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Coming Home: Explaining the Variance in Jihadi Foreign Fighter Returnees Across Western Europe

By Reinier Bergema and Colonel RNLAF (ret.) Peter Wijninga

 

Little is left of the Islamic State’s territorial control, which, at one point, stretched from Aleppo, Syria to Fallujah, Iraq. The intensification of the 60 nation coalition’s effort to defeat the Islamic State has borne fruit, regaining control over key urban strongholds, such as Raqqa and Mosul. Yet, with the degradation of Islamic State territorial control, European nations may face an influx of returnees. The international intelligence and security community has already indicated that, while the IS’s territorial control may cease to exist, it is highly likely that IS as an underground terrorist organization will continue its jihad against Middle-Eastern and Western targets. Not only do they fear that returning fighters have, while in the trenches, adopted the radical anti-Western ideologies of their jihadi peers, but also that they would return to European soil, heavily traumatized and familiar with a wide range of heavy weaponry and explosives. The fact that the 2014 shooting at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, the November 2015 Paris attacks, and the 2016 Brussels bombings involved returned operatives appears to confirm this.

With at least 6,800 European nationals fighting in Syria and Iraq1, and estimates suggesting that approximately a quarter – nearly 2,000 – have already returned, the risk is not insignificant. Monitoring these returnees has added significant strain to European intelligence and security services. Closer examination of the available data shows a variance in the number of returnees per country. A (rough) distinction can be made between Northern and Southern European countries (see figure). While countries such as Italy (10.5%, 13/124), France (14.2%, 271/1910), and Spain (14.7%, 30/204) are facing relatively low percentages of returnees, countries such as Denmark (49.6%, 67/135), the United Kingdom (50%; 425/850), and Finland (53.8%; 43/80) have a significantly higher share of jihadi foreign fighters returning. Where does this variance stem from?

FIGURE 1. JIHADI FOREIGN FIGHTER RETURNEES IN WESTERN EUROPE (RETURNEES/TOTAL)

First, there is a difference in terms of approach between the mostly Southern European countries on the one hand and the Northern European, especially Scandinavian, countries on the other, with the latter tending to focus much more on the reintegration and rehabilitation of returnees. This soft approach may lower the threshold for disillusioned jihadis that are hoping to return to their home country.2 In Sweden, authorities have experimented with housing, employment, education, and financial support, with the aim to reintegrate returnees back into society.3 The Danish so-called ‘Aarhus model’ aims at disengagement, offering returnees a second chance.4 On the other end of this continuum, the prospects of returning to normal life in countries taking a more repressive approach are significantly limited, given the probability of severe penalties upon their return. For example, France, with a significantly lower share of returnees, takes a much more repressive approach, as it is capable of stripping fighters from French nationality, revoking passports, and/or sentencing them to long jail terms.5 The Pontourny Center, France’s first, and only, deradicalization program closed its doors in August 2017.6 In Italy, administrative deportation of foreign suspects is a common measure: since early 2015, the authorities have deported more than two hundred individuals deemed a threat to national security.7

Second, apart from the perspectives upon their return, there is a distinction to be made in terms of national approaches in facilitating return journeys. Danish foreign fighters wishing to return to their home country are actively repatriated, a tactic that fits its inclusive approach.8 The Netherlands requires its nationals to report to a Dutch embassy or consulate, before they acquire the right to be repatriated.9 This requirement makes it inherently difficult to return, given the limited possibilities of free and safe travel in Syria and Iraq. Additionally, passports and travelling documents were oftentimes confiscated by IS upon arrival in the Caliphate, or sometimes deliberately burned by the fighters themselves, making travel even more difficult. Other countries simply refuse to repatriate its citizens, as they suggest jihadis should be tried or even killed abroad.10

Third, in an attempt to prevent fighters from returning, several countries, including France and the United Kingdom, but also the United States, have formulated a hit list, deliberately targeting their own nationals, aiming to eliminate them and thereby prevent them from returning. Although such extrajudicial killings are obviously far from undisputed, they prefer a dead jihadi over a captured one – a notion that is shared by countries without such a list.11 Although not all countries have formulated such a hit list, it is possible that these countries provide crucial intelligence that may lead to the targeted assassination of its own nationals. The Netherlands, for example, could provide intelligence to its coalition partners, that may contribute, directly or indirectly, to the targeting process.12

Fourth, although there is limited data available on the European level, and the lion share of returnees were part of IS (in Belgium: 64/353; 18.1%), data on the Belgian sample shows that the relative share of returnees who were members of the Al Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra (14/55; 25.5%) seems to be bigger.13 Although there is no similar data available for the Netherlands, approximately twenty jihadis returned before IS became a player in Syria, potentially implying a similar process at work.14 This seems to be in line with the general belief that IS tends to be significantly more repressive when it comes to fighters attempting to leave their ranks.15 (Suspected) defectors are generally considered as spies or traitors, resulting in execution.16 Hence, a possible explanation for the different numbers of returnees may lie in the different policies of the organization the jihadis have joined. This hypothesis requires further exploration.

So far, a higher share of returnees has not necessarily translated into more terrorist attacks. The 2014 shooting at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, the November 2015 Paris attacks, as well as the 2016 Brussels bombings were conducted by returnees of French and/or Belgian origin. Moreover, the perpetrators of these attacks returned to Europe under the radar of the European intelligence and security community. It is unclear how many jihadis – with or without malicious intent – have returned to Europe beyond the gaze of intelligence and security services. So far, the number of returnees that was involved in terrorist attacks in Europe has been limited. Yet, given their vast number, they represent a significant security challenge for their home countries. Even with the so-called Islamic State collapsed, the conflict in Syria and Iraq has provided a new impetus to global jihadism for years to come.

Reinier Bergema is a Strategic Analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies and Colonel RNLAF (ret.) Peter Wijninga is a Subject Matter Expert in Defense & International Security at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

Notes

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2 Charles Lister. Returning Foreign Fighters: Criminalization or Reintegration? (Doha: Brookings Institution, August 2015). Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/En-Fighters-Web.pdf

3 Lizzie Dearden, “Swedish city to offer returning Isis fighters housing and benefits in reintegration programme”. Independent (October 20, 2016). Retrieved from http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/sweden-isis-fighters-city-lund-returning-jihadis-housing-job-education-benefits-reintegration-a7371266.html

4 Alastair Reed & Johanna Pohl. Tackling the Surge of Returning Foreign Fighters (The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), July 2017). Retrieved from https://icct.nl/publication/tackling-the-surge-of-returning-foreign-fighters/

5 Piotr Bąkowski & Laura Puccio. Foreign Fighters – Member state responses and EU action [Briefing] (Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service (EPSR), March 2016). Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-579080-Foreign-fighters-rev-FINAL.pdf

6 Leela Jacinto. “France’s ‘deradicalisation gravy train’ runs out of steam”. France24 (August 2, 2017). Retrieved from http://www.france24.com/en/20170801-france-jihad-deradicalisation-centre-closes-policy

7 Lorenzo Vidino & Francesco Marone. The Jihadist Threat in Italy: A Primer (Milano: Italian Institute for International Political Studies (IPSI), November 13, 2017). Retrieved from http://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/jihadist-threat-italy-primer-18541

8 Piotr Bąkowski & Laura Puccio. Foreign Fighters – Member state responses and EU action [Briefing] (Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service (EPSR), March 2016). Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-579080-Foreign-fighters-rev-FINAL.pdf

9 National Coordinator for Security & Counterterrorism (NCTV). Voortgangsrapportage integrale aanpak jihadisme (April 6, 2017). Retrieved from https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/blg-804699.pdf.

10France refuses to repatriate Brittany’s notorious female Isis jihadist“. The Local (January 4, 2018). Retrieved from https://www.thelocal.fr/20180104/france-refuses-to-repatriate-brittanys-notorious-female-jihadist

11 Thomas Renard & Rik Coolsaet, Returnees: Who are they, why are they (not) coming back and how should we deal with them? Assessing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (Brussels: Egmont Institute, February 2018). Retrieved from http://www.egmontinstitute.be/returnees-assessing-policies-on-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters-in-belgium-germany-and-the-netherlands/

12 Commissie van Toezicht op de Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdiensten (CTIVD). Toezichtsrapport. Over bijdragen van de MIVD aan targeting (August 3, 2016)

13 Personal communication Pieter Van Ostaeyen & Guy Van Vlierden.

14 National Coordinator Security & Counterterrorism (NCTV), Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland (DTN) 35. (February 2014). Retrieved from https://www.nctv.nl/binaries/dtn-35-kamerbrief-nl-def_tcm31-31601.pdf. See also: van Ginkel & Simon Minks, “Addressing the Challenge of Returnees: Threat Perceptions, Policies and Practices in the Netherlands”. In Thomas Renard & Rik Coolsaet (editors), Returnees: Who are they, why are they (not) coming back and how should we deal with them? Assessing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (Brussels: Egmont Institute, February 2018). Retrieved from http://www.egmontinstitute.be/returnees-assessing-policies-on-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters-in-belgium-germany-and-the-netherlands/

15 Peter R. Neumann. Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation & Political Violence (ICSR), September 18, 2015). Retrieved from http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ICSR-Report-Victims-Perpertrators-Assets-The-Narratives-of-Islamic-State-Defectors.pdf

16 Ibid.

IS in Action

On 28 September, the head of Investigations at the Attorney General’s (AG) Office, Sadeq al-Sour, held a press conference in Tripoli in which he gave the names and affiliations of several IS and Ansar al-Sharia connected individuals in Libya. He also provided details and photographs of accused, organizational charts, links and routes of travel into Libya based on 14 months of investigation. While many of the revelations and individuals named were already in public domain, this was the first time they were officially revealed or confirmed by official judicial Libyan authorities.

Al-Sour revealed that about 800 arrest warrants had been issued for nearly 200 terrorist attacks in Libya. He said there are currently 250 cases before the courts and that more than 1,000 elements belonging to terrorist organizations are wanted for justice. He also said that a database has been created containing all the information on 1,500 ISIS members.

Foreign links

Al-Sour said that more than 1,000 people belonging to terrorist organizations are wanted for justice, a large number of whom are wanted in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Fifty warrants will be delivered to Interpol for ISIS suspects abroad. He added that more than 700 bodies of ISIS fighters from Sirte are being held in mortuary fridges.

Regarding leadership of IS in Libya, he claimed several Arab leaders rotated the command of IS in Libya, in coordination with the Libyan IS leadership. He said there are Libyan individuals who participated in the Syrian war and returned to Libya with an IS philosophy, however he also said that most IS members had not been Libyan, but that they had come from Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Mali, and Chad. There are still a lot of individuals in the Sudan and Tunisia who are recruiting members.

Suspects – believed dead

Many of the perpetrators of terror attacks in Libya that al-Sour mentioned are believed dead, with many killed in the battle or Sirte. These include:

  • Abu Amer al-Jazrawi, a Saudi commander of IS in Sirte
  • Abdulhadi Zaroon, one of the important IS leaders in Sirte
  • Wissam Najm Abd Zayd al-Zubaydi, an Iraqi commander also known as Abu Nabil al-Anbari, who was appointed commander of IS in Libya.
  • Hasan Araj, who according to al-Sour was the first person to be recruited by IS in Libya

Suspects – wanted

  • Mahmoud al-Barasi, the commander of IS in Benghazi. He is wanted for arrest and according to al-Sour, is currently located in the south of Bani Walid.
  • Mahdi Salem Rajab Dingo, who was responsible for IS’s staff and military office

Attacks

Al-Sour said that more than 200 suicide bombers and assassinations had been identified across Libya. Al-Sour listed several attacks and assassinations for which he said IS was responsible. These included:

  • The Egyptian Copts who were killed in Sirte. He said that the burial sites had been identified behind Sirte’s Mahari hotel and that the AG’s Office had all the information about those responsible for the slaughter.
  • The kidnapping of the Italians in Sabratha
  • The murders of former Attorney General Abdulaziz al-Hassadi, HoR member Freha al-Barkawi, Hasan Dakam, Sheikh Mohammed bin Othman and the director of the security of Sabratha, Hasan Kamuka.
  • Attacks on oil fields and the kidnapping of foreigners
  • Many murders, kidnappings, and assassinations in Sabratha

IS funding

Al-Sour said that IS kidnapped businessmen and used the ransoms for funding. He added that most of IS’s funding came via high ranking commanders in Syria and Iraq as well as through gaining control of various Libyan banks including Central Bank of Libya branches in Sirte, Benghazi, and Derna. He revealed that the AG’s Office had issued summons for some Libyan officials who had supported some terrorist figures financially.

IS cells

Al-Sour claimed that Derna, which is currently under the control of the Derna Mujahadeen Shura Council (DMSC) was preparing itself to become an emirate like Syria and Iraq. He also said there were numerous IS cells operating across Libya, including in Misrata. He said that the AG’s Office had information about cells trying to activate themselves in Libya, one of which is connected to the Hamas movement.

Other Jihadi Actors

On 28 September, the head of Investigations at the Attorney General’s (AG) Office, Sadeq al-Sour, held a press conference in Tripoli in which he gave the names and affiliations of several IS and Ansar al-Sharia connected individuals in Libya. He gave official confirmation that Ansar al-Sharia were the nucleus of the formation of IS in Libya and that the majority of Libyan IS leaders were former al-Qaida members. He also said the financing of Ansar al-Sharia emanated from the Libyan state.

Al-Sour claimed that the storming of the US Special Mission in Benghazi on 11 September 2012, and the subsequent death of US ambassador Chris Stevens and three others, was carried out by Ansar al-Sharia. He said Mohamed al-Zahawi, the leader of Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi, was responsible for the operation. He added that Ansar al-Sharia and al-Qaida were taking instructions from al-Qaida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri directly. It is interesting that this revelation was made as the trial of a key suspect in the case gets underway in the US.

On 2 October, the U.S. District court for the District of Columbia began the trial of Ahmed Abu Khatallah, the Libyan man accused of orchestrating the Benghazi attack. Khatallah has been awaiting trial in the US since 2014, when he was captured by a team of US military and FBI officials in Benghazi and transported on a 13-day journey to the US aboard a Navy vessel. The case is expected to last several weeks.

On 1 October, Ahmed al-Mismari, the spokesperson for the Libyan Nationa Army (LNA), said that IS and branches of the Muslim Brotherhood affiliated to al-Qaida have joined forces to spread extremism in Libya. He claimed that Qatar is transporting armed IS fighters from Syria to Libya and that Qatar continues to provide financial support for terrorist organizations in Libya.

__________________

A weekly update of ISIS’s actions, the Western response, and developments pertaining to Libya’s other militias is available by subscribing here. To read about Western countries’ responses to ISIS in Libya this week, click here, and to read about the developments within the anti-ISIS Coalition of Libyan militias, click here. To read all four sections of this week’s Eye on ISIS in Libya report, click here.

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What was it that made you take that step towards Hijrah?

Subhan’Allah living in the UK is very difficult, I felt as if I was imprisoned, you know you can’t really express your feelings, in case you’re being watched by the secret services or suspicion could be raised about you, it’s very difficult for someone who has such passion for the Muslim Ummah to be able to express his feelings.
So Subhan’Allah Ya’ani, it’s not easy to read news regarding Ahlu Sunnah in Syria where you are oppressed because you simply believe in Allah, follow the Sunnah of the Prophet (SAW). Watching videos of innocent and helpless Muslims getting tortured by the regime, similar to Iraq, Burma and other Muslim countries; alongside these I was inspired by a few Mashaikh who would always talk about the situation of the Muslim Ummah and had links with Jihad.
They spoke about how Jihad would bring back the pride of Islam that we once had – such as Shaikh Abu Qatada al-Filistini, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Shaikh al-Muhaysini, because he was active in Syria, may Allah preserve them, and Shaikh Anwar al-Awlaqi who really had a big impact on me, I used to watch him at a young age, my family would always watch his lectures until it got to a point where he went to Yemen to join al-Qaeda. My parents, may Allah protect them, would then discourage me to follow his videos.

How did you go about making preparations for Hijrah, and were your family aware about you leaving them?

In terms of planning the routes, Allah made it easy for me, very easy to find hotel bookings, finding the tickets were not really an obstacle, you know it maybe less than an hour to get everything sorted out. In terms of planning, Alhamdulillah, Allah سبحانه وتعالى made it easy.
In terms of navigating my way from Turkey to Syria, Allah سبحانه وتعالى made it easy. At times I thought to myself “that’s it I’m going to get caught and sent back” when I got my passport taken off me in Turkey and inspected by the police, I could feel my heart pounding intensely, my knees shaking but Subhan’Allah once I began remembering Allah and the verse in Surah Al-Baqarah: {Allah has set a seal upon their hearts and upon their hearing, and over their vision is a veil….} [Al-Baqarah; 2:7]. Allah blinded the Kuffar and I arrived safely.
In terms of letting my parents know, I told them whilst I was in Turkey that I was in Syria, because I got nervous when I accidentally answered a phone call from them. They wanted to know where I was because I was out of my house for so long, roughly four days.
Before I left I told them I went to visit my cousin in another city but unfortunately that failed because they contacted him. I really couldn’t say anything, when I spoke to my parents I kind of began to stutter, I got really nervous, they began to suspect so I just told them.
I told them I was in Syria with hope they wouldn’t call the police and they had known where I was and they wouldn’t panic as much but the opposite had occurred. If you really want to participate in Jihad Fi SabilAllah and your heart is pure and your niyyah is for the sake of Allah, Allah will find you a way out from every hardship. Alhamdulilah they constantly make Dua for me now.

What were the items you took when coming to Syria?

While preparing to come to Syria the expectations I had of it was that it was going to be similar to Afghanistan, as a result I brought with me many items which I didn’t need and some of which can be found in Syria. One thing which I overloaded in my luggage was clothes some of which I would not need later, as a fighter the best thing for one to wear is combat gear, which is provided here, or you can buy some using your own money. I also brought with me daily hygiene items which can be found in Syria.

An advice for those wanting to take part in Hijrah to Syria:

My first advice would be to not procrastinate and let the whispering of Shaitan hinder you from this path, if you’re not ready start preparations today, in terms of saving money, and even learning Arabic, [then] prepare yourself spiritually by increasing in good deeds and Dua for Allah to make things easy for you, take full measures to ensure your Hijrah goes well and put your trust in Allah سبحانه وتعالى .

Jazak’Allahu khair for conducting this interview with us.

_______________

Source: http://fursanshammedia.net/2017/01/14/fursan-al-sham-media-interview-with-abu-bakr-al-britani/

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{The ones who have believed, emigrated and striven in the cause of Allah with their wealth and their lives are greater in rank in the sight of Allah . And it is those who are the attainers [of success].}

[Al-Bar’a; 9:20]

Brother Malik left his native land for Hijrah along with other brothers, who wanted to travel to Syria for Jihad in the cause of Allah, and to help support their vulnerable brothers and sisters in Syria despite themselves facing oppression under the Chinese government. They had to leave in secret, hiding from a government that would torture, kill and imprison, for years, those who had even thoughts of Jihad.

The first stages of the journey was to go from the Chinese occupied Autonomous Uyghur region into the Chinese heartland. The process involved three days of travel where they would have to overcome ambushes, checkpoints, and government inspections — by the Grace of Allah the kuffār were blinded and the brothers managed to surmount these obstacles.

Once they had managed to penetrate into the heartland they stayed in the home of one of the brothers. The situation there was dire and the authorities constantly raided the homes searching the premises and the surrounding area. In order to evade detection Malik began going out into the parks and for five months he hid and slept in the parks, in order to avoid detection and capture, all the while trying to find a way to get out of China to continue his journey.

At the end of the five months he managed to find a way out from China, and was able to go to Burma on the way to the Republic of Laos. The road through Laos was arduous and he and the others had to ride in a small car for ten hours before having to trek through a smugglers’ pass in the mountains for eleven more hours throughout the long night. After this exhausting leg of the journey the group paid a local man to let them stay in his home for a few days, so they could rest before preceding onward.

During the stay in that house they awoke from their long needed rest to the dubious claims of their ‘host’ that he had been robbed. He claimed that $2,000 had been stolen from him, the brothers discovered that they too had had their money stolen. It became clear to them that the man had robbed them as they slept but as they were in the country illegally and in need of shelter they could neither accuse him or go to the authorities.

The next stage of their the trip entailed crossing a river into Thailand. This river was fraught with many dangers, in addition to the swift current of the river itself, it was rife with gangs of bandits and pirates. While crossing the river their boat was stopped and all of their remaining wealth was stolen from them at gunpoint. After the many hardships and months away from their homes the loss of what remained of their meagre provisons seemed to be the end for many of the brothers who opted to return home. Yet by the Tawfiq of Allah Malik and some other brothers remained steadfast and completed their journey across the river into Thailand undaunted by their losses and trials.

After three days waiting in Thailand the remaining group of brothers moved on to the capitol Bangkok where they stayed for two months while they tried to find a way to get into Malaysia. By the favour of Allah they were finally able to pass into Malaysia but they faced new hurdles in their journey as they had counterfeit passports that would not hold up under the scrutiny needed in order for them to continue onward from Malaysia.

After a year and half of waiting and making their preparations they decided to attempt to fly out of Malaysia to Turkey. They entered the airport and when they reached customs the authorities discovered their fake passports and the brothers were detained and then charged with entering the country illegally and for having forged documents.

For four long months they languished in prison until money could be raised to secure their release, fees of $2,000 for each brother. After their release they were expelled from Malaysia, Alhamdulilah they were not repatriated to China but were instead allowed to continue on their way to Turkey. The flight from Malaysia to Turkey lasted eleven hours and cost each brother $500, Allah made their entrance into Turkey easy and from there they were able to enter into Syria.

After more than two years since first setting out from their homes, after enduring fear and duress losing their wealth, being tested with prison and facing trials and hardships, that saw even their stalwart brothers turn back, they endured and were patient with the order of Allah, all the while exerting themselves to their fullest in obedience to the command of their Lord who said to them:

{March forth, whether you are light or heavy, and strive hard with your wealth and your lives in the cause of Allah.}
[Al-Bar’a; 9:43]

So my beloved brothers and sisters in Islam this is but one story of many who have risked their freedom, their wealth and their lives in the service of our Lord, The One who created us and sustains us and The One to Who we belong and will return. How can we deny our Lord His right over us or be stingy with our wealth and lives when they belong to The One who created and gifted them. May Allah reward those brothers like Malik and increase them in goodness and preserve them and may He also grant us all the knowledge and ability to serve Him and obey Him, Ameen.

_________________

Source: http://fursanshammedia.net/2016/12/15/yearning-the-call-to-jihad-from-uyghur-to-sham/

(لقد كان في قصصهم عبرة لأولي الألباب)

أمر رباني يبين قيمة التجارب وأهميتها في استخلاص العبر والاستفادة من أخطاء من سبقونا، وعدم تجريب المجرب، والغرق في تفاصيل أثبتت التجارب الصح والخطأ منها، فنحذر من الخطأ ونعمل على الصحيح.

هذا الأسلوب القرآني في سرد القصص دعوة لهذه الأمة جماعات وأفراد إلى الاستفادة من مجريات الأحداث التاريخية، فالذي يريد أن يكون إلها من دون الله ويسعى ليكون الناس عبيداً له عليه أن يتعظ أن فرعون قام بهذا الشيء ثم كانت النتيجة أن أغرقه الله وجعله عبرة وآية، والدول التي تشرعن للظلم والفساد متباهية باقتصاديها وحنكة قادتها عليها أن تدرك أن عاداً قالت من أشد منا قوة فأخذها الله نكال الآخرة والأولى، والجيوش التي يتباهى أفرادها بعدتهم وعددهم وينسون فضل الله ورحمته عليهم أن يفهموا أن الله قال لمن هم خير القرون ويوم حنينإذ أعجبتكم كثرتكم فلم تغن عنكم شيئا.
هذه حقائق قرآنية لو لم يكن الهدف منها اتخاذ العبرة والاستفادة من أحداثها لعدم تكرار الخطأ ذاته ومعرفة النتائج مسبقاً لمن أصر على الاستمرار على نفسه الخطأ فما الهدف إذا..!

إقراء التاريخ ففي التاريخ العبر    ضل قوم ليس يدرون الخبر

اليوم هناك من يعتقد أنه فوق النصيحة، وأن مستواه وفهمه أكبر من أن ينظر في تجارب التاريخ وبالتالي يعمل على عدم تكرار الأخطاء، بل يصر على الخطأ وهو يعرف أين وصل بغيره هذا الخطأ.

غيرك من الجماعات دفعوا الثمن من الدماء والجهود والأموال نتيجة تلك الأحداث والسياسات العقيمة، فلماذا الإصرار على دفع هذه التكاليف مجدداً، ولما لا تحفظ تلك التكاليف من خلال الاستفادة من تجربة غيرك الذي كلفته وكلفت الأمة الشيء الكثير.
عندما ترى ما يجري على أرض الشام المباركة من تعدد الجماعات واعجاب كل ذي رأي برأيه، تعود بك الذاكرة إلى الجهاد الأفغاني، ثم تنصدم أن كل الأحداث التي كانت تحصل في أفغانستان تعاد وتكرر بنفس الأخطاء في الشام، مع تغيير بسيط في الأسماء واللاعبين، ولا يمكن الاعتقاد أن من في الشام من الجماعات لم تطلع على ما حدث في أفغانستان.

كل شيء يحدث قد حدث من قبل من ارتهان الأحزاب والجماعات إلى الدول الصديقة، ومن الاقتتال الداخلي وتمزيق الصفوف والحظوظ النفسية، حتى موضوع الخلافة كان حاضر أيضاً في أفغانستان، فقد ظهر تنظيم الخلافة في بيشاور وأعلن تكفير كل من لم يبايع الخليفة وعين حكاما من طرفه في عدد من البلاد الإسلامية، بل إن الخليفة أرسل إلى فلسطين يعلن أنه قادم لتحريرهم، وما عليهم إلا قطع شجرة الغرقد حتى لا يختبئ خلفها اليهود ثم أنتقل بكل فكره إلى أفغانستان، يقول صاحب كتاب 15 طلقة في سبيل الله “ثم بعد ذلك بسنوات أن عاد الخليفة إلى بريطانيا التي يحمل جنسيتها بعد ما فشل مشروعه، وخذلته الأمة الإسلامية ورفض الجميع مبايعته، من الأحزاب الأفغانية إلى القبائل إلى حركة طالبان إلى أسامة بن لادن، فعاد إلى الدولة الأم بريطانيا التي لم توجه له أي تهمة، حتى عن جرائم القتل التي ارتكبها في عهد خلافته.!!”

إن حركة التأريخ تعيد الأحداث والأدوار ولكن المصيبة ألا يعيرها الأشخاص والجماعات أي اهتمام.

فهل يجهل هؤلاء ما أحدثته الدول الصديقة للجهاد الأفغاني على ساحة أفغانستان؟ وكيف أفسد التمويل والدعم مستقبل أفغانستان وحرف مسار ثورتها وجهادها ضد الروس؟

إن الجهاد الأفغاني فيه العبر لو نظر إليها وتفحصها من في الشام لما جربوا الأخطاء، ولا يدري المرء هل الغباء مسيطر أم العمالة.

الدور الذي قامت به باكستان في الجهاد الأفغاني وشرائها لرموز وجماعات كانت تقاتل النظام الشيوعي تقوم به تركيا في الجهاد الشامي، فهناك من طار مسرعاً إلى أحضان النظام التركي، وهو يؤمل أنه صديق الثورة السورية وما عرف أن باكستان كانت تظهر نفسها بأكثر من مجرد صديق للجهاد الأفغاني، ثم لما حانت اللحظة حاربت باكستان الذين لم يقبلوا دعمها بالجماعات التي كانت تدعمها، وحصل الاقتتال الأهلي، وخانت باكستان المجاهدين العرب، فسلمت منهم الأعداد إلى أمريكا.

لا يوجد في هذه الأنظمة صداقة بل يوجد مصلحة، وإذا انتهت مصلحة هذه الدول ستكون أول من يناصبك العداء، ولكننا نرى في الشام من انتقل من كون العلاقة صداقة بينه وبين تركيا إلى درجة أن أصبح جندي لها في حرس الحدود، لمهمة تأمين الحدود القومية لتركيا!

لقد استخدمت باكستان الأحزاب وزعمائها الذين كانوا يقيمون في بيشاور من أجل محاربة الجهاد الأفغاني الذي يقوده العلماء أمثال مولوي يونس خالص والمولوي جلال الدين حقاني في ولاية باكتيا وكان العلماء قد التفوا حول هؤلاء وكان الجهاد ديني وليس مصالح سياسية ثم شن زعماء الأحزاب في بيشاور من المنتمين لجماعة الإخوان والذين استطاعت حكومة باكستان ترويضهم باسم الدولة الصديقة والسياسة الشرعية، فشنوا حرب ضد هؤلاء العلماء وكانوا ينادوهم بالمولوية استخفافاً بهم، وتزعم هذه الحرب رباني وسياف وحكمتيار.
فإن كانت باكستان هي صديقة الجهاد الأفغاني فإن تركيا اليوم هي صديقة الجهاد الشامي عند البعض، وإن كان زعماء الأحزاب يسخرون من العلماء بتسميتهم المولوية فاليوم نفس هؤلاء يسخرون من العلماء بتسميتهم المناهجة تارة والغلاة تارة أخرى، وإن كانت بيشارو تمثل وكر هؤلاء فإن إسطنبول تمثل وكر الآخرين اليوم.

وقد سجل مصطفى حامد تلك الأحداث وتفاصيلها، ومما كتبه أن أمريكا ركزت في الجهاد الأفغاني على استبعاد القيادات الدينية عن جهاد أفغانستان، وفضلت أمريكا كالعادة استخدام تيارات سياسية وقيادات لا تتمتع بمصادر قوة داخل أراضيها بل تعتمد كلياً على تلك المصادر التي تأتيهم من الخارج.

فلم يكن بلاء الساحات الجهادية هو تلك الجماعات التي تستقل بالرأي والتمويل، إنما التجارب شاهدة أن الجماعات التي قبلت الدعم من الأنظمة بمسمى الدول الصديقة للثورة أو للاستقلال هي من أفسد ساحات الجهاد، أمامكم التجارب من أفغانستان إلى العراق واليوم يحدث الأمر في بلاد الشام.

يقول مصطفى حامد عن دور الدول الصديقة: “وقد أخبرني السيد عبد الله نورى فى حديث خاص، أن إحدى الدول الإقليمية الصديقة لحزب لنهضة جاءت، تماشيا مع الرغبة الأمريكية، تطلب من النهضة بإلحاح أن تقبل بالتفاوض مع حكومة “دوشنبه” فى طاجيكستان وتوقف العمليات العسكرية وتشارك فى السلطة وتعيد المهاجرين إلى ديارهم. وأنه لما لاحظ ذلك الإلحاح الضاغط ، قال لهؤلاء الأصدقاء :” أنتم لم تساعدونا بشئ حتى الآن، فساعدونا أولا وإعطونا شيئا حتى يمكنكم الضغط علينا”.

إذن الرجل أدرك بذكائه ، واحدة من قواعد “لعبة الأرض الصديقة” وهى قاعدة: “المعونات مقابل الضغوط”. فلا يمكن لأى طرف أن يمارس ضغطا جافا “على الناشف” غير مشفوع بشحومات المعونة التى تلين المواقف. لهذا فشل دور الإخوان فى طاجيكستان رغم أن حزب النهضة هو ضمن المنظومة الدولية للإخوان.

وهذا درس آخر وقاعدة جديدة لدور الأحزاب السياسية الإسلامية فى تعاملها مع الحروب الجهادية. إنه دور الضاغط بالنيابة، والمخترق بالنيابة، والمساعد الأصغر لدولة صغيرة فى إطار لعبة دولية كبيرة. والمقابل مكاسب “لمصلحة الدعوة” وتحسنا فى وضعها السياسى والمالى. وهى غالبا مكاسب مؤقتة تستفيد منها الحركة آنيا، ويجرى سحبها فى وقت لاحق. وذلك هو الأسلوب الأمريكي المعتاد الذى تمارسه مع كل حلفائها ماعدا الحليف الإسرائيلي”. أ.ه

فإذا كان هذا الأمر متعلق بجماعة مع دولة تعتبرها صديقة، فما هو الحال إن كانت بعض الجماعات لديها أكثر من دولة صديقة، فتركيا دولة صديقة والسعودية دولة صديقة وقطر دولة صديقة لهذه الجماعة!

في اعتقادي أن هذا الكم من الدول الصديقة سيستنزف جهد الجماعة وهي تبحث عن إرضاء أطماع كل هذه الدول الصديقة، فمغشوش من اعتقد أن أي نظام ممكن أن يقدم دعم غير مشروطاً وإن لم يكن مشروط في تلك اللحظة فهي ضغوط مستقبلية.

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Source: http://hossamamaoi.blogspot.com/2016/11/blog-post.html

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