Three new statements from Jabhat al-Nuṣrah

Three new statements from Jabhat al-Nuṣrah

Minbar at-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād presents four new articles from Shaykh Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī

New statement from Millat Ibrāhīm: "Regarding the Leader Brother Abū Talḥah al-'Almānī (Deso Dogg)"

5UFV2
Arabic:

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لله وحده والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله وعلى آله وصحبه ومن والاه

أما بعد،

قامت بعض الصفحات على الشبكة العنكبوتية بنشر خبر مفاده أن اﻷخ أبا طلحة االألماني قد استشهد في غارة جوية على موقع للجيش الحر..

لذا فإننا تؤكد على الحقائق التالية:

أوﻻ: إن أخانا الحبيب أبو طلحة الألماني ( مغني الراب السابق Deso Dogg) من قادة جماعة ملة إبراهيم ولم ينضم للجيش الحر في يوم من الأيام، وإنما يقاتل جنبا إلى جنب مع إخوانه المجاهدين في سبيل الله.

ثانيا: ﻻ صحة للأخبار التي تحدثت عن مقتل أخينا وننصخ الجميع بالتبين قبل نشر أي خبر.

ثالثا: ما حدث هو تعرض بيت أحد الأخوة اﻷنصار والذي كان يؤوي فيه بعض المهاجرين إلى قصف عنيف بطائرة حربية واخرى مروحية،
نتج عنه اصابة اﻷخ أبو طلحة الألماني وبعض اﻷخوة اﻵخرين ومقتل عدد من أطفال المسلمين ، نسأل الله أن يتغمدهم برحمته.

نسأل الله أن يشفي أخانا وجميع إخواننا المصابين وأن يعوض إخواننا اﻷنصار خيرا مما فقدوه
وأن يفك أسر إخواننا ومشايخنا المأسورين

والحمد لله رب العالمين

إخوانكم في

جماعة ملة إبراهيم
الإثنين 3 ذو القعدة 1434 هـ
الموافق
09/09/2013

German:
Bismillahi Rahmani Rahim
Alles Lob gebührt Allah und der Segen und Frieden seien auf dem Siegel aller Propheten sowie auf seine Familie und Gefنhrten
Um fortzufahren
Einige Internetseiten haben die Nachricht verbreitet, dass unser Bruder und Mujahid Abu Talha Al-Almani bei einem Luftangriff auf einer Stellung der freien Syrischen Armee (FSA) getِtet wurde.
Dazu mِchten wir folgende unterstreichen:
Erstens: Unser geliebter Bruder Abu Talha Al-Almani (Ex-Gangster Rapper Deso Dogg) ist einer der Anfuehrer der Gruppe von Millatu Ibrahim und hat sich kein Tag der freien syrischen Armee (FSA) angeschlossen. Vielmehr kنmpft er Seite an Seite mit den Mujahidin auf Allahs Weg.
Zweitens: Die Nachrichten ueber die Tِtung des Bruders sind unwahr und wir raten allen sich bei jedem Geruecht zu vergewissern.
Drittens: Was geschehen war, ist dass ein Haus eines Ansari, der Muhajirin bei sich aufgenommen hatte, von einem Kampfjet und ein Helikopter angegriffen wurde. Dies fuehrte dazu, dass einige Brueder verletzt wurden, darunter unser geehrte Bruder Abu Talha Al-Almani sowie der Tِtung von mehreren Kindern. Wir bitten Allah, dass Er mit ihnen barmherzig ist. Ebenso bitten wir Allah, dass Er unseren Bruder und all unseren verletzten Bruedern heilt, unsere Brueder die Ansar besseres erstzt und unsere Gefangenen befreit.
Und unser letztes Bittgebet lautet
Alhamdulillah Rabbil Alamin

Eure Brueder von

Millatu Ibrahim


الإثنين 3 ذو القعدة 1434 هـ
09/09/2013
المصدر : (مركز صدى الجهاد للإعلام)
الجبهة الإعلامية الإسلامية العالمية
رَصدٌ لأخبَار المُجَاهدِين وَ تَحرِيضٌ للمُؤمِنين
_______________

To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]

Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad: The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham’s Messages and Self-Presentation in Syria and Iraq

NOTE: An archive of the Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad column can now be found here.

The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham’s Messages and Self-Presentation in Syria and Iraq

By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Click here for a PDF version of this post
As the civil war in Syria continues to rage on, it is apparent that the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) in Syria has enjoyed a degree of success that the group’s counterparts in Iraq have never been able to achieve. For example, ISIS controls a number of towns and villages in Syria, most notably on the border areas with Turkey, such as Jarabulus in Aleppo province and ad-Dana in Idlib. Further, even where ISIS is not the main faction in charge, the group has engaged in outreach to locals through providing social services that resemble what my colleague Phillip Smyth terms the mechanisms of a “proto-state.”
This phenomenon most notably encompasses the provision of food aid, with ISIS even having introduced a formal rationing system of basic necessities in some Aleppo suburbs. In the rural Aleppo town of Manbij, ISIS is currently attempting to gain a monopoly on the means of bread-production in the town, sparking a dispute with the local council.
Elsewhere, particularly in towns where ISIS is the dominant faction (dubbed “emirates”- such as the “Emirate of Jarabulus”), the group goes beyond provision of food to running schools for children. From Raqqa, ISIS recently released a video of Qur’an recitation classes for children in the mosques.
The consequence of this level of control is that in images and videos put out by ISIS, its supporters and sympathizers within Syria, the wider ideological agenda of the group is made much more apparent than within Iraq. Thus, below one can see a number of images from Syria circulated among pro-ISIS circles that openly affirm the goal of establishing a Caliphate, which should eventually encompass the entire world.
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Figure 1: A photo of a pro-ISIS rally in the Aleppo area released by an unofficial pro-ISIS media network called “State of the Caliphate.” The placard reads: “Islam: Political Justice. Islam: Economic Justice. Islam: Societal Justice. State of the Caliphate: God’s Shari’a on Earth.”
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Figure 2: An image that can be found circulating on pro-ISIS social media pages from Syria, depicting the entire Earth under the banner of ISIS.
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Figure 3: An image circulated among some pro-ISIS activists (e.g. in Idlib). The provinces of the more immediate “State of the Caliphate” are as follows: the Iberian Peninsula is Andalusia, northwest and west Africa the Maghreb, central and east Africa the Land of Abyssinia, Egypt the “Arḍ al-Kenana,” the Levant ash-Sham, and the Arabian Peninsula excluding Yemen (which retains its name) is the Hejaz. Iraq likewise retains its name, but the existence of a Kurdistan province to the north alongside Anatolia is included. Iran (with the exception of Ahwaz in the southwest) and Central Asia become Khorasan, while southeastern Europe as far as Vienna is the province of Europe. Southern Russia forms the Caucasus.
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Figure 4: A mural from the ISIS-controlled town of Jarabulus (Emirate of Jarabulus) on the northern border with Turkey in Aleppo Governorate. The logo on the left, with the ISIS banner in the middle of it, reads: “The Caliphate: Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham.”
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Figure 5: A photo from an ISIS video in May of a youth training camp the group was running in the Abu Kamal area along the border with Iraq. The children are wearing T-shirts with the logo: “The Cadets of the Caliphate.”
Video evidence paints a similar picture. Indeed, even when there was only Jabhat al-Nusra, in localities where the group has had a long-established presence, one could find rallies for a Caliphate, such as this video from the Idlib town of Binnish. In a similar vein, from the Aleppo area of Tariq al-Bab, which has a strong ISIS presence, one can find regular rallies for an Islamic state and/or Caliphate. For example, here is a rally from mid-July set to the nasheed ‘Labbayka Islam’– a well-known nasheed for the Caliphate also used in Hizb-ut-Tahrir circles.
Likewise, in one of ISIS’ da’wah meetings that have now become a familiar sight in the Aleppo suburbs, one of the ISIS muhajireen explains that they have come in order to establish an Islamic state in Arḍ ash-Sham as an extension to an Islamic state in Iraq that is currently fighting the Safavid government and army. In the Aleppo town of Manbij, which ISIS shares with some other battalions, a preacher for ISIS gave a lengthy sermon in the town’s grand mosque on the need for the establishment of a Caliphate, explaining it as an all-embracing system of economics, governance and justice, while denouncing rival concepts like democracy, a secular state and nationalism.
Arguably most significant are the official ISIS videos released by al-Furqān media, as part of two series entitled “Those who believe, emigrate and wage jihad” and “Messages from Arḍ al-Melāḥam [Syria].” From the first, we have the video of ISIS’ martyred French convert Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Faransi, who speaks in an interview of the need to fight jihad in Syria and restore the Caliphate. The second series is widely advertised on jihadi forums, as shown by the photo distributed below:
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Figure 6: “Messages from Arḍ al-Melāḥam.”
The fighter shown in Figure 6 is an interviewee in one of these videos. His accent most likely indicates origin in the Iraq-Syria border areas. Going by the nom de guerre of Abu Omar al-Anṣārī, he is said to have taken part in the ISIS-led assault on Mannagh airbase in rural Aleppo. He is also described in the video caption as the eldest fighter for ISIS, noting in the video that he is 75 years old.
Among his children, four ended up becoming mujahideen, and one of them was imprisoned in Iraq by the Americans. He says: “I came to jihad because jihad is farḍ al-ayn [a duty incumbent on all Muslims]…I hope for martyrdom with my children.” Expanding on ISIS’ wider vision, he explains:
“God, give victory to Islam, give victory to the mujahideen…over all the enemies of the mujahideen…God give the mujahideen victory in every place….in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Somalia, Mali, Iraq, Pakistan and in every place…My age and elderliness are not a problem…Fighting [jihad] will always be until the Day of Judgment…God willing, when we are victorious in this land [Bilad ash-Sham], we will complete the errand to establish an Islamic state over the whole world. It is necessary for the Islamic state to be established by the permission of God- Almighty and Exalted is He- over the whole world, and it [jihad etc.] is not only in Bilad ash-Sham. For if we are victorious here, it will be guaranteed in the rest of the land, God willing” (emphasis in bold).
The vision outlined is entirely consistent with what the al-Qa’ida leadership, fighters and supporters have stated on past occasions:
Richard Dawkins: Do you want Islam to take over the rest of the world?
Yousef al-Khattab: Of course I want it to, and it will.

(From an interview conducted by Richard Dawkins for the documentary “The Root of All Evil?” with Yousef al-Khattab, who would go on to found the pro-al-Qa’ida site RevolutionMuslim.com).
You’ll see that the Muslim war has just started…until Islam is spread throughout the whole world.
(Videotape of failed Times Square bomber Faisal Shahzad, released by Umar Media and obtained by al-Arabiya).
Alright, i [sic] wont [sic] go into too much details about me [sic] fantasy, but basically they are jihad fantisies [sic]. I imagine how the great jihad will take place, how the muslims will win insha Allah and rule the whole world, and establish the greatest empire once again!!!
(From a 2005 forum posting by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who tried to bomb a flight en route to Detroit on Christmas Day 2009)
Or, as one Egyptian supporter of ISIS put it to me in response to the UK’s designation of the mujahideen as the greatest security threat from Syria: “I love it when the Fish & Chips Folks exaggerate. Their [the mujahideen’s] focus is on Bashar for now. Their [the British people’s] time will eventually

Hizballah Cavalcade: Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada Emerges: Updates on the New Iraqi Shia Militia Supplying Fighters to Syria

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada Emerges: Updates on the New Iraqi Shia Militia Supplying Fighters to Syria
By Phillip Smyth ([email protected])
Click here for a PDF version of this post
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Figure 1: A KSS member salutes the group’s flag.
When Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS) first announced their presence to the world, little was known about the organization, its leadership, or its force size. Funerals the group held for three of its fallen fighters in May not only announced the group’s existence, but also pointed to a strong link with Iran. However, following these funerals, little was heard from the group. Nevertheless, it would appear that starting in August the organization has fully redeveloped its messaging and online propaganda. This campaign has included well-organized and professional group funerals for members killed fighting in Syria, brand new and far-less amateurish imagery, and the introduction of some more unique features in KSS’s propaganda. Even the group’s uniforms have undergone a type of remake, featuring the KSS’s logo and patches showing their fighter’s commitments to “Defending Sayydiah Zaynab”.
The group has also been more open when it came to the numbers of its fighters deployed to Syria. In an Al-Sharqiya interview held with KSS’s information office, the group claimed to have sent 500 members to Syria.[1] Public announcements by the group have also established that since July, KSS has deployed a number of combat units to more rural zones around Damascus, particularly the frontlines in East Ghouta.
Additionally, via official websites belonging to the Badr Organization Military Wing, it is possible that a closer relationship exists between KSS and the Badr Organization. Since Badr did not announce its involvement in Syria until July, 2013, this may be a signal that KSS was used as a front group to send Badr fighters to Syria.
In terms of a social media presence, KSS has tried to reinvent itself. When the group’s more private group page was removed from Facebook, the organization simultaneously established a new Facebook page and more private profiles to disseminate photos and other information about the group. Since August, KSS has posted 1-4 unique new photographs of their activities in Syria. Additionally, other pro-Shia militia-in-Syria Facebook pages have re-posted their photographs.
Social media stature aside, the group’s rapid public growth, increased professionalism, combat deployments, and growing presence in Iraq—beyond its original base in Basra, demonstrates KSS as a rapidly growing Shia militia force. It is likely KSS will continue to announce its militant activities in Syria.
The Fighters
The fighters of Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada appear to be uniformed with clear identifiable insignia. The combatants carry arms which are familiar to other Shia militia groups, particularly the PKM machine gun, RPG-7s, Kalashnikov-type assault rifles, and the popular SVD-style sniper rifle. KSS fighters have also been photographed with anti-material sniper rifles.
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Figure 2: A KSS fighter with a customized Kalashnikov-type rifle and an SVD style sniper rifle.
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Figure 3: A KSS fighter poses with a mortar.
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Figure 4: A KSS fighter poses on rubble with an SVD style sniper rifle. Note the KSS logo patch.
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Figure 5: A KSS fighter holds an RPG-7.
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Figure 6: KSS fighters pose with a PKM machine gun.
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Figure 7: A small unit of KSS fighters holding a mixture of Kalashnikov type rifles, an SVD style sniper rifle, and a PKM machine gun
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Figure 8: This KSS fighter appears to be holding a Steyr HS .50 style,  .50 caliber bolt action anti-material sniper rifle. The rifle could also be an Iranian copy of the HS .50.
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Figure 9: Diya Issawi’s brother (left), pictured in a white turban of commonly found with Shia clerics. He was listed by KSS
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Figure 10: KSS members “Enjoy a simple modest lunch”. This photo was issued by the group to demonstrate the humility of their fighters.
The KSS’s New Martyrs
On August 20, a main Facebook page which publishes information about Shia militia operations and deaths in Syria, claimed that Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada was operating in East Ghouta. During their operations in the area, the page reported three fighters as killed-in-action, with another five missing (listed in the post as, “Fate unknown”).
On August 24, KSS released eight martyrdom announcements in the form of more professionally designed graphics. The photographs were first released on the KSS and then the Badr Organization Military Wing’s official Facebook page. The posted images presumably show the eight fighters who were killed or who were missing in East Ghouta, in Rif Dimashq. It is important to note that on August 21, East Ghouta was also the reported as the scene of the deadliest chemical weapons attack within Syria.[2] According to American Military University’s In Homeland Security Blog chief correspondent and chemical weapons expert, William Tucker, it is possible these KSS fighters were, “bracketing the kill box”.[3] Meaning, they had generally surrounded the area where the chemical weapons were used and then attacked any Syrian rebel elements which may have tried to breakout.
However, a video emerged on September 1st showing some of the KSS fighters being killed in an assault by rebel forces.  A longer video of the engagement was released on September 7th. The KSS fighters were reportedly stationed in what rebels referred to as a train station in East Ghouta. This would suggest that some of the KSS fighters may have been guarding transportation links in the area.
** Warning: Graphic Imagery **

In the video, it is clear to see that KSS fighters openly wear the insignia for their organization during combat operations. Some KSS and possibly Hizballah fighters are shown with Shia Islamic paraphernalia. One card removed from the pocket of a dead fighter featured a stylized photo of the assassinated Hizballah terror-leader, Imad Mughniyeh.[4]
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Figure 11: Eight of the dead KSS members are featured on this poster.
Name: Amir al-Badlawi
Death Announced: September 5, 2013
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Name: Muhammed Radi al-Shumaylawi
Death Announced: August 24, 2013. Funeral held on August 27, 2013.
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Name:  Al-Said Hasan ‘Ali Farhoud al-Furaydawi
Death Announced: August 11, 2013
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Name: Sejjad al-Shibani
Death Announced: August 23, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013, funeral reportedly held on August 27, 2013.
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Name: Walid al-‘Abudi
Death Announced: August 23, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013.
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Name: ‘Ali Hamza al-Deraghi al-Sadiqi
Death Announced: August 23, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013, funeral reportedly held on August 27, 2013.
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Figure 12: Sadiqi is shown in a car with what may be another KSS member and a Kalashnikov style rifle.
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Figure 13: An official KSS release of Sadiqi with other KSS fighters.
Name: Zulfiqar al-Raseetmawi
Death Announced: August 25, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013, funeral reportedly held on August 27, 2013.
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Name: Muhammed ‘Abd al-Husayn al-Faridawi
Death Announced: August 25, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013, funeral reportedly held on August 27, 2013.
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Name: Ala al-Ka’bi
Death Announced: August 23, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013, funeral reportedly held on August 27, 2013.
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Name: Watheq Hashem al-‘Anzi
Death Announced: August 23, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013, funeral reportedly held on August 27, 2013.
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Figure 14: An officially produced martyrdom post
Name: ‘Ali Sami al-Zubaydi
Death Announced: August 23, 2013, reportedly killed on August 20, 2013, funeral reportedly held on August 27, 2013.
Notes: Zubaydi was one of the few KSS dead who had other photos of him in Syria uploaded to a number of pro-Shia militia