Category: The Islamic State

New issue of The Islamic State’s newsletter: “al-Nabā’ #92"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

For prior parts see: #91, #90, #89, #88, #87, #86, #85, #84, #83, #82, #81, #80, #79, #78, #77, #76, #75, #74, #73, #72, #71, #70, #69, #68, #67, #66, #65, #64, #63, #62, #61, #60, #59, #58, #57, #56, #55, #54, #53, #52, #51, #50, #49, #48, #47, #46, #45, #44, #43, #42, #41, #40, #39, #38, #37, #36, #35, #34, #33, #32, #31, #30, #29, #28, #27, #26, #25, #24, #23, #22, #21, #20, #19, #18, #17, #16, #15, #14, #13, #12, #11, #10, #9, #8, #7, #6, #5, #4, #3, #2, and #1.
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic State — al-Nabā’ Newsletter #92
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To inquire about a translation for this newsletter issue for a fee email: [email protected]

The Archivist: The Islamic State’s Security Apparatus Structure in the Provinces

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

NOTE: For prior parts in The Archivist series you can view an archive of it all here. And for his older series see: Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad.
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The Islamic State’s Security Apparatus Structure in the Provinces
By Aymenn al-Tamimi

Introduction

Like any state-like governance project, it is hardly surprising that the Islamic State (IS) should have bureaucracy dedicated to the maintenance of internal security in the territories under its control. This field of responsibility falls broadly under the Diwan al-Amn al-Aam (Public Security Department), one of a series of diwans set up by IS in the wake of its Caliphate declaration in June 2014. Little, however, has come to light regarding the internal structure of IS’ security apparatus. The exclusive IS documents discussed in this piece, obtained by Syrian rebels from the former north Aleppo IS stronghold of al-Bab, should help to illuminate this issue in much more depth than ever before. The documents raise a number of questions relating to our understanding of IS, which will be explored as part of this analysis.

Centralized control vs. Provincial autonomy

As mentioned in the introduction, the Diwan al-Amn al-Aam is one of a number of diwans set up as part of the Caliphate system of IS, arguably representing the most sophisticated stage of governance that has ever existed on the ground for a jihadist organization controlling territory. IS territory has been divided into a number of wilayas (‘provinces’), with each province under the stead of a governor (wali). Within IS documents, the wilayas in Iraq and Syria seem to be broadly classified into two halves: the eastern wilayas and western wilayas, the former presumably referring to Iraqi provinces and the latter to Syrian provinces. The documents explicitly refer to the western wilayas in defining the security centre of a given province. The concept of the security centre in a province though is also found in many documents from Iraq such as the wilayas of Ninawa and Fallujah.[1]

Each province should have more local departments of the various diwans of IS, such as offices for services, education, and public security. These departments should exist both at the wider provincial level (e.g. the central education office for a given wilaya) and sub-provincial level (e.g. the education office in a sector of a wilaya). The diagram below should help the reader visualize this broad framework for public security in a sample wilaya X with sample sectors A, B and C.



One of the most important questions for any researcher looking into IS is how far there is centralized control of administration and bureaucratic functioning. Is there a system in which central ministries- the greater diwans– exert tight control over the policies, functioning and composition of their provincial and sub-provincial offices, or are the more local institutions more or less left to their own devices in terms of day to day management and appointments of officials and personnel with only some very general policy dictates and guidelines from the central ministries? The concept of decentralization, for instance, has been espoused by Iraqi researcher Hisham al-Hashimi, who told Niqash that “each offshoot of the IS group has a lot of autonomy.”[2] In these documents, an impression of a high degree of autonomy might arise at first sight when one notices that the organizational connection of the amir of the security centre is described as being with the provincial governor. One should compare with a document found in Fallujah that mentions the formation of a number of Diwans (i.e. sub-departments) within the wilaya that should be connected with the wali, his deputy or the general administration official of the province.[3]

Yet the documents under consideration indicate that the central Diwan al-Amn al-Aam decides not only on the general policies, but also the internal system of organization, with which the provincial administration must comply. Further, while the amir of the public security centre in a given province must be mutually agreed upon by the provincial governor and the greater Diwan (with the higher body of the Delegated Committee intervening in the event of a disagreement), the amir of the public security centre cannot simply appoint whosoever he likes for the positions of his deputy, heads of the administrative divisions in the centre and heads of the sectors. The appointments must all be submitted to the greater Diwan for approval (with the position of deputy also being submitted to the provincial governor). Similarly, transfers and removals for these officials cannot be done without the greater Diwan’s approval. The central Diwan can also issue orders for arrest and tracking that the provincial security centre must comply with, and has a right to order for cases (presumably of a much more serious type) to be transferred to it by the provincial security centre. Regular central oversight is another notable aspect of these documents, with the provincial security centre required to submit monthly reports to the greater Diwan. Meanwhile, the provincial administration is barred from redistributing certain equipment handed to the provincial security centre by the greater Diwan, as well as electronic devices in the security centre. In events of military crisis where mobilization of administrative personnel is required, limits are placed on the provincial administration as to the proportion of security personnel that can be mobilized (20%).

In short, going by these documents, it can hardly be said that the greater Diwan adopts a policy of laissez-faire towards provincial and sub-provincial affiliates.

A Ba’athist Hand?

It has become a common theme to attribute the rise of IS since 2010-2011 and its apparent success for a time to the role of former officers from the military and intelligence services of Iraq’s Ba’athist regime.[4] It may thus be tempting to look at the security structures outlined in these documents, be impressed by the apparent sophistication, and then attribute this supposed sophistication to former Ba’athist officer influence. Superficially, one may want to compare the structures with the intelligence services under Saddam Hussein and try to find parallels.

In reality though, this narrative is only intuitive, rather than supported by evidence. The concept of an internal security apparatus is actually well established in jihadist organizations. In its cabinets of ministries declared in 2007 and 2009, IS’ predecessor- the Islamic State of Iraq- counted a public security department among its ministries.[5] In a similar vein, the concept of a security committee features in traditional frameworks for the al-Qa’ida organization, and a security committee was also a part of Ansar al-Islam’s emirate project

Eye On ISIS in Libya Weekly Update: August 1st

Posted on by libyaanalysis
ISIS in Action On 29 July, the Sabratha municipal council mobilized a new security force called the ‘anti-Islamic State (IS) Operation Room’ after agreement for the move was reached with local tribes last week. The force is intended to police the areas around Sabratha and Mellitah, and the council appointed Col. Omar Abdul Jalil from Sabratha as head of the new force. Tensions between the new force and the notorious local ‘Ammo’ militia led to a brief closure of the coastal road around Mellitah. In consequence, the ‘Ammo’ militia, which is led by Ahmed Dabbashi and reportedly runs the migrant smuggling networks across this region, withdrew from some of its current positions to around 20 km west of Sabratha. The anti-IS force announcement comes in a broader context of Sabratha municipal council’s recent efforts to empower local governance and strengthen rule of law from the bottom up. On the same day, Sabratha municipal council successfully launched the debut meeting of its ‘association of municipalities’. The association includes 45 local councils and aims to give local governments more weight in policy, security, and service delivery. Local tensions in Sirte between residents and Government of National Accord (GNA)-affiliated, Misratan-led al-Bunyan al- Marsus (BM) forces continue for fear of a Libyan National Army (LNA) incursion into the city. BM forces raised the anti-IS alert level last week and on 26 July, they claimed to have detected more IS movements on al-Load agricultural project on the road between Sirte and Jufra. On 27 July, unidentified aircraft launched two airstrikes targeting IS positions on the road, according to local sources. Other Jihadi Actors On 26 July, Libyan National Army (LNA) Special Operations forces posted pictures of a captured Ansar al-Sharia senior leader, Ibrahim Abu Nawwara. Although Nawwara was reportedly captured in western Libya near Khoms, local sources say that Khoms and Misratan forces affiliated with anti-IS salafis facilitated his handover to Benghazi as part of the ongoing political rapprochement between Misrata and the LNA. Meanwhile in Benghazi, LNA forces continue to fight with jihadis in the final block of flats in al-Khribish district in the city centre–despite the city being declared ‘liberated’ by the LNA in early July. LNA fighters reported that the remaining jihadist fighters were observed to be wearing explosive vests. The conflict areas remain littered with sewage, landmines, IEDs, and booby traps. On 28 July, a mother and her 2 daughters were injured when a landmine exploded in the Busnaib area of Benghazi. On 22 and 23 July, the Libyan National Army (LNA) conducted airstrikes against Derna Muhajadeen Shura Council (DMSC) positions near Derna. In retaliation on 29 July, the DMSC shot down an LNA MiG-23 fighter jet seizing both the pilot and the co-pilot prisoner when they parachuted into al- Dahr al-Hamar area. The DMSC announced that one of the pilots, Adel Jehani, had died from his injuries, while the LNA and many other local sources claim that the pilot was actually executed by the DMSC (allegedly by Muath al-Tashani). In response, Brigadier Salem al-Rifadi, Commander of the LNA’s Omar al-Mukhtar operation room, announced a return to full blown siege, and shut down all routes into Derna—preventing food, medicine or fuel from entering the city. On 30 July, the DMSC attempted to break the blockade but failed, allowing the LNA to reclaim the Kassarat area east of Derna. The DMSC offensive started at dawn with the DMSC militants attacking three LNA positions – al-Kassarat, Madrassat al- Ardam, and Hajjaj al-Hila – around the town. Five LNA fighters were killed and 4 were injured in the battle, while the DMSC said it lost one fighter, Feras al-Zinni, who is alleged to have been a member of Ansar al-Sharia. The latest escalation is estimated to be the result of a tightening military and social noose around the DMSC. Local sources allege that the DMSC has already ‘forgiven’ many IS captives it had in its custody and have gone as far as to recruit them into the DMSC ranks. On 26 July, the LNA counter terrorism forces positioned in Karsah beach, west of Derna, arrested former IS member, Anis Abdul Qader al-Sharkasi, as he was attempting to leave the city with his parents. Sharkasi, who lives in Wadi al-Naga area in Derna, was a former aide to Sofian Ben Qumu, the leader of Ansar al-Sharia in Derna who supposedly fled the city some time ago. — A weekly update of ISIS’s actions, the Western response, and developments pertaining to Libya’s other militias is available by subscribing here. To read about Western countries’ responses to ISIS in Libya this week, click here, and to read about the developments within the anti-ISIS Coalition of Libyan militias, click here. To read all four sections of this week’s Eye on ISIS in Libya report, click here. Eye-on-Isis-Logo-001

New issue of The Islamic State’s newsletter: “al-Nabā’ #91"

Posted on by Aaron Y. Zelin

For prior parts see: #90, #89, #88, #87, #86, #85, #84, #83, #82, #81, #80, #79, #78, #77, #76, #75, #74, #73, #72, #71, #70, #69, #68, #67, #66, #65, #64, #63, #62, #61, #60, #59, #58, #57, #56, #55, #54, #53, #52, #51, #50, #49, #48, #47, #46, #45, #44, #43, #42, #41, #40, #39, #38, #37, #36, #35, #34, #33, #32, #31, #30, #29, #28, #27, #26, #25, #24, #23, #22, #21, #20, #19, #18, #17, #16, #15, #14, #13, #12, #11, #10, #9, #8, #7, #6, #5, #4, #3, #2, and #1.
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic State — al-Nabā’ Newsletter #91
____________

To inquire about a translation for this newsletter issue for a fee email: [email protected]

Weekly Eye on Jihadis in Libya Update – July 26, 2017

Posted on by libyaanalysis
ISIS in Action Misratan-led Bunyan Marsus (BM) forces have raised the level of security readiness in Sirte in response to increased security threats. There are reports that on 22 July, BM forces sent 20 vehicles to Sabaa and established checkpoints at the west and east of the city in anticipation of an impending Islamic State (IS) attack on Sirte from the south and the east. On 23 July, the spokesperson for the GNA’s forces, Brigadier Mohammed al-Ghosri, denied rumors that BM requested military support from the LNA in the fight against IS. Ghosri, who was recently rumored to have resigned from his position, posited that the LNA’s position in Jufra may actually facilitate the presence and movement of IS south of Sirte. The bodies of hundreds of foreign militants who were killed in the final battle against IS in Sirte earlier this year, are being stored in freezers in Misrata. A Misratan-organized crime division has worked to collect DNA samples, preserve, document and to photograph the bodies before they are moved out of Libya. The Prosecutor General is negotiating the sensitive issue of repatriation arrangements with the fighters’ countries of origin. A new video featuring the notorious LNA Saiqa Special Forces senior commander, Mahmoud al-Werfalli, directing the execution of prisoners of war was released on 23 July. Earlier this year Haftar rejected Werfalli’s resignation from Saiqa following widespread condemnation of the cruel behavior he exhibited in earlier videos. In the most recent edition, al-Werfalli is shown reading out charges as 18 prisoners dressed in orange jump suits are shot in the back of the head at point-blank range by militia men. The video release follows a renewed call by the UN to the LNA to investigate the summary executions of prisoners, prompted by concerns over human rights abuses. The prisoners of war are believed to belong to IS, and the video is captured with a similar style of choreography to the infamous IS execution videos.   — A weekly update of ISIS’s actions, the Western response, and developments pertaining to Libya’s other militias is available by subscribing here. To read about Western countries’ responses to ISIS in Libya this week, click here, and to read about the developments within the anti-ISIS Coalition of Libyan militias, click here. To read all four sections of this week’s Eye on ISIS in Libya report, click here. Eye-on-Isis-Logo-001