Fatwā from Shaykh Abū al-Mundhir al-Shanqīṭī of Minbar at-Tawḥīd wa’l-Jihād- “Question about How Things Happened in Tunisia”
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UPDATE: Click here for an English language translation of the below message.
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NOTE: It should be noted that AQIM has nothing to do with the uprisings in Tunisia. They are trying to take advantage of the situation and attach themselves to the cause in a very cynical manner. One should therefore be weary of their reason for supporting this uprising.
For more background to the citizen uprising in Tunisia one should check out the following coverage, articles, and twitter accounts:
Brian Whitaker at al-Bab.
Foreign Policy’s Middle East Channel (Unfortunately, they do not have a specific Tunisia tag so you might have to search around a bit).
al-Jazeera maps the protests.
Global Voices coverage.
Kal at the Moor Next Door: Here and here.
Follow on Twitter: Nawaat, Weddady, jilliancyork, themoornextdoor, and ibnkafka among others. As well as the hashtag #sidibouzid
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Statement from the Amīr of al-Qā’idah in the Islamic Maghreb Abū Muṣ’ab ‘Abd al-Wadūd [‘Abd al-Malik Drūkdīl]- “In Support of the Intifada of our People in Tunisia”
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They did not have much interest in the battle of the Taliban and the Muslim principality, and they were hesitant to get involved with the Taliban government or to consider it a religious legal leader in Afghanistan … They were also not convinced of the attempts bin Laden and al Qaida were making, nor of the latter’s military unidirectional penchant. Indeed, this was the case with the majority of the organizations and the Arab groups in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, despite all of these facts, when the American attacks occurred, every one of them got involved in that battle.
This reminded me of a recent tweet from Leah Farrall:
I wonder when, if ever, we’ll start talking about how we made AQ’s day, with Afghanistan, then Iraq.
I’m not sure whether Farrall is referencing al-Sūrī’s observation that the American invasion brought together a bunch of disparate nationalist-jihadist movements into al-Qā’idah’s global jihadist mold or that it led the United States into an economically bloodletting war. Either way, it raises an interesting question that has not been discussed much: what role the invasion of Afghanistan had on bringing many of the nationalist-jihadist groups — that were solely training in Afghanistan during the Ṭālibān’s rule to overthrow their own local regimes — over to al-Qā’idah’s side.
Addendum: It should be noted that I am not necessarily saying that we should not have invaded Afghanistan, rather it is just something to think about.
