UPDATE 2/6/12 9:48 AM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic video message:
[wpvideo xw86oRg3]
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UPDATE 2/16 8:11 AM: Click here for an English translation of the below audio message.
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NOTE: In late November AQAP released a statement with a similar title, which you can read here, which claimed responsibility for the attacks on the Ḥūthīs. Then AQAP had a follow up message in early December, which can be seen here.
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New audio message from Abū Sufyān al-Azdī (Sa’īd al-Shehrī) of al-Qā’idah in the Arabian Peninsula: “Victory for you oh Ahl al-Sunnah”
Shaykh Abū Dhar al-Shamhurī al-Yamānī — “What is the Ruling for the Mujāhidīn Fighting Against the Yemenī Government and What is the Clear Path of Jihād in Yemen?”
[scribd id=47660788 key=key-1ke0l0v2ipawxtqsx1p1 mode=list]
NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to Global Jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.
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By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
On January 19, Joshua Foust posted a rather interesting article at Jihadology questioning Anwar al-Aulaqi’s importance as a jihadi ideologue, and in so doing, also called into question the assumed linkage between Islamist ideology and behavior. Though Foust’s post raises interesting and valid questions, and introduces bodies of research that are often ignored in debates over terrorist radicalization, I find his conclusion problematic for three reasons. First, Foust seems to be arguing against a strawman on the question of how ideology can have an impact on behavior. Second, the applicability of his general observations about the connection between ideas and behavior is questionable in the context of Islamist ideology. And third, erecting the very high evidentiary standard with which Foust concludes his article is not at all helpful when it comes to a problem set like terrorist radicalization, which it is necessary to address now.
Strawman Opponent?
It is somewhat unclear what Foust is objecting to within the current literature on radicalization—which, in fairness, is reflected in his post’s title, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology.” But to the extent his article refutes a definable set of ideas, it seems to argue against monocausal explanations of behavior. Specifically, Foust writes:
The assumption behind the ideology discussion appears to be that behavior is a gun, and ideology is a trigger. That is, you have a person, they accept ideology, and then the output is behavior (in this case, violence). But that just isn’t how people work, and using some basic logic and self-knowledge can reveal that. We are not mono-causal creatures, even in relatively simple matters like choosing where to eat lunch.
The last point is undoubtedly correct: we are not monocausal creatures. But which authors, specifically, share this set of assumptions? A careful reading of Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens’s Foreign Policy article that is the hook for Foust’s piece reveals no such monocausal assumption, though Meleagrou-Hitchens clearly does conclude—contrary to Foust—that ideology is important. Nor does Foust point to other authors who write about ideology as though it is the sole cause of terrorist violence.
This framing of the discussion seems designed to bolster the importance of Foust’s refutation. But the contribution an author can make by refuting a clearly exaggerated interpretation of a subject is minimal when that exaggerated interpretation does not represent the conventional wisdom in a field. And in the academic discussion of terrorist ideology, it seems that the dominant opinion among prominent scholars—including Marc Sageman, Jessica Stern, Robert Pape, Jerrold Post, and now apparently Brian Michael Jenkins—is that religious ideology is relatively unimportant. (There are of course plenty of scholars on the other side of this debate, including Mary Habeck, Assaf Moghadam, and myself.)
So let’s define the debate in a more reasonable way. The question is not whether terrorists are automatons who read something on the Internet and then act in service of that idea. They aren’t, full stop. Rather, the question is whether religious/ideological factors seem to provide a robust explanation for both terrorist radicalization and also terrorist actions.
One Man’s Experiences
Before turning to the role of al-Aulaqi specifically, I’d like to address the role that Islamist ideology has on behavior. Foust writes: “The heart of my problem with discussing Islamist ideology is that I don’t understand how it affects behavior.” This is because behavior is complex, encompassing such causal factors as “constraints, signaling from peers, intent, and capability.” On the question of how Islamist ideology can impact behavior, I believe the answer is so obvious as to be virtually indisputable. Note that Foust frames the issue as Islamist and not jihadi ideology. I don’t know whether this framing was purposeful, but I’m glad that he put the question this way, because an examination of Islamist behavior is illuminating.
As I recently discussed on a Bloggingheads appearance with Matt Duss, and as a number of readers will know, before my entry into the counterterrorism field I worked for an Islamist charity, the Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, that has now been named a specially designed global terrorist entity by the U.S. Treasury Department. I had converted to Islam in college, and worked for Al Haramain in 1998-1999 between college and law school. I entered as a relative Islamic novice, with a very moderate conception of the faith; during my time at Al Haramain, my behavior changed substantially and I ultimately adopted an interpretation that I now consider extreme. Though I wrote a book about this period in my life, until now I have not really introduced my experiences into my own academic work on radicalization due to my awareness that people often universalize their own experiences improperly. However, their applicability should be clear in this response to Foust; and then I will introduce my empirical work on the subject.
At its heart, Islamism holds that human instincts and inclinations do not provide a reliable guide for determining morality. The reason Islamists believe that society should be governed by sharia is because man-made laws are contingent, and subject to shifting views of morality. Only God’s guidance, as best exemplified in the Qur’an and sunna, provides a reliable and unquestionable framework for determining how a society should be run. But if we can only trust God—and, related to that, Muhammad’s example—for the making of laws, isn’t it just as true that only the sunna can provide a guide to how we should live our own lives?
Thus, within Islamism, one’s behavior is clearly and unequivocally controlled by ideology. I encountered an intricately legalistic system within Al Haramain, wherein the restrictions were virtually all-encompassing. Growing a beard was required for men; likewise it was necessary to eat only with the right hand and roll one’s pants legs up above the ankles. Petting a dog, listening to music, and shaking hands with a member of the opposite sex all clearly transgressed the bounds of morality. Quite clearly ideology played a role in these behavioral outcomes. Absent the prevalent ideology (which could be described either as Islamism or Islamic conservatism), there is simply no explanation for why a relatively large number of people would decide to grow their beards out in a similar way, see dogs as unclean, stop making physical contact with members of the opposite sex, et cetera. While Foust writes that behavioral changes occur “in an unpredictable way,” in this case the behavioral changes all comported with the dominant ideology.
Moving beyond my own experiences, one of the remarkable aspects of Islamism—giving lie to Foust’s claim that behavioral changes in this area are unpredictable—is the consistency of behavioral changes across a broad array of cases. To be clear, not all Islamist interpretations of the faith are alike, and there are variegations among known Islamists, but in case after case the behavioral changes mirror those I experienced during my time at Al Haramain. One example is the Duka brothers—Shain, Eljvir, and Dritan—who were arrested with three others in May 2007 for plotting to attack the military base in Fort Dix, New Jersey. As the brothers turned to Islamism, they alienated family members with the announcement that “[t]he playing of music—a centuries-old tradition at Albanian weddings—had been banned” at Eljvir Duka’s wedding. Similarly, they spent an extended conversation captured via covert surveillance exploring the legalistic rules of how their beards should be kept:
Dritan Duka: That’s not really the way it [the beard] should be kept, it should be kept trimmed.
Unidentified male: It’s supposed to be neat, not, right trimmed but not over your lip.
Dritan Duka: Not shaved off completely.
Shain Duka then told a story about how a man in a Popeyes Chicken restaurant, after staring at them for a short time, asked why young men like them had such large beards. Shain recounted that “then we explained to him listen all the prophets wore beards and were Muslim so we wear the beards because all prophets wore beards.” Similarly, Daniel Joseph Maldonado’s behavioral changes included “wearing traditional Arab clothing, including the galabeyah, an ankle-length gown with long sleeves that covered the tattoos on his arms.” Tattoos are considered haram (prohibited by Islamic law) within the dominant conservative interpretations of Islam. Maldonado also tried to grow a beard; when he failed, “he blamed his Puerto Rican heritage and began chastising fellow Muslims who could grow a full beard and chose not to.”
Both Adam Gadahn and John Walker Lindh stopped listening to music. Gadahn had previously been seriously obsessed with death metal, but gave away virtually his entire music collection. Explaining this to the recipient, Gadahn said: “Well, I turned
NOTE: Click here for the entire issue of AQAP’s most recent release of its magazine Ṣadā al-Malāḥim. Also see ‘Umar al-Jawfī’s “The Ḥūthīs And The Coming Project,” which was also recently translated here and Abū Ubaydah al-Ḥaḍramī’s “A Dream Come True” here. Below is Shaykh Abū Sufyān al-Azdī’s [Sa’īd al-Shehrī] “Qaṭar: The Secretary of the Rafidites” unedited from the translation provided at the Anṣār al-Mujāhidīn English Forum.
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Anyone who is following the Rafidite movement in the Arabian Peninsula can see that it starts and ends in Qatar. This is witnessed in the case of the Houthis in Yemen, and how the reconciliation and the cease-fire were achieved via the state of Qatar; and how this agreement became a (diplomatic) document for pressuring the Yemeni government. Indeed it is the Yemeni government that is now requesting the implementation of these agreements, and is conferring directly with the Qatari government to convince the Houthi Rafidites to calm down. Likewise (Qatar) intervened in the dialogue with the Hizb al-Lat, and in the area (which) was under the control (of Hizb al-Lat), and where they had established their reforms, at a time when it was assumed that Iran was moving events there, since Hizb al-Lat is after all of Iran’s military wing in Lebanon. What happened in the south between Hizb al-Lat and its Rafidite supporters on the one hand and the UNIFIL forces on the other made Iran intervene at the same (time) that Syria and Saudi Arabia intervened to calm the struggle between Rafidites and Sunnis in the region. What we witness today between Hasan Nasrallah and Sa’d al-Hariri, who represents the Saudi current in Lebanon, shows that matters are about to explode. Syria may have something to do with that, since this is to its benefit. Thus, is revealed the relationship between Iran and the lackey Qatari government, which is highlighted by the recent visit of Ahmadinejad to Qatar, which caused alarm among the Gulf states and was followed by visits by some Gulf leaders, and what happened in Bahrain after this meeting revealed the Rafidite danger in the region, and the danger of Qatar in facilitating Rafidite affairs outside Iran, and the coordination among Iran and its followers abroad.
In the late nineties, Qatar played a dangerous role in coordinating between Iran and the Jews. Iran was thereby able to take possession of the Palestinian situation through HAMAS and take possession of its leaders, so that Iraq took control of regional affairs through the Palestinian issue. The statements we see from the Iranian government today and how Hamas reacts to these statements with military operations on the ground of reality all point to the imminent outbreak of a new war in the region. The Jews (want) to finish the Palestinian issue. They therefore entered into public, direct negotiations with the lackey Abbas. By these negotiations, they want to calm matters in Palestine so that they are able to open a new front against Iran in the Gulf. Iran is trying by all means to avoid becoming involved in a war during this period, which is the Shia golden age in the region. They possess the military might and the political capability to expand in the region, so war is not in their interest at this time. Iran wants to achieve control over the governments of neighboring countries, as is now the case in Iraq and is occurring in Bahrain. It is expected that there will occur in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques and Kuwait the same unrest that occurred in Bahrain, and the rebellion against the lackey government. Iran is now racing against time to replace all the regional governments with client Shia governments. This will pave the way for them to destroy the Sunnis or convert them to the Rafidite ideology.
What is the role that Ahl al-Sunnah should play in these events, under the rule of such lackey governments?
The one who studies the scholars who are the leaders of the Ummah of Ahl al-Sunnah in the Gulf states, sees that they – except those upon whom Allah has had mercy – rush singing into the embrace of their lackey government or praise America to gain its goodwill or obtain the opportunity to appear on a television show on one of the satellite networks or on a website they are afraid might be closed one day. This is the case of many of them, except those upon whom Allah has had mercy. Or they are like the scholar who is content with taking stupidity as his banner and abandoning sources of information and what is happening in reality on the ground. Such one receives nothing but the government-run networks that broadcast news and so he issues his fatwas based on this news. He does not heed anyone who offers him advice revealing to him what is happening in real world to the Muslims. It has become his business to repeat what his government utters and thus societies become disengaged from what is happening to them. Moreover, some of them who claim to belong to ‘Ilm are raising the Muslim masses on a distortion of the creed of al-wala’ wal-bara’ (loyalty and enmity), cowardice in confrontation; humiliation before the enemies and prostration before their leaders.
As for the governments: They have lost security in their survival, and are confused about to whom to turn in these events, especially after they have seen their master; America shamed and humiliated in Afghanistan and Iraq. They have lost the ability to open any new front in which to defend itself or aid its lackeys. The governments are so ensnared (that they) are clutching at any straw that will rescue them: sometimes looking to China, at other times to India, then heading to Russia. There are arms deals to buy Russian loyalty, and other such blundering we did not reach us. But those shouting back and forth have no life. No doubt these governments will fall and people will be able to march with the Book in one hand and a weapon in the other to defend against the humiliation of the subjugation of colonialism.
As for the peoples of the Arabian Peninsula, goodness is latent in the coming generation, the generation of epic battles and conquests, Allah permitting. This is also the generation which is raising the banner of Jihad as an perception of those societies whose lackey apostate governments try to depict in their media as morally decayed people of confused creed and foolish dreams. Despite this media distortion, the fact is that the goodness still shines through Allah permitting. Even if the voice of corruption is raised high, the people of Deen are true and present to enjoin the good and forbid vice. If the media is capable of misguiding the Muslim masses away from the truth and reality that they are demanding, the Islamic Jihadist media has, Allah permitting, reached every house. It has been able, Allah permitting, to refute the errors of those who misguide and Ahl al-Sunnah, Allah permitting, have become aware of the plots hatched against them by their enemies. Praise be to Allah, they are starting to be aware of the reality of these governments, and see their clear clientage. This is a grace from Allah, even if they were cut off from arms.
Finally, we say to our brothers among Ahl al-Sunnah in Qatar:
The danger that is befalling Ahl al-Sunnah in the Arabian Peninsula is from the Rafidite Shia and from their lackey government. The assistance and aid their government is providing to the Rafidites will assist the Rafidites in occupying the entire peninsula. By Allah, what the Rafidites will undertake in the Arabian Peninsula is more evil and calamitous than what they did in Iraq. Fear Allah, people of Qatar! And hold back your stupid ones from us as much as you can.
Finally, we pray; all praise to Allah, Lord of Creation.
Translated From Sada al-Malahim Magazine Issue #15
NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to Global Jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.
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By Joshua Foust
Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens wrote a provocative article for Foreign Policy, in which he argues that Anwar al-Aulaqi, the American-Yemeni preacher working for al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, is “the most persuasive supporter of jihad for Muslims in the West.”
Under any circumstances, this would be a difficult argument to make: persuasion is notoriously difficult to quantify and measure. Even in discourse studies, measuring the influence or persuasion of individual figures is difficult: there is first-mover bias (in which one is important not because of any merit but merely because one said it first), and any number of other phenomenon that contribute to one’s influence in unpredictable ways. Politicians hire PR consultants, management consultants, and spend hundreds of thousands of dollars per month on “messaging,” and still cannot consistently predict reaction and electoral outcome.
Marketing firms try this as well: planting the desire for a product, or persuading consumers to purchase something they might not need but might definitely want. Marketing, too, is notoriously unpredictable—for reasons few people acknowledge or explain one quirky, off-beat commercial like the Old Spice Guy is a raging success, while a similarly quirky advertising campaign like Burger King’s is an expensive failure.
This is because, at the end of the day, it’s rare that people are “persuaded” to do anything. As humans, we tend to seek confirmation of our beliefs and wants and to ignore contrasting information—and there is a rich field of studies in cognitive psychology to back this up. In other words, most advertising—and most political messaging—is really about reinforcing beliefs and wants one already has, and providing a means to express justification for them.
In that light, describing Aulaqi as “the most persuasive” doesn’t make any sense. There is no way to prove such an argument. And indeed, in Meleagrou-Hitchens’ article, his evidence never rises above the circumstantial: some people read something on the Internet, and then they acted. They liked a speech, and then they acted. They read some manifesto, then they acted. This is correlation, to be sure. But is is not evidence of persuasion.
Meleagrou-Hitchens’ argument rests on the belief that Anwar al-Aulaqi possesses a unique capability to radicalize Westerners. Appealing to the publication of Inspire, the English-language magazine produced by AQAP, which has suggested Muslims carry out lone-wolf terror operations, Meleagrou-Hitchens argues that this is the crux of Aulaqi’s influence on radicalizing Westerners. His evidence amounts to interrogated statements by a few people who were arrested trying to commit murder: they enjoyed reading Aulaqi, he argues, so therefore Aulaqi persuaded them to commit violence.
Such an argument is logically backward. Why did these people decide to read Aulaqi in the first place? Roshonara Choudhry, one of the people Meleagrou-Hitchens cites as an Aulaqi inspiration, was not a radical in 2008. Yet, in 2009, she began to download Aulaqi’s sermons, eventually claiming to act upon them. What everyone who claims Aulaqi thus inspired her act ignore, including Meleagrou-Hitchens, is why she began to download Aulaqi’s sermons in the first place. I suspect it goes back to the conceit behind advertising, political messaging, and so on: people are not easily persuaded, but they are easily reinforced. I can’t answer what changed, but something happened where an otherwise adjusted young woman starts reaching out to an Internet preacher demanding violence. There is no evidence to support the assertion, however, that it was ideology, and specifically Aulaqi’s talents of persuasion, which directly inspired her to stab an MP.
The heart of my problem with discussing Islamist ideology is that I don’t understand how it affects behavior. Behavior is a complex process. It is the result of a number of causal factors, including constraints, signaling from peers, intent, and capability. All of those must come together in order for a behavior to occur. Ideology can be a contributing factor, as it is a form of signaling and constraint — making some behaviors appear to be acceptable, and some not. But this happens in an unpredictable way, and the fact we all acknowledge here (namely, that some people choose to act and most do not) should tell us that it is not a simple process to describe or predict.
The assumption behind the ideology discussion appears to be that behavior is a gun, and ideology is a trigger. That is, you have a person, they accept ideology, and then the output is behavior (in this case, violence). But that just isn’t how people work, and using some basic logic and self-knowledge can reveal that. We are not mono-causal creatures, even in relatively simple matters like choosing where to eat lunch. In particularly emotional issues, like religion and death, I would argue we are especially bad at explaining our beliefs and behavior (and there is actually a substantial body of cognitive science literature that argues people are reliably unreliable in accurately explaining their decisions).
We react to our environment, we respond to peer pressures, to community norms and signals, to physical and social constraints on behavior, and so on. Ideology can, potentially, be one of those contributing factors — as a means of signaling and of establishing justification for certain behaviors. But to say that ideology causes behavior is difficult if not impossible to prove — not only can we never get inside someone’s head to say, conclusively, why they did something, but we know, from neuroscience, that people cannot explain their own behavior consistently. And still, you’re left with the lingering question of why this specific person reacted against ideology while the thousands of others who were exposed to it did not.
At best, ideology is a woefully incomplete explanation for why terrorists chose to commit terror. But to argue that it is so important requires a standard of evidence that is, in practical terms, impossible to achieve.
Joshua Foust is a fellow at the American Security Project and the author of Afghanistan Journal: Selections from Registan.net.
UPDATE 2/8 11:03 AM: Here is an Arabic translation of issue four of AQAP’s English language magazine Inspire:
Click the following link: Inspire Magazine 4 (Ar)
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UPDATE 2/7 11:54 AM: Here is a Russian translation of issue four of AQAP’s English language magazine Inspire:
Click here: Inspire Magazine 4 (Russian)
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NOTE: Here is the first, second, and third issue of Inspire Magazine. Below is a brief summary of what is in this magazine. When I have more time I hope to read the content more in depth and be able to dig deeper into this.
The magazine begins with a letter from the editor, Samīr Khān, about the Shi’a in their midst, as well as a reprint of AQAP’s statement following the car bombing against the Ḥūthīs this past November titled “Statement on the Operations of Defense for the People of the Sunnah.” Then after a series of pages of quotes from friends and foes Khān pens an article reiterating the importance of farḍ al ‘ayn (individual obligation) for jihād. After this, there is a reprint of part of Adam Gadahn’s recent video message from October titled “The Arabs And Muslims: between the Conferences of Desertion .. and the individual Duty of Jihād,” which I analyzed here. Following this there is an article from Abū Zūbayr ‘Adīl bīn ‘Abdullah al-Abāb, AQAP’s chief religious authority, where he answers questions about targeting non-Muslims and Yemeni soldiers. Muḥammad al-Ṣana’ānī follows this up with an article on Roshonara Choudhry who stabbed the UK MP Stephen Timms, and Taymūr ‘Abd al-Wahāb who was responsible for the recent attack in Stockholm. After this Abū Khowla pens a piece titled “Which is Better: Martyrdom or Victory?” Then there is a roundup of the recent jihadist activities in Abyan by Abū Zakarīā al-Erītrī, which confirms that there are members of AQAP from Eritrea. After this, there is a long excerpt from Abū Muṣ’ab al-Sūrī’s magnum opus The Global Islamic Resistance Call. Then in the section titled Open Source Jihād it details how to burn down a building, training with an AK-47, and advice for those that want to help with AQAP’s media outlet al-Malāḥim Media, which includes:
Following this they reprint sections of Shaykh Abū Muṣ’ab Moḥammed ‘Umayr al ‘Awlaqī’s essay titled “Why I chose al-Qā’idah” who was killed in late 2009. After this is the feature article in the entire magazine, which is highlighted on the cover of it from Anwar al ‘Awlaqī titled “The Ruling of Dispossessing the Disbelievers Wealth in Dār al-Ḥarb [the Abode of War].” This is a continuation of advice regarding the economic jihād, which AQAP boasted about in the third issue of Inspire magazine and written about by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross in Foreign Policy following the failed UPS parcel plot. I would be interested to hear his further thoughts about this in light of this new article from ‘Awlaqī. After ‘Awlaqī’s article, there is one from Hazīm Nūr titled “The Call of the Qur’ān” about the importance of the concept tawḥīd (oneness of God), which is one of the most fundamental concepts in Islām. Inspire magazine concludes by recapping recent releases from al-Malāḥim Media including: Issue #15 of AQAP’s Arabic language magazine Ṣadā al-Malāḥim, “Martyrs of the Arabian Peninsula #4 – Abū Hammām al-Qaḥṭānī (Nāyīf bin Muḥammad bin Sa’īd al-Kūdurī al-Qaḥṭānī),” Shaykh Ibrāhīm bin Sulaymān al-Rubaysh’s audio message: “Between Islamists and Liberals”, an audio message from Shaykh Abū Zūbayr ‘Adīl bīn ‘Abdullah al-Abāb: “We Responded to the Sharī’ah of God, not the Laws of ‘Alī Ṣāliḥ”, a tribute to Zayyid al-Daghārī al-’Awlaqī by Shaykh Ibrāhīm bin Sulaymān al-Rubaysh, and a video titled “By the Lord of the Ka’abah, I Triumphed [Part 2]” among others. After this it tells the reader how to get in contact with Inspire magazine and like the previous issue it also lists Muslim prisoners.
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Click here: Inspire Magazine 4
NOTE: Click here for the entire issue of AQAP’s most recent release of its magazine Ṣadā al-Malāḥim. Also see ‘Umar al-Jawfī’s “The Ḥūthīs And The Coming Project,” which was also recently translated here. Below is Abū Ubaydah al-Ḥaḍramī’s “A Dream Come True” unedited from the translation provided at the Anṣār al-Mujāhidīn English Forum.
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So many times I would hear about the Mujahideen and about their purity; and their noble characters and many times I would hear and see the news of the Mujahideen and their heroism, and I would ask myself: how do I reach them? Would it be possible for me to sit with them and be with them?!
This was the dream that enticed us, despite media (attempts) to obscure and spread rumors about (the Mujahideen). Indeed a significant matter and great calamity is the misguidance by some of those who claim to adhere to ‘Ilm by issuing disgraceful fatwas to the effect that “any of the Mujahideen” are corrupters on earth and they destroy homes and kill innocents. But I do not know which innocents they mean.
Despite all this, that dream was in mind as the days disappeared and events moved swiftly. The banner was becoming clearer every day and Paradise was receiving the martyrs. My days were decreasing and my life hastening onward as the shaytan with all his might and trickery to deter me from achieving my desired goal. But through the Grace of Allah, after it had been difficult for us to migrate to the lands of Jihad like Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, a front was opened for me, and it was one of the greatest battle fronts: the Peninsula of Muhammad, صلى الله عليه وسلم.
After Allah granted me the good fortune to join my Mujahideen brothers, I saw the wonder of wonders. I saw the brothers sacrifice their persons, their wealth and all that they possessed for their Lord. I saw the brothers who were humble to the Believers and hard upon the infidels. I saw brothers preferring poverty for themselves. I saw brothers rising in the night and fasting in the day. I saw brothers who loved one another. I saw brothers who possessed the qualities of goodness and piety: a great thing.
Amongst the beautiful qualities I perceived in them was following the guidance of Shari’ah in their Jihadist lives and in their dealings with their enemies. I felt a life of happiness and spiritual ease despite the fact I was far from my family and loved ones, but believe Allah Who says: “He who forsakes his home in the cause of Allah, finds in the earth many a refuge, wide and spacious: should he die as a refugee from home for Allah and His messenger, his reward becomes due and sure with Allah: and Allah is oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.”And believe the words of the Messenger of Allah, صلى الله عليه وسلم, when he said: “You must wage Jihad in the cause of Allah Almighty and Blessed, for it is one of the gates of Paradise by which Allah banishes concern and sorrow” (1). For rest; all rest, is to be found in jihad fi sabeel Allah to elevate the Word of Allah Almighty in order to achieve the desired dream and aspiration.
Finally, I advise myself and my brothers to praise Allah and thank Him for what he has bestowed upon us to serve His Deen. By Allah, how many of the deprived and the idle are shown that, in Jihad, it is Allah from whom we seek aid. And, my brothers, we must beseech from Allah steadfastness and dedication and that He destine for us Martyrdom head on and not from behind.
(1) Narated by Ahmad in his Musnad 23094
Translated From Sada al-Malahim Magazine Issue #15
NOTE: Click here for the entire issue of AQAP’s most recent release of its magazine Ṣadā al-Malāḥim. Below is ‘Umar al-Jawfī’s “The Ḥūthīs And The Coming Project” unedited from the translation provided at the Anṣār al-Mujāhidīn English Forum.
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At a time when the throats of the Rafidites from the Houthi sect were becoming hoarse from shouting from above the military vehicles that they had seized from the lackey Ali Saleh’s army and ringing out “Death to America! Death to Israel!”, there was another voice in London declaring in a sound bite – with implications that will not be uttered by the lackey Arab rulers – and saying with all confidence “The war with the Houthis in northern Yemen has ended”.This was none other than American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. The matter required only a few days before the Houthi Abdul Malek revealed the existence of a cease-fire initiative which had been put in force – with all speed – by all parties: Ali Saleh, the house of al-Saud and the Houthis.
So how can we therefore understand Houthi slogans which are hostile to America and Israel? In exchange for these slogans, Hillary Clinton has made a handsome proposal to the Houthis, as it is known that a cease-fire initiative works to the advantage of the Houthis more than any other party?
Upon swift contemplation, every rational person understands the truth which the Houthis attempt to conceal behind their deceptive slogans and statements is that their plan is completely contrary to their shining declarations and that they have never been opposed to America or Israel. To prove this fact: can the Houthis show us one case in which they harmed a single American or Israeli, let alone killed him? Can their media show us a picture of one bullet they have fired against an American or Israeli target at this time when global networks are conveying images of those who truly are carrying death to America and Israel? If the Houthis were threatening Israel and America with death, why then have American aircraft and missiles of death not pursued them in Maran, al-Talah and other areas of Sa’da and Safyan? I think everyone knows those whom America really pursues with its missiles of destruction and lava of death because they; simply put, threaten it with real death.
The death of America and Israel; therefore, is not a goal of the Houthis, who prefer a plan for successive wars with local authorities and the shabby army.
With a swift review of the most significant and prominent events that have occurred after the cease-fire between the Houthis and the governments of Riyadh and Sanaa, we know why Hillary Clinton stopped the war. After the cease-fire, the Houthis were roaming the markets in Saudi and Yemeni military clothes and rejoicing in victory. And I think that they mean what they say! They mean the continuing triumph of their project, but this time the victory is greater, wider and more comprehensive. They continued in their plan to control the mosques of the Ahl al-Sunna by seizing pulpits and Friday sermons; and performing what they call sarkha, or chanting their special slogans after prayers, and hanging their posters which preach their ideas and false; Rafidite ideology. If these acts are not countered by the rejection or cessation on the part of the Imam of the mosque and his group then the only solution is force of arms. This incident has been repeated more than once, and has been verified by reliable eye-witnesses in Sa’da and Jawf. Indeed, in one case, they were not content with killing the Sunni imam of the mosque, but also destroyed his home and expelled his family! All the children of al-Jawf know the story of Zubnullah, may Allah have mercy on him.
After the cease-fire had taken effect and after the Houthis had a quick breather, the battles against the tribes loyal to the state began. In the past, Ali Saleh had used these tribes in the war against the Houthis and then abandoned them as an easy victim. When the Houthis killed dozens from the bin Aziz tribes loyal to the state, and captured more than 100 soldiers of Ali Saleh along with seizing the al-Za’la military base with all its equipment and ordnance; Ali Saleh stressed his commitment to peace, the cease-fire and calming the situation; forgetting those tribes who were his allies yesterday, and even his soldiers who were taken prisoner in battles which should have been sufficient to detonate a seventh war! It was as if none of this had happened and as if Ali Saleh was saying to those allied with him: this is the reward of those who trust in the “al-Anasi lions” and a warning to those who ally with and trust in the apostate; lackey governments which are only concerned with pleasing the Americans and no else while on the other hand (Saleh) was confirming that the Houthis were continuing with their project which bears no relation at all to their slogans.
Although the cease-fire stipulates the removal of Houthi checkpoints and the opening of roads, the situation remains as it was and even more so with the expansion of the areas under (Houthi) control. Their barracks, which they have taken from schools as places to drill, have spread and their checkpoints cut off roads so they can secure and subjugate the region, especially in the Sunni areas adjacent to their own regions or in which they have a presence. There are many Sunni captives in Houthi prisons who were captured at these checkpoints. The identification of all those who pass these checkpoints is inspected. In the best of cases, and with the intervention of mediators, investigation of identity can last for days – if they are from the tribes. As for others from among the weak of the Ahl al-Sunna, do not ask! These Houthi checkpoints have been used to capture some Mujahideen and deliver them to America’s lackey regime in Sanaa. These brothers are Mashur al-Ahdal al-Husseini al-Hashemi and Hussein al-Tais al-Wa’ili who were captured at a Houthi checkpoint in al-Jawf. They were betrayed after they resisted and clashed with the Houthis. I don’t think Hillary Clinton needs more than that and I think the Americans consider this tantamount to a good turn and mutual acknowledgment; and confirmation of good Houthi intentions towards America and the international community. There is no death to America and they are not sad! Rather there is cooperation and collusion. America, throughout the history of its war on Islam, has found not better and greater cooperation even from Rafidite Shias of Iraq, than they have from my example here.
Therefore, after reviewing some of the recent events after the cease-fire with the Houthis, we can say that the upcoming project of the Houthis is tantamount to a project of “control and expanding influence” in which the Houthis present themselves as the police and the clubs of the Americans in the northern regions against the Mujahideen of the Ahl al-Sunna and the al-Qaeda Organization; and those who aid them, especially after Ali Saleh lost control and lost the trust he was granted by satisfying the Americans. At the same time, the Houthi movement will be one of the throns of Iran in the sides of the Gulf regimes. We understand these dual-loyalties when we view the situation of the Rafidite governments in Iraq throughout the years of the past occupation. (Look) how the Iranian president was received in the Green Zone, as if he was a partner of the Americans in occupying the country. The Americans expressed their repeated displeasure over acts of the Rafidite governments which did not hesitate to provide every kind of service and subordination to both the Iranians and the Americans at the same time. Upon understanding the Rafidite mindset and the way in which they act with that, it is understood that they have no Deen! They are wherever their material interest lies. That is what the Rafidite politician Hasan Zayd declared in an interview on the al-Arabiyah network when he said “The Houthis can never deal with al-Qaeda, but on the other hand they are prepared to deal with the Americans”. He then corrected this slip of the tongue and said, “Of course, when America gives up”. This corroborates the story which tells of great Saudi support for the Houthis in return for war against the “al-Qaeda Organization”. Because if, according to the words of Hasan Zayd, they accept dealing with the American, they will find no shame in the House of al-Saud; their enemies of yesterday. We can therefore understand Obama’s message which was sent through his special envoy in Yemen in which he expressed support for the lackey government in Sanaa against the “al-Qaeda Organization”. He likewise confirmed his complete commitment to the cease-fire in Sa’da.
The coming Houthi project then is a project of control and expansion at the expense of the Ahl al-Sunna in Yemen, and the implicit expansion of false Iranian Rafidite ideology and all it entails of shame, humiliation and disgrace for the Ahl al-Sunna at the hands of the hated Rafidites. I do not think we need a repetition of the tragedy of the Ahl al-Sunna in Iraq, Iran and Lebanon, especially in the shadow of the abandonment by the Islamic movements of arms and the choice of Jihad and confrontation; and the clear treachery of the regional governments who even abandon their allies – after dragging them into the vortex of a grinding war – in order to satisfy America. If this is the project of the Houthis to fulfill the desires of the Americans and Iranians in the region, what then will be the fate of the Ahl al-Sunna if they do not stand in one rank to repel, defend, halt and defeat this project; far removed from those lackey governments who have
NOTE: Jabār al-Fayfī has been lauded for helping tip the Saudis off to the planned parcel plot late last year. I disagree with this assessment since the dates he left Yemen and when the actual plot occurred there was too much lag time where AQAP could have altered there plans. Gregory Johnsen is skeptical of his involvement in breaking up this plot too, who briefly wrote about this most recent confession from al-Fayfī.
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