Category: Islamic State of Iraq

NOTE: An archive of the Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad column can now be found here.
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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
General Overview

While both Raqqah and Aleppo offer ample evidence for an Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) presence, there is nothing of the sort for Deraa. In fact, a search in Arabic on Twitter for ISIS and Deraa turns up one result: namely, a query I had sent to another user about whether he knew of any ISIS fighters operating in Deraa.
That question went unanswered. Youtube, Facebook and jihadi forums likewise turn up no results. Instead, one only finds evidence for fighters operating under the banner of Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN), which continues to play an important role in rebel offensives in Deraa.
Indeed, while the disagreement that arose in April between Sheikh al-Baghdadi and Sheikh al-Jowlani on the merging of JAN with Islamic State of Iraq remained unresolved by a verdict from Sheikh Aymenn al-Zawahiri, not only did numerous reports via rebel media outlets continue to appear of JAN activities in Deraa, but there also emerged a ‘Jabhat al-Nusra: Wilaya of Deraa’ council that put out statements for distribution in jihadi media circles.
Deraa itself is perhaps the best example of how, despite Jowlani’s pledge of allegiance to Zawahiri, other rebel battalions of different ideological inclinations have still been willing to cooperate with JAN in operations against Assad regime forces.
This was most apparent at the beginning of May when a video emerged of JAN’s takeover of the eastern front in Deraa, with the cooperation of other battalions like Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya.[i] Later that month, a video was posted explaining JAN’s seizing control of a sample area in Deraa with the cooperation of those identifying by the label of the ‘Free Army.’ Here was another video where ‘Free Army’ rebels acknowledged cooperation with JAN in Deraa, though it has since been removed from Youtube.
This testimony of cooperation between JAN and those calling themselves the ‘Free Army’ is corroborated by an earlier Omawi News interview with a Jabhat al-Nusra field commander in Deraa on operations conducted against the Syrian army with the cooperation of ‘our brothers in the Free Army’ (eastern region).
Towards the end of May and into the beginning of June, more overt evidence of JAN’s presence in the rebel offensives in Deraa emerged. For example, here is a collection of photos released at the start of June of JAN fighters in Buṣra ash-Sham[ii]. Note the distinctive flag and the use of a distinct ‘Deraa’ logo with a JAN flag as a media outlet for JAN in the area.
In a similar vein, here is a video of a JAN tank operating in Deraa. Here is another video of the JAN tank released via the channel al-Maysar. Further, here is a video of Jabhat al-Nusra, ‘with the participation of a number of battalions,’ in the battle for Wadi al-Yarmouk in west Deraa.
JAN’s Deraa Media Outlet and Military Council
The Deraa media channel for JAN bears further consideration. Here is a video released by the outlet at the end of May of a JAN training camps in Deraa, introduced by the nasheed ‘Madin Kas-Sayf’ by Abu Ali (see translation here). Deemed ‘camps of martyrs’, the fighters wear sophisticated military uniforms and the JAN flag features prominently throughout, with a banner at around 3:50 reading ‘An Ummah whose leader is Mohammed (sall Allahu alayhi wa salam) will not bow down [in submission]’.
Here likewise is a JAN Deraa video from the beginning of June denouncing Assad, Iran and Hezbollah, with admiration for figures like Osama bin Laden and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi also made clear.
In the meantime, some statements have been released on jihadi forums and elsewhere from the ‘Military Council in Jabhat al-Nusra (Province of Deraa).’ They were not put out in the name of JAN’s official media channel al-Manarah al-Bayḍā, suggesting a degree of autonomy for JAN in Deraa.
For example, corroborating the video and photographic evidence of JAN operations in Buṣra ash-Sham, the council released a statement at the end of May, indicating that it had undertaken operations in the ‘battle to liberate Buṣra ash-Sham’ in cooperation with ‘Liwa al-Haramain affiliated with Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya, Liwa al-Qādisiya al-Islami, Liwa al-Yarmouk, Liwa al-Fallujah, Liwa Mohammed bin Abdullah, Liwa Hāfiẓ Meqdad, Katiba Usud as-Sunnah, and Katiba Muṣ’ab bin Umair al-Islamiya.’
Apart from Liwa al-Haramain, which by virtue of its affiliation is part of the Salafist Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), and Liwa al-Qādisiya al-Islami with its espousal of global jihad, most of what can be ascertained about the other battalions is that they are what is considered ‘mainstream’ in the overall Syrian insurgency. That is, combining some sort of Islamic motif(s) with notions of the Free Syrian Army.
For instance, see this Facebook page of Liwa Mohammed bin Abdullah, which features the banner of jihad and the FSA flag, though the page has been inactive since being taken over by pro-Assad hackers. In a similar vein, here is the Facebook page of a detachment affiliated with Liwa Hāfiz Meqdad (also called Katība Shaheed Hāfiz Meqdad).
For further evidence, here is a video from the end of January in Buṣra ash-Sham of a dead Shabiha militant called Jawad Jafar, killed by Liwa Hāfiẓ Meqdad. Note the nasheed playing in the background but also the claimed affiliation with the ‘Free Army.’
All of these data only reinforce my earlier point about JAN’s ability to work with a variety of rebel battalions even after the pledge of allegiance to Zawahiri that many commentators characterized as a turning-point for the worse in JAN’s fortunes.

JAN and Minorities in Deraa
Another statement from the Deraa military council for JAN concerns its position vis-à-vis the Druze community. While some media reports conveyed the impression of a shift in allegiances among the Druze towards the rebels a few months back, the reality is that the majority of Druze have not taken up arms and among those that have done so, the tendency is to side with the regime.
In fact, in response to a video at the start of May that purportedly showed JAN fighters on the march to Deraa as reinforcements (NB just before the announcement of JAN’s takeover of the eastern rebel front in Deraa), some pro-Assad Druze from Suweida released a video purporting to show resolute Druze support for the regime.
The JAN Deraa council probably had that in mind, along with the Battle of Qusayr, when it released a statement warning the Druze in Suweida in particular and other communities that they would face the consequences at the hands of the mujahideen for any support lent to the Shabiha or Hezbollah, said by the council to be fighting in Buṣra ash-Sham. Key to this message is the notion of, ‘Leave us alone, and we will leave you alone’ (i.e. a defensive jihad), with citation of the example set by Christian villages and by villages inhabited by minority sects in Idlib.[iii]
The Latest Offensive
The council further released a statement on 6 June announcing the beginning of a new offensive to liberate the checkpoints of al-Banayyat and al-Khazan in Deraa, in cooperation with Liwa al-Haramain, Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islami and Harakat al-Mothana al-Islamiya.[iv] This statement is corroborated by the earlier videos of the JAN tank from June mentioned above, illustrating operations to take over al-Banayyat.  See also this video from 10 June of a tank with the banner of Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham

NOTE: In addition to the recent column started by Phillip Smyth “Hizballah Cavalcade,” “Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad” is a new semi-regular column that Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi will be writing. This was borne out of his excellent guest posts. I hope his posts will be useful to all who read in better understanding and dissecting what is going on in Syria and beyond as it relates to global jihadis.  An archive of all of Aymenn’s posts can now be found here.
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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
The past week or so has seen a significant controversy erupt in jihadist circles over the relationship between an entity called the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS)- a merger of Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) first proclaimed by ISI emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in April- and JAN as headed by Abu Mohammed al-Jowlani.
First came a purported letter by Jowlani circulated to his followers, summarizing an alleged edict by Aymenn al-Zawahiri that denied responsibility for Baghdadi’s announcement of ISIS and accordingly called for the abolition of this name, and recognition that ISI and JAN have the separate spheres of Iraq and Syria respectively. The Zawahiri document then came to light only a couple of days later, obtained by al-Jazeera.
The supposed Jowlani letter and the alleged ruling by Zawahiri (NB: I have provided full translations with notes on both documents here and here) both emphasize the need for cooperation between ISI and JAN, and mutual respect for each other’s efforts of jihad. In short, the documents merely call for an end to the name of ISIS, and stress an ideal harmony that is thought to have existed prior to Baghdadi’s declaration of ISIS.
Whatever the truth behind these documents, a quick search on Twitter, Facebook, forums and the like will show that many jihadi activists and media groups are continuing to use the name of ISIS as if nothing has happened. Most notably, the newspaper ash-Sharq al-Awṣat claims to have obtained a document circulated by those under the banner of ISIS denying the authenticity of the Zawahiri letter (hat-tip: Charles Lister).
Whether or not the newspaper has an authentic ISIS document, there are understandable reasons why those favoring the brand of ISIS might be skeptical? Why, for example, did Zawahiri not simply discuss the issues in his purported letter in the video statement? Why also did Jowlani not issue his letter in the name of JAN’s media channel al-Manarah al-Bayḍā’, which in the letter he claims will return to full operation very soon?
There are of course reasonable counter-arguments to these objections, most notably if one posits the idea that Zawahiri- as the alleged letter from him suggests- wanted the naming controversy dealt with quietly on the ground and out of the site of media, hence the initial lack of discussion in jihadi circles on social media and forums.
Yet here I am not so much concerned with debating the authenticity of the documents as realities and perceptions on the ground. What is apparent from recent evidence is that ISIS is an active entity in the Aleppo area, going beyond mere tweets and Facebook statuses of jihadis. In media articles on the ISIS-JAN controversy, reporters like Basma Atassi and Mariam Karouny have drawn a dichotomy of foreign fighters versus native Syrians, whereby the majority of the former are said to have flocked under the banner of ISIS.
Certainly this paradigm of analysis makes sense in Aleppo, which has since last year seen a particularly strong concentration of foreign mujahideen relative to other areas. There are in fact other battalions in the wider area using the same al-Qa’ida banner as ISIS, such as the Katiba al-Muhajireen (KAM) led by Abu Omar al-Shishani and Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen (not to be confused with the Gaza/Sinai group).
Thus, this relatively recent photo of a Qatari mujahid in Aleppo could be a fighter aligned with any one of the aforementioned groups. However, it must be recognized that the boundaries between these groups is not at all clear-cut, rather analogous to the fact that Iranian proxy groups in Iraq can serve as mere fronts for one another. In this context, my friend Shami Witness rightly points out that Baghdadi had appointed Shishani as emir of Aleppo, Idlib and Lattakia.
The most recent wave of evidence for ISIS activities in the Aleppo area most prominently featured the circulation of a photo of ISIS insignia being used in the area. As far back as 18 May, the pro-ISIS channel ash-Sham reported that ISIS fighters had freed a number of prisoners from Aleppo central prison.
It would appear that ISIS in Aleppo has been conducting siege operations against the central prison for quite some time, for the Syrian Observatory on Human Rights reported on June 7 that ISIS fighters in coordination with Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham was targeting the central prison with machine-gun fire.
Meanwhile, the past few days has seen a surge in the number of Youtube videos uploaded by the Halab News Network (NB: not pro-ISIS, but simply providing footage of developments in the Aleppo area) allegedly showing ISIS operations.
For instance, here is a video from the Duwerineh district of Aleppo, purporting to show clashes between ISIS fighters and regime forces. Here are two other videos from the same area, allegedly showing ISIS men targeting regime forces with Grad-missiles.
Another area of operations for ISIS is the regime stronghold of Jabal Ma’ar (dubbed Jabal Shouihna in the video titles), which is also being targeted by other battalions like the Kata’ib Nur ad-Din az-Zinki (see Facebook page here). Thus, here is one video where ISIS purportedly targets a tank with a Malyutka missile.
Likewise, here is a video of the aftermath of ISIS bombardment of regime positions in the same area. Further, here is a video of ISIS fighters in the area firing at regime forces: and note in particular the presence of the ISIS flag on the Mazda car.
So what of the relation between ISIS and JAN in the Aleppo area? To be sure, there is certainly a JAN presence in Aleppo (e.g. see this recent photo from Halwaniya). To hear from the report by Basma Atassi in particular, there have been tensions in Aleppo over distribution of flour, as fighters aligned with ISIS did not recognize the committee headed by JAN and other battalions responsible for said distribution.
Thus, Atassi’s report implies that in Aleppo, ISIS and JAN are two separate entities, which contrasts with the situation in Raqqah Governorate where ISIS and JAN are more or less synonymous and interchangeable. In my view this separation in the Aleppo area is borne out with other evidence.
For example, recently a report emerged from Aleppo of a child who had been brutally slain, allegedly by Islamist rebels for apostasy. In response, JAN and ISIS issued separate statements disassociating themselves from the execution, with the JAN statement also bearing a stamp of the ‘Shari’a committee in Aleppo’ and ‘Jabhat al-Nusra.’
Here is a copy of the ISIS statement, bearing the familiar stamp of the group and lacking identification with any Shari’a committee in the city. This corroborates the idea of lack of recognition by ISIS of the already established Shari’a organizations in Aleppo.
Videos of ISIS rallies in Aleppo also add to this portrait of separation and a degree of animosity between ISIS and JAN in Aleppo. Here is one video of an ISIS rally in the Bab al-Hadid area, featuring a recital of al-Fātiḥa. In a similar vein, here is a video of an ISIS march through Tariq al-Bab. Here is another video of the same rally, featuring the nasheed ‘Labbayka Islam al-Butula’ (see translation on my website; it is popular with Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Syria too).
There are two things to note about these rallies. First, Jabhat al-Nusra flags are nowhere to be seen. Second, the demonstrations are entirely separate from those held elsewhere in Aleppo featuring FSA flags, giving a strong contrast with Raqqah where ISIS, JAN and FSA flags can be observed together in a rally united under one cause (see my Jihadology post on Raqqah, as well as this recent video).
All this evidence suggests that no concord of understanding has been reached between pro-ISIS demonstrators and those of different ideological inclinations, or even with JAN activists who are similarly al-Qa’ida-aligned.
In sum, whereas Raqqah showed how JAN and ISIS could generally be interchangeable, the case of Aleppo appears to provide strong indications that the two organizations are separate and at odds with each other, with ISIS containing a disproportionate number of foreign fighters who are more strongly concentrated in Aleppo than other parts of the country.
Indeed, nothing may be thought to encapsulate this issue of ISIS, foreign fighters and Aleppo better than this video of a Turkish fighter under the ISIS banner in Aleppo (Duwerineh). The Raqqah-Aleppo contrast illustrates just how fragmented both ISIS and JAN are.
In any event, so long as there is no clear, public statement by Zawahiri or any other figures involved in the naming controversy of ISIS and JAN, and bearing in mind the issue of inevitable personal rivalries among different rebel groups, the problems of ISIS-JAN tensions in rebel-held areas of Aleppo are likely to remain and grow, even if clashes with regime forces in the Aleppo area do not preclude military cooperation between ISIS and other battalions.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University. His website is https://www.aymennjawad.org. Follow on Twitter at @ajaltamimi