest Airlines 253. Al-Aulaqi’s prevalence in case after case, with terrorists actively seeking his guidance, is strong evidence that he is indeed an important influencer.

Foust objects that any argument about ideology’s importance “requires a standard of evidence that is, in practical terms, impossible to achieve.” This is a strange evidentiary standard indeed, particularly when ideology appears to be influencing people to carry out attacks right now. Is it better to wait for scientific certainty—which is the standard of proof Foust urges—or to proceed based upon the best available evidence?

For these reasons, it seems that there is a stronger connection between ideas and behavior within both Islamism and jihadism than Foust admits. And he seems to be erecting an evidentiary standard more suitable to a behavioral science lab than to pressing policy debates about the impact of jihadi ideology on terrorists’ propensity to violence.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is the director of the Center for the Study of Terrorist Radicalization at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and is a Ph.D. candidate in world politics at the Catholic University of America.

GUEST POST: Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator.

Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to Global Jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.

By Joshua Foust

Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens wrote a provocative article for Foreign Policy, in which he argues that Anwar al-Aulaqi, the American-Yemeni preacher working for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, is “the most persuasive supporter of jihad for Muslims in the West.”

Under any circumstances, this would be a difficult argument to make: persuasion is notoriously difficult to quantify and measure. Even in discourse studies, measuring the influence or persuasion of individual figures is difficult: there is first-mover bias (in which one is important not because of any merit but merely because one said it first), and any number of other phenomenon that contribute to one’s influence in unpredictable ways. Politicians hire PR consultants, management consultants, and spend hundreds of thousands of dollars per month on “messaging,” and still cannot consistently predict reaction and electoral outcome.

Marketing firms try this as well: planting the desire for a product, or persuading consumers to purchase something they might not need but might definitely want. Marketing, too, is notoriously unpredictable—for reasons few people acknowledge or explain one quirky, off-beat commercial like the Old Spice Guy is a raging success, while a similarly quirky advertising campaign like Burger King’s is an expensive failure.

This is because, at the end of the day, it’s rare that people are “persuaded” to do anything. As humans, we tend to seek confirmation of our beliefs and wants and to ignore contrasting information—and there is a rich field of studies in cognitive psychology to back this up. In other words, most advertising—and most political messaging—is really about reinforcing beliefs and wants one already has, and providing a means to express justification for them.

In that light, describing Aulaqi as “the most persuasive” doesn’t make any sense. There is no way to prove such an argument. And indeed, in Meleagrou-Hitchens’ article, his evidence never rises above the circumstantial: some people read something on the Internet, and then they acted. They liked a speech, and then they acted. They read some manifesto, then they acted. This is correlation, to be sure. But is is not evidence of persuasion.

Meleagrou-Hitchens’ argument rests on the belief that Anwar al-Aulaqi possesses a unique capability to radicalize Westerners. Appealing to the publication of Inspire, the English-language magazine produced by AQAP, which has suggested Muslims carry out lone-wolf terror operations, Meleagrou-Hitchens argues that this is the crux of Aulaqi’s influence on radicalizing Westerners. His evidence amounts to interrogated statements by a few people who were arrested trying to commit murder: they enjoyed reading Aulaqi, he argues, so therefore Aulaqi persuaded them to commit violence.

Such an argument is logically backward. Why did these people decide to read Aulaqi in the first place? Roshonara Choudhry, one of the people Meleagrou-Hitchens cites as an Aulaqi inspiration, was not a radical in 2008. Yet, in 2009, she began to download Aulaqi’s sermons, eventually claiming to act upon them. What everyone who claims Aulaqi thus inspired her act ignore, including Meleagrou-Hitchens, is why she began to download Aulaqi’s sermons in the first place. I suspect it goes back to the conceit behind advertising, political messaging, and so on: people are not easily persuaded, but they are easily reinforced. I can’t answer what changed, but something happened where an otherwise adjusted young woman starts reaching out to an Internet preacher demanding violence. There is no evidence to support the assertion, however, that it was ideology, and specifically Aulaqi’s talents of persuasion, which directly inspired her to stab an MP.

The heart of my problem with discussing Islamist ideology is that I don’t understand how it affects behavior. Behavior is a complex process. It is the result of a number of causal factors, including constraints, signaling from peers, intent, and capability. All of those must come together in order for a behavior to occur. Ideology can be a contributing factor, as it is a form of signaling and constraint — making some behaviors appear to be acceptable, and some not. But this happens in an unpredictable way, and the fact we all acknowledge here (namely, that some people choose to act and most do not) should tell us that it is not a simple process to describe or predict.

The assumption behind the ideology discussion appears to be that behavior is a gun, and ideology is a trigger. That is, you have a person, they accept ideology, and then the output is behavior (in this case, violence). But that just isn’t how people work, and using some basic logic and self-knowledge can reveal that. We are not mono-causal creatures, even in relatively simple matters like choosing where to eat lunch. In particularly emotional issues, like religion and death, I would argue we are especially bad at explaining our beliefs and behavior (and there is actually a substantial body of cognitive science literature that argues people are reliably unreliable in accurately explaining their decisions).

We react to our environment, we respond to peer pressures, to community norms and signals, to physical and social constraints on behavior, and so on. Ideology can, potentially, be one of those contributing factors — as a means of signaling and of establishing justification for certain behaviors. But to say that ideology causes behavior is difficult if not impossible to prove — not only can we never get inside someone’s head to say, conclusively, why they did something, but we know, from neuroscience, that people cannot explain their own behavior consistently. And still, you’re left with the lingering question of why this specific person reacted against ideology while the thousands of others who were exposed to it did not.

At best, ideology is a woefully incomplete explanation for why terrorists chose to commit terror. But to argue that it is so important requires a standard of evidence that is, in practical terms, impossible to achieve.

Joshua Foust is a fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net.

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