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To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
UPDATE 8/17/14 10:54 PM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic video message:
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NOTE: For previous parts in this video series see: #86, #85, #84, #83, #82, #81, #80, #79, #78, #77, #76, #75, #74, #73, #72, #71, #70, #69, #68, #67, #66, #65, #64, #63, #62, #61, #60, #59, #58, #57, #56, #55, #54, #53, #52, #51, #50, #49, #48, #47, #46, #45, #44, #43, #42, #41, #40, #39, #38, #37, #36, #35, #34, #33, #32, #31, #30, #29, #28, #27, #26, #25, #24, #23, #22, #21, #20, #19, #18, #17, #16, #15, #14, #13, #12, #11, #10, #9, #8, #7, #6, #5, #4, #3, #2, and #1.
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UPDATE 7/27/14 6:17 PM: Here is an Arabic transcription of the below video message:
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Shaykh Abū ‘Abd al-Malik — “And [Because] They Were Deluded In Their Religion By What They Were Inventing” (Ar)
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To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
NOTE: For prior parts in the Clear Banner series you can view an archive of it all here.
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“Let Him Eat Leaves”: North Caucasians Aligned to Islamic State Slam Caucasus Emirate Emir
By Joanna Paraszczuk
A recent video address by Caucasus Emirate (CE) Emir Ali Abu Muhammad stating that North Caucasians in Syria ought to have backed Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN) and accusing the Islamic State’s (IS) military Emir in Syria Umar Shishani of worsening the fitna between IS and JAN, has unleashed a flood of responses and counter-responses from North Caucasian jihadis in various factions.
North Caucasians in or aligned with IS spoke out harshly against Abu Mohammad and the CE-affiliated group Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar (JMA), while those close to JMA expressed support for Abu Mohammad while slamming IS.
The storm has also prompted another prominent Chechen foreign fighter in Syria, Muslim Abu Walid Shishani, Emir of the independent faction Junud a-Sham, to break his long silence in a lengthy audio message discussing the “fitna in Sham,” IS, and Umar Shishani.
Previously, I examined the growing rift in Syria between North Caucasians aligned to the Caucasus Emirate, and those aligned to IS, over concepts of jihad. An exploration of some of the responses prompted by Abu Mohammad’s video message will help shed more light on this fault line. It will also show how, for North Caucasian jihadis in Syria, the question of loyalties, including with relation to the jihad “back home”, is a major cause of this rift.
1. ALI ABU MOHAMMAD’S CRITICISMS
In his video address, CE Emir Ali Abu Mohammad attempts to gain ideological and practical control not only over the CE-affilated Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, but over all North Caucasians in Syria. He makes several main points (for an English translation, click here). These chiefly reflect his concerns over how North Caucasian participation in Syria affects the CE and the North Caucasian insurgency.
Abu Mohammad’s main points are:
1. North Caucasians wishing to fight in Syria have posed an ideological/ theological conundrum for the CE [1]. While some hadith implied Muslims could and should fight in Sham, others implied that one should fight “the closest enemy”. Abu Mohammad takes a harder line on this than his predecessor Dokku Umarov, stating that, “We did not find even one scholar calling for the brothers who are fighting in their own land, to leave the Jihad at home, and join the Jihad in Syria.”
While Abu Mohammad poses this problem as a matter of theology, in reality the issue of Caucasians in Syria is about resources, and (to some extent) prestige: the jihad in the North Caucasus needs fighters, and why should this struggle be marginalized? He admits, “We hoped that [Caucasians in Syria] would return to their home country after taking part in the jihad in Syria so we could share our experience with them, and that they would help us. This is because we have a severe shortage of brothers.”
2. The decision to form JMA went against the instructions of the CE, who told North Caucasian fighters not to form a CE battalion in Syria, but rather to join the “oldest and most legitimate” jamaat. Abu Mohammad deems this to be Jabhat al-Nusra. The CE also instructed fighters not to make video or other addresses. By disobeying, North Caucasians have made it known to “the Kuffar”—Abu Mohammad is of course referring to Russia—that the CE are fighting in Syria, making it harder for Caucasians to return home and fight there.
3. Abu Mohammad makes a personal address to two individuals: Umar Shishani, and his deputy Abu Jihad. Umar Shishani’s decision to join IS was mistaken, according to Abu Mohammad. Umar then disobeyed orders by failing to maintain a neutral stance in the fitna. Umar should not speak on behalf of the CE, should stay out of politics because he does not express himself well, and should return to JMA, Abu Mohammad insists. Regarding Abu Jihad, Abu Mohammad says the CE does not know who he is.
2. REACTIONS FROM NORTH CAUCASIANS IN AND ALIGNED TO IS
North Caucasian fighters in Syria and their factions maintain a network of social media accounts—mostly on Russian social networking site VKontakte—and Web sites. Many of these published criticisms of Abu Muhammad’s address, of the Caucasus Emirate in general, and of the Caucasus Emirate’s representatives in Turkey in particular.
Sham Today (ST), a VK account run by North Caucasian fighters in ISIS, published a multi–part response to the CE Emir’s address.
Like other IS-affiliated jihadis, ST was particularly incensed by what the writer saw as a personal attack by Abu Muhammad on Umar Shishani and Abu Jihad.
Beyond this, ST’s reactions also shed light onto how at least some IS jihadis perceive the jihad in Syria in relation to the insurgency in the North Caucasus. It is notable that IS-affiliated fighters, while setting themselves apart from the CE, still emphasize that they are North Caucasians, and even question whether JMA/CE affiliated fighters are “true” North Caucasians, and/or whether they truly can claim the North Caucasian jihadi heritage.
Rather than considering the North Caucasian struggle as separate from that in Syria, ST’s response suggests it wants to consider both conflicts as part of a wider transnational jihad. ST’s response also demonstrates that its writer does not consider himself obedient to the CE: the writer is careful to express solidarity with “brothers fighting in the Caucasus,” not “with the Caucasus Emirate.”
With regard to the CE itself, ST dismisses the group as out of touch with the situation in Syria (and by extension with the true state of global jihadi affairs):
The CE leadership have no clue what is really happening in Sham. It’s entire knowledge resource is the internet, non-objective tales from CE representatives in Turkey, and other non-objective opinion.
ST argues that the CE’s presence in Syria has always been limited to a small group; that Umar was not, as Abu Muhammad claimed, sent by the CE to Syria; and that Umar never had an oath of allegiance to the CE, though he “respected Dokku Umarov.” Rather, Umar was the Emir of a multiethnic faction, JMA, within which the CE-affiliated fighters were a small, discrete group with their own Emir. Writing of Umar’s decision to pledge allegiance to then-ISIS, ST emphasizes that Umar’s jamaat did not only include North Caucasians:
That night, Emir Umar and the first group gave bayat to ISIS and it was clear that the whole Muhajireen wal-Ansar brigade and its Emirs would go to ISIS, these were Caucasians, Arabs, Turks, Azerbaijanis, Europeans, Uzbeks, Tajiks, and others. The only ones who didn’t go was the CE group.
ST further claims that the CE had tried to press its own, local goals among North Caucasians in Syria, thus hindering the jihad, by sending representatives from Istanbul to interfere with Umar. Rather than supporting these jihadis in fighting the Kuffar on the global stage, the CE pushed its narrow, national interests, browbeating Umar into agreeing to train and send CE Mujahideen back to the Caucasus:
Representatives of the CE came to Syria from Turkey, ranted at Umar as per usual and told him how it was hard for them and what the situation in the Caucasus was, that he had to help the Caucasus and send brothers home, prepare them, unite them, and whatnot. After multiple negotiations, Umar knew he would have a ton of problems with them and that it would really distract him as he actively waged jihad in Sham… so he agreed. After all, he himself is from the Caucasus, he is pained and suffers because of the position of the Mujahideen in the Caucasus, as do we all, he really loved and respected Dokku Abu Usman…
Despite this, the CE refused to support its faction in Syria, leaving their welfare to Umar:
All the CE in Syria jamaat’s expenses were paid for by Umar’s jamaat. Food, weapons, cars, visits to Turkey and Europe, sending cash to the Caucasus, treating brothers…they didn’t have a single ruble to spend, it all came from Umar…
In warning the CE that it is alienating the wider ummah by criticizing IS and Umar, ST positions itself as part of that ummah within the wider jihad. Rather than seeing Abu Muhammad as the Emir of all North Caucasian jihadis, ST implies he is but a small, Russian-speaking fish in a very big jihadi pond:
We advise you to change your informants…whoever shows friendship to infidels and does not show hatred toward them..is in a bad position. This video is already translated into Arabic and the entire Ummah and most mujahideen are watching this video on the lands of jihad… in Syria, in Iraq, in Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere. The reaction is negative and many are asking us, “how can the Mujahideen of the Caucasus and their Emir talk that way and insult us and our Emirs…Maybe we only knew their good side…”
3. JAISH AL-MUHAJIREEN WAL ANSAR: UMAR BROKE HIS OATH
In response to these criticisms, CE fighters published a rebuttal on the pro-CE VK account Ajr ot Allakha Subhanu wa Tag’alya SHAM, stressing their loyalty to the CE and Abu Muhammad:
[A]fter our Emir, Ali Abu Muhammad clarified his position regarding the fitna in Syria, some began to unleash on our Emir a barrage of criticism with with explanations about the fitna in Syria, totally humiliating the dignity of the Mujahideen of the Caucasus Emirate in the blessed land of Sham.
Arguing that both Umar and Abu Jihad had in fact pledged allegiance to Dokku Umarov, the rebuttal concludes that both men have broken that oath by swearing to ISIS. Umar and his followers, they argue, should not have broken their first oath to Umarov, because the conditions had not arisen to allow them to do so. CE jihadis, even those fighting in Syria, cannot relinquish their allegiance to the CE until there is a single Emir to whom all Muslims
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To inquire about a translation for this article for a fee email: [email protected]
UPDATE 8/17/14 10:06 PM: Here is an English translation of the below Arabic video message:
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NOTE: For previous parts in this video series see: #85, #84, #83, #82, #81, #80, #79, #78, #77, #76, #75, #74, #73, #72, #71, #70, #69, #68, #67, #66, #65, #64, #63, #62, #61, #60, #59, #58, #57, #56, #55, #54, #53, #52, #51, #50, #49, #48, #47, #46, #45, #44, #43, #42, #41, #40, #39, #38, #37, #36, #35, #34, #33, #32, #31, #30, #29, #28, #27, #26, #25, #24, #23, #22, #21, #20, #19, #18, #17, #16, #15, #14, #13, #12, #11, #10, #9, #8, #7, #6, #5, #4, #3, #2, and #1.
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To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
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To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Jabhat al-Nuṣrah — “Monthly Harvest Of the Network Correspondents For the Month of June 2014”
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For jihadists, the Syrian war recalls Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s for various reasons. Perhaps most notably, in both conflicts groups traveled from other battlefields to fight and train for future jihad upon returning home. This comparison truly signals Syria’s emergence as the epicenter of the global jihadist movement, even if more attention has rightly been given in recent weeks to Iraq. Just as events in Afghanistan spawned many later insurgencies and terrorist attacks, many future threats will now likely emanate from or have a connection back to Syria.
During the latter years of the anti-Soviet jihad in the 1980s and, later, the fight against the Afghan puppet communist regime and the Taliban’s rise in the 1990s, individuals from jihadist national groups and, in some cases, the groups themselves traveled to Afghanistan to set up camp, train, and acquire new skills. Most often, these groups used the Afghan safe haven to escape harassment within their home countries. The groups also used Afghanistan as a planning site for insurgencies and terrorist attacks at home, with some such endeavors receiving seed money from al-Qaeda’s Usama bin Laden. Unlike the national jihadist groups, al-Qaeda focused on providing training for foreign-fighter insurgencies in central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans. Al-Qaeda was also involved in planning terrorist attacks against Western targets, interests, or the states themselves.
Beyond the known cases of al-Qaeda terrorist attacks, national jihadist groups that graduated from Afghanistan include the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Algerian Armed Islamic Group, and Egyptian al-Gamaa al-Islamiyah. All were involved in multiyear insurgencies in the early- to mid-1990s that killed many innocents. Other low-level insurgencies or terrorist attacks played out in Tunisia with the Tunisian Combat Group, in Morocco with the Moroccan Islamic Combat Group, in Uzbekistan with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), in China with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, in Indonesia with Jemaah Islamiyah, and in Yemen with the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army. Whereas many of these groups evoke the past, Syria is producing its own new generation of national jihadist groups, in addition to the global leaders, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) — now the Islamic State (IS) — and Jabhat al-Nusra (JN).
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