Category: Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām

New statement from Shamūkh al-Islām Forum: "Important: Regarding the Recent Events in Bilād al-Shām"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

Untitled2

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

والصلاة والسلام على النبي الأمين محمد بن عبدالله وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين ، ثم أما بعد :

لا يخفى على أحدٍ ما يعصفُ بالمجاهدين من فتنٍ وابتلاءاتٍ عظيمة في هذه الفترة الحساسة ، فتنٌ وابتلاءاتٌ عظيمة بحق ، تحتاج منّا لصبرٍ وثباتٍ واحتسابٍ ودعاء،
إنها مرحلة ليست بالجديدة على الموحدين ، بل إن ما يحصل اليوم لهو تأكيدٌ على سنة الابتلاء التي يبتلي الله بها عباده المجاهدين ، ليمحص صفوفهم وينقي أتباعهم ويميز الخبيث من الطيب والصادق من الكاذب ،
هي سحابة نحسبها ستمر بإذن الله ، هذا ظننا بربنا ثم بقادتنا وأمرائنا ، ستزول بعون الله هذه الغُمة وستكشف بإذن الله الكُربة ، وستتوحد بعون الله الصفوف وستتآلف القلوب وستجتمع الجهود وما ذلك على الله بعزيز .
هي مرحلةٌ حساسة وخطيرةٌ ومعقدة بحق ، ونقدر التخبط الذي أصاب الكثير من الإخوة ، ونلتمس لهم الأعذار ، لكن ولأننا أصحاب مسؤولية وقائمين على هذا الثغر الإعلامي علينا توضيح بعض النقاط لإخواننا وأخواتنا الكرام فقد كثر التساؤل عن دور الشبكة في ظل الأحداث الجارية ..
فنقول مستعينين بالله تعالى :..
إن الإخوة وللأسف الشديد انقسموا في ظل هذه الأحداث لثلاث أقسام ، قسم اختار النصرة والصمت والدعاء لقاداتهم وأمرائهم وإخوانهم المجاهدين وكف لسانهم عنهم وترك الطعن واللمز فيهم تورعاً ، وقسم انحاز تماماً للجبهة فصار يعادي ويلمز ويطعن بكل من ناصر الدولة ، وقسم آخر انحاز تماماً للدولة فصار يعادي ويلمز ويطعن بكل من ناصر الجبهة !
وصار كل طرف من الثاني والثالث يحاول فرض رأيه ويلزم الجميع به بل زاد هذا الأمر عن حده حتى باتت تصلنا الطلبات من كل طرف بحذف كل ما يتعلق بالطرف الآخر والله المستعان ..
ونشهد الله أن هذا كان أشد علينا من الخلاف نفسه ، لأننا كما قلنا نثق بأن الله سبحانه لن يضيع عباده وسيهيء لهم من الأسباب ما يجمعهم ويؤلف بين قلوبهم ، لكن ما يخيفنا بحق هو تعامل الأنصار والمتابعين مع هذا الأمر الجلل ، ثم استغلاله ممن باعوا دينهم وأسلموا أنفسهم للشيطان ومن حمل في قلبه على الموحدين حقداً ووجد من هذا الخلاف فرصة للنيل منهم والطعن فيهم ..
نقول أيها الإخوة الكرام بأننا منذ أقمنا هذا الصرح لم نقمه إلا لنصرة المجاهدين والذب عن أعراضهم ، ما أقمنا هذا الصرح إلا لنسدد ونقارب ونجمع ولا نفرق ونوحد ولا نشرذم !
إننا وأمام هذا الحدثوالخطب الجلل نقف بقدر المستطاع موقف الحياد حتى يتم حسم المسألة و تأتينا التوجيهات من أهل الشأن !
وحتى ذلك الحين سنقف بقدر المستطاع على مسافة واحدة من الجميع ونسعى جاهدين لتلطيف الأجواء وعدم السماح لمن يريدون سكب البنزين على النار أن يحققوا أهدافهم ! وكل من يطعن ولو تلميحاً بدولة الإسلام وقادتها أو بجبهة النصرة وقادتها فإنه سيتم إيقافه دون تنبيه مسبق وقد أعذر من أنذر .في رعاكم الله كونوا عوناً لنا ولا تكونوا عوناً علينا ، انصروا إخوانكم وادعوا لهم فلا أقل من الدعاء في هذه الظروف ، أو اصمتوا ولا تخوضوا في أعراضهم ونواياهم ، دعوا خلافاتهم لهم واكتفوا بالدعاء لعل الله يستجيب من أحدكم وما ذلك على الله بعزيز ،
انصروهم ولا تبخلوا عليهم ، فلم يبخلوا عليكم بشيء ، سددوا وقاربوا ، ناصروا ونافحوا ، جمعوا ولا تفرقوا ، لا تتعصبوا لراية أو طائفة ، فمن هم على خلاف اليوم هم إخواننا ولهم حق علينا أن ندعو لهم وننصح بالتي هي أحسن ! .

هذا فإن أصبنا فمن الله وحده وإن أخطأنا فمن أنفسنا والشيطان ، وآخر دعوانا أن الحمد لله رب العالمين .

مع تحيات
إخوانكم في شبكة شموخ الإسلام

_________

To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]

New audio-visual message from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām’s Shaykh Abū Muḥammad al 'Adnānī: "So Fight Them, Verily They Are Polytheists"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin



__________

To inquire about a translation for this audio-visual message for a fee email: [email protected]

New audio-visual message from the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām's Abū Bakr al-Ḥussaynī al-Baghdādī: "Remaining in Iraq and al-Shām"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin



____________

To inquire about a translation for this audio-visual message for a fee email: [email protected]

Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad: Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: Aleppo Area

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: In addition to the recent column started by Phillip Smyth “Hizballah Cavalcade,” “Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad” is a new semi-regular column that Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi will be writing. This was borne out of his excellent guest posts. I hope his posts will be useful to all who read in better understanding and dissecting what is going on in Syria and beyond as it relates to global jihadis.  An archive of all of Aymenn’s posts can now be found here.
—
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
The past week or so has seen a significant controversy erupt in jihadist circles over the relationship between an entity called the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS)- a merger of Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) first proclaimed by ISI emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in April- and JAN as headed by Abu Mohammed al-Jowlani.
First came a purported letter by Jowlani circulated to his followers, summarizing an alleged edict by Aymenn al-Zawahiri that denied responsibility for Baghdadi’s announcement of ISIS and accordingly called for the abolition of this name, and recognition that ISI and JAN have the separate spheres of Iraq and Syria respectively. The Zawahiri document then came to light only a couple of days later, obtained by al-Jazeera.
The supposed Jowlani letter and the alleged ruling by Zawahiri (NB: I have provided full translations with notes on both documents here and here) both emphasize the need for cooperation between ISI and JAN, and mutual respect for each other’s efforts of jihad. In short, the documents merely call for an end to the name of ISIS, and stress an ideal harmony that is thought to have existed prior to Baghdadi’s declaration of ISIS.
Whatever the truth behind these documents, a quick search on Twitter, Facebook, forums and the like will show that many jihadi activists and media groups are continuing to use the name of ISIS as if nothing has happened. Most notably, the newspaper ash-Sharq al-Awṣat claims to have obtained a document circulated by those under the banner of ISIS denying the authenticity of the Zawahiri letter (hat-tip: Charles Lister).
Whether or not the newspaper has an authentic ISIS document, there are understandable reasons why those favoring the brand of ISIS might be skeptical? Why, for example, did Zawahiri not simply discuss the issues in his purported letter in the video statement? Why also did Jowlani not issue his letter in the name of JAN’s media channel al-Manarah al-Bayḍā’, which in the letter he claims will return to full operation very soon?
There are of course reasonable counter-arguments to these objections, most notably if one posits the idea that Zawahiri- as the alleged letter from him suggests- wanted the naming controversy dealt with quietly on the ground and out of the site of media, hence the initial lack of discussion in jihadi circles on social media and forums.
Yet here I am not so much concerned with debating the authenticity of the documents as realities and perceptions on the ground. What is apparent from recent evidence is that ISIS is an active entity in the Aleppo area, going beyond mere tweets and Facebook statuses of jihadis. In media articles on the ISIS-JAN controversy, reporters like Basma Atassi and Mariam Karouny have drawn a dichotomy of foreign fighters versus native Syrians, whereby the majority of the former are said to have flocked under the banner of ISIS.
Certainly this paradigm of analysis makes sense in Aleppo, which has since last year seen a particularly strong concentration of foreign mujahideen relative to other areas. There are in fact other battalions in the wider area using the same al-Qa’ida banner as ISIS, such as the Katiba al-Muhajireen (KAM) led by Abu Omar al-Shishani and Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen (not to be confused with the Gaza/Sinai group).
Thus, this relatively recent photo of a Qatari mujahid in Aleppo could be a fighter aligned with any one of the aforementioned groups. However, it must be recognized that the boundaries between these groups is not at all clear-cut, rather analogous to the fact that Iranian proxy groups in Iraq can serve as mere fronts for one another. In this context, my friend Shami Witness rightly points out that Baghdadi had appointed Shishani as emir of Aleppo, Idlib and Lattakia.
The most recent wave of evidence for ISIS activities in the Aleppo area most prominently featured the circulation of a photo of ISIS insignia being used in the area. As far back as 18 May, the pro-ISIS channel ash-Sham reported that ISIS fighters had freed a number of prisoners from Aleppo central prison.
It would appear that ISIS in Aleppo has been conducting siege operations against the central prison for quite some time, for the Syrian Observatory on Human Rights reported on June 7 that ISIS fighters in coordination with Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham was targeting the central prison with machine-gun fire.
Meanwhile, the past few days has seen a surge in the number of Youtube videos uploaded by the Halab News Network (NB: not pro-ISIS, but simply providing footage of developments in the Aleppo area) allegedly showing ISIS operations.
For instance, here is a video from the Duwerineh district of Aleppo, purporting to show clashes between ISIS fighters and regime forces. Here are two other videos from the same area, allegedly showing ISIS men targeting regime forces with Grad-missiles.
Another area of operations for ISIS is the regime stronghold of Jabal Ma’ar (dubbed Jabal Shouihna in the video titles), which is also being targeted by other battalions like the Kata’ib Nur ad-Din az-Zinki (see Facebook page here). Thus, here is one video where ISIS purportedly targets a tank with a Malyutka missile.
Likewise, here is a video of the aftermath of ISIS bombardment of regime positions in the same area. Further, here is a video of ISIS fighters in the area firing at regime forces: and note in particular the presence of the ISIS flag on the Mazda car.
So what of the relation between ISIS and JAN in the Aleppo area? To be sure, there is certainly a JAN presence in Aleppo (e.g. see this recent photo from Halwaniya). To hear from the report by Basma Atassi in particular, there have been tensions in Aleppo over distribution of flour, as fighters aligned with ISIS did not recognize the committee headed by JAN and other battalions responsible for said distribution.
Thus, Atassi’s report implies that in Aleppo, ISIS and JAN are two separate entities, which contrasts with the situation in Raqqah Governorate where ISIS and JAN are more or less synonymous and interchangeable. In my view this separation in the Aleppo area is borne out with other evidence.
For example, recently a report emerged from Aleppo of a child who had been brutally slain, allegedly by Islamist rebels for apostasy. In response, JAN and ISIS issued separate statements disassociating themselves from the execution, with the JAN statement also bearing a stamp of the ‘Shari’a committee in Aleppo’ and ‘Jabhat al-Nusra.’
Here is a copy of the ISIS statement, bearing the familiar stamp of the group and lacking identification with any Shari’a committee in the city. This corroborates the idea of lack of recognition by ISIS of the already established Shari’a organizations in Aleppo.
Videos of ISIS rallies in Aleppo also add to this portrait of separation and a degree of animosity between ISIS and JAN in Aleppo. Here is one video of an ISIS rally in the Bab al-Hadid area, featuring a recital of al-Fātiḥa. In a similar vein, here is a video of an ISIS march through Tariq al-Bab. Here is another video of the same rally, featuring the nasheed ‘Labbayka Islam al-Butula’ (see translation on my website; it is popular with Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Syria too).
There are two things to note about these rallies. First, Jabhat al-Nusra flags are nowhere to be seen. Second, the demonstrations are entirely separate from those held elsewhere in Aleppo featuring FSA flags, giving a strong contrast with Raqqah where ISIS, JAN and FSA flags can be observed together in a rally united under one cause (see my Jihadology post on Raqqah, as well as this recent video).
All this evidence suggests that no concord of understanding has been reached between pro-ISIS demonstrators and those of different ideological inclinations, or even with JAN activists who are similarly al-Qa’ida-aligned.
In sum, whereas Raqqah showed how JAN and ISIS could generally be interchangeable, the case of Aleppo appears to provide strong indications that the two organizations are separate and at odds with each other, with ISIS containing a disproportionate number of foreign fighters who are more strongly concentrated in Aleppo than other parts of the country.
Indeed, nothing may be thought to encapsulate this issue of ISIS, foreign fighters and Aleppo better than this video of a Turkish fighter under the ISIS banner in Aleppo (Duwerineh). The Raqqah-Aleppo contrast illustrates just how fragmented both ISIS and JAN are.
In any event, so long as there is no clear, public statement by Zawahiri or any other figures involved in the naming controversy of ISIS and JAN, and bearing in mind the issue of inevitable personal rivalries among different rebel groups, the problems of ISIS-JAN tensions in rebel-held areas of Aleppo are likely to remain and grow, even if clashes with regime forces in the Aleppo area do not preclude military cooperation between ISIS and other battalions.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University. His website is https://www.aymennjawad.org. Follow on Twitter at @ajaltamimi

GUEST POST: Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: Raqqah Governorate

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Past Guest Posts:
Hazim Fouad, “Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj),” April 30, 2013.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
–
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
A couple of weeks ago I wrote on emerging signs of an apparent split in some respects between Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS). What other evidence has emerged since then? Here I will just focus on the rebel-held city of Raqqah and the wider Raqqah Governorate.
For one thing, the nature of the channel ‘ash-Sham’, which has put out a number of videos purportedly showing members of ISIS, has now become clear. While its now-terminated Youtube profile gave the impression that ash-Sham is run by someone in the United States, the channel is actually based in the city of Raqqah.
Here is an advertisement board put out by ash-Sham in Raqqah, with the slogan ‘Together, let us spread our Shari’a.’ In effect, the channel is a media front for ISIS in Raqqah, and so ash-Sham’s Facebook page also uploaded a photo of the entrance to ISIS’s security office in Raqqah, together with a view of the interior of the office.
More generally, the presence of ISIS supporters can be observed in videos of rallies in Raqqah. For instance, in this video clip of a 24 May demonstration for Qusayr in Raqqah, an ISIS banner can be seen, though it should also be noted that some of the protestors are also waving JAN flags, alongside others who hold FSA flags and one demonstrator for Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya (HASI), which was the main group of rebel battalions that took over Raqqah in March.
Here is another video clip of protests in Raqqah on that day, again featuring an ISIS banner alongside an ISIS flag, together with HASI and FSA banners.  Note also this photo of one of the processions in solidarity with Qusayr with two ISIS flags in the background.
Further, on 31 May, a Friday protest was held in Sayf ad-Dawla street under the name of ‘Our Red Lines’ (alluding to the Obama administration’s shifting of the ‘red line’ on the use of chemical weapons in Syria). Here too one can observe an ISIS flag alongside FSA flags and white banners with the Shahada in black, signifying the realm of Islamic law.
Some inferences can be drawn here. First, whatever ideological differences the protestors and activists in Raqqah may have (and as I have noted before, there is a secular and anti-sectarian trend in the city), cooperation and accommodation rather than mutual hostility remain the norm at demonstrations, particularly those organized around common causes like solidarity with the rebels in Qusayr.
True, some activists in Raqqah have also protested against the rise in Shari’a courts, but to the extent that ISIS and other groups compete to win the support of locals, the competition for ‘hearts and minds’ is generally being pursued peacefully.
The second point to note is that the presence of JAN flags alongside ISIS symbols at demonstrations illustrates that posing an antagonistic JAN-ISIS dichotomy can be simplistic. Some of the activists aligned with ISIS and JAN may simply view each other’s names and banners as mere synonyms.
In a similar vein to JAN’s distribution of works by the likes of Abd al-Wahhab I have noted previously, ISIS is also offering study circles for the Qur’an and life of the Prophet at various mosques. Further, now that the presence in Raqqah has been established for some time, ISIS has taken upon itself to exercise jurisdiction over perceived criminals and regime agents.
The latter was shown with the widely-circulated execution video last month of three men accused of being officers in Assad’s forces, while an example of the former has recently come to light with ISIS’s arrest of a man identified as ‘Ahmad al-Assaf’, accused by ISIS of leading a gang responsible for stealing motorcycles and cars in Raqqah.
One further point suggesting continuity between ISIS and JAN in the Raqqah area and a relationship more or less along the lines of seeing the two there as synonymous is the issue of the northern border town of Tel Abyad. This town was the site of clashes between the northern Farouq Battalions and JAN at the end of March, most likely over control of border access points and resources.
Renewed clashes appear to have emerged in Tel Abyad at the end of May, only this time between Farouq (or the recently formed Liwaa Mustafa) and ISIS, with the latter then taking the initiative to distribute a notice with the ISIS insignia to residents on their right to report on and complain about misconduct by any of the mujahideen.
In short, the case of the city of Raqqah and the surrounding area is indicative of the complexity on the ground of the relationship between JAN and ISIS. In some places elsewhere in Syria, there is probably antagonism between those adopting the JAN label and others the ISIS symbols, but the picture in Raqqah and Raqqah governorate is one of continuity between ISIS and JAN.
Most importantly, the modus operandi of those identifying as ISIS- increasingly prevalent in Raqqah city rather than the banner of JAN- is not fundamentally different from JAN. Ultimately, it is ISIS’ actions on the ground that matter more than a name and flag.
Thus, I do not see a gradual shift to ISIS from JAN in the Raqqah area as having a significant impact for fighters and activists in sympathy with al-Qa’ida. Deeds- and not symbols or names- will decide their fortunes.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University. His website is https://www.aymennjawad.org. Follow on Twitter at @ajaltamimi

New article from Shaykh Abū Basīr al-Ṭarṭūsī: "They Leave the People of Syria, the Soldiers of al-Shām, and They Join the Iraqi State"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin


Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū Basīr al-Ṭarṭūsī — “They Leave the People of Syria, the Soldiers of al-Shām, and They Join the Iraqi State”
____________

To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: [email protected]

New statement from the Syrian Islamic Front's Ḥarakat Aḥrār al-Shām al-Islāmīyyah: "Clarification on the Declaration of the 'Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām' and Its Implications for the Domestic and Regional Arena"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

UPDATE 5/6/13 1:36 PM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic statement:
In the name of God, the most gracious, the most merciful.
Praise be to God and prayers and peace upon the messenger of God.
We were surprised, just as many were surprised, by what Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, released concerning the announcement the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. We were similarly surprised by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s response, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, in which he pledged allegiance (bay’ah) to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda.
Given that we are watching with interest the implications of the event – and what it means in terms of its large impact on the internal and regional arenas – we wish to record some important points that make our position clear on what has come out. We take the approach of offering advice (al-nush) and admonition (al-tazkir):
1: We in the Islamic Ahrar al-Sham Movement are keen on concentrating efforts and unifying them in the battle to topple the aggressive Assad enemy, as nothing except for faith (iman) is more required and nothing comes before it.
2: God has set forth the legitimate norms (sunan) and universal laws to establish rightly guided states. Whoever breaches the laws is deprived of their consequences(note: this line was unclear to me). Religious leadership (al-imamah) over Muslims must have ability and authority to secure its interests. This does not exist among any of the factions and brigades on the ground.
3: The “emirate” is a method – enunciated in God’s law – to unify the message and the ranks, but it is not an end in itself. What al-Baghdadi announced did not unify the scattered groups and it did not reconcile conflicting factions, and this is what is called “corruption of the situation” among religious scholars. This is when what resulted from a ruling is the opposite of what is originally intended.
4: No one in this country – no religious scholars or sincere Islamists and FSA brigades working on the ground – was consulted in the announcement of the state. This opens up the field for anyone to announce initiatives on their own according to how they see fit
5: As such, the two announcements will drag parties into the conflict that do not serve – as we see it – the people’s revolution and Jihad. The principle is to not expand the scope of the conflict and to concentrate on fighting the Assad regime, undermining its pillars of support, and stopping its aggression.
Our wounded people. When we saw Jabhat al-Nusra’s dedication and valor in battle, their charity and their good treatment of the people, it was thought that they would continue being altruistic and serving the interests of the nation.
Based on what has preceded, we ask both parties to get a sense of the magnitude of the event, the danger of regionalizing the conflict in this way, and bringing in other parties. This is not based on arbitrary distinctions between members of the Islamic nation, but an objective reading of the situation. It is a presentation of what we see as being in the best interests of Muslims and their Jihad against the tyrant of Syria.
Lastly, we in the Islamic Ahrar al-Sham Movement announce that the establishment of a rightly guided Islamic state that rules its subjects with justice is a goal that we strive to achieve through legitimate means. As such, we take care to heed the requirements of the situation and the state of the Islamic nation, which has concealed its religion for a half century. We ask God to guide us rightly in both thought and action and to grant our nation what is best. He is the protector and enabler, praise be to God, lord of the worlds.
Saturday 05/04/2013
_____________

—
-2-e1360974378582
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Ḥarakat Aḥrār al-Shām al-Islāmīyyah — “Clarification on the Declaration of the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām’ and Its Implications for the Domestic and Regional Arena”
__________

New statement from Shaykh Abū Basīr al-Ṭarṭūsī: "On the Announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin


Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū Basīr al-Ṭarṭūsī — “On the Announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām”
___________

To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]

Check out my new 'Policy Alert' for the Washington Institute: "Al-Qaeda Announces an Islamic State in Syria"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin


Early Tuesday morning, Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Husseini al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi — the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, an al-Qaeda branch — released an audio message announcing the extension of its “Islamic State” into al-Sham (the Levant), effectively bringing Syrian jihadist rebel group Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) into the fold. This comes on the heels of “al-Qaeda Central” leader Ayman al-Zawahiri releasing a video message two days ago calling for unification of the jihad in Syria. This is no coincidence — rather, it highlights the continued relevance of al-Qaeda’s central command. Although Baghdadi’s announcement confirms what many already surmised and what the United States noted in its December designation of JN as a terrorist group, his words offer several important takeaways.
Baghdadi’s audio message explains that al-Qaeda did not announce the connection to JN previously for two reasons: security concerns, and a desire for Syrians to get to know JN on their own terms and not be clouded by media “misrepresentations” ahead of time due to the stigma of association with al-Qaeda. This is in line with an overarching tactic al-Qaeda has used in various locales in the post-Arab uprising environment. In Yemen, for example, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s late sharia official Abu Zubayr Adil bin Abdullah al-Abab explained in April 2011 why the group was rebranding itself as “Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen”: “[It] is what we use to introduce ourselves in areas where we work to tell people about our work and goals.” Similarly, Tunisia and Libya have witnessed the establishment of Ansar al-Sharia groups that act locally but, at least at the leadership level, believe in al-Qaeda’s global ideology.
More important, Baghdadi’s message illustrates that al-Qaeda Central in Pakistan is still relevant to the global jihad that it originally called for in 1998. Although JN was not officially announced until late January 2012, evidence suggests that it was originally established in summer 2011. Abu Lokman, a senior JN commander in Aleppo, explained to the BBC in January 2013 that he originally joined the group in its infancy six months prior to its first public video release. This would place JN’s founding at the end of July 2011 — a timeframe corroborated in interviews with other JN fighters who have spoken with Western and Arab media outlets.
Abu Lokman’s date also coincides with Zawahiri’s first video related to the Syrian uprising, released on July 27, 2011. In it, he supported the “Muslims in Bilad al-Sham, the land of ribat, jihad, glory, Arabism, and nobility.” In the context of his latest announcement on Syria, this suggests that al-Qaeda Central had knowledge of — and perhaps even ordered — JN’s establishment two years ago.
Click here to read the rest.

al-Furqān Media presents a new audio message from the Islamic State of Iraq’s Shaykh Abū Bakr al-Ḥussaynī al-Qurayshī al-Baghdādī: “Announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

UPDATE 10/28/13 8:00 AM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic audio message:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū Bakr al-Ḥussaynī al-Qurayshī al-Baghdādī — “Announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām” (En)
________________

—
ax0vZ
Shaykh Abū Bakr al-Ḥussaynī al-Qurayshī al-Baghdādī — “Announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Shām”

____________