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New video message from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: “Confessions of the Arrested Network of ISIS-Khawarij in Badakhshan”
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Category: The Islamic State
New magazine issue from The Islamic State’s Wilāyat Khurāsān: “Voice of Khurāsān #29″
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For prior issues see: #28, #27, #26, #25, #24, #23, #22, #21, #20, #19, #18, #17, #16, #15, #14, #13, #12, #11, #10, #9, #8, #7, #6, #5, #4, #3, #2, and #1.
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic State’s Wilāyat Khurāsān — “Voice of Khurāsān #29
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Source: Telegram
New video message from The Islamic State’s Wilāyat Khurāsān: “The Afghanistan and Pakistan Emirate”
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Source: RocketChat
To inquire about a translation for this video message for a fee email: [email protected]
New release from The Islamic State’s Wilāyat Khurāsān: “Shariah Assessment of Diplomatic Relations With Infidels”
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic State’s Wilāyat Khurāsān — Shariah Assessment of Diplomatic Relations With Infidels
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Source: RocketChat
To inquire about a translation for this release issue for a fee email: [email protected]
New issue of The Islamic State’s newsletter: “al-Nabā’ #410″
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For prior newsletter issues see: #409, #408, #407, #406, #405, #404, #403, #402, #401, #400, #399, #398, #397, #396, #395, #394, #393, #392, #391, #390, #389, #388, #387, #386, #385, #384, #383, #382, #381, #380, #379, #378, #377, #376, #375, #374, #373, #372, #371, #370, #369, #368, #367, #366, #365, #364, #363, #362, #361, #360, #359, #358, #357, #356, #355, #354, #353, #352, #351, #350, #349, #348, #347, #346, #345, #344, #343, #342, #341, #340, #339, #338, #337, #336, #335, #334, #333, #332, #331, #330, #329, #328, #327, #326, #325, #324, #323, #322, #321, #320, #319, #318, #317, #316, #315, #314, #313, #312, #311, #310, #309, #308, #307, #306, #305, #304, #303, #302, #301, #300, #299, #298, #297, #296, #295, #294, #293, #292, #291, #290, #289, #288, #287, #286, #285, #284, #283, #282, #281, #280, #279, #278, #277, #276, #275, #274, #273, #272, #271, #270, #269, #268, #267, #266, #265, #264, #263, #262, #261, #260, #259, #258, #257, #256, #255, #254, #253, #252, #251, #250, #249, #248, #247, #246, #245, #244, #243, #242, #241, #240, #239, #238, #237, #236, #235, #234, #233, #232, #231, #230, #229, #228, #227, #226, #225, #224, #223, #222, #221, #220, #219, #218, #217, #216, #215, #214, #213, #212, #211, #210, #209, #208, #207, #206, #205, #204, #203, #202, #201, #200, #199, #198, #197, #196, #195, #194, #193, #192, #191, #190, #189, #188, #187, #186, #185, #184, #183, #182, #181, #180, #179, #178, #177, #176, #175, #174, #173, #172, #171, #170, #169, #168, #167, #166, #165, #164, #163, #162, #161, #160, #159, #158, #157, #156, #155, #154, #153, #152, #151, #150, #149, #148, #147, #146, #145, #144, #143, #142, #141, #140, #139, #138, #137, #136, #135, #134, #133, #132, #131, #130, #129, #128, #127, #126, #125, #124, #123, #122, #121, #120, #119, #118, #117, #116, #115, #114, #113, #112, #111, #110, #109, #108, #107, #106, #105, #104, #103, #102, #101, #100, #99, #98, #97, #96, #95, #94, #93, #92, #91, #90, #89, #88, #87, #86, #85, #84, #83, #82, #81, #80, #79, #78, #77, #76, #75, #74, #73, #72, #71, #70, #69, #68, #67, #66, #65, #64, #63, #62, #61, #60, #59, #58, #57, #56, #55, #54, #53, #52, #51, #50, #49, #48, #47, #46, #45, #44, #43, #42, #41, #40, #39, #38, #37, #36, #35, #34, #33, #32, #31, #30, #29, #28, #27, #26, #25, #24, #23, #22, #21, #20, #19, #18, #17, #16, #15, #14, #13, #12, #11, #10, #9, #8, #7, #6, #5, #4, #3, #2, and #1.
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic State — al-Nabā’ Newsletter #410
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Source: RocketChat
To inquire about a translation for this newsletter issue for a fee email: [email protected]
Check out my Congressional Testimony for the Homeland Security Committee’s Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence: “The Future of Homeland Security: Addressing the Rise of Terrorism in Africa”
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Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee for giving me the opportunity to testify today on terrorism threats emanating from parts of the African continent, in particular focusing on issues and recommendations related to the Sahel region, especially in Mali where insecurity is getting worse by the day. There are two main jihadist groups now operating there: the Islamic State’s Sahel Province and Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).
This increased insecurity can be directly linked to the August 2022 withdrawal of French forces operating under the Operation Barkhane counterinsurgency mission. At the time of the French departure, the Mali insurgency had not been deterred or defeated, but it has undoubtedly worsened since. This suggests France at the very least was managing the situation in hopes that a future easing of the political tempest would facilitate a more sustainable resolution. The French withdrew at the request of the government of interim Malian president Assimi Goita, who seized power after a May 2021 coup and expressed his preference for the Russian-sponsored Wagner Group as a counterterrorism partner.
The latter point highlights the fact that Washington and its allies cannot bifurcate counterterrorism and great power competition. A position that casts counterterrorism and great power competition as an either/or challenge will only undermine the challenge of both. While this discussion is focused on Mali and the Sahel more generally, this dynamic first occurred in Syria since the 2011 uprising and is also playing out in Afghanistan following the U.S. withdrawal in mid-August 2021.
Click here to read the written testimony it in full.
Check out my new ‘Policy Note’ with Sarah Cahn for the Washington Institute: “Exploiting a ‘Vast Jihad Arena’: The Islamic State Takes Territory in Mali”
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In April, Islamic State fighters in Mali seized villages surrounding the city of Menaka, marking the group’s first territorial conquest since losing its final Syrian foothold in 2019. The human cost of these advances has been steep. By May, at least 150,000 individuals had reportedly been displaced, and civilians have been subjected to targeted killings, kidnappings, and looting. The offensive occurred amid a string of regional of security setbacks: namely, France’s August 2022 military withdrawal (which followed the Malian junta’s expressed preference for Russia’s Wagner Group), the April 2023 dissolution of the UN mission in Mali, and the junta’s decision earlier this month to form a tripartite alliance with Burkina Faso and Niger, thereby undermining the French-led G5 Sahel framework designed to thwart jihadist actors in the region.
In this amply illustrated Policy Note, Aaron Zelin and Sarah Cahn explain that while the United States may have limited room for maneuver in Mali today, it can promote regional stability and U.S. national interests by pursuing further sanctions against local Islamic State officials and exploring constructive arrangements with nearby African states.
Click here to read the paper in full.
New article from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: “Suppressing ISIS, Our Own Responsibility “
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Afghans fought for 20 years against the occupational forces of fifty countries under the leadership of the United States, in such a way that they proved predictions of all the wise people of the world wrong and finally forced all of the occupational forces to flee the country under the leadership of the United States.
In addition, they foiled all the conspiracies of the invaders and international intelligence that they used against Afghans during these twenty years, however, the most dangerous conspiracy, which was the last hope and strength of international intelligence organizations, was under the name of ISIS.
ISIS made unexpected progress in some specific areas of Afghanistan in a short period of time, but the sacrifices of the Mujahideen soon led to their defeat in all the places.
Through the intelligence agencies of that time, ISIS militants were transferred to the cities and facilitated to settle in different places, and some of them were kept in prisons under different pretexts and cases.
After the Islamic Emirate came to power, ISIS carried out attacks in different places of the country,taking advantage of the opportunity and the temporary vacuum, and they targeted all the places that are regarded as soft targets, such as mosques, madrassas, bazaars, monasteries, etc.
But with the sole help of Allah Almighty, the Mujahideen targeted their hideouts and either killed or captured almost all of them.
Recently, some intelligence agencies tried to show that Islamic Emirate had support of some countries in the fight against ISIS or some statements come forward that are meant to applaud the efforts of the Islamic Emirate in fight against ISIS, to frame the defeat of ISIS as a shared and mutual objective between them.
We know what these statements and claims are for. This is a part of their campaign for ISIS and these are the raw materials that ISIS uses to recruit insurgents to their lines and ranks.
But we want to tell them that it’s water under the bridge now and everything is under our own control.
First of all, there is no active movement in the name of ISIS or any other group against the current system, and even if there are any ISIS seditionists, the special forces of the Islamic Emirate will have them by their collars and eliminate them one day.
In this regard, Afghans do not need the support and help from any country or any intelligence agency.
The Islamic Emirate has shown that they don’t need anyone other than Allah and can defeat their enemies with the sole help of Allah, and it has been proven in practice, as Afghans have successfully thwarted every act of sedition with Allah’s assistance.
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New issue of The Islamic State’s newsletter: “al-Nabā’ #409″
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For prior newsletter issues see: #408, #407, #406, #405, #404, #403, #402, #401, #400, #399, #398, #397, #396, #395, #394, #393, #392, #391, #390, #389, #388, #387, #386, #385, #384, #383, #382, #381, #380, #379, #378, #377, #376, #375, #374, #373, #372, #371, #370, #369, #368, #367, #366, #365, #364, #363, #362, #361, #360, #359, #358, #357, #356, #355, #354, #353, #352, #351, #350, #349, #348, #347, #346, #345, #344, #343, #342, #341, #340, #339, #338, #337, #336, #335, #334, #333, #332, #331, #330, #329, #328, #327, #326, #325, #324, #323, #322, #321, #320, #319, #318, #317, #316, #315, #314, #313, #312, #311, #310, #309, #308, #307, #306, #305, #304, #303, #302, #301, #300, #299, #298, #297, #296, #295, #294, #293, #292, #291, #290, #289, #288, #287, #286, #285, #284, #283, #282, #281, #280, #279, #278, #277, #276, #275, #274, #273, #272, #271, #270, #269, #268, #267, #266, #265, #264, #263, #262, #261, #260, #259, #258, #257, #256, #255, #254, #253, #252, #251, #250, #249, #248, #247, #246, #245, #244, #243, #242, #241, #240, #239, #238, #237, #236, #235, #234, #233, #232, #231, #230, #229, #228, #227, #226, #225, #224, #223, #222, #221, #220, #219, #218, #217, #216, #215, #214, #213, #212, #211, #210, #209, #208, #207, #206, #205, #204, #203, #202, #201, #200, #199, #198, #197, #196, #195, #194, #193, #192, #191, #190, #189, #188, #187, #186, #185, #184, #183, #182, #181, #180, #179, #178, #177, #176, #175, #174, #173, #172, #171, #170, #169, #168, #167, #166, #165, #164, #163, #162, #161, #160, #159, #158, #157, #156, #155, #154, #153, #152, #151, #150, #149, #148, #147, #146, #145, #144, #143, #142, #141, #140, #139, #138, #137, #136, #135, #134, #133, #132, #131, #130, #129, #128, #127, #126, #125, #124, #123, #122, #121, #120, #119, #118, #117, #116, #115, #114, #113, #112, #111, #110, #109, #108, #107, #106, #105, #104, #103, #102, #101, #100, #99, #98, #97, #96, #95, #94, #93, #92, #91, #90, #89, #88, #87, #86, #85, #84, #83, #82, #81, #80, #79, #78, #77, #76, #75, #74, #73, #72, #71, #70, #69, #68, #67, #66, #65, #64, #63, #62, #61, #60, #59, #58, #57, #56, #55, #54, #53, #52, #51, #50, #49, #48, #47, #46, #45, #44, #43, #42, #41, #40, #39, #38, #37, #36, #35, #34, #33, #32, #31, #30, #29, #28, #27, #26, #25, #24, #23, #22, #21, #20, #19, #18, #17, #16, #15, #14, #13, #12, #11, #10, #9, #8, #7, #6, #5, #4, #3, #2, and #1.
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Click the following link for a safe PDF copy: The Islamic State — al-Nabā’ Newsletter #409
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Source: RocketChat
To inquire about a translation for this newsletter issue for a fee email: [email protected]
Check out my new article with Devorah Margolin in CTC Sentinel: “The Islamic State’s Shadow Governance in Eastern Syria Since the Fall of Baghuz”
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Abstract: Since losing its last semblance of control in Syria in March 2019, the Islamic State has spent the last four and a half years not only attempting to survive, but also working to create the conditions for returning to territorial control. While it is true that the organization’s insurgency has been degraded in recent years, only focusing on the Islamic State’s attack claims and propaganda misses an important trend happening at the local level: Despite the best efforts of the Global Coalition Against the Islamic State and the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Islamic State has continued attempts to govern as shadow actors in eastern Syria. The Islamic State’s shadow governance efforts can be seen occurring on four main axes: taxes, moral policing, administrative documents, and retaking of territory (albeit for brief periods of time). The Islamic State’s level of governance today is nowhere near where it was when it controlled territory the size of Britain from 2014-2017. Yet, these governance attempts illustrate that the group may be stronger than many assume, while also highlighting that the group’s interest in governing and controlling territory has not waned in recent years.
Click here to read the research in full.