Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — “Battle of the Liberation of the al-Khazān and al-Banāyyāt Checkpoints in Dar’ā”
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To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]
Click the following links for safe PDF copies:
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — Liquidating Two Shabīḥah of the Regime Who Committed Crimes Against The Rightful Muslims in Damascus
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — Storming and Clearing the Fīlūn Checkpoint in the City of Idlib
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — Targeting the Checkpoints al-Malīḥah and Kāzīyyah al-Nūr in Two Martyrdom Operations in Eastern al-Ghūtah in Rural Damascus
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — A Battle of Mortars and Rockets in Response to the Masscres of the Nuṣayrī Regime in Damascus and Its Countryside
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — Bombing the al-Shaykh Miskīn Outpost in Dar’ā and In Its Were Soldiers of the Regime
Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — Bombing a T62 Tank Along the Road (Damascus – Dar’ā) After Seizing What Was In It
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To inquire about a translation for these statements for a fee email: [email protected]
NOTE: An archive of the Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad column can now be found here.
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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Introduction
On account of the border with Iraq, one might infer through common sense stronger links in Deir ez-Zor and the east with mujahideen in Iraq fighting under the command of Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who announced the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) in the first place. Thus, it might be predicted that ISIS has either taken over the eastern areas completely or is otherwise indistinguishable from Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN), as is the case in Raqqah.
The city of Deir ez-Zor
An overview of the evidence demonstrates a more complicated picture. In the city of Deir ez-Zor itself, it would appear that JAN and ISIS are two separate entities. This can be shown by the fact that there is no overlap in claimed operations for the two groups.
Thus, the main source for ISIS actions in Deir ez-Zor comes from the pro-ISIS channel ash-Sham, which put out a video of members of ISIS destroying a Shi’i mosque in Deir ez-Zor. Confirmation of ISIS responsibility is made clear by the fact that the opening speaker introduces those in the video destroying the mosque as members of ISIS.
Here is another video released by ash-Sham of ISIS gunmen executing two men in Deir ez-Zor, described in the video tag as ‘murtadeen’ (‘apostates’) and apparently guilty of crimes against Muslims. ISIS also appears to be playing a role in the ongoing battle for Deir ez-Zor airport between regime forces and rebels. Considering that those under the banner of the ‘Free Army/FSA’ are continuing to fight for the airport, it is likely that there is coordination in this operation between ISIS and other rebels.
JAN is also playing its own role in leading and coordinating operations with other rebels, despite what appeared to be a decline in evidence of JAN activity in Deir ez-Zor (contrasting with the western regions of the country) between Sheikh Baghdadi’s announcement of ISIS and Sheikh Aymenn al-Zawahiri’s letter of compromise between ISIS and JAN.
Thus, on 15 June, some rebel outlets reported that JAN along with the ‘Jamaat al-Tawhid wa l-Jihad’ had taken over the military court in Deir ez-Zor. Ugarit News says that the operation was a joint one between JAN and those under the banner of the ‘Free Army’, with additional mention of a joint JAN-‘Free Army’ takeover of a Bemo Bank building. Neither of these operations has been claimed for ISIS, and vice-versa as regards ISIS actions in Deir ez-Zor.[i]
Abu Kamal and the Kata’ib Junud al-Haq
Outside of Deir ez-Zor- in particular in eastern towns freed from regime control- there is not really a clear distinction between ISIS and JAN. The best case-in-point comes from the town of Abu Kamal on the Euphrates that is right on the border with Iraq, making links with jihadis in Iraq perfectly logical. During the upsurge in claimed ISIS videos in mid-May, one emerged purporting to show ISIS’ presence in Abu Kamal, allegedly showing operations by the ‘Kata’ib Junud al-Haq’ (‘Battalions of the Soldiers of Righteousness’- KJAH) based in Abu Kamal and with claimed affiliation to ISIS.
Later that month, another video emerged of an ISIS training camp for youths in Abu Kamal. For instance, at 0:33 in the latter video, some of the ISIS cub scouts are seen holding the ISIS banner with the inscription ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Sham’ in Arabic and English.
The clip also includes teaching children to disarm opponents of their weapons at close quarters, marksmanship and using sniper rifles. Moreover, there is the chanting of slogans such as ‘God preserve the Muhajireen’ (3:52), suggesting that some foreign fighters- and in this case I would in particular suggest Iraqis from the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)- have been involved in the running of the training camp.
The key to tracking developments as regards the ISIS-JAN relationship in Abu Kamal lies in KJAH, about which nothing in English has otherwise been written. A look at the group’s Facebook page is most revealing. Originally, KJAH was set up as a front-group for JAN in Abu Kamal. This is apparent from their first logo that included the name of Jabhat al-Nusra underneath ‘Kata’ib Junud al-Haq.’
Furthermore, in March, a video was released purportedly showing dead Shabiha fighters in the town of ash-Shaddadi in Hasakah province. The speaker in the video mentions that the men were killed at the hands of ‘Kata’ib Junud al-Haq- Kata’ib Jabhat al-Nusra.’
Here is another video of the battalion coordinating operations with those identifying as the ‘Free Army’ in trying to take Kabajab from regime forces (in Deir ez-Zor province). Note that neither of these videos was released through al-Manārah al-Bayḍā, suggesting that like the JAN military council in Deraa, KJAH should in theory enjoy some degree of autonomy.
At the same time, KJAH’s sympathy- at the minimum- with Sheikh Baghdadi’s ISI was made clear with another emblem uploaded in March to mark a purported JAN offensive to take Homs. The name of Jabhat al-Nusra is inscribed as with the first logo but part of the ISI logo is incorporated, perhaps acknowledging KJAH’s debt to ISI (something that applies to JAN more generally).
A more glaring change came at the end of April- some three weeks after the announcement of ISIS- that saw KJAH drop JAN’s name from their logo entirely, making clear its affiliation to ISIS. Indeed, the impression of ISIS affiliation was strengthened by those two videos in May mentioned above.
The battalion also released a statement in mid-May- under its own name but openly claiming membership of ISIS- addressed to the people of Abu Kamal, notifying them that the battalion’s request for permission for students in Abu Kamal to sit their exams in Abu Kamal rather than in Deir ez-Zor had been turned down.
At the same time, the switch to ISIS name and imagery did not mean a rejection of or hostility towards JAN, as indicated by the fact the Facebook page uploaded a photo featuring JAN fighters and their logo on 10 May.
In any event, when Sheikh Zawahiri announced his compromise ruling in favor of maintaining JAN’s name, KJAH switched back to claiming affiliation with JAN, while maintaining on its Facebook page the logo adopted after Sheikh Baghdadi’s announcement of ISIS.
The most recent statement released by KJAH explicitly states affiliation as JAN’s wing in Abu Kamal, discussing a recent problem of residents of villages near Abu Kamal receiving weapons from regime forces in Deir ez-Zor.
KJAH is a good example of how defining the exact ISIS-JAN relationship in Syria can be difficult to describe in general terms. Certainly the changes in claimed logos and affiliations reflect the disputes at the leadership level of the jihad in Syria over the names of JAN and ISIS, but KJAH’s adoption of one or the other did not mean hostility to the other name or banner, regardless of the battalion’s composition.
Further, besides the praise of ‘Muhajireen’ being taught in the then KJAH/ISIS camp in Abu Kamal, one should note that some of KJAH Facebook postings appear to have been made in Baghdad, adding credence to my hypothesis of strong links between the mujahideen in Abu Kamal and Iraqi fighters, if not the presence of Iraqi mujahideen in Abu Kamal.
If that be the case, then Abu Kamal presents an example of how views on JAN and ISIS are not always predictable according to a foreign-fighter vs. native Syrian dichotomy.
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — The Bombing of the Mall, Which Is Controlled By Regime Forces On al-‘Adawī Road in Rural Damascus
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — The Battle of “Labayk Oh Sisters%22- Revenge For The Crime Committed By The Regime Against Our Sister In The Neighborhood Of Jūbar In Damascus”
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To inquire about a translation for these statements for a fee email: [email protected]
NOTE: An archive of the Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad column can now be found here.
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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
In a previous post for Jihadology I documented how looking at evidence from Raqqah Governorate basically illustrates that the designations of Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) are interchangeable in that area. The latest controversy that has emerged in the city of Raqqah itself further demonstrates this conclusion.
The controversy began with videos that came to light of a sit-in demonstration being held by some women in front of what the channel Aks Alser termed ‘the headquarters of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham.’ The grievances focus on calls for ISIS to release close family members from detention, with one woman holding a placard entitled ‘I want a piece of my liver’ (i.e. an idiomatic expression for ‘I want my son/offspring’).
The woman who first speaks at length in the video holds a sign saying ‘Where is my son?’. The lady to her right holds a sign asking ‘Where is my brother?’ As for the speaker, she mentions how men from rival battalions like the Kata’ib al-Farouq[i] have been detained with no knowledge of their fate, with some having been held for up to a whole month now.
Similarly, another video [H/T: @Syrian_Scenes] emerged showing demonstrations ‘in front of the headquarters of Jabhat al-Nusra,’ where a young girl first appeared, crying about the fact that her father- himself a rebel fighter- had been detained with ‘that Jabha’ for more than a month. By ‘Jabha’ (‘front’), she is presumably referring to ‘Jabhat al-Nusra’, as she also mentions how they are ‘Islamiyeen’ (‘Islamists’). In her pleas for her father, the young girl was one of the figureheads for the protests.
To be sure, the protestors shown in this video are religious, but they clearly do not subscribe to a comprehensive Islamist program, and only the Free Syrian Army flag is to be observed here.
Some Arabic news channels like al-Arabiya seized upon news of these protests, prompting a response from activists in JAN and ISIS circles. Most notably, here is a statement released by a pro-JAN activist based in Syria who uses the handle @9amar_1.
She begins by complaining of the spreading of slanderous attacks on ‘the mujahideen of the Islamic State [of Iraq and ash-Sham][ii] and Jabhat al-Nusra, especially in light of what is transpiring from the protests in Raqqah in front of the headquarters of the Islamic State, by which also Jabhat al-Nusra has faced accusations- for general distortion- in the media,’ later singling out al-Arabiya and al-Jazeera in particular for incitement against the mujahideen.
She goes on to explain how the ruling of Syria by a ‘Nusayri regime’ has distanced the people from religion. As for those whom ‘the Islamic State has arrested,’ she justifies the detention by asserting that said prisoners ‘have exceeded the boundaries of Shari’a.’
One conclusion to note from this activist’s statement is the importance of not generalizing about the ISIS-JAN relationship in terms of what activists in these ideological circles. It is quite clear that @9amar_1 views ISIS and JAN as working for the same goals but the naming is a matter of personal preference and completely interchangeable.
In turn, it is clear that a conflation of JAN-ISIS in terms of the naming of the headquarters outside of which were protests and the faction against which the protests took place indicate how ISIS and JAN in Raqqah are essentially one and the same.
In Raqqah itself, further evidence of an ISIS-JAN unity became clear in the counter-demonstrations on the ground. Here is one such video, featuring several youths holding the banners of Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya (which, to recall, was the main group of battalions responsible for the rebel takeover of Raqqah in March), ISIS and the general flag of jihad.
The video itself is entitled ‘Syrians’ response to the al-Arabiya report against Jabhat al-Nusra, Raqqah.’ In the video, the speaker sarcastically asks, ‘Where is the Arab Jabha?’- a clear retort to denunciations of JAN. He concludes by making clear that the only worthy slogan is the Shahada. Here is another video of a recent counter-demonstration, featuring the banners of Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya, JAN and ISIS.
These videos form a marked contrast with footage of demonstrations from Raqqah before. While it is evident that the numbers in these rallies and counter-rallies are fairly small in comparison to the protests based on common causes like solidarity with the rebels fighting for Quṣayr, they mark for the first time a true demarcation based on ideology, whereas in earlier demonstrations I documented banners and factions from across the spectrum could be seen.
At the same time, it is apparent that ISIS/JAN in Raqqah does not think it can assert itself in the face of ideologically-opposed protestors by means of an armed confrontation. Notice how the demonstration outside its headquarters was entirely left alone, even as the group has made its show of strength clear with spectacles like the execution of three men in a public square, accused of working for the Assad regime.
However, if the rallies and counter-rallies continue, it may well be that no concord can be reached again whereby FSA and ISIS flags feature side-by-side in rallies, and instead a situation emerges as in Aleppo where ISIS and other sympathetic factions have their own separate marches.
The recent developments should also debunk the false dichotomy posed by some commentators of ‘Salafist nationalist’ Syrian Islamic Front [SIF] groups like Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya versus transnational jihadist groups (cf. my overview of statements put out by various factions on Sheikh Jowlani’s bayah to Sheikh Aymenn al-Zawahiri).
To sum up, the recent wave of demonstrations in Raqqah only reinforces the point that in this part of Syria, ISIS and JAN are interchangeable. Further, it illustrates how groups like Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya of SIF can on the ground display more affinity with overtly transnational jihadist groups than commonly thought. The current tensions are unlikely to spill into overt bloodshed between rival battalions in Raqqah itself, but that could well change when such rivalries are on display in the border town of Tel Abyaḍ.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum. His website is https://www.aymennjawad.org. Follow on Twitter at @ajaltamimi
Notes
NOTE: Click here for the first part in this series.
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Abū Muḥammad al-Maqdisī — “Answer of the Question in the Questions of the Calamity #2”
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To inquire about a translation for this release for a fee email: [email protected]
NOTE: An archive of the Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad column can now be found here.
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By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
General Overview
While both Raqqah and Aleppo offer ample evidence for an Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS) presence, there is nothing of the sort for Deraa. In fact, a search in Arabic on Twitter for ISIS and Deraa turns up one result: namely, a query I had sent to another user about whether he knew of any ISIS fighters operating in Deraa.
That question went unanswered. Youtube, Facebook and jihadi forums likewise turn up no results. Instead, one only finds evidence for fighters operating under the banner of Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN), which continues to play an important role in rebel offensives in Deraa.
Indeed, while the disagreement that arose in April between Sheikh al-Baghdadi and Sheikh al-Jowlani on the merging of JAN with Islamic State of Iraq remained unresolved by a verdict from Sheikh Aymenn al-Zawahiri, not only did numerous reports via rebel media outlets continue to appear of JAN activities in Deraa, but there also emerged a ‘Jabhat al-Nusra: Wilaya of Deraa’ council that put out statements for distribution in jihadi media circles.
Deraa itself is perhaps the best example of how, despite Jowlani’s pledge of allegiance to Zawahiri, other rebel battalions of different ideological inclinations have still been willing to cooperate with JAN in operations against Assad regime forces.
This was most apparent at the beginning of May when a video emerged of JAN’s takeover of the eastern front in Deraa, with the cooperation of other battalions like Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya.[i] Later that month, a video was posted explaining JAN’s seizing control of a sample area in Deraa with the cooperation of those identifying by the label of the ‘Free Army.’ Here was another video where ‘Free Army’ rebels acknowledged cooperation with JAN in Deraa, though it has since been removed from Youtube.
This testimony of cooperation between JAN and those calling themselves the ‘Free Army’ is corroborated by an earlier Omawi News interview with a Jabhat al-Nusra field commander in Deraa on operations conducted against the Syrian army with the cooperation of ‘our brothers in the Free Army’ (eastern region).
Towards the end of May and into the beginning of June, more overt evidence of JAN’s presence in the rebel offensives in Deraa emerged. For example, here is a collection of photos released at the start of June of JAN fighters in Buṣra ash-Sham[ii]. Note the distinctive flag and the use of a distinct ‘Deraa’ logo with a JAN flag as a media outlet for JAN in the area.
In a similar vein, here is a video of a JAN tank operating in Deraa. Here is another video of the JAN tank released via the channel al-Maysar. Further, here is a video of Jabhat al-Nusra, ‘with the participation of a number of battalions,’ in the battle for Wadi al-Yarmouk in west Deraa.
JAN’s Deraa Media Outlet and Military Council
The Deraa media channel for JAN bears further consideration. Here is a video released by the outlet at the end of May of a JAN training camps in Deraa, introduced by the nasheed ‘Madin Kas-Sayf’ by Abu Ali (see translation here). Deemed ‘camps of martyrs’, the fighters wear sophisticated military uniforms and the JAN flag features prominently throughout, with a banner at around 3:50 reading ‘An Ummah whose leader is Mohammed (sall Allahu alayhi wa salam) will not bow down [in submission]’.
Here likewise is a JAN Deraa video from the beginning of June denouncing Assad, Iran and Hezbollah, with admiration for figures like Osama bin Laden and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi also made clear.
In the meantime, some statements have been released on jihadi forums and elsewhere from the ‘Military Council in Jabhat al-Nusra (Province of Deraa).’ They were not put out in the name of JAN’s official media channel al-Manarah al-Bayḍā, suggesting a degree of autonomy for JAN in Deraa.
For example, corroborating the video and photographic evidence of JAN operations in Buṣra ash-Sham, the council released a statement at the end of May, indicating that it had undertaken operations in the ‘battle to liberate Buṣra ash-Sham’ in cooperation with ‘Liwa al-Haramain affiliated with Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya, Liwa al-Qādisiya al-Islami, Liwa al-Yarmouk, Liwa al-Fallujah, Liwa Mohammed bin Abdullah, Liwa Hāfiẓ Meqdad, Katiba Usud as-Sunnah, and Katiba Muṣ’ab bin Umair al-Islamiya.’
Apart from Liwa al-Haramain, which by virtue of its affiliation is part of the Salafist Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), and Liwa al-Qādisiya al-Islami with its espousal of global jihad, most of what can be ascertained about the other battalions is that they are what is considered ‘mainstream’ in the overall Syrian insurgency. That is, combining some sort of Islamic motif(s) with notions of the Free Syrian Army.
For instance, see this Facebook page of Liwa Mohammed bin Abdullah, which features the banner of jihad and the FSA flag, though the page has been inactive since being taken over by pro-Assad hackers. In a similar vein, here is the Facebook page of a detachment affiliated with Liwa Hāfiz Meqdad (also called Katība Shaheed Hāfiz Meqdad).
For further evidence, here is a video from the end of January in Buṣra ash-Sham of a dead Shabiha militant called Jawad Jafar, killed by Liwa Hāfiẓ Meqdad. Note the nasheed playing in the background but also the claimed affiliation with the ‘Free Army.’
All of these data only reinforce my earlier point about JAN’s ability to work with a variety of rebel battalions even after the pledge of allegiance to Zawahiri that many commentators characterized as a turning-point for the worse in JAN’s fortunes.
JAN and Minorities in Deraa
Another statement from the Deraa military council for JAN concerns its position vis-à-vis the Druze community. While some media reports conveyed the impression of a shift in allegiances among the Druze towards the rebels a few months back, the reality is that the majority of Druze have not taken up arms and among those that have done so, the tendency is to side with the regime.
In fact, in response to a video at the start of May that purportedly showed JAN fighters on the march to Deraa as reinforcements (NB just before the announcement of JAN’s takeover of the eastern rebel front in Deraa), some pro-Assad Druze from Suweida released a video purporting to show resolute Druze support for the regime.
The JAN Deraa council probably had that in mind, along with the Battle of Qusayr, when it released a statement warning the Druze in Suweida in particular and other communities that they would face the consequences at the hands of the mujahideen for any support lent to the Shabiha or Hezbollah, said by the council to be fighting in Buṣra ash-Sham. Key to this message is the notion of, ‘Leave us alone, and we will leave you alone’ (i.e. a defensive jihad), with citation of the example set by Christian villages and by villages inhabited by minority sects in Idlib.[iii]
The Latest Offensive
The council further released a statement on 6 June announcing the beginning of a new offensive to liberate the checkpoints of al-Banayyat and al-Khazan in Deraa, in cooperation with Liwa al-Haramain, Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islami and Harakat al-Mothana al-Islamiya.[iv] This statement is corroborated by the earlier videos of the JAN tank from June mentioned above, illustrating operations to take over al-Banayyat. See also this video from 10 June of a tank with the banner of Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
والصلاة والسلام على النبي الأمين محمد بن عبدالله وعلى آله وصحبه أجمعين ، ثم أما بعد :
لا يخفى على أحدٍ ما يعصفُ بالمجاهدين من فتنٍ وابتلاءاتٍ عظيمة في هذه الفترة الحساسة ، فتنٌ وابتلاءاتٌ عظيمة بحق ، تحتاج منّا لصبرٍ وثباتٍ واحتسابٍ ودعاء،
إنها مرحلة ليست بالجديدة على الموحدين ، بل إن ما يحصل اليوم لهو تأكيدٌ على سنة الابتلاء التي يبتلي الله بها عباده المجاهدين ، ليمحص صفوفهم وينقي أتباعهم ويميز الخبيث من الطيب والصادق من الكاذب ،
هي سحابة نحسبها ستمر بإذن الله ، هذا ظننا بربنا ثم بقادتنا وأمرائنا ، ستزول بعون الله هذه الغُمة وستكشف بإذن الله الكُربة ، وستتوحد بعون الله الصفوف وستتآلف القلوب وستجتمع الجهود وما ذلك على الله بعزيز .
هي مرحلةٌ حساسة وخطيرةٌ ومعقدة بحق ، ونقدر التخبط الذي أصاب الكثير من الإخوة ، ونلتمس لهم الأعذار ، لكن ولأننا أصحاب مسؤولية وقائمين على هذا الثغر الإعلامي علينا توضيح بعض النقاط لإخواننا وأخواتنا الكرام فقد كثر التساؤل عن دور الشبكة في ظل الأحداث الجارية ..
فنقول مستعينين بالله تعالى :..
إن الإخوة وللأسف الشديد انقسموا في ظل هذه الأحداث لثلاث أقسام ، قسم اختار النصرة والصمت والدعاء لقاداتهم وأمرائهم وإخوانهم المجاهدين وكف لسانهم عنهم وترك الطعن واللمز فيهم تورعاً ، وقسم انحاز تماماً للجبهة فصار يعادي ويلمز ويطعن بكل من ناصر الدولة ، وقسم آخر انحاز تماماً للدولة فصار يعادي ويلمز ويطعن بكل من ناصر الجبهة !
وصار كل طرف من الثاني والثالث يحاول فرض رأيه ويلزم الجميع به بل زاد هذا الأمر عن حده حتى باتت تصلنا الطلبات من كل طرف بحذف كل ما يتعلق بالطرف الآخر والله المستعان ..
ونشهد الله أن هذا كان أشد علينا من الخلاف نفسه ، لأننا كما قلنا نثق بأن الله سبحانه لن يضيع عباده وسيهيء لهم من الأسباب ما يجمعهم ويؤلف بين قلوبهم ، لكن ما يخيفنا بحق هو تعامل الأنصار والمتابعين مع هذا الأمر الجلل ، ثم استغلاله ممن باعوا دينهم وأسلموا أنفسهم للشيطان ومن حمل في قلبه على الموحدين حقداً ووجد من هذا الخلاف فرصة للنيل منهم والطعن فيهم ..
نقول أيها الإخوة الكرام بأننا منذ أقمنا هذا الصرح لم نقمه إلا لنصرة المجاهدين والذب عن أعراضهم ، ما أقمنا هذا الصرح إلا لنسدد ونقارب ونجمع ولا نفرق ونوحد ولا نشرذم !
إننا وأمام هذا الحدثوالخطب الجلل نقف بقدر المستطاع موقف الحياد حتى يتم حسم المسألة و تأتينا التوجيهات من أهل الشأن !
وحتى ذلك الحين سنقف بقدر المستطاع على مسافة واحدة من الجميع ونسعى جاهدين لتلطيف الأجواء وعدم السماح لمن يريدون سكب البنزين على النار أن يحققوا أهدافهم ! وكل من يطعن ولو تلميحاً بدولة الإسلام وقادتها أو بجبهة النصرة وقادتها فإنه سيتم إيقافه دون تنبيه مسبق وقد أعذر من أنذر .في رعاكم الله كونوا عوناً لنا ولا تكونوا عوناً علينا ، انصروا إخوانكم وادعوا لهم فلا أقل من الدعاء في هذه الظروف ، أو اصمتوا ولا تخوضوا في أعراضهم ونواياهم ، دعوا خلافاتهم لهم واكتفوا بالدعاء لعل الله يستجيب من أحدكم وما ذلك على الله بعزيز ،
انصروهم ولا تبخلوا عليهم ، فلم يبخلوا عليكم بشيء ، سددوا وقاربوا ، ناصروا ونافحوا ، جمعوا ولا تفرقوا ، لا تتعصبوا لراية أو طائفة ، فمن هم على خلاف اليوم هم إخواننا ولهم حق علينا أن ندعو لهم وننصح بالتي هي أحسن ! .
هذا فإن أصبنا فمن الله وحده وإن أخطأنا فمن أنفسنا والشيطان ، وآخر دعوانا أن الحمد لله رب العالمين .
مع تحيات
إخوانكم في شبكة شموخ الإسلام
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — Raid of the Officers Club in the City of Aleppo
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — Attack on a Farm Where the Army Is Stationed In the Neighborhood of al-Rāshidayn in Aleppo
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