The Archivist: Unseen Islamic State Financial Accounts for Deir az-Zor Province

NOTE: For prior parts in The Archivist series you can view an archive of it all here. And for his older series see: Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril on Jihad.

Unseen Islamic State Financial Accounts for Deir az-Zor Province
By Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi

The question of where the Islamic State [IS] acquires its funding has been a subject of much discussion. Though ideological partisans often see a private Gulf Arab funding hand behind IS, the general consensus now seems to accept that IS is not dependent on foreign donors in any meaningful way, and thus largely acquires its revenues from resources within the territories it operates, including taxation, sales of oil and gas, antiquities and the like. Thus, the majority of the debate now focuses on trying to determine the relative importance of each of these sources of revenue.

A number of analyses have been produced relying on local sources within Iraq and Syria, and in this regard I highly recommend Die Zeit’s investigation from December 2014, the fruit of a team of researchers including my colleague Yassin Musharbash.

However, a deficiency in all the work thus far on IS finances is a lack of statistics from IS itself on income and expenditures, and so a degree of guesswork in estimating has always been involved. The exclusive documents that will be presented below- obtained from IS’ Diwan Bayt al-Mal (financial ministry) in eastern Syria’s Deir az-Zor province (Wilayat al-Kheir)- provide a remedy in giving a first time view of IS budgets by its own account for the month of Rabi’ al-Awal 1436 AH (c. 23 December 2014-22 January 2015).

For context, Deir az-Zor province has been almost entirely under the control of IS since July 2014, while a regime presence still holds out in parts of Deir az-Zor city and at a military airport. In defeating the rebels in Deir az-Zor province, IS has gained a monopoly on oil and gas resources in the province. The province’s long-standing importance to the oil and gas sector of the Syrian economy is well-known, and it undoubtedly constitutes the largest pool of oil and gas resources in Syria that IS has been able to exploit.

As part of its narrative of ‘breaking the borders’ between Syria and Iraq, IS created a ‘Euphrates Province’ that spans eastern Deir az-Zor province and western Anbar province, including the districts of Albukamal in Syria and al-Qa’im, Rawa and Anah in Iraq.

Figures in the documents help us to quantify IS financing. From IS’ richest province in fossil fuels, revenues and expenditures for the province come in the form of millions of dollars on a monthly basis, not tens or hundreds of millions. Further, despite the significant holdings of oil and gas resources, these sources of revenue by no means constitute the majority of IS’ income in the province. Statistically, revenue streams for the province can be divided as follows using the data from the documents:

Source Percentage of Revenue
Oil & Gas 27.7%
Electricity 3.9%
Taxes 23.7%
Confiscations 44.7%


As can be seen, a plurality of the income actually comes from confiscations of property and money. This may take place for a number of reasons: e.g. residents who fled their homes, violations of IS regulations and illicit smuggling of goods, particularly forbidden items like cigarettes and alcohol. Movement across border areas is important in this regard when combined also with transit fees for legitimate travel and transportation of goods.

Meanwhile, IS’ expenditures primarily go towards military upkeep in the form of expenditures for bases and paying fighters’ salaries. Conspicuously absent from the expenditures are accounts for salaries of workers officially under the authority of the Diwan al-Ta’aleem (education). The reason for this is that the IS process of revamping the education system in accordance with its ideology required the closing of many schools in this period to subject teachers and staff to ‘repentance’ and Shari’a lessons, while the regime continued to pay salaries though under strict conditions for the recipients to come in person to the relevant places stipulated by the regime. Note that the Islamic Police comes under the Diwan al-Hisba working closely with IS’ judiciary department (Diwan al-Qada wa al-Mazalim), and both these diwans play key roles in confiscations of goods and property. Here is the breakdown of expenditures by percentage.

Expenditure Percentage of Expenditure
Expenditures for bases 19.8%
Fighters’ salaries 43.6%
Media 2.8%
Islamic Police 10.4%
Diwan al-Khidamat (Services Department) 17.7%
Diwan Bayt al-Mal: aid sums 5.7%

Some more points of analysis to consider:

– Popular conceptions of IS income need to have a more sober and realistic perspective on the role oil and gas revenues. Daily revenues from the oil wells here (total divided by 30) yield on average $66,433. If this is the average revenue from IS’ best oil holdings in Syria and one engages in reasonable extrapolation, then one will come nowhere near the total figure of $3 million a day for IS in oil sales that was widely touted in the media in summer 2014, even when making allowances for subsequent damage to infrastructure from coalition airstrikes. A sounder estimate would put such income at no more than 5-10% of that figure.

– On a related historical note, one should dismiss accounts that portray IS’ predecessors as being suddenly enriched from eastern Syrian oilfields and antiquities beginning in late 2012, based on hearsay about alleged computer flash sticks revealing IS finances and off-base regarding the dynamics of control of eastern Syrian oil over the course of the Syrian civil war (pace the Guardian report, IS’ predecessor ISIS did not exist in late 2012, let alone ‘commandeer’ eastern Syrian oilfields).

– The sale of antiquities under the authority of the antiquities subdivision of the Diwan al-Rikaz is not explicitly mentioned in the accounts here, but it is most likely included within taxation as part of the IS bureaucratic structure. Documents captured from the Abu Sayyaf raid by U.S. forces appear to show a 20% tax to be paid on antiquities sold in Deir az-Zor province. Two of the individual transactions presented from December 2014 illustrate tax payments of more than $10,000, while the third constitutes a little over $1000.

– Despite IS’ propaganda on ‘breaking the borders’ and the creation of ‘Euphrates Province’, the inclusion of Albukamal within Deir az-Zor province financial data and transactions is an example of how IS still deals in prior administrative boundaries. Compare with  a previous July 2015 document I published from Wilayat al-Kheir’s Diwan al-Khidamat ordering for an Abu Dujana al-Libi to be paid $100,000 for a road project between Albukamal and al-Qa’im. Other administrative documents from ‘Euphrates Province’ indicate that IS administration rarely seems to deal with the territory as a united entity, but rather by its Syrian and Iraqi halves. This is so even as travel within ‘Euphrates Province’ is relatively easy, as a friend of mine from Rawa now works in Albukamal, and residents on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border regularly cross both ways for business, market shopping etc.

– Ultimately, the most vital IS revenues depend on the continued existence of its bureaucratic structure within the territories it controls, and there is little one can do to disrupt that short of destroying that structure militarily. The suggested siege-like strategy to trigger a collapse from within is impossible to realize in the current circumstances, as one cannot wholly isolate IS territory from interactions with the outside world, and so cash flows will continue. The Iraqi government’s decision to cut off direct salary payments to workers in IS-held areas will certainly help reduce IS taxation revenues, but it was not the sole avenue for cash flow, and though hardships for residents will increase, IS’ rigid security apparatus is still highly capable of suppressing major revolt.

Below are the documents with translation.

ISEconomy

Islamic State
Wilayat al-Kheir
Diwan Bayt al-Mal
Bayt al-Mal Administration
15 Rabi’ al-Thani 1436 AH
5 February 2015

Rough draft of the operation of the management of wealth project.
Bayt al-Mal in Wilayat al-Kheir
Copy to the Diwan al-Wilaya [governor’s office]
Copy to the Diwan al-Hisba [checks for potential irregularities in the records etc.]

Uncirculated

ISEconomy2

In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Table of accounts for Wilayat al-Kheir for the month of Rabi’ al-Awal of the year 1436 AH

Table for income to the treasury of Wilayat al-Kheir.

Wilayat al-Kheir Albukamal Al-Mayadeen Al-Badiya Borders Tajammu’at [Deir az-Zor area residential districts]
Oil wells $820,000 $513,000 $630,000 $30,000
Gas $12,000 $330,000
Electricity $53,000 $68,000 $13,000 $9,000 $188,000
Taxes $611,000 $313,000 $297,000 $577,000 $200,000
Confiscations $33,000 $17,000 $280,000 $2,700,000 $744,000

Total accounting of income for the treasury of the Wilaya for the month of Rabi’ al-Awal of the year 1436 AH from the centre of Wilayat al-Kheir, Albukamal, al-Mayadeen, al-Badiya and the border centres for the Wilaya is $8,438,000.

ISEconomy3

Table of confiscations for the month of Rabi’ al-Awal of the year 1436 AH:

Wilayat al-Kheir Albukamal Al-Mayadeen Al-Badiya Borders Tajammu’at
House 6 17 56
Car 3 2 80 11
Truck 1 11 36
Material sums $2000 $1300 $13,000 $480,000
Land
(in dunams)
180 dunams 20
Forbidden items Cigarettes: 3000 packs 100 cases of cigarettes 1200 cases of cigarettes
Livestock 93 600 head of sheep 1320 head of sheep, 50 cows

In what follows is a table of expenditures for Wilayat al-Kheir for the month of Rabi’ al-Awal of the year 1436 AH:

ISEconomy4

Expenditure for the bases: “Provision of food” etc. in the centre of the wilaya $262,000
Expenditure for the bases: “Provision of food” etc. in al-Mayadeen $130,000
Expenditure for the bases: “Provision of food” etc. in Albukamal $98,000
Expenditure for the bases: “Provision of food” etc. in the Badiya $512,000
Expenditure for the bases: “Provision of food” etc.: airport $104,000
Mujahid allowance [monthly salaries for fighters] from the city centre $600,000
Mujahid allowance from al-Mayadeen and Albukamal $480,000
Mujahid allowance from the Badiya $1,360,000
Media centre $155,000
Islamic Police centres $580,000
Diwan al-Khidamat for the centre and countryside of the wilaya $988,000
Diwan Bayt al-Mal: aid sums $318,000
Total $5,587,000


Zakat taxes in Wilayat al-Kheir for the month of Rabi’ al-Awal of the year 1436 AH:
ISEconomy5

Zakat on wheat:

. $300,000 distributed upon [i.e. imposed as zakat taxation on] the cultivated lands in ‘wheat’ in Wilayat al-Kheir, without taking into account the kusur of the zakat [zakat that could not be paid] for the year 1435 AH, and accounting of zakat will be accomplished in the month of Rabi’ al-Awal every year.

Zakat on barley:

. $170,000 distributed upon the cultivated land in ‘barley’ in Wilayat al-Kheir,

al-Furāt Media Foundation presents a new video message from The Islamic State: "And I Hastened To You, My Lord, That You Be Pleased"

The title of this release is in reference to Qur’anic verse 20:84. Here it is in full: “He said, ‘They are close upon my tracks, and I hastened to You, my Lord, that You be pleased.'”

CQJuYcrUkAA3X6G

_____________________

To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
 

Hizballah Cavalcade: Al-Quwat al-Ja’afariyah & Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya: The Building of an 'Islamic Resistance' in Syria

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

Al-Quwat al-Ja’afariyah & Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya: The Building of an “Islamic Resistance” in Syria
By Phillip Smyth
Al-Quwat al-Jafariyah
Figure 1: The logo belonging to Al-Quwat al-Ja’afariyah’s Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayyah. The symbol features two golden Kalashnikov-type rifles flanking the white dome of the Sayyida Ruqayyah shrine. The group’s logo bears many similarities to Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuahda’s. Both feature a shrine dome in the center of a roundel flanked by Kalashnikov-type rifles.
Since the creation of Syria’s pro-Assad National Defense Forces (NDF), there has been a rise in Syria-based sectarian militia groups with Iranian training and advisors.  Al-Quwat al-Ja’afariyah (The Ja’afari Force) has attempted to market itself as one of these types of organizations. The group has also described itself as “al-muqawama al-islamiyah fi suriya” (“The Islamic Resistance in Syria”) and has pushed its own Shia identity mixed with pro-Assad Syrian nationalist and pro-Iranian proxy material. These elements of group identity suggest the militia pulls members from Syria’s small Shia community while still being influenced by external allied actors.
A process where local pro-Assad militias have been modeled off of Lebanese Hizballah has been a continuing development.  This has especially been the case with Alawite-manned and Shia-manned militias.  Syria’s first major Shia militia, Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas (LAFA) maintained close links to the Assad regime and Lebanese Hizballah. Even with Lebanese Hizballah’s aid, local actors such as LAFA’s secretary general, Abu Ajeeb, generally led LAFA’s command and control functions.
Unlike many of the other groups which have also worked closely with Lebanese Hizballah, Al-Quwat al-Ja’afariyah has also claimed to be a Syria-based subdivision belonging to the Iraqi Shia Iran-proxy, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS).
A number of Syria-based Shia militias have their own Iraqi wings and some Iraqi Shia political parties have external branches. Nonetheless, Al-Quwat al-Ja’afariyah is the only Syrian Shia militia which has declared itself as a sub-division of an Iraq-based Iraqi Shia Islamist group, yet began life as a component of an established Assad element (the NDF).
The first prominent mentions of Al-Quwat al-Ja’afariyah or its professed sub-militia Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya came with the April 6, 2013 death of NDF leader Shaker Rashid Darwish (A.K.A. Al-Ja’afari). Despite the group being around for a number of years, it lacked a formal announcement or acknowledgement outside of a small number of accounts on social media. At different times throughout 2014, the group’s members would often pose for photos in their battle dress uniforms. These photos regularly found their way onto mediums such as Facebook and could only be accessed via private Facebook profiles.
Al-Quwat al-Jafariyah2
Figure 2: A militiaman belonging to Liwa al-Saqiyah Ruqayya wearing the group’s distinctive patch.
What set these photos aside from other uploaded images of Syrian and Iraqi Shia militiamen in Syria was that these fighters’ uniforms would feature unique patches. This patch included the group’s name along with a stylized version of the white dome of the Sayyida Ruqayya shrine in Damascus, Syria.
By late August 2015, due to an increased public presence by Al-Quwat al-Ja’afariyah on social media (via KSS’s own media apparatuses), and due to the death of Quwat al-Ja’afariyah commander Hasan Kana’an, more attention was granted by Arabic-language (primarily pro-Syrian rebel) media sources. In early July, Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya established a number of public Facebook pages and was also mentioned in a September 2015 piece by The Guardian (albeit, the group was incorrectly recognized as the “Sayyida Ruqayya Martyrs Brigade”).
What’s In A Name?
The term, “Ja’afari”, helps highlight Al-Quwat al-Ja’afariyah’s denominational membership. “Ja’afari” is often used as a synonym for “Shia Muslim”. Moreover, in the Twelver Shia tradition, Ja’afar al-Sadiq is considered the sixth and longest serving Imam. The majority of Shia Muslims also adhere to the Ja’afari school of jurisprudence.
Liwa Sayyida Ruqayya gets its name from the Sayyida Ruqayya mosque and shrine. Located in Old Damascus, the Sayyida Ruqayya mosque and shrine houses the remains of Sukayna (a.k.a. Ruqayya), the baby daughter of Twelver Shia Islam’s third Imam, Husayn ibn Ali.
Built in 1985 with Iranian funds, the design of the mosque was described by Iran analyst Nigel Coulthard as, “a pure example of post-revolutionary Iranian architecture that would have been more at home in Tehran than Damascus”. Sociology professor Marnia Lazreg claimed a Syrian policeman told her that the mosque, “was controlled by the Iranian government, which claimed its spiritual ownership.” Design and theological/political control aside, the shrine is one of Syria’s major Shia shrines.
Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya & The Militia’s Stages of Development
The main militia falling under the header of Al-Quwat al-Ja’afariyah is Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya (The Brigade of Sayyida Ruqayya). At the time of this writing, no other groups have yet been listed as under Quwat al-Ja’afariyah’s umbrella. The continual grouping of these two elements suggests that the groups may be one in the same, as opposed to it being a legitimate sub-militia which reports to a larger umbrella-style grouping or a parent organization.
Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya has claimed to be active in the Midan section of southern Damascus and to have fought in Jobar, Otaiba, Dekhania, and other sections to the north and east of Damascus. The group was also deployed to Shaykh Miskin in southern Syria.
Family connections between the group’s members is another noticeable trend. This speaks to how recruitment seeks new members and also shows the limited numbers from which it can recruit. During the militia’s participation in the November 2013 battles around Otaiba, Ali Mahmoud Darwish (A.K.A. Karar) and the 16 year-old fighter, Jawad Abbas Darwish (A.K.A. Abu Turab), were both killed. Reportedly, these fighters were cousins and were likely related to Shaker Rashid Darwish.
Al-Quwat al-Jafariyah3
Figure 3: The Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya martyrdom poster for Hasan Ahmed Kana’an. He is listed as a “martyr commander”. Additionally, Liwa al-Sayyida al-Ruqayya is described as, “The Islamic Resistance in Syria”. Interestingly, despite the group’s links to Irqi KSS, on this poster the “Islamic Resistance in Syria and Lebanon” is mentioned and not  the“Islamic Resistance in Iraq”.
There were number of developmental stages for the current Quwat al-Ja’afariyah and Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya. The first began with its inception as an NDF sub-militia in 2013. Then, the group’s fighters appeared under a number of different monikers. These names included, Huras al-Sayyida Ruqayya (The Guardians of Sayyida Ruqayya) and Liwa Ansar al-Husayn (The Brigade of the Supporters of Husayn). Whether these groups are still in existence, were little more than temporary fronts, or are elements of other units is unknown.
Al-Quwat al-Jafariyah4
Figure 4: A “martyrdom” poster featuring killed Liwa al-Sayyida Ruqayya members under the header, “Huras al-Sayyida Ruqayya”.
Still, during this initial stage, there was more direct linkages to the NDF and the Assad regime. Images promoting pro-Assad Syrian nationalism were a regular feature. The second stage of development, which immediately followed (if not coincided with the first), was the addition of links to Lebanese Hizballah. “Martyrdom”