
It should have come as no surprise that Seifeddine Rezgui, the individual that attacked tourists in Sousse, Tunisia more than a week ago, had trained at a camp in Libya. The attack represented the continuation of a relationship between Tunisian and Libyan militants that, having intensified since 2011, goes back to the 1980s. The events in Sousse are a stark reminder of this relationship: a connection that is set to continue should The Islamic State (IS) choose to repeat attacks in Tunisia in the coming months.
Brief History on the Tunisian-Libyan Militant Nexus
Although Ennahda did not explicitly call for individuals to fight against the Soviets during the Afghan jihad, they were regularly involved in facilitation and logistical networks that brought Libyans to the region. Additionally, according to Noman Benotman, a former shura council member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Libyans alongside Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the Afghan leader of Ittihad-e-Islami, attempted to help the Tunisians create their own military camp and organization. This would not come to fruition until 2000, when future leaders of Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST), Tarek Maaroufi (based in Brussels) and Sayf Allah Bin Hassine (moved from London to Jalalabad, Afghanistan; also known as Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi) co-founded the Tunisian Combatant Group.
Following the Afghan jihad, many Ennahda members were exiled to Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, by former president Ben Ali. While some returned home, the committed were drawn to the jihadi and foreign fighter networks that had spread across Europe, especially in Milan, Italy. Milan became a central hub for recruitment, logistics, and facilitation of foreign fighters going to the Bosnian war as well as assisting the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in the Algerian jihad. While the Egyptian, Anwar Sha’aban, led the network, the group surrounding him was made up largely of Tunisians and Libyans, with some Algerians and Moroccans, working together. This milieu helped build interesting relationships among the individuals, along with other cells in Europe. One in particular was between Sami Essid bin Khamis, a future leader of AST, and the Libyan Lased Ben Heni, who was based in Frankfurt, who worked together to plan the 2000 Strasbourg Cathedral Plot (along with the London Algerian jihadi network).
Following 9/11, the successor group to the GIA in Algeria was the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC; which would eventually become al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib in 2007). In 2003, Nabil Sahrawi, the leader at the time, was attempting to regionalize the jihad beyond Algerian borders and emphasize recruitment from Tunisia and Libya. While the organization was still dominated by Algerians, the Tunisians and Libyans worked together in GSPC’s ‘Zone 5,’ which was close to the border with Tunisia and under the banner of El-Fatah El-Moubine. Because of this, there were a number of cases in the mid to late 2000’s where groups of Algerians, Tunisians, and Libyans would get arrested together, either on the Algerian or Tunisian side of their respective borders. In many ways, this formation was a precursor to the now AQIM splinter group, Katibat ‘Uqba ibn Nafi (KUIN) based in the Chaambi Mountains on the Tunisian-Algerian border. Around the same time, GSPC networks in Algeria and remnant LIFG networks in Libya were providing logistics and facilitation to fighters going to Iraq in the mid-2000s to fight with al-Qaeda (the precursor to IS). There were a number of routes that Tunisians took to get to Iraq, but one was through the Libyan support networks, which was a reversal of the 1980’s trend. Here many relationships were forged, which would be important after 2011 since a number of Iraq jihad veterans then became involved with AST, Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (ASL), and then eventually The Islamic State in Libya. One such case was Abu Radwan al-Tunisi, from Bizerte, who came to Iraq via Libya and eventually died fighting the Badr Brigades.
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Category: The Islamic State
GUEST POST: ISIS and the Hollywood Visual Style
NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
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ISIS and the Hollywood Visual Style
By Cori E. Dauber and Mark Robinson
The slick production techniques ISIS uses in its propaganda are the reason people have written about their videos as “Hollywood quality” or “like Hollywood movies.” Obviously this is not, strictly speaking, true. When people write about ISIS videos being like “Hollywood action films,” they don’t mean that in a literal sense – Hollywood blockbusters, after all, cost on average several hundreds of millions of dollars to produce. But that doesn’t mean people saying that aren’t onto something. They’re seeing something in ISIS videos that is reminiscent of Hollywood films that they don’t see in the videos of other groups. Yes, ISIS videos are of far higher quality than are those of other groups – we would say they are, technically, a generation ahead of most others. But there’s something else going on here that people are cueing on. We would argue that, visually, ISIS videos mimic what could be called a “Hollywood visual style.” And this is being done so systematically and carefully that, while its entirely possible that it’s accidental, we find that very unlikely.
While there has been a great deal of work done on the way ISIS uses Social Media to distribute their materials, our focus is on the content of their output, specifically, on their visual material. We believe this focus is important for a number of reasons, not the least of which is the enormous amount of empirical research that argues that visual material, in many contexts, can actually be more powerful than textual. That is to say, the image can trump the word: it more effectively draws the viewer’s attention, it is remembered more accurately and for a longer period of time.
That’s all well and good, but what specifically does it mean to say that ISIS material is sophisticated in visual terms, or that their videos are done in a “Hollywood visual style?” While that’s a complicated question to get after, one can start by breaking it down in terms of the way ISIS makes use of some of the compositional elements of production to contribute to the persuasive power of their materials, in a way that other groups either cannot or simply do not. We’ll directly contrast some of their videos with some of Jabhat al Nusrah’s to make the point.
- What the viewer will notice first: the opening graphics package and the clarity of the image.
ISIS employs “industry standards” for video. That doesn’t necessarily mean standard for Hollywood, it might mean what you see in commercial video or advertisement, but its what we have become accustomed to seeing, what the eye has become accustomed to for anyone who watches a good bit of professionally shot and uploaded media. Neither of us can speak to what is standard outside of Europe and North America, but it seems worth noting that ISIS is systematically working to use visual standards that will give their videos an underlying professional look to someone whose eye is accustomed to a European or North American industry standard.
This is done through a variety of techniques: for example, through the way they deal with the colors in their videos, by adjusting the range of colors you see. They minimize the color palette that comes across on video so that, for instance, there are fewer variances, fewer “shades of red,” presented in their videos than there were in the physical world seen through the viewfinder when they were filming. The result is that the reds they do show you are more vibrant, brighter, higher contrast, and they come across looking sharper and clearer. Just look at how saturated the colors of the produce are in this frame from one of the Mujatweets Episodes:

This requires planning, both pre-and post-production. Many of their videos were clearly shot by a media team trained (and trained sufficiently) to execute in a “digital age” style. So you see this kind of color saturation, high contrast, and an emphasis on resolution. You also see a shallow depth of field – in other words, there is a tight focus on something or someone, but the rest of the visual field is intentionally out of focus. That’s a good example of what we mean by “Hollywood style.” It points specifically to a contemporary trend set by younger media professionals, but someone who had just randomly picked up a camera certainly wouldn’t know to do that. If you look at the most expensively produced Hollywood films of the 1970s or ‘80s, you won’t see a shallow depth of field, because it’s a fairly recent development. As an example:
When video is shot (and when someone prepares to share it via the web or phone) the video must go through a compression process. This makes the files smaller at the cost of lost resolution and visual impact. Most videos we look at are grainy in part because of this process. Another reason ISIS’ videos read as so crisp and clear relative to those of other groups is that they have been shot more carefully and compressed much more carefully.
In less professional videos, already compressed sequences are put together, then exported through a compressor. These lesser quality videos are thus compressed to a point that they appear amateurish, since they read as if the person who produced them didn’t know or, at least, didn’t care that the resolution drops significantly when videos are prepared this way. This is what creates the grainy, pixelated effect. Think about how you automatically can tell the difference between the professionally shot and prepared footage from a news network and the amateur footage that network pulled from some random guy who just happened to be there with a cellphone camera in his pocket when a newsworthy event took place.
IS videos that are crystal clear suggest that there was a crafting hand behind them, one that was trained and careful.
Earlier videos from AQ and the affiliates paid no attention to contemporary industry principles and standards. More recent videos from ISIS (and more and more from some other groups) mark a clear movement: they are being produced according to knowledge and execution of industry standard in the entire process, from pre- to post-production. It seems clear that their media teams are getting trained somewhere.
There is no question that the content of some of the most recent videos released by JN were substantially better than what had been their baseline. But as often seems to be the case with groups other than ISIS, these major advances do not then override, with the prior, weaker style disappearing. There is not a single, controlling visual style, so that even after videos of much higher quality are released, those videos will then be followed by others that look the same as earlier, weaker releases did.
In this JN video that was released recently, they didn’t really know what they were doing, so they were filming with a non-professional, handy-cam, while moving way too fast:
If we just take a still of the sign you can see why that footage appears to be of low quality. Look at the leaves around the sign, and you can see that the image is actually pixelating.
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As far as graphics are concerned, as software became available making it easier and easier to produce computer-animated graphics, not only did it become commonplace for these videos to begin with animations, they are often now relatively sophisticated even if the accompanying video is of very low quality. Still, ISIS is in a class by themselves here for several reasons: the consistency of the quality, the crisp resolution of almost all of the graphics they use, and, a key factor, the design. Many groups acquired the ability to incorporate animations, but not necessarily any ability to design ones that worked. Often they go on forever, they’re distracting, they’ve got so much going on, the eye can’t figure out where to focus, and so on.
On this measure, JN made enormous leaps forward recently:
It isn’t, by the way, only JN making these leaps. This one from AQAP is hard to miss: its eye-catching, attractive, and likely took several days of work by someone who really knew what they were doing:
But of course groups now insert graphics into the middle of videos, not just at the beginning.
And compare that to the way ISIS uses graphics in the Mujatweets series:
- Composition:
Most ISIS videos appear as if every frame of every shot of every scene has been carefully calculated, thought through, and laid out.
Just consider the stock piece of footage that they use over and over (and that some news networks use as a “visual metaphor” for ISIS): two rows of fighters, one in the black “ninja” outfit, the other row dressed in white, both marching in unison, shot in slow motion and from below. Keep in mind, it is a truism that what is filmed from below will appear larger, more imposing, more authoritative, and so forth. It’s stock footage for them because it came out so well.
Now consider the JN version by way of comparison. You hardly need a communication or media specialist to point out the differences – the outfits don’t match, the editing is jumpy, “professional” is hardly the word that leaps to mind here. But part of the reason it looks this
New statement from Majlis Shūrā al-Mujāhidīn Darnah: "Implementation of the Retribution Upon Some of the Members of the 'State' Involved in [Shedding] Blood of Majlis Shūrā al-Mujāhidīn Darnah"

Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Majlis Shūrā al-Mujāhidīn Darnah — “Implementation of the Retribution Upon Some of the Members of the ‘State’ Involved in [Shedding] Blood of Majlis Shūrā al-Mujāhidīn Darnah”
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New video message from The Islamic State: "The Ramaḍān Atmosphere in Wilāyat al-Khayr"

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New video message from The Islamic State: "They Are the Enemy, So Beware of Them – Wilāyat al-Raqqah"
The title of this release is in reference to Qur’anic verse 63:4. Here it is in full: “And when you see them, their forms please you, and if they speak, you listen to their speech. [They are] as if they were pieces of wood propped up – they think that every shout is against them. They are the enemy, so beware of them. May God destroy them; how are they deluded?”
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[Video redacted, post created for historical record of when it was released]
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New release from Ajnād al-Khilāfah bi-Ifrīqīyyah Media Foundation: "'The Raid of al-Qanṭāwī': The State of Emergency: Enter Upon Them Through the Gate"
The latter part of this release title is in reference to Qur’anic verse 5:23. Here it is in full: “Said two men from those who feared [to disobey] upon whom God had bestowed favor, ‘Enter upon them through the gate, for when you have entered it, you will be predominant. And upon God rely, if you should be believers.'”
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Ajnād al-Khilāfah bi-Ifrīqīyyah Media Foundation — “‘The Raid of al-Qanṭāwī’- The State of Emergency- Enter Upon Them Through the Gate”
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New video message from The Islamic State: "That You May Become Righteous – Wilāyat Nīnawā"
The title of this release is in reference to Qur’anic verses 2:21, 2:63, 2:179, 2:183, 6:153, and 7:171.
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New release from Dr. 'Abd Allah bin Muḥammad al-Muḥaysinī: "The Fifth of Ramaḍān"
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
الحمد لله رب العالمين، والصلاة والسلام على أشرف الأنبياء والمرسلين، رب اشرح لي صدري ويسر لي أمري واحلل عقدة من لساني يفقهوا قولي..
هذا بيان مهم جداً أكتبه نصحا للأمة ليهلك من هلك عن بينه ويحيى من حيّ عن بينه، وأسال الله سبحانه وتعالى أن ينفع به كاتبه وقارئه، وقد تمت ترجمته إلى عدة لغات: الإنجليزية والروسية؛ والفرنسية والتركستانية .. لأهميته للمسلمين عامة وللمجاهدين في أقطار الأرض خاصة، أسميته: (الخامس من رمضان) وذلك لأن هذا اليوم هو يومٌ فارق في المتابعين لهذه القضية أعني: (قضية جماعة البغدادي)..
أما بالنسبة لي: فلم يكن هذا اليوم فارقاً عندي؛ حيث إن الأمر لدي في غاية الوضوح منذ أمد، ولكن ليس من رأى كمن سمع، فهذا اليوم يشكل فارقاً عند كل باحث للحق قد طالت حيرته ولم يتضح له الأمر في شأن (تنظيم البغدادي) لأجل جلد أنصارهم وقوة إصداراتهم، فكلما قلنا عنهم قولاً وبيَّناه للأمة ظهر أنصارهم يردّون وينافحون، مدعّمين ذلك بإصداراتهم القوية، فحار المستمع وقال: القضية بين طرفين، وقول الطرف لا بد له من بيّنة! وبدأ يبحث عن البينات، فجاءوه بادّعاءات ملفقة زورًا وبهتاناً، فحار أكثر الناس في الأمر، وآثر البعض السكوت والتوقف!
أما اليوم (الخامس من رمضان) فقد سقط بإذن الله القناع، وشاء الله سبحانه وتعالى أن يفضح متحدثهم ، على رؤوس الأشهاد في قضية جوهرية فارقة في الحكم على هذه الجماعة المارقة، أعني: قضية تكفيرهم للمسلمين بغير حق.
نعم لقد كنت منذ مباهلة العدناني وذكره أن لعنة الله عليه ، إن كانوا يكفرون من خالفهم كنت منذ ذلك الحين أنتظر سنة الله بفضحه ، وكنت على يقين من ذلك ولم أكن أظن أبداً أن يفضحه الله بعد سنة وبلسانه هو فسبحان الله ، له الحكمة البالغة !
وقد علم الجميع أن من أبرز صفات الخوارج قتلهم للمسلمين كما قال النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: “يقتلون أهل الإسلام” وإنّ قتلهم للمسلمين يكون بتكفير لهم، فالصفات في الجماعات كما ذكر أهل العلم في الفرق والنِّحَل صفات مؤسسة، وصفات مشبهة، فالصفات المؤسسة: كوصف فرقة الخوارج بقتلهم أهل الإسلام واستباحتهم للدماء وتكفيرهم للمسلمين بغير حق، وما عدا ذلك فهي صفات مبينة وموضحة..
ولنقف عند هذه الصفة الخطيرة، وهي تكفيرهم للمسلمين بغير حق:
قد ذكرت قبل عام ونيف من هذه الكلمات أنني أشهد الله سبحانه وتعالى على موقف حصل لي شخصياً مع الرجل الثاني في تنظيمهم ألا وهو الأنباري، فقد دخلت عليه حين انطلقت شرارة القتال في ريف المهندسين في حلب وقلت له:
يا فلان! القتال بدأ يستعر، وإني أسألك بالله هل ترى جيش المجاهدين -وهو تجمع من تجمع الجيش الحر- هل تراهم مرتدين؟ إن كان الأمر كذلك فأبلغني حتى أتوقف عن السعي، فلا داعي لذلك!
فقال لي: والله لو نعلم عنهم ردة لأعلنَّاها.
فقلت له: ولكن حراسك والحواجز عند الباب تزعم أنهم مرتدون، فبيِّن!
فقال لي بالحرف الواحد: نحن أعلم متى نتكلم ومتى نصمت!!
فسكتُّ حينها وخرجت، وأُشهد الله على هذا الكلام..
فلما نشب القتال بينهم وبين الأحرار في مسكنه أعلنوا أنهم يرون ردة الأحرار بل ردة الجبهة الإسلامية!
ولما نشب القتال بينهم وبين جبهة النصرة في دير الزور وصفوا جبهة النصرة هنالك بالمرتدين! ولما نشب القتال في حلب وصفوا جبهة النصرة في حلب بالمرتدين!
ولما نشب القتال بينهم وبين جبهة النصرة بالقلمون وصفوا جبهة النصرة بالقلمون بأنهم مرتدين!
وهكذا كلما قاتلهم فصيل وصفوه بالردة، ولا حول ولا قوة إلا بالله..
واليوم لم يقاتلهم الأخوة في جند الأقصى ولا الأخوة في أنصار الدين، ولو أنهم قاتلوهم لوصفوهم بالردة، وستذكرون ما أقول لكم!
قد يقول قائل: ما دليلك على هذا الكلام؟ وأين برهانكم؟ فإنهم يقولون خلاف ذلك!
أقول: كان الأمر كذلك، أما اليوم بعد الخامس من رمضان فلا تسأل عن دليلي، فدونك إقرار متحدثهم الرسمي، فالإقرار سيد الأدلة كما هو معلوم عند أهل العلم..
أقول: إن الذي حدث في اليوم الخامس من رمضان -إي والله- علامة فارقة لكل صادق وأقول (صادق) من مناصريهم أو من باحث عن الحق في هذه القضية..
فما إن باهل متحدثهم ولعن نفسه قبل عام حتى أظهر الله الحق وفضح الله زيفه وكذبه على لسانه، وإن هذه لمن عجائب هذه المحنة التي حلت بالأمة الإسلامية!!
دعك من قولي وقول فلان بأن القضية اليوم في الخامس من رمضان قضية اعتقاد وتوحيد وتحريف في دين الله سبحانه وتعالى، فقبل عام من الآن ذكرتُ وذكر من قبلي آخرون أنهم يكفّرون من قاتلهم، وثار أتباعهم وأنصارهم ومؤيدونهم يكذّبون ذلك وينفونه، وخرج متحدثهم الرسمي ينكر ذلك، بل ويا للعجب يباهل ويلعن نفسه إن كانوا هم كذلك –أي: إن كانوا يكفرون من قاتلهم- وذلك في تسجيل أعلنه قبل عام من الآن بعنوان: (ثم نبتهل فنجعل لعنة الله على الكاذبين) فكان مما قال: “وزعموا أن الدولة ترى كل من قاتلها قد صار محارباً للإسلام خارجاً عن الملة، وأنها تكفّر باللوازم والشبهات والاحتمالات والمآلات”، ثم قال: “اللهم إني أُشهدك أن هذا كذب وافتراء، وأنه ليس منهجًا تعتقد به، اللهم من كان كاذباً فاجعل عليه لعنتك وأرنا فيه آيتك”.
ثم بعد هذا التسجيل وهذا الكلمات من هذا المتحدث -عليه من الله ما يستحق- خرج لنا في (الخامس من رمضان في عام 1436ه) يقول في تسجيل بعنوان: (يا قومنا أجيبوا داعي الله) فقال ما نصه: “فاحذر؛ فإنك بقتال الدولة الإسلامية تقع بالكفر من حيث تدري أو لا تدري” فيا لله!! إنها عبارة عظيمة تهتز لهولها الجبال، أن يكفّر كل من قاتل دولته وباهل ولعن نفسه قبل عام إن كانوا يقولون بمثل هذا القول، ونحن نقول: آمين.. اللهم آمين..
وأنتم فأمِّنوا أيها المسلمون! وأيُّ دليل ترجو بعد هذا أيها المناصر الصادق، يا من ما زلت متردداً في شأنهم من الجماعات المجاهدة من العرب والعجم في مشرق الأرض ومغربها..
أقول: إني لأحسب والله أن من سمع هذا الكلام الخطير في تكفيرهم وقتلهم، وتيقّن من ذلك، وهو يعلم ما معنى خطورة التكفير بمثل هذا التعميم، ثم لم يحسم أمره ولم يتغير موقفه من ذلك فإني أحسب ما منعه من ذلك إلا الهوى، فقد علمنا أن نواقض الإسلام عشرة، وهؤلاء قد أضافوا ناقضًا آخر من نواقض الإسلام! فأي هدم وأي تحريف للعقيدة والتوحيد ولدين الله سبحانه وتعالى ولملة إبراهيم جاء به هؤلاء؟!
نعم والله! لقد كان اليوم الخامس من رمضان علامة فارقة لكل باحث عن الحق والله المستعان، أقول بعد ذلك: يا من تناصر هؤلاء أو تشك في أمرهم وتتردد في شأنهم دونك ما ذكرتُ آنفاً، وإني أقول: إني أُشهد الله أني ما رأيت جماعة أسوأ خُلقًا ولا أبعد عن هدي النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم من هذه الجماعة، فقد خالفنا أعداء الدين من الرافضة والنصيرية وغيرهم، وقاتلناهم وأثخنَّا فيهم، فوالله ما سمعنا سباباً
New video message from The Islamic State: "Healing the Chests of the Believing People – Wilāyat Ḥimṣ"

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New video message from The Islamic State: "Course of the Sons of the Caliphate for the Sciences of Sharī'ah – Wilāyat al-Fallūjah"

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