New article from Shaykh Ḥussayn bin Maḥmūd: "Us and Iran"

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

كانت إيران “محمد رضا بهلوي” الرافضي العلماني في منتهى التفسخ والإنحلال الخلقي ، وقد عاثت “المزدكية” فساداً في المجتمع الإيراني ، ولولا الإسلام لكان فسّاق أوروبا المعاصرة تلاميذ عند الفرس ، وقد حفظ الله تعالى بقية باقية في هذه الدولة بالإسلام الذي حاربه هذا الرجل بمنعه للحجاب مما أدى إلى ثورات عارمة استغلها “الخميني” الوصولي القابع في فرنسا لينقلب على “بهلوي” ويعلنها “جمهورية إسلامية” ثورية صفّق لها جل العالم الإسلامي بكل حرارة ليكتشفوا بعدها بسنوات أنها عنصرية فارسية طائفية تحارب الإسلام والمسلمين باسم التشيع وحب آل البيت ، ولولا فضل الله على الأمة باندلاع شرارة الجهاد الأفغاني ضد السوفييت في نفس الوقت لاستطاعت الخمينية ابتلاع العالم الإسلامي بشعاراتها الرنانة المرتكزة على الثورة الإسلامية المعادية للغرب والصهيونية !!

وضع الخميني “خطة خمسينية” لتصدير الثورة الرافضية الفارسية إلى العالم الإسلامي ، وعمل على توفير ميزانية ضخمة لتحقيق هدفه في استعادة مجد الإمبراطورية الساسانية ، فأرسل الدعاة إلى آسيا الوسطى وأوربا وأفريقيا وشرق آسيا والدول العربية ، وأنفق مئات الملايين من الدولارات ليحرف الناس عن دينهم إلى دين الرفض المجوسي الصفوي المعادي للإسلام ، فنجح عن طريق التغلغل في الأوساط الصوفية والبدعية ، وعن طريق كل من يخالف أهل السنة ، وعن طريق بعض المسلمين الذين انخدعوا بشعارات ثورته “الإسلامية” البراقة ، وعمل على جذب الكثير من أبناء المسلمين للدراسة في “قم” تحت إشراف ملالي الفرس الحاقدين على الصحابة الذين أسقطوا الامبراطورية الساسانية الفارسية منذ أكثر من ألف وأربعمائة سنة ..

كان انتقام الفرس المجوس من المسلمين ابشع انتقام : حيث حرّفوا دين التوحيد ، ونشروا الشرك والفساد ، وقتلوا أبناء الصحابة باسم حب آل البيت ، أخذوا أخماس أموال المسلمين ، وهتكوا أعراض بناتهم باسم المتعة ، ورغم هذا كله انتشر الرفض بين المغفلين من المسلمين في كثير من البلاد ، وتحقق هدف عبد الله بن سبأ اليهودي في الانتقام من الإسلام ، فاجتمع حقد بني ساسان مع خبث اليهود ، ودان أتباع المذهب الرافضي بالولاء المطلق لإيران ومعمميها الفرس الشعوبيين الحاقدين ليكونوا الطابور الخامس في أي تحرك إيراني مستقبلي ضد الأمة الإسلامية ..

بينما كانت حكوماتنا تنشر بين المسلمين : “وثن الوطنية” ، وسخافة “التعايش السلمي” ، وتفاهة “الحوار المذهبي” ، كانت إيران تغذي في نفوس أتباعها : البغض لكل ما هو سنّي ، والكفر بالكذبة الوطنية ، والاستهزاء بالتعايش السلمي والحوار المذهبي ، مع إعمال التقية في كل هذا ..

استطاعت إيران أن تبني سياجاً حديدياً على مخططاتها المستقبلية ، وبقيت أعمالها طي الكتمان لسنوات طويلة تعمل خلالها على تقوية جيشها ونشر دعاتها واستقطاب الكوادر العلمية من شتى بقاع الأرض ، وقد استفادت إيران من تفتت الإتحاد السوفييتي لتستقطب علماء الذرة المسلمين ومهندسي الصناعات الحربية من الجمهوريات السابقة وتدفع لهم ما يطلبون مقابل تطوير التكنلوجيا الإيرانية ، ومقابل تشيّع بعضهم ، بينما كانت الدول العربية في ذات الوقت تستقطب المومسات الروسيات من هذه الدول ، وتبحث عن تعاون اقتصادي هنا وهناك في مجال السلع الاستهلاكية ، وتحاول استقطاب الأموال الروسية لاعادة تدويرها فيما يسمى “بغسيل الأموال” لتدخل في جيوب المتنفذين عندنا فتزيدها تخمة !!

سقط الإتحاد السوفييتي بفضل الله عز وجل ، ثم بسبب المجاهدين في أفغانستان ، وشارك الرافضة (الهزارة) في الجهاد الأفغاني ، وكان على رأس القادة الروافض “محمد إسماعيل خان” صاحب “هراة” الذي لقي دعماً كبيراً من إيران ، وقد وفد إليه الكثير من الرافضة للقتال في صفه ضد السوفييت ، ثم ضد طالبان ، ولما رجع هؤلاء إلى إيران : استقبلتهم الحكومة الإيرانية استقبال الفاتحين ، وأعطتهم المناصب في الجيش الإيراني ، بعكس ما فعلته الدول العربية بأبناءها المجاهدين الذين أودعتهم السجون بتهمة الإرهاب ، وطاردتهم وشردتهم في البلاد ، وكان على رأس هؤلاء الشيخ المجاهد “أسامة بن لادن” رحمه الله وتقبله في الشهداء ، والذي قال لي في شأنه تاجر صيني في ذلك الوقت : “لو كان أسامة فينا لصنعنا له صنماً ولعبدناه” !!

أهملت إيران الكثير من البنى التحتية لتفرغ لبناء المفاعلات النووية والغواصات ولتطور منظومتها الصاروخية وصناعتها العسكرية ، بينما انشغلت بعض الدول العربية – في نفس الوقت – ببناء ناطحات سحاب يتطاولون فيها ، وإنشاء مسارح وملاعب رياضية ودور سينما وأسواق تجارية ، وبينما كانت إيران تربي أجيالاً من “العلماء” و”طلبة العلم” على نشر مذهبها في شتى بقاع الأرض لتضمن ولاء المخدوعين ، كانت الدول العربية تسجن علماءها وطلبة علمها بدعوى الإرهاب ، ونية قلب أنظمة الحكم ، والفساد ، ونشر الفوضى وغيرها من التهم الفرعونية !! وبينما كانت إيران تدرّب الكتائب في بلادها باسم “القدس” و”فلسطين” وتعمل على كسب ود الفصائل الفلسطينية ، كانت الحكومات العربية توقّع اتفاقات سلام مع يهود ، وتحارب الفصائل الفلسطينية باسم محاربة الإرهاب !!

استطاعت إيران التغلغل في البلاد الإسلامية باستقدام قادة الحركات الشيعية إلى إيران وتمويلهم بسخاء وتدريبهم ، وأرسلت إليهم الكتب والدعاة في بلادهم لتكسب ولاء هذه الحركات ، ثم سلطت عليهم الإذاعات ثم القنوات الفضائية ، فدخلت إيران : لبنان واليمن والمنطقة الشرقية في بلاد الحرمين والبحرين والكويت والإمارات والسودان والجزائر والمغرب وسوريا وفلسطين والعراق وجيبوتي وأريتريا ونيجيريا والسنغال ودول شرق ووسط آسيا وغيرها من البلاد ، واستطاعت تغيير عقائد بعض الفرق المنحرفة إلى العقيدة الرافضية الإثنا عشرية : كالجارودية الزيدية (الحوثية) في اليمن ، والنصيرية في سوريا وتركيا ، والإسماعيلية في أفغانستان ، والصوفية في أفريقيا وآسيا الوسطى وشرق آسيا ، واستطاعت إيران الفارسية مزاحمة العرب على سيادة المذهب الإثنا عشري في العراق : فزرعت فيها الفرس ليكونوا مرجعاً للعرب فيها بعد صراع تاريخي مرير بين جانبي الحدود

al-Fārūq Media presents a new statement from Anṣār al-Furqān: "Condolences of the Ummah for Shaykh Hārith al-Naẓārī"

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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: Anṣār al-Furqān — “Condolences of the Ummah for Shaykh Hārith al-Naẓārī”
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To inquire about a translation for this statement for a fee email: [email protected]
 

Check out Phillip Smyth's new Policy Focus for The Washington Institute: "The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional Effects"

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In 2012 and early 2013, media sources were widely reporting the imminent fall of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad regime to Sunni rebel groups. But not long thereafter, it began to show resilience, holding off further rebel advances and even retaking lost ground.
This turnabout was fueled largely by Iran-backed Shiite proxy groups fighting on Assad’s behalf. While these groups often invoked the defense of the Sayyeda Zainab shrine as their rallying cry, their influx into Syria was far from a spontaneous expression of Shiite unity. Indeed, it reflected instead a highly organized geostrategic and ideological effort by Iran to protect its Syrian ally and project power across the Middle East. When fighting spread to neighboring Iraq, many of the Iraq-based proxies regrouped across the border to defend their homeland against advances by The Islamic State.
The web of Iran-backed Shiite proxies is exceedingly complex, with much overlap and many changing aliases. In this new Institute study, Phillip Smyth — author of Hizballah Cavalcade and University of Maryland researcher — deftly navigates these many groups, exploring topics such as the narrative of pan-Shiite jihad, the range of Shiite clerical views on the jihad, recruitment techniques, and weapons used. His discussion compellingly shows why pursuing U.S. regional interests must involve targeting not only ISIS but also its Shiite adversaries.
Click here to read the entire report.

Hizballah Cavalcade: Quwat Sahl Nīnawā: Iraq’s Shia Shabak Get Their Own Militia

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

Quwat Sahl Nīnawā: Iraq’s Shia Shabak Get Their Own Militia
By Phillip Smyth
Liwa Sahl Ninewa
Figure 1: Quwat Sahl Nīnawā’s logo. The Iraqi (left) and Shabak (right) flags emerge out of a map of the Hamdaniya region of the Nineveh Plain. The symbol also features an AK-102 rifle.
Quwat Sahl Nīnawā (A.K.A. Liwa Sahl Nineveh or QSN) purports to be a Shia Shabak militia associated with the Democratic Assembly of Shabaks (Tajema’ al-Shabak al-Dimokrati or DAS).1 QSN announced itself via a November 23, 2014 official statement posted on the website and social media apparatus belonging to the DAS. The group has also already claimed to take casualties in the fight against the Sunni jihadist “Islamic State” (A.K.A. IS, ISIS, or ISIL).2
Liwa Sahl Ninewa2
Figure 2: A QSN fighter poses with martyrdom posters (one featuring the dome of Sayyida Zaynab in Syria – bottom right) and other posters featuring Badr Organization founder Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir Sadr and the first Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini.
Present in the symbols and photos, QSN mixes a limited quantity of Shabak particularism and an added emphasis on Shia identity. On some pages the group has simultaneously promoted links to Iran’s proxy forces. While the group may have relations with Iran’s proxies, its official statements have announced a commitment to “gladly serve the supreme religious authority in Najaf [Grand Ayatollah Sistani].”3 This would likely indicate the group is not an equivalent (in terms of ideology and/or levels of control) to newer Iraqi Shia Iran-proxy militias such as Hizballah al-Abrar.
Photos claiming to show the group training also indicate that they may be assembled along the lines of a “Popular Assembly/Mobilization” or “al-Hashd al-Sha’abi” type group. Photographs of claimed QSN fighters holding flags promoting al-Hashd al-Sha’abi add further credence to this likelihood. Organization along those lines would mean many of the fighters are possibly newer recruits trained and likely led by more experienced personnel and advisors.
In photos of QSN, around 100 fighters were shown posing in ranks. This suggests the numbers for the group are likely in the range of 100-500 combatants.
The creation and promotion of the group may exemplify another method Iran and its proxies are using to place pressure on Kurdish organizations. QSN, as organized along lines of the more dominant Iraqi Arab Shia militias in the south of the country, also demonstrates the direction in which other new militias may be organized. QSN further exemplifies how some of Iraq’s minority groups are mobilizing against ISIS.
The Name & Symbols
QSN’s name directly refers to an area of heavy Shabak habitation, Iraq’s Ninewa (or Nineveh) Plain. Their logo and a post by the Shabak Democratic Assembly describes the group as “Quwat Sahl Nīnawā” or the “Nineveh Plain’s Forces.”4 Albeit, via social media, one page purporting to belong to the group claimed it also went by the name of “Liwa Sahl Nīnawā” or the “Nineveh Plains Brigade”. However, such minor alterations in name are common during the early stages of many new militias.5
The group’s logo also demonstrates a rather rudimentary approach to create symbolism for the new group. Readily available images (including the pictures of an AK-102 rifle, the Shabak and Iraqi flags, and a map of the Hamdaniya area of the Nineveh Plains) were likely pasted together following a simple image search online.6
Liwa Sahl Ninewa3
Figure 3: A QSN fighter poses with a flag associated with the Popular Mobilization type militias.
Liwa Sahl Ninewa4
Figure 4: QSN fighters congregate.
Who Are the Shabak & What is the Nineveh Plain?
The Nineveh Plain is a minority rich area; home to the Shabak, numerous Christian sects (including the Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Syriac Orthodox and Syriac Catholics), Turkmen, Yezidis, and Kurds.7 Considered a heartland for Iraq’s Christians, Assyrian Christian and other Syriac (Aramean, Syriac, and Chaldean) Christian nationalist organizations and political parties have pushed for autonomy in the area.8 There has also been a campaign to make the Nineveh Plain its own province (under primarily Christian leadership) within the Iraqi federal framework.9 Nevertheless, the Plain has not been granted a truly autonomous standing.
Many Shabak insist they have a unique ethnic identity, which is neither Arab nor Kurd (albeit, primarily non-Kurdish).10 The group also speaks its own language, Shabaki.11 Most Shabak are also religiously (Twelver) Shia.12
Within the Nineveh Plain, the Shabak primarily live in villages to the east of the city of Mosul, in the Hamdaniya area, and a few thousand also lived in the city of Mosul (before the invasion). Due to ISIS advances, many Shabak hamlets have been overrun.
The Democratic Assembly of Shabak & Issues With the Kurds
While QSN was ostensibly created as a Shabak arm to fight back ISIS threats and offensives targeting the Shabak, there are other underlying trends present with the creation of the militia associated with Shabak-Kurdish relations.
Kurdish groups have shown interest in further incorporating areas of Shabak habitation into Kurdistan.13 As early as 2008, minority groups including the Shabak claimed there was an effort to “Kurdify” areas they inhabited.14
Along with the promotion of a separate non-Kurdish identity, the DAS’s leader and parliamentarian Hanin Qaddo has specifically called out Kurdish parties for claimed abuses against the Shabak. In 2008 Qaddo opposed the incorporation of Shabak inhabited areas into Iraqi Kurdistan.15 Two years later, Qaddo denounced the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) for “intimidating” Shabak voters.16 In 2012 the Shabak leader demanded the expulsion of Kurdish and Christian armed forces from the Nineveh Plain.17
With this in mind, QSN’s establishment also recalls the 2012 decision by then Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to allow for the creation of a 500-man Shabak militia force referred to as, “The Shabak Regiment of Doom.”18
For their part, many Kurdish political leaders have not been supportive of independent Shabak efforts to create their own militias. Nevertheless, some of those Kurdish apprehensions were downgraded following the ISIS advance. Thus, QSN has not been the only Shabak armed group to come into existence. However, its other counterpart is under the control of Kurdish military commanders.19 Whereas QSN is organized along lines set by Baghdad-supported Shia militias and Iran’s proxy groups and does not appear to be taking order from Kurdish commanders.
Tensions between QSN’s DAS parent party and Kurdish parties may explain for QSN’s retention of its independence. The DAS, the largest Shabak Party, is also part of the ruling Iraqi State of Law Coalition. This is the same coalition which included former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the current Iraqi Prime Minister, the Badr Organization and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, among other Iranian proxy groups. Nevertheless, Qaddo has “wavered between the Hakim and Maliki factions,” and then ran on the Badr Organization’s electoral list.20
The increase in Iranian proxy cooperation via training, equipping, and other support also speaks to other issues related to Iran’s and their proxies’ policies in Iraq. The policies in question are particularly focused on Kurdistan. From the summer of 2014 until the present, there has been increased tension between Iran’s Iraqi Shia proxies and Kurdish Peshmerga forces.21 Additionally, Iran’s proxies have also threatened Kurdish leaders such as Masoud Barzani.22
A push for support for a group which has already had problems with Kurdish leadership seems to be another avenue for Tehran to exert pressure on the Kurds. Nevertheless, QSN’s main goals and activities have and will likely remain oriented against the existential threat that is ISIS.
Liwa Sahl Ninewa5
Figure 5: Around 100 QSN are shown in this photo.
Liwa Sahl Ninewa6
Figure 6: QSN Martyrs are shown on a poster featuring the dome of Syria’s Sayyida Zaynab. It is possible the dome was included by graphics designers to demonstrate that the fight in Syria and Iraq, marketed as “protection for shrines”, are one in the same.
Liwa Sahl Ninewa7
Figure 7: The martyrdom poster for Kazem Husayn al-Asharaf (Abu Sajad).
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Notes: 
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1 See: https://www.alshabak.net/ArticlePrint.aspx?ID=457. 2 It is important to note that an Assyrian Christian militia by the same name has also been announced. 3 See: https://www.alshabak.net/ArticlePrint.aspx?ID=479. Often, Iran’s proxies adhere to the religious-ideological concept of absolute Wilayat al-Faqih and religious and political loyalty is given to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. 4 See: https://www.alshabak.net/ArticlePrint.aspx?ID=457. 5 This was the case with Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas. The group was often referred to as “Kata’ib Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas” or “Kata’ib Abu Fadl al-Abbas.” 6 An example of this includes the photo of the AK-102: https://www.avtomats-in-action.com/media3/AK102right3.jpg. 7 See: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28351073. 8 See: https://vaticaninsider.lastampa.it/en/world-news/detail/articolo/iraq-iraq-irak-35369/. 9 See: https://unpo.org/article/16780. 10 See: https://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=2219. 11 See: https://www.cnn.com/2013/09/14/world/meast/iraq-suicide-blast/. 12 Many Sunni Shabak often consider themselves Kurdish. 13 See: https://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2014/06/24/iraqs-minorities-left-between-scorpions-and-a-hard-place/ 14 See: https://www.mcclatchydc.com/2008/11/11/55711/kurdish-expansion-squeezes-northern.html. 15 See: https://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/mp-slams-shabak-demands-for-incorporation-into-kurdistan/. 16 See: https://ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=ELJMKK. 17 See: https://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3134. 18 See: https://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3134. 19 See: https://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3599. 20 See: https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2014/05/23/the-badr-organization-and-the-new-state-of-law/2/. 21 See: https://bit.ly/FP-AllTheAyatollahsMen and https://www.businessinsider.com/r-rivalries-resurface-in-iraqi-town-recaptured-from-islamic-state-2014-12. 22 Ibid.

Hizballah Cavalcade: The Shia Militant Response to Ayatollah Nimr al-Nimr’s Death Sentence

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.
 

The Shia Militant Response to Ayatollah Nimr al-Nimr’s Death Sentence
By Phillip Smyth
Nimr al-Nimr
Ayatollah Sheikh Nimr Baqr al-Nimr, an outspoken radical Saudi Arabian Shia cleric, has been the center of controversy and brewing conflict between Shia protesters, militant Shia groups of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and their respective Sunni governments. According to a 2012 article by Toby Matthiesen, al-Nimr was, “long a peripheral figure in the local Shia power struggle but now seems to have become the most popular Saudi Shia cleric among local youth.”1 His cause and image is spreading across the Middle East as the latest example of Sunni oppression of Shia in the region and his recent death sentence has become a potent rallying cry for regional Shia militant organizations, particularly those with links to Iran.
Arrested in 2012, Nimr was accused by the Saudi government’s Special Criminal Court of making sectarian statements to cause strife, inviting foreign intervention (shorthand for Iranian influence), and disobeying the king. Following his 2012 arrest, thousands took to the streets and Saudi police shot and killed two protesters.2 In mid-October 2014, Nimr was sentenced to be “crucified”, a process where the sheikh will be beheaded and his body displayed.3
Protests in Saudi began in early 2011 and in part addressed anti-Shia discrimination suffered by the group in the Shia majority area in Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern Province; primarily zones around the Shia-majority towns and villages near the city of Qatif.4 Following the 2011 Saudi intervention in Bahrain, protests against the Saudi government increased in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia among Shia protesters.5 Following the 2011-2012 protests, links between Bahrain’s and Saudi Arabia’s protest movement spilled over into the more militant circles which actively promoted Nimr’s defiant stance and a hope to combine their fronts against common foes.
Of further interest are Nimr’s own ideological leanings and how they may relate to Shia militant responses. In Frederic Wehrey’s Sectarian Politics in the Gulf, the sheikh is described as a follower of the late Ayatollah Muhammad al-Shirazi.6 Shirazi was one of the founders of a radical Shia political school of thought referred to as the “Shiraziyya.” Shiraziyya clerics have been some of the most influential in the Arab Shia world. Initially al-Shirazi agreed with the Islamic revolutionary ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini, only to split from Khomeini over issues regarding how the new Islamic state (in Iran post 1979 revolution) should be led.7 In one BBC Arabic report, Nimr had been accused by Riyadh of attempting to spread Wilayat al-Faqih.8 Absolute Wilayat al-Faqih is the Khomeinist concept that serves as the basis for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Nevertheless, it was not clarified whether this was the type of Wilayat al-Faqih Nimr was accused of propagating.
Despite the history of strife between Shirazi’s school of thought and that of Ayatollahs Khomeini and Khamenei, al-Nimr appeared to increase public support for Tehran and send other more mixed messages. In 2008, he had also reportedly stated he supported Iran’s nuclear program by saying any attack against it should be met by a response from the Islamic world. That same year, he also said that Saudi Shia may need to call on foreign support (implying Iran) to help press their issues in Saudi Arabia.9 Later in 2009, Nimr reportedly called for secession, stating during a sermon, “Our dignity is more precious than the unity of this land.”10 His statement came as a response to discrimination against Shia in the kingdom and reflected possible repercussions if certain demands made by Shia protesters were not addressed.
Since 2013, in a piecemeal fashion, social media accounts associated with Iranian proxy groups in Iraq have promoted the images and other supportive statements for Ayatollah Nimr al-Nimr.11 While this does not necessitate that Nimr is a true ally or proxy of Tehran, his message and influence is likely seen by Iran as a cause to be promoted in that country’s wider struggle for the leadership of Shia Islam and as a counter to Saudi Arabia.
Nimr’s deep links and strong voice within the Saudi Shia community, particularly among youthful radicals and other more non-violent protestors, has led to Shia militant groups championing his cause from Bahrain and Iraq. Even in Yemen, Shia supporters of Ansar Allah, more commonly known as the Houthis, even launched demonstrations for the jailed cleric.12 Some Bahraini militant groups, which view the struggle of their coreligionists in a geographically close region of Saudi Arabia, as part and parcel to their conflict with the Khalifa monarchy and their Saudi government supporters. Additionally, powerful Iranian proxy groups based in Iraq—which have also maintained anti-Saudi and anti-Bahraini government narratives—have taken to issuing stern threats against Riyadh for his sentence.
The Violent Replies From Saudi Arabia’s and Bahrain’s Militants
Bahraini militant groups demonstrated the most concerted effort in terms of orchestrating violent retorts to Nimr’s jailing and sentence. While other threats and attacks were conducted since the start of 2014, this piece will focus on more recent threats and attacks beginning in the summer of 2014.
Bahrain’s Saraya al-Mukhtar (SaM), a group which once said the Saudi Shia of the Qatif and the Shia of Bahrain constituted one people with common foes, launched the most attacks over the longest period specifically addressing Ayatollah Nimr al-Nimr’s arrest, trial, and death sentence.
Starting in August, SaM attacked an electricity tower in Ar-Rifā near a Bahraini military base. The group filmed the attack and stated it had been a warning related to the imprisonment and trial of Ayatollah Nimr al-Nimr. Around the same time, SaM also began an online countdown for the Nimr verdict and increased their threats against Saudi Arabia. The group also ratcheted up it’s pro-Nimr messaging with the release of numerous images.
This messaging coincided with Saraya al-Mukhtar making its first direct threat against U.S. military personnel in Bahrain on August 11. Through an image posted to Facebook, SaM stated that, “The American cover on al-Saud and Al_Khalifa crimes,,Marines in bahrain will pay the price. [sic]” The message essentially claimed that the U.S. was the real backer for the Khalifa and Saud monarchies. As a result, they bore equal responsibility and could be targeted.
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Figure 1: Saraya al-Mukhtar’s anti-American message posted on August 11, 2014.
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Figure 2: A Saraya al-Mukhtar photo for Ayatollah Nimr al-Nimr posted on August 8, 2014. The poster reads: “Sheikh Nimr[‘s trial and poor treatment] will make us put all options on the table.”
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Figure 3: A Saraya al-Mukhtar photo posted on August 10, 2014. This poster reads: [in the red box] “A warning from Saraya al-Mukhtar to the mafia of the Sauds [in white text] Harming Sheikh Nimr will make us put all options [on the table]. Harming the Faqih Nimr means every single Saudi national will enter our country in a coffin.”
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Figure 4: A Saraya al-Mukhtar photo for Ayatollah Nimr al-Nimr posted on August 11, 2014. The poster reads: “Do not hesitate, Do not underestimate, No red lines.. after [the] discrimination [against] the Faqih al-Nimr.”
On September 16, SaM announced it had planted 6 explosive devices in retaliation for al-Nimr’s incarceration. Albeit, these bombs did not target U.S. interests and there was little confirmation as to whether any devices were actually planted.
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Figure 5: Saraya al-Mukhtar’s September 16 claim to have planted 6 bombs.
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Figure 6: Saraya al-Mukhtar’s claim of 2 attacks on October 18, 2014.

Then on October 9, SaM claimed to conduct an attack in the town of Karana, Bahrain utilizing an improvised firearm. SaM’s claim of responsibility stated they attacked, “herds of mercenaries” (shorthand for Bahraini police and other security entities). On October 15, SaM claimed to have launched attacks in Sanabis and Aker, Bahrain targeting “mercenaries”. In another statement from that day, the group threatened, “The occupying mafia of al-Saud and al-Khalifa [would face]…consequences for the death sentence.” Later, on October 18, SaM claimed two attacks, referring to them as “Revenge of the Faqih [an expert in Islamic jurisprudence] Nimr.” SaM’s statement declared that it had injured “ranks of the enemy occupier.”
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Figure 7: SMS’s claim of attack in honor of Sheikh Nimr.
Bahraini militant group, Saraya

Hizballah Cavalcade: Ansar Allah al-Awfiyya: One of Many New Khomeinist Militias in Iraq

NOTE: For prior parts in the Hizballah Cavalcade series you can view an archive of it all here.

Ansar Allah al-Awfiyya: One of Many New Khomeinist Militias in Iraq
By Phillip Smyth
Ansar Allah al-Awfiyya
Figure 1: AAA’s logo. The symbol features the fist-gripping-a-Kalashnikov symbol, which is nearly ubiquitous among Iranian proxy groups.
On August 10, 2014, Ansar Allah al-Awfiyya (The Loyal Partisans of God or AAA), a Shia jihadi militia, announced its existence via Facebook and cast itself as a militia whose purpose is to assist in fighting Sunni Jihadi groups such as the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS or the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) and the “Ba’athists” (likely a reference to the Naqshbandi Army or JRTN). Two weeks following its declarations of existence, the group had already reported its first losses.
The group has cast itself as supportive of the Iranian Supreme Leader and attempts to appeal to Iraq’s large Sadrist Movement (Al-Tayyar al-Sadri) by incorporating images of the late Ayatollah Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq Sadr.
Proxy Overlap
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Figure 2: A “martyrdom” poster released for a Liwa al-Hamad militant killed in Syria. The poster was circulated by and featured the logo of KSAI’s media wing.
While new and relatively unheard of, AAA did not emerge from a void. As with other Iranian proxies, the group has listed itself as one of the many groups belonging to “al-Muqawama al-Islamiyyah fi al-Iraq” (“The Islamic Resistance in Iraq”). Yet, its “Muqawama” credentials are simply one piece to a larger interconnected Iranian proxy network.
Shaykh Haydar al-Gharawi, Secretary General of Kayan al-Sadiq w al-‘Atta fi al-Iraq (KSAI or The Group of Honesty and Caring in Iraq) announced AAA as a militia associated with his small Maysan Province based party. LSAI has been politically active since 2012 and has had members serve on Maysan’s provincial council. In June, one LSAI leader on Maysan’s provincial council declared the province would allocate billions of Iraqi dinars to assist with training for volunteer fighters.1
KSAI has also promoted its association with Akram Kaabi, the Secretary General of Liwa al-Hamad’s parent group, Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba. Since HHN has sub-militia groups, such as Liwa Ammar Ibn Yasir and Liwa al-Imam al-Hasan al-Mujtaba, it appears that KSAI has the most extensive links with HHN’s Liwa al-Hamad. These associations were exposed via Facebook posts earlier in 2014 via the posting of “martyrdom” notices from the group about a member killed fighting as part of Liwa al-Hamad. Additionally, the same style of graphics used for Liwa al-Hamad’s online posts are replicated. Further demonstrating the deep links between Liwa al-Hamad and AAA, Liwa al-Hamad’s official Facebook pages have even adopted the logo of AAA.
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Figure 3: A “martyrdom” poster for a HHN member. The image is the same model used by AAA.
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Figure 4: A “martyrdom” poster for Liwa al-Hamad. This model is the same as AAA’s “martyrdom” imagery.
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Figure 5: Liwa al-Hamad’s official Facebook page has also adopted the AAA logo.
Ansar Allah al-Awfiyya has also claimed it is affiliated with Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiyya, (The Movement for the Loyal Partisans of God). It is unknown whether the group is attempting to market itself as a separate or unified movement with LSAI, or simply using the term “Harakat” (“Movement”) to appear larger and/or more developed. Nevertheless, the creation of multiple interlinked groups utilizing commanders who were members of other established organizations is a common strategy within the realm of Iran proxy militias.2
Ansar Allah al-Awfiyya Joins the Battle
AAA has not yet announced the areas of Iraq in which their armed forces are operating. However, other details have emerged. Shaykh Haydar al-Gharawi, the Secretary General of KSAI has now been simultaneously described as AAA’s Secretary General. From released images, the group appears to follow the same types of tactics utilized by other groups when they have gone about asserting their presence in the arena of Iraqi Shia militias. The group has pressed civilian vehicles into service and declared the deaths of two members, including a commander, Muhammad Abdul Amir Ibrahim al-Assadi.
It is likely AAA is organized along the lines of other Iranian proxies, with the militia borrowing fighters from other established organizations in order to appear more powerful and established. Nevertheless, since the group already has a strong regional influence, it is possible it can count on the regional populace it represents to assist with the recruitment of new fighters.
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Figure 6: “Martyrdom” poster for an AAA member announced killed on August 31, 2014.
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Figure 7: AAA commander Muhammad al-Assadi was declared killed while fighting in Iraq in a number of posts on August 24, 2014.
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Figure 8: AAA’s secretary general, is shown in uniform posing in front of a car featuring the group’s logo and a poster of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.
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NOTES:

1 See: https://ar.aswataliraq.info/(S(v2u2chuqssknbk55agdjjo2h))/printer.aspx?id=332936 2 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/iranian-proxies-step-up-their-role-in-iraq.