Click here for the first part in this video series.
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: al-Qā’idah in the Islamic Maghrib and Jamā’at Nuṣrat al-Islām Wa-l-Muslimīn — The Jews Were Terrified At the Proximity of the Promises
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Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for giving me the opportunity to testify today on terrorism threats emanating from parts of the African continent, in particular focusing on issues and recommendations related to the Sahel region, especially in Mali where insecurity is getting worse by the day. There are two main jihadist groups now operating there: the Islamic State’s Sahel Province and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).
This increased insecurity can be directly linked to the August 2022 withdrawal of French forces operating under the Operation Barkhane counterinsurgency mission. At the time of the French departure, the Mali insurgency had not been deterred or defeated, but it has undoubtedly worsened since. This suggests France at the very least was managing the situation in hopes that a future easing of the political tempest would facilitate a more sustainable resolution. The French withdrew at the request of the government of interim Malian president Assimi Goita, who seized power after a May 2021 coup and expressed his preference for the Russian-sponsored Wagner Group as a counterterrorism partner.
The latter point highlights the fact that Washington and its allies cannot bifurcate counterterrorism and great power competition. A position that casts counterterrorism and great power competition as an either/or challenge will only undermine the challenge of both. While this discussion is focused on Mali and the Sahel more generally, this dynamic first occurred in Syria since the 2011 uprising and is also playing out in Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal in mid-August 2021.
Click here to read the written testimony it in full.
In April, Islamic State fighters in Mali seized villages surrounding the city of Menaka, marking the group’s first territorial conquest since losing its final Syrian foothold in 2019. The human cost of these advances has been steep. By May, at least 150,000 individuals had reportedly been displaced, and civilians have been subjected to targeted killings, kidnappings, and looting. The offensive occurred amid a string of regional of security setbacks: namely, France’s August 2022 military withdrawal (which followed the Malian junta’s expressed preference for Russia’s Wagner Group), the April 2023 dissolution of the UN mission in Mali, and the junta’s decision earlier this month to form a tripartite alliance with Burkina Faso and Niger, thereby undermining the French-led G5 Sahel framework designed to thwart jihadist actors in the region.
In this amply illustrated Policy Note, Aaron Zelin and Sarah Cahn explain that while the United States may have limited room for maneuver in Mali today, it can promote regional stability and U.S. national interests by pursuing further sanctions against local Islamic State officials and exploring constructive arrangements with nearby African states.
Click here to read the paper in full.
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: al-Qā’idah in the Islamic Maghrib and Jamā’at Nuṣrat al-Islām Wa-l-Muslimīn — Condolences and Sympathy To Our Afflicted People in Morocco and Libya
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Arabic:
English:
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There are two main reasons for this: 1. pledges are leader-specific rather than group-specific and thus need to be renewed with each succession and 2. it is a way to legitimize al-Qurashi’s rule and create a media event so that the group can promote itself as it transitions to a new phase.
The first reason is also something that IS pointed to when it began to overtly feud with al-Qaeda (AQ) in 2013, by saying that following Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s death, his successor Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir gave baya to the newly created Islamic State of Iraq’s leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and even after Abu ‘Umar was killed, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over in 2010 and then Usamah Bin Laden was killed in 2011, Abu Bakr never publicly gave baya to Ayman al-Zawahiri, even if al-Zawahiri claims he gave it to him privately. Therefore, from the perspective of IS this whole process is not trivial, but important for legitimacy of its leadership and to potentially weed out any insubordination before it manifests into something larger as it already did in the past vis-a-vis AQ.
This post will be updated with the latest official pledges.
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August 5, 2023:
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Krenoa Region
August 6, 2023:
Wilāyat al-Ṣūmāl
Wilāyat al-Yaman
August 7, 2023:
Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Tri-Border Area
Wilāyat Bākistān
August 8, 2023:
Wilāyat Wasaṭ Ifrīqīyah
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – al-Buhayrah Region
Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Anderamboukane
August 9, 2023:
Wilāyat Khurāsān
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – Sambisa Region
Wilāyat al-Sāḥil – Azawagh
August 10, 2023:
Wilāyat al-Shām
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyah – al-Faruq Region and Banki Region
August 11, 2023:
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq
August 12, 2023:
Wilāyat Sharq Asīā
August 14, 2023:
Wilāyat Mūzambīq
Wilāyat Bākistān
Wilāyat Sāḥil – Burkina Faso
August 16, 2023:
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq
Wilāyat al-Shām
For prior parts in this video series see: #2 and #1.
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The title of this release is in reference to Qur’anic verse 37:173.
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