NOTE: The title of this book is an allusion to two of Sayyīd Quṭb’s works.
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Hādī al-Maṣrī — “Milestones Along the Road of Da’wah from the Shade”
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Click the following links for safe PDF copies:
Abū Hamām Bakr Bin ‘Abd al- ‘Azīz al-‘Atharī — If Our Welfare in Libya is Between Democracy or Civil War, What Do We Choose?
Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shinqīṭī — Question on al-Qā’idah: Those That Do Not Excommunicate Kuffār Are Kuffār?
Abū Hamām Bakr Bin ‘Abd al- ‘Azīz al-‘Atharī — Are there Aqīdah Errors in the Tafsīr “In the Shade of the Qur’ān”?
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NOTE: The title of this booklet معـالم في طريـق ثـورات التـغيير is an allusion to Sayīd Quṭb’s infamous book معالم في الطريق (Milestones Along the Road).
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Gharīb Ṣābr Faraj — “Milestones Along the Revolutions Road of Change”
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[Originally posted at al-Wasat. Unedited from the original.]
Two days ago, J.M. Berger of IntelWire wrote an article describing a recent trend in the statements and video releases published by Adam Gadahn and Anwar al ‘Awlaki that have tried to discredit the ‘ulama (religious scholars). These ideas, though, are not new, but provide further example of a trend, which has pervaded some of the key Jihadist intellectual thinkers in the post-Caliphate era (the Caliphate was abolished in 1924). Today, Hasan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brothers in 1928, would not be considered a global jihadist, but his ideas became a foundation for later thinkers to build off of and further radicalize his thought. al-Banna did not understand how the ‘ulama could do nothing in the face of what he percieved was happening to the Muslim world. He viewed the Muslim Brothers’ values as a refutation of the values of al-Azhar University (the most respected Sunni place of high education) and how the university dealt with contemporary issues. The late Richard P. Mitchell, a scholar at the University of Michigan and author of The Society of the Muslim Brothers, summed up al-Banna’s thought on the ‘ulama, stating:Azhar had persisted in a time-worn, anachronistic approach to Islam and its teachings—dry, dead, ritualistic, and irrelevant to the needs of living Muslims.[1]
Sayyid Qutb, who is viewed as the godfather of the modern jihadist movement, was critical of the ‘ulama as well. He believed they were opportunists that were using religious texts to their own advantage, which is pretty rich coming from Qutb, a man that has a degree in literature and created his own innovative way of understanding Islam.[2] Even more zealous over the problems with the ‘ulama was Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Farrag, who coined the term the near enemy as well as led the group Tanzim al-Jihad (later Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat. These are his thoughts from his book Jihad: The Neglected Duty:
There are some who say that what we should do now is busy ourselves with seeking knowledge, for how can we struggle in the cause of Allah while we are lacking the knowledge, which is fard (obligatory) to seek? But we have not heard anyone who says that it is permitted to abandon an Islamic order or an obligation of the obligations of Islam because of knowledge, especially if this obligation is Jihad. So how can we abandon a fard ‘ayn (individual obligation) because of fard kifayah (collective obligation)? … So he who says that knowledge is Jihad must realize that what is fard is fighting … If a person wants to increase his knowledge … he could do so, because there are no restrictions on knowledge, which is available for everybody. But to delay Jihad because of seeking knowledge is an evidence of the one who has no evidence … However, we do not underestimate knowledge and scholars, rather we call for that. But we do not use it as evidence to abandon the obligations that Allah ordained.[3]
More recently, Osama bin Laden argued:
Despite of this hard siege imposed on you O my Islamic Ummah, you still have a great opportunity to regain your freedom to go out of the submission to and the dependence of this Crusader/Zionist alliance. To reach that, you should free yourself from the fetters of humiliation and subservience shackling us by the agents of this alliance who are our countries’ governors and their helpers especially the fetters of the Ulamaa of the Sultan, as well the fetters of the Islamic groups which transform their method to recognize the governor who betrayed the religion and the Ummah, and they join the political process of the state of this governor, and no difference for them if they are in the rule or opposition.[4]
Further, last month, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri stated:
This orientation has the purer methodology and the more correct doctrine, because it relies on the explicit and definite proofs of the Qur’an and Sunnah [Prophetic Way], and cites the historical and political reality of the Muslim Ummah, and believes neither in the fatwas of the “Fuqahaa” of the Marines nor in the hired ‘Ulama in Riyadh, Cairo and Qatar.[5]
Finally, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, the Jordanian cleric who mentored Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi and is considered the most influential living global jihadist theorist, has written about what he describes as the murji’ah (non-righteous scholars) on several occasions. Here are a couple examples:
Added up, one can see that individuals involved with the jihadist movement have tried to discredit the ‘ulama for quite some time now. One of the goals is to weaken state institutions linked to corrupt governments, as well as weakening potential enemies. Another is due to the lack of true religious legitimacy by many in the movement. As such, they are compensating and trying to discredit individuals who are trained in the religion and understand that their understanding of Islam is not based on the classical tradition. — [1] Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993), 212-213. [2] Roxanne Leslie Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 133. [3] Muhammad ‘Abd al-Salam Farrag, Jihad: The Neglected Duty (Birmingham, UK: Maktabah Al Ansaar Publications, 2000), 46-48. [4] Osama bin Laden, The Way To Rescue Palestine (As-Sahab Media Productions, 2008). [5] Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, A Victorious Ummah, A Broken Crusade: Nine Years After the Start of the Crusader Campaign (As-Sahab Media Productions, 2010). [6] Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, A message in support of the Mujahideen in Somalia and exposing the doubts created the Ullamah of Dajjaal(Minbar Tawhid W’al Jihad, 2009). [7] Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, The Caravan is Moving and the Dogs are Barking (Minbar Tawhid W’al Jihad).I advise them not be deceived by the ambiguities of the phony scholars, who confuse the truth with falsehood and confuse the path to Paradise with the path to Hellfire.[6]
The Mujahideen do not need you, half men and with no resolve. They do not need any advice on Jihad from scholars who are paid for and defeated. They do not need to ask you if it is okay with you or if their Jihad is compatible with you thinking. No, they do not need that. They have all the wisdom and the vision that they need. Die in your anger, and continue your criticism of the Mujahideen. You cannot destroy their resolve; your poisoned pins would not affect their Jihad. Nothing will affect them.[7]
NOTE: I recently received an email from an individual who would like to remain anonymous since he works in the government. In it he provides his own take on my recent blog post about counter narrative strategy and al-Qā’idah. He agreed to allow me to re-post his comments here since I thought it would be fruitful to continue the conversation. The opinions expressed below are those of the guest author and they do not necessarily represent the views of this blogs administrator. That said, I hope you enjoy the post and as always comments are welcomed!
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I’m not deep into the theological arguments for or against the Al Qaeda worldview, but I’m a pragmatist and will point out a few things.
1. I really liked Jarret Brachman’s position that Al Qaeda and their associated groups should be labeled “Qutbians” to bluntly insert a human into their idealogy and see how many religious scholars can be found to argue against Qutb.
2. Brachman’s research into the mindset of the jihadist forum readers shows that:
A) Qutb is still the most widely read “theologian” by jihadists (hence calling them Qutbians) by a wide margin.
B) Al Qaeda and their supporters react immediately to threats to their worldview as seen in their responses to the rejection of their ideology by Dr. Fadl and the LIFG.
3. There is already a small counter-narrative as noted above. I don’t believe a U.S. counter-narrative will have a great effect on the current crop of committed jihadists. It may help reduce the number of available recruits but it would more likely affect their support base and erode some supporters.
4. The same philosophy professor who cited the need to agree on definitions in order to engage in constructive debate also stated that you can’t debate belief (faith) because faith has no basis in empirical fact. No matter how you couch your arguments, true believers (i.e. committed jihadists who believe that the non-Muslim world is at war with Islam and who see the world as a binary — dar ul harb or dar ul Islam) cannot be reasoned with because they cling to blind faith. So who is the counter-narrative trying counter?
5. What the U.S. and the Western world says about Al Qaeda and others not being Islamic may have a positive effect and reduce the so-called “home grown” extremists because of the volume of the message locally. What the U.S. and the Western world says about AQ will likely have no effect in Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, etc. because of the number and volume of voices who denounce the western world.
6. These loud voices are heard from childhood in the madrassas of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and are a trusted voice compared to the voice of the Western world. Part of the challenge is getting the Muslim world to denounce violent organizations and what seems to occur more often is the Muslim world embracing the violent organizations.
7. The “rehabilitation” programs, as exemplified by the Saudi program, attempts to establish a counter-narrative and to rehabilitate those who see violence against those who do not share their beliefs as a valid program. The Saudi counter-narrative carries more weight than a U.S. counter-narrative would have and the Saudi program boasts an 80-90% success rate… of those that agreed to attend. Even if those percentages are correct, they’re likely misleading. Of the number of people who engaged in “jihad” over the past twenty years (meaning those Muslims who traveled to another country and received combat training), how many actually continued to support violent jihad cause over the long-term? That was a rhetorical question, the number is small. Of the thousands who filtered through training camps in Afghanistan over the decades, only a very small number continued to actively engage in supporting violence. So are the Saudis convincing a bunch of people who aren’t committed to violence to not be committed to violence? Good success rate to publicize with little effect of the overall levels of violence. The hard-core guys never even showed up.
As always, making simplistic blanket statements in a complex world is dangerous, but my gist is that we do need to strike up a counter-narrative, but we must understand that our narrative will have little effect globally without other, more trusted Islamic voices stating the same. Even then, a committed core will continue to decry those Islamic voices as apostates who have joined with the infidels to steal the resources of the true Muslims and to enslave the righteous.
