Category: Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad

Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad: Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: Aleppo Area

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: In addition to the recent column started by Phillip Smyth “Hizballah Cavalcade,” “Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad” is a new semi-regular column that Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi will be writing. This was borne out of his excellent guest posts. I hope his posts will be useful to all who read in better understanding and dissecting what is going on in Syria and beyond as it relates to global jihadis.  An archive of all of Aymenn’s posts can now be found here.
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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
The past week or so has seen a significant controversy erupt in jihadist circles over the relationship between an entity called the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS)- a merger of Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) first proclaimed by ISI emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in April- and JAN as headed by Abu Mohammed al-Jowlani.
First came a purported letter by Jowlani circulated to his followers, summarizing an alleged edict by Aymenn al-Zawahiri that denied responsibility for Baghdadi’s announcement of ISIS and accordingly called for the abolition of this name, and recognition that ISI and JAN have the separate spheres of Iraq and Syria respectively. The Zawahiri document then came to light only a couple of days later, obtained by al-Jazeera.
The supposed Jowlani letter and the alleged ruling by Zawahiri (NB: I have provided full translations with notes on both documents here and here) both emphasize the need for cooperation between ISI and JAN, and mutual respect for each other’s efforts of jihad. In short, the documents merely call for an end to the name of ISIS, and stress an ideal harmony that is thought to have existed prior to Baghdadi’s declaration of ISIS.
Whatever the truth behind these documents, a quick search on Twitter, Facebook, forums and the like will show that many jihadi activists and media groups are continuing to use the name of ISIS as if nothing has happened. Most notably, the newspaper ash-Sharq al-Awṣat claims to have obtained a document circulated by those under the banner of ISIS denying the authenticity of the Zawahiri letter (hat-tip: Charles Lister).
Whether or not the newspaper has an authentic ISIS document, there are understandable reasons why those favoring the brand of ISIS might be skeptical? Why, for example, did Zawahiri not simply discuss the issues in his purported letter in the video statement? Why also did Jowlani not issue his letter in the name of JAN’s media channel al-Manarah al-Bayḍā’, which in the letter he claims will return to full operation very soon?
There are of course reasonable counter-arguments to these objections, most notably if one posits the idea that Zawahiri- as the alleged letter from him suggests- wanted the naming controversy dealt with quietly on the ground and out of the site of media, hence the initial lack of discussion in jihadi circles on social media and forums.
Yet here I am not so much concerned with debating the authenticity of the documents as realities and perceptions on the ground. What is apparent from recent evidence is that ISIS is an active entity in the Aleppo area, going beyond mere tweets and Facebook statuses of jihadis. In media articles on the ISIS-JAN controversy, reporters like Basma Atassi and Mariam Karouny have drawn a dichotomy of foreign fighters versus native Syrians, whereby the majority of the former are said to have flocked under the banner of ISIS.
Certainly this paradigm of analysis makes sense in Aleppo, which has since last year seen a particularly strong concentration of foreign mujahideen relative to other areas. There are in fact other battalions in the wider area using the same al-Qa’ida banner as ISIS, such as the Katiba al-Muhajireen (KAM) led by Abu Omar al-Shishani and Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen (not to be confused with the Gaza/Sinai group).
Thus, this relatively recent photo of a Qatari mujahid in Aleppo could be a fighter aligned with any one of the aforementioned groups. However, it must be recognized that the boundaries between these groups is not at all clear-cut, rather analogous to the fact that Iranian proxy groups in Iraq can serve as mere fronts for one another. In this context, my friend Shami Witness rightly points out that Baghdadi had appointed Shishani as emir of Aleppo, Idlib and Lattakia.
The most recent wave of evidence for ISIS activities in the Aleppo area most prominently featured the circulation of a photo of ISIS insignia being used in the area. As far back as 18 May, the pro-ISIS channel ash-Sham reported that ISIS fighters had freed a number of prisoners from Aleppo central prison.
It would appear that ISIS in Aleppo has been conducting siege operations against the central prison for quite some time, for the Syrian Observatory on Human Rights reported on June 7 that ISIS fighters in coordination with Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham was targeting the central prison with machine-gun fire.
Meanwhile, the past few days has seen a surge in the number of Youtube videos uploaded by the Halab News Network (NB: not pro-ISIS, but simply providing footage of developments in the Aleppo area) allegedly showing ISIS operations.
For instance, here is a video from the Duwerineh district of Aleppo, purporting to show clashes between ISIS fighters and regime forces. Here are two other videos from the same area, allegedly showing ISIS men targeting regime forces with Grad-missiles.
Another area of operations for ISIS is the regime stronghold of Jabal Ma’ar (dubbed Jabal Shouihna in the video titles), which is also being targeted by other battalions like the Kata’ib Nur ad-Din az-Zinki (see Facebook page here). Thus, here is one video where ISIS purportedly targets a tank with a Malyutka missile.
Likewise, here is a video of the aftermath of ISIS bombardment of regime positions in the same area. Further, here is a video of ISIS fighters in the area firing at regime forces: and note in particular the presence of the ISIS flag on the Mazda car.
So what of the relation between ISIS and JAN in the Aleppo area? To be sure, there is certainly a JAN presence in Aleppo (e.g. see this recent photo from Halwaniya). To hear from the report by Basma Atassi in particular, there have been tensions in Aleppo over distribution of flour, as fighters aligned with ISIS did not recognize the committee headed by JAN and other battalions responsible for said distribution.
Thus, Atassi’s report implies that in Aleppo, ISIS and JAN are two separate entities, which contrasts with the situation in Raqqah Governorate where ISIS and JAN are more or less synonymous and interchangeable. In my view this separation in the Aleppo area is borne out with other evidence.
For example, recently a report emerged from Aleppo of a child who had been brutally slain, allegedly by Islamist rebels for apostasy. In response, JAN and ISIS issued separate statements disassociating themselves from the execution, with the JAN statement also bearing a stamp of the ‘Shari’a committee in Aleppo’ and ‘Jabhat al-Nusra.’
Here is a copy of the ISIS statement, bearing the familiar stamp of the group and lacking identification with any Shari’a committee in the city. This corroborates the idea of lack of recognition by ISIS of the already established Shari’a organizations in Aleppo.
Videos of ISIS rallies in Aleppo also add to this portrait of separation and a degree of animosity between ISIS and JAN in Aleppo. Here is one video of an ISIS rally in the Bab al-Hadid area, featuring a recital of al-Fātiḥa. In a similar vein, here is a video of an ISIS march through Tariq al-Bab. Here is another video of the same rally, featuring the nasheed ‘Labbayka Islam al-Butula’ (see translation on my website; it is popular with Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Syria too).
There are two things to note about these rallies. First, Jabhat al-Nusra flags are nowhere to be seen. Second, the demonstrations are entirely separate from those held elsewhere in Aleppo featuring FSA flags, giving a strong contrast with Raqqah where ISIS, JAN and FSA flags can be observed together in a rally united under one cause (see my Jihadology post on Raqqah, as well as this recent video).
All this evidence suggests that no concord of understanding has been reached between pro-ISIS demonstrators and those of different ideological inclinations, or even with JAN activists who are similarly al-Qa’ida-aligned.
In sum, whereas Raqqah showed how JAN and ISIS could generally be interchangeable, the case of Aleppo appears to provide strong indications that the two organizations are separate and at odds with each other, with ISIS containing a disproportionate number of foreign fighters who are more strongly concentrated in Aleppo than other parts of the country.
Indeed, nothing may be thought to encapsulate this issue of ISIS, foreign fighters and Aleppo better than this video of a Turkish fighter under the ISIS banner in Aleppo (Duwerineh). The Raqqah-Aleppo contrast illustrates just how fragmented both ISIS and JAN are.
In any event, so long as there is no clear, public statement by Zawahiri or any other figures involved in the naming controversy of ISIS and JAN, and bearing in mind the issue of inevitable personal rivalries among different rebel groups, the problems of ISIS-JAN tensions in rebel-held areas of Aleppo are likely to remain and grow, even if clashes with regime forces in the Aleppo area do not preclude military cooperation between ISIS and other battalions.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University. His website is https://www.aymennjawad.org. Follow on Twitter at @ajaltamimi

GUEST POST: Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: Raqqah Governorate

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Past Guest Posts:
Hazim Fouad, “Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj),” April 30, 2013.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
A couple of weeks ago I wrote on emerging signs of an apparent split in some respects between Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS). What other evidence has emerged since then? Here I will just focus on the rebel-held city of Raqqah and the wider Raqqah Governorate.
For one thing, the nature of the channel ‘ash-Sham’, which has put out a number of videos purportedly showing members of ISIS, has now become clear. While its now-terminated Youtube profile gave the impression that ash-Sham is run by someone in the United States, the channel is actually based in the city of Raqqah.
Here is an advertisement board put out by ash-Sham in Raqqah, with the slogan ‘Together, let us spread our Shari’a.’ In effect, the channel is a media front for ISIS in Raqqah, and so ash-Sham’s Facebook page also uploaded a photo of the entrance to ISIS’s security office in Raqqah, together with a view of the interior of the office.
More generally, the presence of ISIS supporters can be observed in videos of rallies in Raqqah. For instance, in this video clip of a 24 May demonstration for Qusayr in Raqqah, an ISIS banner can be seen, though it should also be noted that some of the protestors are also waving JAN flags, alongside others who hold FSA flags and one demonstrator for Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya (HASI), which was the main group of rebel battalions that took over Raqqah in March.
Here is another video clip of protests in Raqqah on that day, again featuring an ISIS banner alongside an ISIS flag, together with HASI and FSA banners.  Note also this photo of one of the processions in solidarity with Qusayr with two ISIS flags in the background.
Further, on 31 May, a Friday protest was held in Sayf ad-Dawla street under the name of ‘Our Red Lines’ (alluding to the Obama administration’s shifting of the ‘red line’ on the use of chemical weapons in Syria). Here too one can observe an ISIS flag alongside FSA flags and white banners with the Shahada in black, signifying the realm of Islamic law.
Some inferences can be drawn here. First, whatever ideological differences the protestors and activists in Raqqah may have (and as I have noted before, there is a secular and anti-sectarian trend in the city), cooperation and accommodation rather than mutual hostility remain the norm at demonstrations, particularly those organized around common causes like solidarity with the rebels in Qusayr.
True, some activists in Raqqah have also protested against the rise in Shari’a courts, but to the extent that ISIS and other groups compete to win the support of locals, the competition for ‘hearts and minds’ is generally being pursued peacefully.
The second point to note is that the presence of JAN flags alongside ISIS symbols at demonstrations illustrates that posing an antagonistic JAN-ISIS dichotomy can be simplistic. Some of the activists aligned with ISIS and JAN may simply view each other’s names and banners as mere synonyms.
In a similar vein to JAN’s distribution of works by the likes of Abd al-Wahhab I have noted previously, ISIS is also offering study circles for the Qur’an and life of the Prophet at various mosques. Further, now that the presence in Raqqah has been established for some time, ISIS has taken upon itself to exercise jurisdiction over perceived criminals and regime agents.
The latter was shown with the widely-circulated execution video last month of three men accused of being officers in Assad’s forces, while an example of the former has recently come to light with ISIS’s arrest of a man identified as ‘Ahmad al-Assaf’, accused by ISIS of leading a gang responsible for stealing motorcycles and cars in Raqqah.
One further point suggesting continuity between ISIS and JAN in the Raqqah area and a relationship more or less along the lines of seeing the two there as synonymous is the issue of the northern border town of Tel Abyad. This town was the site of clashes between the northern Farouq Battalions and JAN at the end of March, most likely over control of border access points and resources.
Renewed clashes appear to have emerged in Tel Abyad at the end of May, only this time between Farouq (or the recently formed Liwaa Mustafa) and ISIS, with the latter then taking the initiative to distribute a notice with the ISIS insignia to residents on their right to report on and complain about misconduct by any of the mujahideen.
In short, the case of the city of Raqqah and the surrounding area is indicative of the complexity on the ground of the relationship between JAN and ISIS. In some places elsewhere in Syria, there is probably antagonism between those adopting the JAN label and others the ISIS symbols, but the picture in Raqqah and Raqqah governorate is one of continuity between ISIS and JAN.
Most importantly, the modus operandi of those identifying as ISIS- increasingly prevalent in Raqqah city rather than the banner of JAN- is not fundamentally different from JAN. Ultimately, it is ISIS’ actions on the ground that matter more than a name and flag.
Thus, I do not see a gradual shift to ISIS from JAN in the Raqqah area as having a significant impact for fighters and activists in sympathy with al-Qa’ida. Deeds- and not symbols or names- will decide their fortunes.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University. His website is https://www.aymennjawad.org. Follow on Twitter at @ajaltamimi

GUEST POST: Jabhat al-Nusra's Relations With Other Rebels After the Bay'ah to Zawahiri

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Past Guest Posts:
Hazim Fouad, “Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj),” April 30, 2013.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
—
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Much discussion arose last month when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi of the Iraqi al-Qa’ida branch Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) declared that his group and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) are in fact one and the same, prompting Sheikh Jowlani of JAN to reply that he was not consulted on this decision, while pledging allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri and making clear the links between ISI and JAN.
It is likely that the decision to have an ISI-JAN merger announced was Zawahiri’s idea. From this likely supposition, many commentators claimed a turning point in JAN’s fortunes in Syria for the worse. Thus did Brian Fishman attempt to draw an analogy with Iraq, asserting: “It wouldn’t be the first time he [Zawahiri] botched the terror group’s strategy in the region.”
Fishman’s analogy is that the al-Qa’ida pledge in Iraq inevitably translated to brutalization of local Sunnis, which, along with “U.S. pressure” on al-Qa’ida, proved the decisive turning point against al-Qa’ida after the rise of the Sahwa (Awakening) movement. Hence he concludes, “For better or worse, the reckoning between al-Qa’ida’s Syria affiliate and other rebel groups is beginning.”
However, I contend that this view is well overblown. “Syria is/is not Iraq” is of course a statement frequently brought up in common debates over whether the outside world should intervene in militarily or provide lethal aid to rebel forces. The problem is that the general debate over comparisons of Syria to Iraq does not appreciate that the dynamics of how the civil war progressed in Iraq are vastly different from Syria.
Iraq’s sectarian civil war was focused on what might be termed a decisive ‘Battle for Baghdad’ between rival Sunni and Shi’a militias, with the former- demographically in a minority- believing that Sunni Arabs were in fact the majority and could win that civil war. By the end of 2006, large-scale ethnic cleansing of Sunnis from Baghdad had convinced many insurgents who had been working with al-Qa’ida that they could not win, and hence a key driving force behind the turn against al-Qa’ida.
On a side note, I should point out that the belief in a Sunni Arab majority in Iraq is by no means dead, and is back on the ascendancy, being promoted by some mainstream Sunni Arab politicians like Osama al-Nujaifi and by groups organizing demonstrations such as Intifada Ahrar al-Iraq (IAAI).
IAAI is essentially the activist wing of the neo-Ba’athist Naqshibandi militia movement. Concomitant with that belief in a Sunni Arab majority is the notion of marching on Baghdad to retake the city and calling for jihad, sentiments apparent at IAAI protests in areas like Hawija and Tikrit.
In any case, the development of Syria’s civil war is not analogous. For one thing, the timescale is much greater than in Iraq, and Sunni insurgents in Syria are not a minority who falsely believe they are in the majority.
False analogies with Iraq aside, an overview of statements made by various other rebel groups as well as developments on the ground show that nothing has changed for the worse for JAN. Beginning with the issue of statements on JAN’s pledge of allegiance to Zawahiri, the sentiment can be summarized as follows: ‘While we appreciate your efforts against the regime, we do not believe a pledge of allegiance to al-Qa’ida is in anyone’s interests.’ Thus, not a repudiation of JAN itself, but just al-Qa’ida.
Consider, for example, a statement (courtesy of Charles Lister) put out by a Deir ez-Zor battalion known as the Jaish al-Tawhid, which is aligned with the Salafist rebel coalition called the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF). The statement read: “As for Jabhat al-Nusra’s allegiance to al-Qa’ida, this is a matter for their concern, even though we do not support them [in it] as they have come to hold this view, and we recognize that Jowlani’s pledge of allegiance to Sheikh al-Zawahiri is a course of action that does not achieve legitimate interests.”
In a similar vein, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya– one of the largest battalions in the SIF- recently put out a statement indicating that they did not approve of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration of a merger between ISI and JAN, saying that his announcement was not done in consultation with any proper religious authorities in Syria.
At the same time, the battalion made clear its appreciation of “the self-sacrifice and courage of Jabhat al-Nusra in battles and its good deeds and the goodness of its treatment of the people,” declared to be advancing “the interests of the Ummah.”
Notably, the statement recognizes the risks of conflict spreading in the wider region, but makes clear that “this does not constitute an arbitrary judgment for the artificial borders between the sons of the Ummah.” In other words, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya does not see the notion of an ideological project beyond Syria’s borders as somehow illegitimate.
Coming to reactions outside this Salafist framework, we have the case of a statement put out immediately after JAN’s al-Qa’ida pledge by a self-proclaimed Free Syrian Army military council in the Damascus area, indicating that while JAN is not part of its structure, “its role in the defense of our oppressed people facing the regime of the tyrant [Assad] is valued.”
The al-Furqan Brigades likewise weighed in on JAN’s pledge of allegiance to al-Qa’ida. Their statement cited Qur’an 5:51, “O you who believe, do not take the Jews and Christians as friends; they are in fact friends of each other. And whosoever among you takes them [as friends] is one of them; and verily God does not guide the people of wrongdoers.”

GUEST POST: Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin: Between Israel and Hamas

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net.
Past Guest Posts:
Hazim Fouad, “Salafi-Jihadists and non-jihadist Salafists in Egypt – A case study about politics and methodology (manhaj),” April 30, 2013.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
—
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
In recent weeks and months there has been a cacophony of Salafi protest that has swept Gaza against the ruling Hamas government related to treatment of prisoners, corruption, and ability to practice Islam as they see fit. One of the groups speaking out has been Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin fi Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis, a jihadi organization that is sympathetic to al-Qaeda’s worldview. By glomming onto a mainstream Salafi cause, MSM is attempting to co-opt individuals to gain a stronger footing within Gaza to challenge Hamas (albeit only at the political and not military level yet), whom they view as an enemy similar, though, on a lesser level than Israel.
Background
Following a cross-border attack on Israel carried out by one Egyptian and one Saudi fighter, the organization’s formation was first declared on 19 June 2012, which was announced in a video released from the Sinai Peninsula, featuring seven fighters. The two attackers read their martyrdom wills in the video as well.
In the first part of the video, the speaker in the center reads out a statement and begins by invoking Qur’an 61:4, ‘Verily does God love those who fight in his path in a row as though they were a firm edifice,’ followed by references to standard global jihadist themes such as the necessity of implementing the Shari’a on Earth and reviving the glory of the Ummah.
The Majlis also appeals to fellow Muslims in countries like Lebanon, Jordan, as well as the ‘Syrian Muslim people- the mujahid [people] brutalized under the control of the idolatrous, criminal Nusayri [derogatory term for ‘Alawite’] regime.’
The flag used is identical to the one pioneered by al-Qa’ida’s Iraqi branch known as the Islamic State of Iraq, and the group praises ‘Sheikh Osama Bin Laden’ in its founding statement.  Yet, while the al-Qa’ida affiliation thus illustrated is not in doubt, the group’s primary focus to attack Israel has been evident from the beginning.
This is apparent in the reference to the obligation of ‘the people of Tawhid [monotheism]’ to heed the ‘screams of al-Aqsa and the moans of prisoners under the grip of the enemy Jewish cowards.’ The founding statement includes in its conclusion a call for God to defeat ‘the Jews and the kuffar.’
In a video from October of last year, the Majlis likewise vowed to fight the Jews as enemies of God. In the wake of an April 2013 rocket attack on Eilat, the group released a video, part of which featured scenes of Jews praying at the Western Wall, denounced by the Majlis as the ‘Judaization of al-Aqsa.’ The video then continues with the recurring theme of treatment of Muslim prisoners by Israel.
MSM and Hamas
The focus on Israel is also made clear by the fact that the organization maintains a presence among Salafist jihadists located in the Gaza Strip. In light of Hamas’ detention and torture of jihadist individuals, the Majlis has on more than one occasion raised the issue of Hamas’ conduct towards Salafist militants.
For example, a senior Salafist in Gaza affiliated with the Majlis recently affirmed: ‘We will continue the jihad regardless of the stance of Egypt or Hamas,’ adding that the Majlis has ‘precise knowledge on the complete cooperation between Egypt and Hamas in the war against the Salafists.’
In a similar vein, the Majlis recently released a statement calling for the release of all Salafist detainees held prisoner by the Hamas government: ‘Everyone who has a free voice and noble pen, and everyone who has a living conscience and faith should raise his voice to pressure the dismissed government to put a stop to its pursuit against the rights of its mujahideen.’
Criticism of Hamas has been a recurring theme in Salafist discourse. A very noteworthy example is a Salafist-Jihadist video (NB not from an al-Qa’ida affiliate) from about a year ago that purports to document evidence on numerous counts of Hamas’ perpetrating- in the words of the video title- ‘massacres…in Gaza against the Salafist mujahideen.’
For example, at 17:40 onwards, the video offers a purportedly intercepted radio transmission from the leadership of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades giving orders to destroy houses and a mosque frequented by Salafists with missiles.
Like the affirmation to continue jihad despite perceived Egypt-Hamas cooperation against Salafist militants, the latest call by the Majlis for Hamas to release Salafist detainees comes following the killing by Israel of a Majlis militant called Haitham Ziyad al-Meshaal, now commemorated as a ‘martyr’ in a video released by the organization.
The day before Haitham was assassinated, relatives of imprisoned Salafist militants in Gaza held a demonstration calling on Hamas’ security forces to release their detained kinsfolk. The al-Qa’ida flag’s presence may indicate that some of the imprisoned fighters in question are members of the Majlis.
It turns out that Haitham, who was targeted as a suspect behind the rocket attacks on Eilat, had once been a member of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades but according to the Majlis, left out of disillusionment with Hamas’ participation in ‘the game of democracy’ (a reference to the 2006 legislative elections that were judged to be free) and its ‘removal of the divine Shari’a.’
One should compare this sentiment with a statement from the group that condemned Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhood and some Salafist parties (e.g. Egypt’s an-Nour) for entering into the ‘mud of democracy.’ Here is a photo of Haitham from his funeral

GUEST POST: Famous Anasheed: ‘Madin Kas-Sayf’ by Abu Ali

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: As with all guest posts, the opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator and does not at all represent his employer at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
Jihadology.net aims to not only provide primary sources for researchers and occasional analysis of them, but also to allow other young and upcoming students as well as established academics or policy wonks to contribute original analysis on issues related to jihadism. If you would like to contribute a piece, please email your idea/post to azelin [at] jihadology [dot] net. Pieces should be no longer than 2,000 words please.
Past Guest Posts:
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Tara Vassefi, “Perceptions of the “Arab Spring” Within the Salafi-Jihadi Movement,” November 19, 2012.
Jack Roche, “The Indonesian Jamā’ah Islāmiyyah’s Constitution (PUPJI),” November 14, 2012.
Kévin Jackson, “The Pledge of Allegiance and its Implications,” July 27, 2012.
Behnam Said, “A Brief Look at the History and Power of Anasheed in Jihadist Culture,” May 31, 2012.
Jonah Ondieki and Jake Zenn, “Gaidi Mtaani,” April 24, 2012.
Joshua Foust, “Jihadi Ideology Is Not As Important As We Think,” January 25, 2011.
Charles Cameron, “Hitting the Blind-Spot- A Review of Jean-Pierre Filiu’s “Apocalypse in Islam,” January 24, 2011.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Why Jihadi Ideology Matters,” January 21, 2011.
Joshua Foust, “Some Inchoate Thoughts on Ideology,” January 19, 2011.
Marissa Allison, “Militants Seize Mecca: Juhaymān al ‘Utaybī and the Siege of the Grand Mosque in Mecca,” June 9, 2010.
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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
When it comes to media articles on jihadism, one of the least explored aspects is the phenomenon of anasheed (‘songs’ [sing. ‘nasheed’]- distinguished in this context by lack of use of musical instruments as per a widely held Islamic view that instruments are haram). Of the munshid artists who produce songs of this type, one of the most prominent is Abu Ali, of Saudi origin.
While Aaron Zelin regularly provides links to more recent anasheed, I decided to translate the lyrics of one of Abu Ali’s most well-known songs: ‘Madin kas-sayf’ (‘Sharp Like The Sword’): famous at least in jihadist circles. The tune is in fact identical to another nasheed he composed, entitled ‘It blew like the wind’– a song that does not refer to jihad but rather calls for the revival of the Ummah’s glory and encourages believers to seek knowledge and help each other out (in the Youtube video linked to for ‘It blew like the wind’, the user has misidentified it as ‘Sharp like the Sword’).
Given the glorification of suicide bombing that becomes very clear towards the end, the reference to ‘the occupier’ and al-Aqsa, one might expect that this nasheed was composed around the time of the Second Intifada, which saw numerous instances of suicide bombings. Yet the earliest instance I know of its use is in a 48-minute video released by the Somali al-Qa’ida affiliate Harakat ash-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, entitled ‘Labbayka ya Osama’ (‘I am at your service, oh Osama’) in 2009 (H/T: Phillip Smyth).
Here is a translation:
‘Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel that tear through his wall with fright.
He has rejected humiliation and has arisen, weaving his pride with might.
Like a weary fugitive has his day concealed him and passed by in concealment.
Like the roaming star, his orbit falls on the path of glory.
He was once not satisfied with the world at all, and injustice is his oppressor.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the night, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut  of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel that tear through his wall with fright.
He hearkened unto glory when Al-Aqsa summoned its revolutionaries.
He chanted, filled with longing for death, and proceeded to play his lute.
The occupier set up his trickery, and his broker was seduced by it.
He molded the words as promises, he embroidered his dialogue with deception.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel tears through his wall with fright.
They cultivated his path in fright, they imposed his blockade with starvation.
So he advanced; cunning did not divert him, even as it summoned its false steps.
How preposterous! He makes a truce until he should wipe away his shame with might.
A volcano of faith; this Talmud is his frenzy.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the wave in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the billows, sparkling.
Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel that tear through his wall with fright.
So he [the occupier] built his strongholds in fear, he raised his walls in them.
So he [the mujahid] blew himself up among them in anger; he fixed his nails in them.
You see him as splinters of fire; a commando makes his raid.
He did not slow down his pace until he carried out his decision in death
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Sharp like the sword, the wind, the billows in abundance.
Strong like the horse, the lion, the thunder, sparkling.
Bold, he seeks his upheaval and sees good tidings in death.
May the Taghut of the world that only rules stones vanish.
He discards them like Ababeel that tear through his wall with fright.’
Explanatory Notes:
Taghut- An Islamic term used to describe idolatry and error. It is one of a group of words that occur in the Qur’an with the –ut termination (cf. ملكوت- ‘kingdom’, especially as in the ‘Kingdom of God’). In the 19th century, Geiger contended that the word is of Rabbinical Hebrew origin, since, he said, ‘no pure Arabic word’ ends with the –ut termination. In any event, the etymology is a matter of much dispute; for an attempt to connect the term with Ethiopic, see this discussion by Gabriel Said Reynolds.
Ababeel– Mentioned in Qur’an 105:3 (in the chapter known as ‘The Elephant’). These are apparently birds sent by God against an Aksumite force that tried to conquer Mecca in the 6th century, driving off the invaders with stones.
How preposterous! He makes a truce until he should wipe away his shame with might– Appears to be a reference to how some Islamist militants interpret the concept of hudna (Arabic for ‘ceasefire’). The idea is to sign a truce with your enemy and then wait until you think you have the upper hand, at which point you should resume hostilities.
Alternative Reading (Update and Revision: 26 May 2013)
On account of the quality of the recording, multiple interpretations can arise as regards the transcription of the Arabic lyrics. I have listened to this nasheed a number of times and I think one can propose some plausible alternatives:
*- Alternatively, this line could be transcribed as ‘نازل طاغوت الدنيا, لا يملك غير حجارة’ (‘He has clashed with the Taghut of the world. He has possession of nothing except stones’). The next line would then be referring to how he throws those stones, presumably at the occupier.
Translation of Arabic lyrics by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, who is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University. His website is https://www.aymennjawad.org