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Copyright © 2010-2014 Aaron Y. Zelin and Jihadology.net. All Rights Reserved. Unauthorized use and/or duplication of original material without express and written permission from this blog’s author is strictly prohibited. Content may be used, provided that full and clear credit is given to Aaron Y. Zelin and Jihadology.net with appropriate and specific direction to the original content.

Minbar al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād presents a new article from Shaykh Muḥammad bin Ṣāliḥ al-Muhājir: “Summary On the Discussions Of the Announcement Of the Caliphate”

munaqashah

Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Muḥammad bin Ṣāliḥ al-Muhājir — “Summary On the Discussions Of the Announcement Of the Caliphate”

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Source: http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=29081402

To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: azelin@jihadology.net

 

Minbar al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād presents a new article from Shaykh Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī: “Remarks On the Notes Of Shaykh Abū Basīr”

malhozat

Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī — “Remarks On the Notes Of Shaykh Abū Basīr”

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Source: http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=29081401

To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: azelin@jihadology.net

 

New video message from Himam News Agency: “Report 94: Tour With the Relief Team Of Jabhat al-Nuṣrah In Dwairke and Majdal Kikh – Rural al-Ladhāqīyyah (Latakia)”

NOTE: For previous parts in this video series see: #93#92#91#90#89#88#87#86#85#84#83#82#81#80#79#78#77#76#75#74#73#72#71#70#69#68#67#66#65#64#63#62#61#60#59#58#57#56#55#54#53#52#51#50#49#48#47#46#45#44#43#42#41#40#39#38#37#36#35#34#33#32#31#30#29#28#27#26#25#24#23#22#21#20#19#18#17#16#15#14#13#12#11#10#9#8#7#6#5#4#3#2, and #1.

zJhr8Ybv

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Source: https://twitter.com/Hemm_Agency/status/504736513666863104

To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: azelin@jihadology.net

 

New article from Dr. Iyād Qunaybī: “Was Gaza Victorious?”

إلى الإخوة الذين يقولون: هل انتصرت غزة؟

  • صمود شعبها أكثر من خمسين يوما محتسبين عند الله القتل والإصابات وهدم المنازل فيما نحسبهم راضين صابرين دون أن يرضخوا لليهود رغم ذلك كله

  • الذل والهوان والخوف الذي أصاب اليهود، وسقوط هيبة جيشهم وانهزام روحهم المعنوية وفشل لأهدافهم التي وضعوها لحربهم وتحول قبتهم الحديدية إلى أضحوكة!

  • فشل تآمر الأنظمة في بلاد المسلمين، والتي دعمت الحرب على مسلمي غزة ماليا واستخباراتيا وافتضاح أمرها

  • فشل الدعم الأمريكي وتسليحه للصهاينة

  • ارتفاع الروح المعنوية لدى المسلمين ورؤيتهم نموذجا من فئة قليلة مستضعفة بلا مقومات ولا موارد تأخذ بالأسباب المادية قدر الاستطاعة فتحقق ما لم تحققه الجيوش الجرارة

كل هذه أمور يُفرح بها ولا ينبغي التهوين من شأنها، ويمكن اعتبارها نصرا نسبيا.

لكن هل الفرحة كاملة غير مشوبة؟

بل يشوبها أمور منها:

- ظهور قيادة السلطة والقيادة المصرية في صورة التفاوض وضمان تنفيذ الشروط وكأنهما مسهمان في النصر مؤتمنان على ثماره ! والجميع يعلم ما كان لهما من دور ! فمن المخيف تصور أن تقطف “السلطة” الثمرة بعد ذلك كله، ولا تغرنا أبدا تحركاتها الموهمة باستقلالية قرارها فضلا عن علمانيتها وسجلها المعروف في خدمة النظام الدولي وتنفيذ أجنداته!

- المآخذ القديمة الحديثة على حركة حماس كموقفها من الديمقراطية وسيادة الشريعة وتحالفاتها واللهجة الوطنية المعترفة بحركة فتح وقياداتها. لكن قرائن حال مقاتلي القسام الذين رأينا منهم التضحية والصبر على قتل نسائهم وأبنائهم تجعلنا نرجو من الله تعالى أن يكرمهم بتعديل المسار ولا يكل الحركة إلى نفسها في قابل الأيام. ووجود هذه المآخذ المهمة لا يسوغ التقليل من شأن ما حققه مجاهدو غزة. بل يتوجب التواصي معهم بتدارك الخلل ونصرتهم في جهادهم المشروع والاستفادة من تجربتهم بدراسة عوامل النصر التي أخذوا بها لتدارك ساحات الجهاد الأخرى.

- دندنة “الوسطاء” و”الرعاة” للاتفاقيات حول “الهدنة الدائمة” و”الحل الجذري” و”التسوية”، والتي تدفع باتجاه الاعتراف بالكيان الصهيوني، الأمر الذي يتطلب من مجاهدي غزة الإصرار على لغة مواصلة الجهاد لئلا تتسرب مصطلحات التسوية إلى نفوس الناس شيئا فشيئا.

ومع هذا كله، ومع خوفنا مما ستسفر عنه الأيام، إلا أن واجب المسلمين نصرة غزة ومسلمي فلسطين عموما، لا الاقتصار على النقد والتحليل وتوقع الزلل، ولا تحميل الثلة المجاهدة والشعب الصامد بغزة ما لا يحتملون والتعويل عليهم أن ينتصروا وحدهم انتصارا شاملا في مواجهة كيد الصهاينة والنظام الدولي وأذنابهما في بلاد المسلمين.

نسأل الله تعالى أن يلطف بأهلنا في غزة وينصرهم على عدوهم وينقي مناهجهم ويسدد رأيهم ويصوب رميهم ويعيننا على نصرتهم.

والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله.

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Source: https://justpaste.it/guiv

To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: azelin@jihadology.net

 

GUEST POST: Manbij and The Islamic State’s Public Administration

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.

Click here to see an archive of all guest posts.

Manbij and The Islamic State’s Public Administration

By Goha’s Nail

Originally posted here and republished below at the request of the author.

iscourt

I recently had the opportunity to speak to a friend in Manbij, a small city in Aleppo of about 100,000 (pre-war) under exclusive Islamic State (IS) control since January 2014 (when the organization was still ISIS). He told me about how IS cadres were administering the city and about what Manbijis think about the new political order. These conversations took place in homes and among family and friends, far from prying IS members seeking to police every aspect of life. These conversations gives us some insight into how IS is doing with their administration of territories under their control and why civilians accept or reject them. Given the similarities between Manbij and other areas under IS rule in Syria, it is likely that many of these dynamics are at play elsewhere.

These accounts give us an idea of how difficult it will be to counter the IS, but also how feebly the organisation commands the obedience of its new subjects. Importantly, these conversations reveal some of the mechanisms that make partnering with the al-Asad regime to counter IS a terrible idea.

What do people think IS doing?

This section won’t focus on what IS is doing to govern but rather what Manbijis seem to think IS is doing. In Manbij, people see that the IS is “getting comfortable,” and that the trappings of statehood appear stronger every day. The IS public administration includes several types of police, courts and administrative bodies. The group provides services and undertakes development projects. IS collects taxes in the form of zakat and redistributes some of the money to the poor. Among the recipients of the aid are internally displaced persons, who now account for at least half of the city’ population. Recently, IS has begun shipping fuel from fields it recently captured in Dayr al-Zawr province and selling it at fixed discounted rates in Aleppo.

A key part of IS’ ability to govern is that the system is comprehensive. IS focuses on policing, on its harsh version of justice, and on public administrative functions. Courts are fast and efficient. The administration can move quickly to repair water lines or fix electricity towers, all in full coordination with the Islamic Police and IS fighters. Everything is coordinated and the different parts of the administration are linked, share information, and generally seem good at working together. But not everything is within the IS administration. Other historically non-state governance mechanisms embedded in social networks like dispute resolution and contract enforcement still exist, but IS is always looking to coopt them. Certain administrative and service functions also continue to operate as before, but under IS supervision.

The comprehensiveness of the IS system stands in contrast to governance in other rebel-held areas of the province, where the administration is uncoordinated and the burden is shared by an array of councils, sharia courts, armed groups and policing bodies, many of which do not get along and all of which are underresourced.

Also in contrast to other rebel-held cities, crime in Manbij is very low. Three elements of the criminal justice system are worth highlighting here, two of which have gotten less attention in the media. It’s obvious that the group is sadistically harsh in its punishment of crime. But the harshness is only part of the deterrent. The other elements are that it is consistent – and therefore predictable – and that it is effective. It is consistent because Manbijis feel confident that if you just follow IS’ rules, then you will be ok. It is effective because few crimes go unpunished (reportedly). Of course, the arbitrariness of some crimes like sorcery or cursing religion and the difficulty of knowing the real rate of crime force us to take both of these claims with a grain of salt. Nonetheless, the perceptions are there and shape Manbijis’ feelings about the IS administration.

Lastly, many Manbijis have noticed the group focusing more recently on schools and education, and has started providing salaries to teachers. Schools focus on religious education and science, the purposes of which are to indoctrinate youngsters and to inculcate them with the skills they will need someday to deploy explosives and fight.

What are Manbijis’ assessments of IS rule?

Manbijis agree that IS has provided badly needed security and stability to the city. When IS consolidated eastern Aleppo province after the January 2014 fighting with other brigades, it brought an end to the lawlessness and insecurity that was common when IS shared the administration with other rebel groups. For this, Manbijis are grateful; not necessarily to the IS, but just generally for the situation.

Many Manbijis are not, therefore, enthusiastic about the prospect of other rebel groups retaking the area from IS. They understand that the fighting could tear the city apart and force people to flee, with many becoming refugees for the second or third time. In addition, they see the other rebel groups as either less interested in or less capable of establishing an effective public administration that provides security and public services. Residents also fear that other rebel groups would not be able to hold the city and that IS would take revenge on the residents once it returned, eliminating whole families for their perceived collusion against the organisation. Finally, residents are grateful that IS rule has meant fewer of the regime airstrikes that have plagued other rebel-held towns and villages and devastated Aleppo city. However, few people are positive about the group’s ideology.

But Manbijis are not united in these opinions. Debates rage among family members and friends in the privacy of their homes about whether IS is a positive or negative force. No one complains about the stability the group has brought, but the prospect of living under a totalitarian theocracy does not excite many, especially women. Although Manbijis are conservative, the culture of IS is seen as alien; Manbijis, like anyone else, enjoy their festive weddings, their music, their shisha, their cigarettes, and everything else that makes them who they are and they are upset that IS is intent on destroying these aspects of their identity.

Another concern for some is the longevity of the group and what happens when the regime is defeated. Many do not believe that IS’ harsh model of governance is sustainable and that an uprising against it is inevitable. Some therefore see the stability that group provides as delaying the inevitable. The logic is that for the time being, IS thrives on the existence of the regime, but not in the conspiratorial sense. Rather, the existence of the regime continues to alienate many sunnis and generates support for IS, especially now that the group is more actively attacking the government. But if the regime falls, many expect the violent contestation of IS’ political and social vision, a development many Manbijis fear will visit destruction on their city.

For the time being, Manbijis are paying something of a price for their tentative comfort with IS rule. Elsewhere in the province, other Aleppans have begun to resent Syrians living comfortably under IS rule. “Shabbihat Da’ish,” they call them, “shabbiha” being a term used to refer to regime thugs and “Da’ish” a derogatory term for IS.

How do locals fit into the governance equation?

But how do locals fit into IS’ governance scheme? Apparently, they don’t participate actively in the IS public administration. IS seems reluctant to integrate potentially less committed members too closely. While some IS administrators are Syrians, many are foreigners. For their part, Manbijis are keen on keeping the group at arms length; they appreciate some aspects of IS governance, but do not want to get too close. They expect, however, that the IS focus on education and indoctrination of children is part of a long-term strategy to more closely link the group with the populations it governs.

Conclusion

So what does this tell us? First, it is clear that the reasons Manbijis tentatively appreciate and support IS are tied to the Syrian conflict context. Manbijis do not just appreciate the security IS provides, they appreciate this security compared totheir experiences before IS took over and with what they hear about what is happening in other parts of the country. They do not support IS because they believe in its cause. They would not choose IS rule if given the choice of other alternatives. IS is, for the time being, taking care of Manbijis’ most basic needs, a welcome respite from the grinding civil war that has destroyed much of the country.

Second, it appears that IS will have trouble integrating with the communities they are seeking to rule. IS predecessor organizations have generally been terrible at governing and have always alienated their subjects. This seems to hold true in Manbij as well, despite some of the changes the group has made to govern better and provide citizens with more resources and services. Current support for IS appears tenuous and too tied to fluid conflict conditions to be sustainable. There is a deep political, ideological and cultural divide between the IS administration and regular people. Manbijis acknowledge do not believe they will put up with IS’ draconian rules forever. Through interactions at home and in social settings, they will mitigate some of the indoctrination their children receive at school. In short, eastern Syrians will not allow IS to stamp out their culture.

Finally, these accounts also tell us that the idea of partnering with the al-Asad regime to counter IS is horribly misguided. The perception that IS is bad and full of murderers is common, but so is the feeling that IS fighters are “giving their souls” to fight the regime, which is hated more. Throwing support behind that regime would only strengthen the latter perception at the expense of the former. It would inflame the sectarianism that IS thrives on, driving more Syrians to support IS and helping the group integrate with the populations it is seeking to win over. It would also significantly assist IS local recruitment efforts, further grounding the organisation within the social fabric of the areas it seeks to govern. The more IS is able to convert anti-al-Asad sentiment into real support for its ideology, the more intractable it will become.

Minbar al-Tawḥīd wa-l-Jihād presents a new Fatwā from Shaykh Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī: “What Is the Definition Of (Brothers Of the Manhaj) and the Ruling Of the Violating Mujāhidīn Of the Manhaj?”

almanhaj

Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī — “What Is the Definition Of (Brothers Of the Manhaj) and the Ruling Of the Violating Mujāhidīn Of the Manhaj?”

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Source: http://www.tawhed.ws/FAQ/display_question?qid=8220&pageqa=1&i=

To inquire about a translation for this fatwā for a fee email: azelin@jihadology.net

 

New statement from Jaysh al-Ummah: “Bombing Erez Crossing With Three 120 Mortar Shells”

Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Jaysh al-Ummah — “Bombing Erez Crossing With Three 120 Mortar Shells”

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Source: https://twitter.com/salfegaza/status/504386890171424768

To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: azelin@jihadology.net

 

Jihadology is a personal project of Aaron Y. Zelin and is not associated with The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Translations

To inquire about translations for a fee email: azelin@jihadology.net

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