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Source: Twitter
To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
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Source: Twitter
To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
There are two main reasons for this: 1. pledges are leader-specific rather than group-specific and thus need to be renewed with each succession and 2. it is a way to legitimize al-Qurashi’s rule and create a media event so that the group can promote itself as it transitions to a new phase.
The first reason is also something that IS pointed to when it began to overtly feud with al-Qaeda (AQ) in 2013, by saying that following Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s death, his successor Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir gave baya to the newly created Islamic State of Iraq’s leader Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi and even after Abu ‘Umar was killed, when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi took over in 2010 and then Usamah Bin Laden was killed in 2011, Abu Bakr never publicly gave baya to Ayman al-Zawahiri, even if al-Zawahiri claims he gave it to him privately. Therefore, from the perspective of IS this whole process is not trivial, but important for legitimacy of its leadership and to potentially weed out any insubordination before it manifests into something larger as it already did in the past vis-a-vis AQ.
This post will be updated with the latest official pledges.
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March 11, 2022:
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Karkūk
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah – Lake Chad Basin
Wilāyat al-Shām
Wilāyat al-Ṣūmāl
Wilāyat Sharq Asīā
March 12, 2022:
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – al-Ānbār
Wilāyat al-Yaman
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn
Wilāyat Khurāsān
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah – al-Faruq Region
Wilāyat Lībīyā
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah – Sambissa
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah – Sahel Region
Wilāyat Gharb Ifrīqīyyah – Kerenoa Region
Wilāyat Bākistān
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Shamāl Baghdād
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – al-Janūb
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Diyālā
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Nīnawā
Wilāyat al-Hind
Wilāyat al-‘Irāq – Dijlah
Wilāyat Saynā’
Wilāyat Wasaṭ Ifrīqīyah
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic State — al-Nabā’ Newsletter #329
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Source: RocketChat
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Abu ‘Umar al-Muhājir — Among Them Is He Who Has Fulfilled His Vow [To The Death]
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Source: Telegram
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic State — al-Nabā’ Newsletter #328
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Source: RocketChat
To inquire about a translation for this newsletter issue for a fee email: [email protected]
As the threat of jihadist attacks in Tunisia faded to a manageable issue in recent years, reforms related to professionalization, transparency, and rule of law became central to moving the country’s counterterrorism architecture forward. Yet last year’s coup by President Kais Saied raised new questions about this progress, with observers wondering whether his authoritarian instincts would lead counterterrorism to be politicized as it was prior to the 2011 revolution.
Click here to read the rest.
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic State — al-Nabā’ Newsletter #327
_________________
Source: RocketChat
To inquire about a translation for this newsletter issue for a fee email: [email protected]
—
Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic State — al-Nabā’ Newsletter #326
__________________
Source: RocketChat
To inquire about a translation for this newsletter issue for a fee email: [email protected]
___________________
To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic State — al-Nabā’ Newsletter #325
_________________
Source: RocketChat
To inquire about a translation for this newsletter issue for a fee email: [email protected]