New article from Shaykh Abū Basīr al-Ṭarṭūsī: "They Leave the People of Syria, the Soldiers of al-Shām, and They Join the Iraqi State"


Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū Basīr al-Ṭarṭūsī — “They Leave the People of Syria, the Soldiers of al-Shām, and They Join the Iraqi State”
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To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: [email protected]

GUEST POST: Jabhat al-Nusra's Relations With Other Rebels After the Bay'ah to Zawahiri

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Past Guest Posts:
Hazim Fouad, “Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj),” April 30, 2013.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Much discussion arose last month when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of the Iraqi al-Qa’ida branch Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) declared that his group and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) are in fact one and the same, prompting Sheikh Jowlani of JAN to reply that he was not consulted on this decision, while pledging allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri and making clear the links between ISI and JAN.
It is likely that the decision to have an ISI-JAN merger announced was Zawahiri’s idea. From this likely supposition, many commentators claimed a turning point in JAN’s fortunes in Syria for the worse. Thus did Brian Fishman attempt to draw an analogy with Iraq, asserting: “It wouldn’t be the first time he [Zawahiri] botched the terror group’s strategy in the region.”
Fishman’s analogy is that the al-Qa’ida pledge in Iraq inevitably translated to brutalization of local Sunnis, which, along with “U.S. pressure” on al-Qa’ida, proved the decisive turning point against al-Qa’ida after the rise of the Sahwa (Awakening) movement. Hence he concludes, “For better or worse, the reckoning between al-Qa’ida’s Syria affiliate and other rebel groups is beginning.”
However, I contend that this view is well overblown. “Syria is/is not Iraq” is of course a statement frequently brought up in common debates over whether the outside world should intervene in militarily or provide lethal aid to rebel forces. The problem is that the general debate over comparisons of Syria to Iraq does not appreciate that the dynamics of how the civil war progressed in Iraq are vastly different from Syria.
Iraq’s sectarian civil war was focused on what might be termed a decisive ‘Battle for Baghdad’ between rival Sunni and Shi’a militias, with the former- demographically in a minority- believing that Sunni Arabs were in fact the majority and could win that civil war. By the end of 2006, large-scale ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from Baghdad had convinced many insurgents who had been working with al-Qa’ida that they could not win, and hence a key driving force behind the turn against al-Qa’ida.
On a side note, I should point out that the belief in a Sunni Arab majority in Iraq is by no means dead, and is back on the ascendancy, being promoted by some mainstream Sunni Arab politicians like Osama al-Nujaifi and by groups organizing demonstrations such as Intifada Ahrar al-Iraq (IAAI).
IAAI is essentially the activist wing of the neo-Ba’athist Naqshibandi militia movement. Concomitant with that belief in a Sunni Arab majority is the notion of marching on Baghdad to retake the city and calling for jihad, sentiments apparent at IAAI protests in areas like Hawija and Tikrit.
In any case, the development of Syria’s civil war is not analogous. For one thing, the timescale is much greater than in Iraq, and Sunni insurgents in Syria are not a minority who falsely believe they are in the majority.
False analogies with Iraq aside, an overview of statements made by various other rebel groups as well as developments on the ground show that nothing has changed for the worse for JAN. Beginning with the issue of statements on JAN’s pledge of allegiance to Zawahiri, the sentiment can be summarized as follows: ‘While we appreciate your efforts against the regime, we do not believe a pledge of allegiance to al-Qa’ida is in anyone’s interests.’ Thus, not a repudiation of JAN itself, but just al-Qa’ida.
Consider, for example, a statement (courtesy of Charles Lister) put out by a Deir ez-Zor battalion known as the Jaish al-Tawhid, which is aligned with the Salafist rebel coalition called the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF). The statement read: “As for Jabhat al-Nusra’s allegiance to al-Qa’ida, this is a matter for their concern, even though we do not support them [in it] as they have come to hold this view, and we recognize that Jowlani’s pledge of allegiance to Sheikh al-Zawahiri is a course of action that does not achieve legitimate interests.”
In a similar vein, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya– one of the largest battalions in the SIF- recently put out a statement indicating that they did not approve of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a merger between ISI and JAN, saying that his announcement was not done in consultation with any proper religious authorities in Syria.
At the same time, the battalion made clear its appreciation of “the self-sacrifice and courage of Jabhat al-Nusra in battles and its good deeds and the goodness of its treatment of the people,” declared to be advancing “the interests of the Ummah.”
Notably, the statement recognizes the risks of conflict spreading in the wider region, but makes clear that “this does not constitute an arbitrary judgment for the artificial borders between the sons of the Ummah.” In other words, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya does not see the notion of an ideological project beyond Syria’s borders as somehow illegitimate.
Coming to reactions outside this Salafist framework, we have the case of a statement put out immediately after JAN’s al-Qa’ida pledge by a self-proclaimed Free Syrian Army military council in the Damascus area, indicating that while JAN is not part of its structure, “its role in the defense of our oppressed people facing the regime of the tyrant [Assad] is valued.”
The al-Furqan Brigades likewise weighed in on JAN’s pledge of allegiance to al-Qa’ida. Their statement cited Qur’an 5:51, “O you who believe, do not take the Jews and Christians as friends; they are in fact friends of each other. And whosoever among you takes them [as friends] is one of them; and verily God does not guide the people of wrongdoers.”

New statement from Jabhat al-Nuṣrah in Wilāyat Dara'ā: "Important Notifications About Some Sharī'ah Questions"

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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Jabhat al-Nuṣrah in Wilāyat Dara’ā — “Important Notifications About Some Sharī’ah Questions”
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To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]

New statement from the Syrian Islamic Front's Ḥarakat Aḥrār al-Shām al-Islāmīyyah: "Clarification on the Declaration of the 'Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām' and Its Implications for the Domestic and Regional Arena"

UPDATE 5/6/13 1:36 PM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic statement:
In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful.
Praise be to God and prayers and peace upon the messenger of God.
We were surprised, just as many were surprised, by what Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, released concerning the announcement the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. We were similarly surprised by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s response, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, in which he pledged allegiance (bay’ah) to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda.
Given that we are watching with interest the implications of the event – and what it means in terms of its large impact on the internal and regional arenas – we wish to record some important points that make our position clear on what has come out. We take the approach of offering advice (al-nush) and admonition (al-tazkir):
1: We in the Islamic Ahrar al-Sham Movement are keen on concentrating efforts and unifying them in the battle to topple the aggressive Assad enemy, as nothing except for faith (iman) is more required and nothing comes before it.
2: God has set forth the legitimate norms (sunan) and universal laws to establish rightly guided states. Whoever breaches the laws is deprived of their consequences(note: this line was unclear to me). Religious leadership (al-imamah) over Muslims must have ability and authority to secure its interests. This does not exist among any of the factions and brigades on the ground.
3: The “emirate” is a method – enunciated in God’s law – to unify the message and the ranks, but it is not an end in itself. What al-Baghdadi announced did not unify the scattered groups and it did not reconcile conflicting factions, and this is what is called “corruption of the situation” among religious scholars. This is when what resulted from a ruling is the opposite of what is originally intended.
4: No one in this country – no religious scholars or sincere Islamists and FSA brigades working on the ground – was consulted in the announcement of the state. This opens up the field for anyone to announce initiatives on their own according to how they see fit
5: As such, the two announcements will drag parties into the conflict that do not serve – as we see it – the people’s revolution and Jihad. The principle is to not expand the scope of the conflict and to concentrate on fighting the Assad regime, undermining its pillars of support, and stopping its aggression.
Our wounded people. When we saw Jabhat al-Nusra’s dedication and valor in battle, their charity and their good treatment of the people, it was thought that they would continue being altruistic and serving the interests of the nation.
Based on what has preceded, we ask both parties to get a sense of the magnitude of the event, the danger of regionalizing the conflict in this way, and bringing in other parties. This is not based on arbitrary distinctions between members of the Islamic nation, but an objective reading of the situation. It is a presentation of what we see as being in the best interests of Muslims and their Jihad against the tyrant of Syria.
Lastly, we in the Islamic Ahrar al-Sham Movement announce that the establishment of a rightly guided Islamic state that rules its subjects with justice is a goal that we strive to achieve through legitimate means. As such, we take care to heed the requirements of the situation and the state of the Islamic nation, which has concealed its religion for a half century. We ask God to guide us rightly in both thought and action and to grant our nation what is best. He is the protector and enabler, praise be to God, lord of the worlds.
Saturday 05/04/2013
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Ḥarakat Aḥrār al-Shām al-Islāmīyyah — “Clarification on the Declaration of the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām’ and Its Implications for the Domestic and Regional Arena”
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New article from Shaykh Ḥussayn bin Maḥmūd: "The Fitnah Episode"

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم فتنة الحلَقة

لعل رؤوس كثيرين من أنصار الجهاد دارت مع تلك الحلقة التي انتهت من حيث بدأت : تزكية الأمير الظواهري للأمير البغدادي ، ثم إعلان البغدادي ضم جبهتي الشام والعراق في “دولة العراق والشام” ، ثم إعلان الأمير الجولاني الإعتذار عن هذا الضم ، ثم مبايعة جبهة النصرة للأمير الظواهري !!
هذه الحلقة رُسمت في أيام معدودات ، وفي كلمات خاطفة ، لكنها أظهرت خللاً كبيراً في الفكر الذي يتبناه بعض أنصار المجاهدين هنا وهناك ، ثم أظهرت خللاً لا يقل عنه عند بعض العلماء والدعاة وطلبة العلم وخواص المناصرين لأهل الجهاد !!

لا بد من إعادة النظر في تأثير هذه الحلقة على كثير من الشباب الذين لم يعهدوا مثل هذه الإشكالات في العمل الإسلامي : فصُدم البعض ، وأخذ البعض موقفاً ، وتعصّب البعض ، وحصل تنافر وتشاحن وتشويش ، فتغيّرت الألفاظ ، وتباعدت القلوب ، ووقف البعض بعيداً يراقب الحال دون تدخّل في أمل أن تنجلي الغمة ، وهي كذلك ..

قد يكون الأمر كبيراً عند البعض ، وقد يكون عند البعض أصغر مما نتصوّر ، فهو عند المتفائلين : سوء تنسيق بين بعض القيادات ، وعند المتشائمين : أموراً ذكروها في كتاباتهم ومقالاتهم وتصريحاتهم .. سنحاول مناقشة بعض المفاهيم التي نعتقد أن بها غبش عند البعض ، وهي المشار إليها في العنوان بالفتنة ، لأنها كذلك ، فمنها :

أولاً : معنى قول الله تعالى {وَالَّذِينَ جَاهَدُوا فِينَا لَنَهْدِيَنَّهُمْ سُبُلَنَا …} (العنكبوت : 69) ، هذه الآية يظلمها البعض ، فالهداية هنا لا تعني العصمة بأي حال من الأحوال ، فالمجاهدون بشر ، وقادتهم بشر ، وهم يُخطؤون وليسوا بمعصومين ، وإنما معنى الآية أنهم أقرب إلى الهداية العامة من كثير من المسلمين لأنهم في موطن إخلاص وعمل جليل وفي عبادة مستمرة ، وقد فسّر بعض العلماء هذه الآية بأنها في أهل القتال ، وقال البعض بأنها في من يجاهد بأي نوع من أنواع الجهاد . فمن جاهد نفسه أو الشيطان أو العدو الداخلي أو الخارجي ولم يكن خاملاً متكاسلاً متقاعساً يدخل في هذه الآية عند بعض علماء التفسير ، وظاهر الآية أنها في أهل القتال لأن العلماء قالوا بأن كلمة الجهاد إذا أطلقت فإنها تعني القتال في سبيل الله ما لم يصرفها صارف عن ذلك ..

الشاهد أن الهداية هنا لا تعني العصمة ، فلا ينبغي أن نلطم بهذه الآية وجه كل من يناقش قراراً أو عملاً للمجاهدين بزعم أنهم هم المهتدون ، ومخالفوهم ضالون ، فخالد بن الوليد – رضي الله عنه – قتل بني جذيمة وتبرأ النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم من صنيعه ، ونزل الرماة من جبل أحدٍ وكانوا من الصحابة المجاهدين وتسببوا في هزيمة المسلمين ، والأمثلة كثيرة .. قد يكون رأي بعض المجاهدين أهدى من بعض ، وقد يكون رأي بعض القاعدين أصوب من رأي بعض المجاهدين ، فالأمر نسبي وليس على إطلاقه ..

ثانياً : سوء الظن بالمسلمين .. وهذا أمر عظيم أنزل الله فيه قرآناً يُتلى ، قال تعالى {يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا اجْتَنِبُوا كَثِيرًا مِنَ الظَّنِّ إِنَّ بَعْضَ الظَّنِّ إِثْمٌ …} (الحجرات : 12) ، وقال تعالى {وَإِنَّ الظَّنَّ لاَ يُغْنِي مِنَ الْحَقِّ شَيْئًا ..} (النجم : 28) ولعلنا لا نجد كلمة الظن معرّفة في القرآن إلا في موضع ذم !! نحن نسأل هؤلاء : ما هو الأصل في المسلمين ؟ ولماذا سوء الظن ؟ وأين حمل كلام المسلم على أحسن محمل ؟ وماذا يفيد سوء الظن غير الخصومة والضغينة !!

ثالثاً : بالرجوع إلى كتاب الله تعالى نجد أن الله تعالى ذكر نهياً عظيماً قبل آية الظن في سورة الحجرات فقال سبحانه {يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا لاَ يَسْخَرْ قَومٌ مِنْ قَوْمٍ عَسَى أَنْ يَكُونُوا خَيْرًا مِنْهُمْ وَلاَ نِسَاءٌ مِنْ نِسَاءٍ عَسَى أَنْ يَكُنَّ خَيْرًا مِنْهُنَّ وَلاَ تَلْمِزُوا أَنْفُسَكُمْ وَلاَ تَنَابَزُوا بِالأَلْقَابِ بِئْسَ الاسْمُ الْفُسُوقُ بَعْدَ الإِيمَانِ وَمَنْ لَمْ يَتُبْ فَأُولَئِكَ هُمُ الظَّالِمُونَ} (الحجرات : 11) ، وقد رأينا كيف أن سوء الظن أدى إلى اللمز والتنابز والسخرية بين الإخوة !! ورأينا الطعن واللعن والبذاءة والفحش في القول !! فأين آداب الإسلام ؟ وهل نحن أنصار قضية إسلامية أم قضية سوقيّة !! وأين نحن من قول نبينا صلى الله عليه وسلم “ليس المؤمن بالطعّان ولا اللعّان ولا الفاحش ولا البذيء” (الترمذي ، وصححه الألباني) ، وهل يعتقد أحد بأن سبيل النصر هو انتفاء صفة الإيمان !!

رابعاً : عمِل البعض على تفريق المجاهدين وتمزيقهم من حيث لا يشعر ، فقد تعصّب البعض لرأي فلان ، وتعصّب آخرون لرأي فلان ، وأصبحت عندنا فرقتان ورأيان بعد أن كنا جبهة واحدة على قلب رجل واحد ، والله تعالى قد بيّن بياناً واضحاً جليّاً ليس فيه أي مجال لتأويل فقال سبحانه {وَأَطِيعُوا اللهَ وَرَسُولَهُ وَلاَ تَنَازَعُوا فَتَفْشَلُوا وَتَذْهَبَ رِيحُكُمْ وَاصْبِرُوا إِنَّ اللهَ مَعَ الصَّابِرِينَ} (الأنفال : 46) ، هذه حقيقة لا تقبل الجدال ، فالتنازع مآله الفشل وذهاب الريح ، وهو مناقض لطاعة الله ورسوله المذكورة في أوّل الآية ، فالواجب الصبر وتحمّل بعض الأمور في سبيل اجتماع الكلمة حتى تتحقق معيّة الله ويحصل النصر بفضله ، فمن تدبّر الآية جيداً علم هذا يقيناً .. كلنا يحفظ هذه الآية : {إِنَّ اللهَ يُحِبُّ الَّذِينَ يُقَاتِلُونَ فِي سَبِيلِهِ صَفًّا كَأَنَّهُمْ بُنْيَانٌ مَرْصُوصٌ} (الصفّ : 4) ، والسؤال هنا : إذا كان الله تعالى يحب هذا ، فهل يحب نقيضه !! وهل ننتصر بما لا يحبه الله تعالى !!

خامساً : هل يسعنا مخالفة رأي قادتنا !! هذه معضلة عند البعض ، ويتحرّج منها البعض ، فلا بد من بيان الأمر ووضوحه .. هناك فرق بين مخالفة رأي القادة ومخالفة أمرهم في غير معصية .. لا ينبغي للإنسان أن يلغي عقله أو يرهنه لغيره ، فالصحابة كانوا يراجعون النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم في بعض قراراته ويناقشونه ، ولم ينههم النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم بل كان يطلب مشورتهم وهو أغنى الناس عن ذلك ، فغيره من باب أولى .. قادة الجهاد ليسوا طغاة ، الطاغية هو من يرفض أن يخالف الناسُ رأيَه ، ولذلك تجد سجناء الرأي بالآلاف في البلاد الدكتاتورية ..

إذا أمر قادة الجهاد أمراً فعلى الجنود السمع والطاعة في غير معصية ، قد يكون الجندي غير محب للرأي أو غير مقتنع به ، ولكن عليه أن يسمع ويطيع ، ولا إثم عليه إن لم يعجبه الرأي ، ولكن قد يأثم إذا شغب على القادة وأبدى إعتراضه على الرأي في بعض المواقف التي لا تحتمل ذلك : كأن يعلن ذلك في معركة أو في موقف يحصل فيه انشقاق في صفوف المسلمين أو وهن ، عندها يكون السكوت هو الواجب ..
قد لا يعجبني أن يعلن البغدادي “دولة العراق والشام” ، أو لا يعجبني اعتذار الجولاني عن الإنضمام إلى هذه الدولة ، وأرى أن رأيي هو الصواب ، وهذا حقي الطبيعي والشرعي أحتفظ به كرأي

al-Manārah al-Bayḍā' Foundation for Media Production presents a new audio message from Jabhat al-Nuṣrah's Abū Muḥammad al-Jawlānī (al-Golani): "About the Fields of al-Shām"

UPDATE 4/19/13 9:06 AM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic audio message:
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الحمد لله والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله وعلى آله وصحبه ومن والاه وبعد
Muslims everywhere, leaderships of the Jihadi movements and leaderships of the armed factions, people of Al-Sham, sons of Jabhat (Front) Al-Nusra, As-salam Alaykum wa Rahmatu l-lāhi wa Barakātuh.
The Truth Almighty: (Alif Lam Mim -1- Do men think that they will be left alone on saying, We believe, and not be tried? -2- And certainly We tried those before them, so Allah will certainly know those who are true and He will certainly know the liars -3-) Surah Al-Ankaboot.
There has been a talk about a speech attributed to sheikh Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi may Allah preserve him and it has been mentioned in the speech attributed to the sheikh that the Front subordination to the Islamic State of Iraq then he declared abolishing the name of the State of Iraq and Jabhat Al-Nusra and replacing them with one name the Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham.
We inform you that the leadership of the Front and its Majlis Al-Shura and the humble slave the general commander of Jabhat Al-Nusra have no knowledge of this deceleration except what they heard from the media.
So if the attributed speech was accurate we weren’t consulted or ordered to do so, and I say seeking aid from Allah:
After some of the papers were uncovered that we accompanied the jihad in Iraq since it began until our return after the Syrian revolution with what occurred to us from predestined abruption but we are familiar with the details of most of the momentous events that occurred to the journey of jihad in Iraq and concluded from our experience there what pleases the hearts of the believers on the land of Al-Sham under the banner of Jabhat Al-Nusra.
And Allah Almighty knows that we only saw from our brothers in Iraq the great goodness of generosity and harbor and their virtues cannot be counted and it is a debt that cannot leave our necks as long as we live.
And I never wished to leave Iraq before seeing the banners of Islam raised high on Mesopotamia but the rapidity of the events in Al-Sham prevented us from that.
And I was honored to accompany many of the righteous people in Iraq whom we reckon him to be so, and many of them have left us that no one of them is mentioned before me without me saying “may Allah accept him”, as well as tens and even hundreds of Muhajirin who perished from the people of Al-Sham and others as sacrifice to declare the Word of Allah under the banner of State of Iraq.
Then Allah Almighty honored me of knowing sheikh Al-Baghdadi that honorable sheikh who gave the people of Al-Sham their right and paid the debt doubly and agreed to the project which we proposed to him to support our oppressed people on the land of Al-Sham then he aided us have the money of the State despite of the hard days that they were passing through then he kept all his trust in this poor slave and authorized him to set the policy and plan and aided us with some brothers despite of their scarcity but Allah Almighty blessed them and their gathering and the Front began to engage the hardships step by step until Allah graced us and banner of the Front was raised high and the hearts of the Muslims and oppressed flapped with it and it became the hard number that counterpoise the battle of the Ummah today on this land, and the focus of the hopes of the Muslims of the whole world.
We have from the beginning that we aspire to return the governance of Allah on His land then reviving the Ummah to implement His Sharia and spread His methodology and we didn’t want to be hasten in declaring a matter that we were patient regarding it, since the functions of the state from implementing the Sharia and ending rivalries and conflicts and seeking to establish security among Muslims and securing their requirements is being done in the liberated areas despite of the delinquency.
Since the issue of the declaration wasn’t of concern in the presence of the essence the State of Islam in the land of Al-Sham is built by the arms of all without exclusion of any major party who participated with us in jihad and fighting in Al-Sham from the mujahid factions and the respected sheikhs of Ahli Sunnah and our brothers Muhajirin as well as not excluding the leadership of Jabhat Al-Nusra and its Shrua council.
Also the issue of postponing the declaration of the correlation wasn’t because of a softness in religion or inanition that occurred to the men of the Front rather it is an enlightened wisdom based Sharia principles and a long history and spending an effort in understanding the Sharia policy that is appropriate for Al-Sham reality which the people of Ahl Al-Hal wa Al-Aqad have agreed upon in Bilad Al-Sham from the leadership of the Front and their students of knowledge then who supports us from the honorable sheikhs and people of opinion and consultancy abroad.
And I’m responding the appeal of Al-Baghdadi may Allah preserve him of upgrading from lowest to highest and say that this is a Baya’a from the sons of Jabhat Al-Nusra and its general commander we renew it to the sheikh of jihad sheikh Aymen Al-Zawahiri may Allah preserve him. We give Baya’a to listen and obey in what is liked and in what is disliked, and to Hijrah and jihad, and not to fight against the people of authority except upon the appearance of Kufr upon which I have Burhaan.
And the banner of the Front will remain as it is without any change despite our appreciation for the banner of the State and who carries it and who sacrificed his blood from out brothers under its banner.
And we reassure our people in Al-Sham that what you saw from the Front from defending your religion, honors and blood and its good character with you and the fighting groups will remain as you knew it and the declaration of the Baya’a won’t change anything in its policy.
O’ Allah unite our word and guidance… Amin, Amin, wa Alhamdulillahi Rabbi AlAAalameen.
Servant of the Muslims the General Commander of Jabhat Al-Nusra
Abu Mohammed Al-Golani
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Abū Muḥammad al-Jawlānī (al-Golani) — “About the Fields of al-Shām”

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New statement from Shaykh Abū Basīr al-Ṭarṭūsī: "On the Announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām"


Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū Basīr al-Ṭarṭūsī — “On the Announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām”
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To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]

Check out my new 'Policy Alert' for the Washington Institute: "Al-Qaeda Announces an Islamic State in Syria"


Early Tuesday morning, Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Husseini al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi — the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, an al-Qaeda branch — released an audio message announcing the extension of its “Islamic State” into al-Sham (the Levant), effectively bringing Syrian jihadist rebel group Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) into the fold. This comes on the heels of “al-Qaeda Central” leader Ayman al-Zawahiri releasing a video message two days ago calling for unification of the jihad in Syria. This is no coincidence — rather, it highlights the continued relevance of al-Qaeda’s central command. Although Baghdadi’s announcement confirms what many already surmised and what the United States noted in its December designation of JN as a terrorist group, his words offer several important takeaways.
Baghdadi’s audio message explains that al-Qaeda did not announce the connection to JN previously for two reasons: security concerns, and a desire for Syrians to get to know JN on their own terms and not be clouded by media “misrepresentations” ahead of time due to the stigma of association with al-Qaeda. This is in line with an overarching tactic al-Qaeda has used in various locales in the post-Arab uprising environment. In Yemen, for example, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s late sharia official Abu Zubayr Adil bin Abdullah al-Abab explained in April 2011 why the group was rebranding itself as “Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen”: “[It] is what we use to introduce ourselves in areas where we work to tell people about our work and goals.” Similarly, Tunisia and Libya have witnessed the establishment of Ansar al-Sharia groups that act locally but, at least at the leadership level, believe in al-Qaeda’s global ideology.
More important, Baghdadi’s message illustrates that al-Qaeda Central in Pakistan is still relevant to the global jihad that it originally called for in 1998. Although JN was not officially announced until late January 2012, evidence suggests that it was originally established in summer 2011. Abu Lokman, a senior JN commander in Aleppo, explained to the BBC in January 2013 that he originally joined the group in its infancy six months prior to its first public video release. This would place JN’s founding at the end of July 2011 — a timeframe corroborated in interviews with other JN fighters who have spoken with Western and Arab media outlets.
Abu Lokman’s date also coincides with Zawahiri’s first video related to the Syrian uprising, released on July 27, 2011. In it, he supported the “Muslims in Bilad al-Sham, the land of ribat, jihad, glory, Arabism, and nobility.” In the context of his latest announcement on Syria, this suggests that al-Qaeda Central had knowledge of — and perhaps even ordered — JN’s establishment two years ago.
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